African Culture and Global Politics
Language, Philosophies, and Expressive Culture in Africa and the Diaspora

Edited by
Toyin Falola and Danielle Porter Sanchez
This volume attempts to insert itself within the larger discussion of Africa in the twenty-first century, especially within the realm of world politics. Despite the underwhelming amount of attention given to Africa’s role in international politics in popular news sources, it is evident that Africa has a consistent record of participating in world politics—one that pre-dates colonization and continues today. In continuance of this legacy of active participation in global political exchanges, Africans today can be heard in dialogues that span the world and their roles are impossible to replace by other entities. It is evident that a vastly different Africa exists than ones that bolster images of starvation, corruption, and compliance.

The essays in this volume center on Africa and Africans participating in international political discourses, but with an emphasis on various forms of expression and philosophies, as these factors heavily influence Africa’s role as a participant in global politics. The reader will find a variety of essays that permeate surface discussions of politics and political activism by inserting African culture, rhetoric, philosophies into the larger discussion of international politics and Africa’s role in worldwide political, social, and economic debates.

Toyin Falola is the Jacob and Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair Professor in the Humanities and a Distinguished Teaching Professor at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. He is a Fellow of the Historical Society of Nigeria and a Fellow of the Nigerian Academy of Letters.

Danielle Porter Sanchez is a doctoral candidate in the Department of History at the University of Texas at Austin, USA.
1 Facts, Fiction, and African Creative Imaginations
   Edited by Toyin Falola and Fallou Ngom

2 The Darfur Conflict
   Geography or Institutions?
   Osman Suliman

3 Music, Performance and African Identities
   Edited by Toyin Falola and Tyler Fleming

4 Environment and Economics in Nigeria
   Edited by Toyin Falola and Adam Paddock

5 Close to the Sources
   Essays on Contemporary African Culture, Politics and Academy
   Abebe Zegeye and Maurice Vambe

6 Landscape and Environment in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa
   Edited by Toyin Falola and Emily Brownell

7 Development, Modernism and Modernity in Africa
   Edited by Augustine Agwuele

8 Natural Resources, Conflict, and Sustainable Development
   Lessons from the Niger Delta
   Edited by Okechukwu Ukaga, Ukoha O. Ukiwo and Ibaba Samuel Ibaba

9 Regime Change and Succession Politics in Africa
   Five Decades of Misrule
   Edited by Maurice Nyamanga Amutabi and Shadrack Wanjala Nasong’o

10 The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment in Africa
    Edited by Toyin Falola and Jessica Achberger

11 Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity
    Edited by Toyin Falola and Kwame Essien

12 Securing Africa
    Local Crises and Foreign Interventions
    Edited by Toyin Falola and Charles Thomas

13 African Youth in Contemporary Literature and Popular Culture
    Identity Quest
    Edited by Vivian Yenika-Agbaw and Lindah Mhando

14 Indigenous Discourses on Knowledge and Development in Africa
    Edited by Edward Shizha and Ali A. Abdi
15 African Culture and Global Politics
Language, Philosophies, and Expressive Culture in Africa and the Diaspora
Edited by Toyin Falola and Danielle Porter Sanchez
African Culture and Global Politics
Language, Philosophies, and Expressive Culture in Africa and the Diaspora

Edited by Toyin Falola and Danielle Porter Sanchez
For Professor Emmanuel Mbah for his contributions to African Studies.

—Toyin Falola

For CCS and JDS.

—Danielle Porter Sanchez
# Contents

*List of Figures*  
xiii  
*List of Tables*  
xv  

Introduction: The Intersection of Africanness and World Politics—Considering African and Diasporic Expressive Cultures in Global Politics  
1  
TOYIN FALOLA AND DANIELLE PORTER SANCHEZ  

## PART I  
African Philosophies and Philosophies for Africa  

1  
**Ideologies of Development in French Algeria: Saint-Simonians, Manifest Destiny, and Globalization**  
17  
EMMA DEPUTY  

2  
**Islam and the Politics of Assimilation in French Colonial Algeria**  
37  
DINO PALAJ  

3  
**Theorizing Conflict and Conflict Resolution in an African Philosophical Discourse**  
56  
OLADELE ABIODUN BALOGUN  

4  
**The Emergent Church in Africa and the Phenomenon of Reverse Missions**  
71  
KELVIN ONONGHA  

5  
**Africa’s Unheralded Contributions to World Politics**  
85  
KUNIRUM OSIA
x Contents

6 Failed State or Political Inspiration?  121
KATHLEEN R. SMYTHE

MYRA ANN Houser

PART II
Literature, Language, Rhetoric, and Politics in Africa and the African Diaspora

8 Ensuring that Africa’s Voice is Heard in International Forums in the Future: The Language Issues Involved  165
ANN ALBUYEH

9 Strongmen and Strategists: Perspectivising Models of Conflict Resolution in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart and Anthills of the Savannah  197
ALEXANDER KURE

10 Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the New South Africa  214
MICHAEL SHARP

11 Evangelism as Political Protest in Nineteenth Century African Diaspora: Appraising Julia Foote’s Spiritual Autobiography, A Brand Plucked from the Fire  231
SAMANTHA MANCHESTER EARLEY

PART III
The Politics of Culture in Africa and the African Diaspora

12 The Politics of Gender Roles: A Comparative Analysis of Female Husbands, Male Daughters, and Sworn Virgins among the Igbo of West Africa, the Nandi and Kikuyu of East Africa, and the Gheg of North Albania  253
FIOSA BEGAI MJESHTRI
Contents

13 The African and Afro-Brazilian Family and Kinship in Nineteenth-Century Brazil  
ISABEL CRISTINA FERREIRA DOS REIS  
269

14 A Global Education: Cold War Networks, Imperial Angst, and the Development of Tanzanian Schools, 1960–1970  
TIMOTHY NICHOLSON  
288

15 Race and Social Islands in Kenya’s Urban Social Spaces  
BESI BRILLIAN MUHONJA  
307

16 Zoot Suiters and Sapeurs: The Politics of Dress in the World War II Era  
DANIELLE PORTER SANCHEZ  
324

17 Democratizing Traditional Rulership and the Question of Women Traditional Rulers: A Comparison of Nigeria and South Africa  
F.A. OLASUPO  
350

Editors and Contributors  
371

Index  
377
Figures

8.1 Approximate area of sub-Saharan fragmentation belt; estimated number of languages in five countries. 167
10.1 Reconciliation. 216
10.2 Truth and reconciliation commission. 218
10.3 Van Vuuren, Cronje, Venter, Mentz, and Hechter before the TRC in Pretoria. 221
This page intentionally left blank
Tables

8.1 Nigeria 169
8.2 The Status and Function of Languages in Nigeria 170
8.3 South Africa 172
8.4 Algeria 176
8.5 Tanzania 178
8.6 Botswana 181
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction
The Intersection of Africanity and World Politics—Considering African and Diasporic Expressive Cultures in Global Politics

Toyin Falola and Danielle Porter Sanchez

As we progress into the twenty-first century, a major question among social scientists and scholars revolves around the issue of the role of Africa during this increasingly global age. As markets become more and more international, the spread of technological advancements intertwine previously disparate communities across national, regional, and continental borders. Furthermore, international politics continue to spark conversations that both divide and unite populations throughout the globe despite geographical, racial, national, class, and spatial differences. The Arab Spring heightened understandings of this growing international interconnectedness, especially through protests that individuals were seemingly able to participate in via the click of a mouse on Twitter, Facebook, and the comments sections of a plethora of international media outlets. The reverberations of these posts, tweets, and comments could be seen throughout news publications and programming around the world. According to *Time* magazine, “The Web and social media were key tactical tools . . . But they seemed at the time to be one-offs, not prefaces to an epochal turn of history’s wheel.”¹ Thus, the Internet brought the world together as we watched the Arab Spring unfold on our computer monitors and television sets. The wide-reaching implications of the interconnectedness that characterized the Arab Spring and the other protest movements of 2011 made such an impact on our world that *Time* magazine named “The Protestor” their Person of the Year.²

Thus, in considering the very interconnectedness that defines our current state in the world, it is important to return, once again, to our initial question: What is the role of Africa in this increasingly global age, especially in world politics? Furthermore, where can we find African voices in international dialogues? What is the value of African voices on the global stage?

Africa has long been characterized in a number of unflattering and inaccurate portrayals in a variety of mediums and spaces: in films, we are often exposed to an Africa that is primitive or exotic; news reports portray an Africa that is corrupt, inhumane, or unstable. These characterizations stem from a diverse pool of political, cultural, and social motivations, including the expansion of empire, Cold War-era politics, neo-colonialism, cultural imperialism, ethnocentrism, racism, and much more. Nevertheless, more
than fifty years after independence, one can find such a diverse array of experiences within the African continent that severely challenge unproductive and unattractive portrayals of Africa and its peoples. Yet, these are not necessarily the portrayals that gain attention in popular culture and international discourses on development, modernity, and politics in and outside Africa.

Despite these major issues in the representation of Africa and its peoples, it is not this volume’s purpose to provide an anthology of corrective works on the history of the continent or Africans as a whole. Rather, this volume attempts to insert itself within a much larger discussion of Africa in the twenty-first century, especially within the realm of world politics. Despite the underwhelming amount of attention given to Africa’s role in international politics in popular news sources, it is evident that Africa has a consistent record of participating in world politics—one that pre-dates colonization and continues today. In continuance of this legacy of active participation in global political exchanges, Africans today can be heard in dialogues that span the world and their roles are impossible to replace by other entities. Thus, it is evident that a vastly different Africa exists than interpretations that bolster images of starvation, corruption, and compliance. Therefore, it is clear that there is still much to be said about Africa and African voices inside and outside the continent.

Instead of focusing on the broad topic of Africa’s participation in world politics, the chapters in this volume center on the Africa and Africans participating in international political discourses, with an emphasis on various forms of expression and philosophies, as these factors heavily influence Africa’s role as a participant in global politics. Thus, you will not find chapters that focus solely on Africa’s economics and power relations with China and the like in this volume. This absence does not devalue the importance of works on such matters, however, the reader will find a variety of chapters that permeate surface discussions of politics and political activism by inserting African culture, rhetoric, and philosophies into the larger discussion of international politics and Africa’s role in worldwide political, social, and economic debates.

It goes without saying that there is an immense diversity of experiences and cultures throughout the continent of Africa and the African diaspora. Thus, Africans from various regions of the continent have a long history of expressive culture, through the oral traditions, music, literature, and art that permeate every aspect of daily life. Some of the most notable Africans in the field of expressive culture are Fela Kuti, Wole Soyinka, Cheri Samba, Cesaria Evora, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, and countless others. However, these artists, musicians, and writers and their works cannot be understood outside the context of domestic and international political currents. Global politics, worldwide economic trends, globalization, and neo-imperialism have historically permeated every aspect of human life in Africa. It is evident that Africans are not silent in these international intellectual, political, cultural, and economic exchanges throughout the continent’s history.
It is evident that there are a variety of ways to participate in global political, social, and economic forums on development, humanitarianism, investment, education, and much more. Thus, it is not surprising that Africans and people of African descent outside Africa have found ways to engage in these discussions in a variety of ways, through formal and informal means. While some may participate in international business or political sectors, others have historically found ways to exemplify the human condition in these changing times through expressive culture. Both approaches have their merits and deserve considerable scholarly attention to push understandings of Africa and the diaspora to a heightened level. In the context of this volume, it is clear that it is difficult to extract African expressive culture from world politics because, in many ways, they are intricately bound.

In considering politics and the history of Africa and its peoples, it is necessary to remember something very basic: Africa was not a blank canvas when the Europeans arrived on the continent. Rather, Africans had well-established governments, political systems, traditions, worldviews, philosophies, and cultures. Much to the chagrin of cultural imperialists and ethnocentric observers, many African societies were structured, stable, and provided services to their constituents. Thus, there was a long history of political, social, cultural, and economic development that pre-dated European contact. We can see the continuation of this history within the ways that Africans inside and outside the continent engage in international discourses on modernity, politics, and development. This is especially clear in a number of the chapters in this volume. As a result, it is important to understand how expressive culture infiltrates and informs understandings and engagements in political discourses from an African and diasporic perspective.

Nevertheless, recognizing the vitality of African cultures is also important in this study. It would be naïve and regressive to say that African and diasporic cultures have maintained complete stability over the past several hundred years since European contact. In fact, even before Africa’s contact with the West, cultures evolved and changed due to internal and external stimuli. By falling into the trap of creating an image of an unchanging Africa, we would be committing the same grave errors that continue to lead to the creation of many of the aforementioned stereotypes of the continent and its people. Thus, it is important to note the issues of continuity and change in the African cultures and politics inside and outside the continent. Perhaps best stated by Toyin Falola in *The Power of African Cultures*, “culture evolves, adapting itself to new circumstances and environments. New ideas come from the outside, to replace older ideas or to be blended with existing ones. Culture and society can be fluid, reflecting an ongoing adaptation.” This notion is important because it reflects the fluidity of African cultures and politics throughout the long histories of African peoples. What we must remember is the fact that the various ways that expressive culture manifests itself within discourses of modernity and international politics are not stuck in a rut or stagnant over time.
Rather, culture and expression are the products of larger currents that enter communities, challenge existing structures, and push individuals to (re)conceptualize meanings of identity, politics, modernity, and tradition. Thus, imagining an unchanging Africa that maintains expressive cultural traditions that date back to the pre-colonial period is regressive because it fails to acknowledge centuries of contact between Africa and the rest of the world. By creating such a false construction, one is vastly over-simplifying the complex exchanges that shape African cultures in the past, present, and future.

As Toyin Falola states in *The Power of African Cultures*, “Culture is an agency of power. If poor technology and devastated economies have painted a negative picture of Africa’s powerlessness, one sees something contrary in the cultures where people have shown the capacity to be creative, to be active in seeking alternative solutions to various problems, and to adapt to imported ideas and objects.”

This is a central factor in this volume because these alternatives are often overlooked in the context of international politics; yet, the mere presence of this capacity to be creative in creating alternative solutions presents an important factor that must be discussed in discourses on international politics and development. While these creative interventions may vary from Western-biased understandings of politics and development, this does not remove their importance in the creation of African solutions for African (and sometimes global) problems.

Thus, it is one of the goals of this volume to give attention to these unique interventions as a way of injecting African agency into dialogues that traditionally marginalize those outside the West. As a result, expressive culture is an immensely strong place to begin discussions of these unique interventions because many of these discourses have origins in oral histories, African philosophies, music, art, and others. These cultural productions are not simply created for their own sake; rather, they are part of a much larger discussion of modernity, tradition, and world politics.

Therefore, in examining the interconnected nature of African expressive culture and world politics, this book attempts to emphasize the complexity of the African experience (or African experiences) and the ways in which Africans participated (and continue to participate) in world politics in unlikely spaces, namely through expressive culture. Furthermore, this book also addresses the ways that Africans continue to actively engage in domestic and international policy debates through rhetoric, expression, and a long history of African philosophies that shape both the politics of daily life and international discourses on development and politics. These insertions are immensely important because the continent of Africa is often relegated as a place that must be “saved.” Despite the positive motives or intentions of these regressive campaigns to “save” the continent, it is evident that such thinking is ultimately detrimental because they fail to acknowledge African progress and participation in their own communities and/or affairs. Perhaps it is time that the world examines the fact that Africans have a long
history of agency and political ideas that may inform present and future attempts at attaining stability throughout the continent.

A NOTE ON THE AFRICAN DIASPORA AND EXPRESSIVE CULTURE

As Patrick Manning asserts in *The African Diaspora: A History through Culture*, “The African continent appears not only as ancestral homeland but as a region developing and participating in global processes at every stage. The exploitative actions of slave masters and corporate hierarchies appear as a major force in history, but so do the linkages among black communities.” Thus, in examining expressive culture and its intersection with Africa and global politics, it is immensely important to consider the implications of continuity and change within the African diaspora. The African diaspora has a long history of cultures and customs in flux as a direct result of the encounters and experiences of individuals and groups within and outside the Black Atlantic. As a result of said continuity and change, the African diaspora is an immensely important part of this text. Beyond the scope of continental Africa, this volume attempts to draw in people of African descent throughout the world and the ways in which they use philosophies, religion, connections with the African continent, and expressive culture to bring about change in the larger international political climate in both historical and contemporary contexts. Thus, through chapters on Civil Rights in the United States, the politics of religious expression in North America, the international politics of the development of Tanzanian Schools, daily life among Afro-Brazilians, and others, this volume hopes to draw together the importance of these various methods of expression, philosophies, rhetoric, and expressive culture at large throughout Africa and the diaspora as a way of contextualizing the importance of these contributions to world politics and a growing internationalism.

In line with Manning’s assertion throughout *The African Diaspora*, understandings of culture and politics within the amorphous community of African-descended peoples throughout the world should be taken in context with parallel movements and political impetuses throughout the globe. Only through such an understanding are we able to remove individual forms of political, cultural, and social expressions from abstract occurrences and heighten them into a greater understanding of the interconnected web of experiences that have historically shaped identity formation, political participation, and cultural expression throughout the African diasporic world. Thus, this insertion is immensely important because it places a few seemingly random case studies of historical and cultural linkages that span the globe into the broader context of the African experience (or African experiences) and how they intersect with global politics before, during, and after the twenty-first century. As a result, this volume seeks to bring
together a series of seemingly disparate case studies of Africa and the African diaspora as a way of emphasizing the major issues of continuity and change across African-descended people throughout the world. While there is quite a bit of diversity within the chapters that build this volume, it is evident that there is also some overlap that may help us understand greater issues such as nationalism, identity formation, and Pan-Africanism. This volume makes it clear that there is no single Africa or African diaspora; rather, both of these entities are constructed by the plethora of individuals and groups, including their differences and similarities. As such, we are presented with a body of immensely diverse people and the intricacies that confront such levels of diversity. It is clear that homogeneity across Africa and the diaspora is a misleading concept, especially in relation to expression and culture. Moreover, it is also evident that absolute heterogeneity is also a fallacy, as we can see cultural continuations among a variety of entities within Africa and the diaspora. This is especially evident in the chapters in this volume that focus on tradition and expressive culture in the African diaspora. Rather, it is clear that the issues of homogeneity and heterogeneity are, and will continue to be, much more complex issues with which we must engage on a critical level as scholars and Africanists.

Thus, it is important that we do not over-generalize or romanticize understandings of the African diaspora. It is not the purpose of this chapter to delve into the highly complex and historical debates over the African diaspora; however, it is necessary to devote at least some attention to the concept in an analytical manner. Several social scientists have engaged in debates on the African diaspora in a variety of fields—perhaps most prominently, Mintz and Price, Herskovits, Thornton, and Manning. This book is not an attempt to revolutionize understandings of the African diaspora; rather, it seeks to build off of these debates and offer specific case studies on interconnectivity within the rather amorphous geographical, theoretical, and temporal space known as the African diaspora. Nevertheless, it is evident that the chapters within this volume that focus on diasporic communities, culture, and their intersections with Africa and global politics often center on the theme of continuity and change. It would be naïve to say that cultures simply transported themselves in their entirety across the Atlantic during the era of the slave trade. Rather, as this volume attempts to emphasize, this picture is a bit more nuanced and somewhat less idealized. Yes, some continuities that span centuries and geographic zones are present within the African diaspora; however, we must also consider the vast amounts of change and the external stimuli that affected the building (or re-building) of cultures in the New World when discussing these cultural “survivals.”

Both in continental Africa and the African diaspora, this volume hopes to assert that culture is not a given or constant. Instead, cultures respond to a diverse amount of pressures from both the inside and outside. In the case of the African diaspora in the Atlantic world, the institution of slavery (and
its diverse manifestations throughout the New World) profoundly affected transmissions of African cultures to the Americas (without even taking into account the diversity of enslaved Africans in the Western hemisphere and how their interactions led to the “re-modeling” of African cultures in the New World). In addition, relations between groups and individuals within the diaspora were and are in a constant state of flux. Therefore, the constantly evolving nature of these relationships must also be taken into account in discussions of diasporic cultures. Thus, with all of this in mind, in the greater context of African cultures and survivalisms in the New World, we must also examine the ways in which culture changed and the reasons why various adaptations or co-optations occurred. The chapters within this volume deal with this quandary both directly and indirectly through their case studies, especially those that focus specifically on African cultures in the diaspora. As a result, it is evident that this volume is continuing a long tradition of engaging with the discussion of the meaning of “diaspora” that began several decades ago and still continues on today.

***

This book builds off of the greater issue of the intersection of expressive culture and international politics in Africa and the African diaspora. This is an important issue because conflicts in Africa continue to be a hot topic in international media sources, especially when one considers the immense attention given to the political situation in Sudan, elections and violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, human rights violations in Uganda, and many other examples. However, what tends to be the primary foci of these glimpses into African life is violence, chaos, and corruption. Outside observers are not exposed to the greater complexity of African and diasporic experiences and the ways individuals find ways to express themselves and draw upon a longer history (that often predates colonialism) to understand the world around them and present solutions domestically and internationally.

A key example of these slanted representations of Africa is Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 campaign that launched in March 2012. Within a week of the film’s launch on the Internet, the short documentary had 70 million views. One of the largest issues of this campaign was the utter lack of African voices throughout the course of the short film. Instead, the viewer is subjected to a film that focuses on the American philanthropist’s goal to “raise awareness” of Kony and his crimes against the people of Uganda, specifically youths. This Western-centric approach to a Ugandan problem fails to acknowledge the Ugandans on the ground who are working to create political stability. Additionally, we are forced to ask, what is the meaning and/or significance of “raising awareness” in the West, especially for such a uniquely Ugandan issue? Through the continued efforts of Invisible Children, spectators see a constructed image of an Africa (or Uganda,
more specifically) that cannot create solutions for its own problems. However, the reality is much more complex than this superficial construction, which has unfortunately grown to such a super-inflated level and drawn in a plethora of celebrity activists including George Clooney, Angelina Jolie, Taylor Swift, and Ryan Seacrest. The immense number of issues pertaining to the *Kony 2012* campaign are perhaps best stated by Ugandan journalist, Rosebell Kagumire:

I viewed [*Kony 2012*] this morning and the first five minutes told me this was another effort by a good white American guy trying to save my people. In this story Ugandans are just mere watchers as Kony kills our children. In this story not much can an African do. It is the same old sensationalization of African stories and simplification of our problems to tell the Western world using even his son that they should save Africa. How? By giving us money.

It’s a narrative that many of us of the continent who work in the media always look at in disbelief but such videos are easy to enter the hearts of an ignorant Western audience who do not question the narrative . . .

It is not my intention in this introduction to discuss the complexities of the Invisible Children campaign or the activists’ attempts to “raise awareness.” However, this example does shed light on the detrimental repercussions of biased constructs of Africa, even within programs that seemingly have good intentions. This is not to say that expressive culture, whether through oral histories, African philosophies, art, literature, or music could stand in to “save” Ugandan children forced to fight for Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (or other issues within the African continent). However, what is evident is the need for African solutions to problems both inside and outside Africa (not limited to those created or exhibited through expressive culture). These African insertions are invaluable because they reflect a long history of unique experiences that influence daily life, domestic and international politics, modernity, culture, and identity.

This book attempts to shed light on these domestic and international insertions, in addition to the concrete African philosophies that shape African politics in the past, present, and future. Furthermore, this volume and the chapters within it also delve into the intricacies surrounding expression and domestic and international politics from an African perspective through language issues, globalization, assimilation, and isolationism. These issues are immensely important because they emphasize the fact that there is no single Africa; rather, the African continent is immensely diverse and continues to shift due to internal and external stimuli. Through this discussion of the power of African culture and the insertion of African voices in international and domestic discussions on modernity, development, politics, and stability, we are able to see an immensely vibrant community of individuals,
Introduction

both in Africa and the African diaspora, that have agency and an immense desire for domestic, national, and international progress. Through expressive culture, it is evident that these insertions are immensely valuable and deserve great attention by scholars and Africanists.

As Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, Rothchild, and Stedman state in *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, “[P]olitical occurrences . . . shed light on the persistent search for relevant and effective ways of preserving human dignity and advancing the quest for meaningful development. Political interaction thus highlights the challenge inherent in the African world at the beginning of the twenty-first century: the need to exercise imagination and ingenuity in unraveling priorities and designing options for societies under pressure.”

These authors are correct in their assertion regarding the challenges facing Africans in the twenty-first century. However, I would add that their “persistent search,” “imagination,” and “ingenuity” have implications that extend far beyond the continent of Africa, something that this volume seeks to address. Without a doubt, Africans continue to face pressing domestic, regional, and continental issues. Despite this, it is evident that Afrocentric solutions and responses reverberate (or have the potential to do so) far beyond the continent. As many of the chapters in this volume seek to show, there is a certain power that exists in African cultures that has the potential to open discourses in the international community and challenge Western notions of modern political and economic development. These voices or interventions should not be ignored, especially because of their innovative and imaginative nature. With the current crises facing the world in the twenty-first century, perhaps it is time to look beyond the West.

In the last few decades, there has been a growing interest in the issue of globalization among academics. This is perhaps most evident among the works of scholars like A.G. Hopkins, C.A. Bayly, Amira K. Bennison, Richard Drayton, Tony Ballantyne, T.N. Harper, Hans van de Ven, John Lonsdale, David Reynolds, and many others. In the words of Hopkins, “Our understanding of globalization (a complex concept crudely reduced in sound-bit culture to the status of a slogan) has been distorted by lack of a rigorous historical perspective. There is nowadays a widespread illusion that globalization is simply a Western creation.”

Through his eternal wit and pithy commentary, Hopkins makes it clear that the issue of globalization requires a much greater scholarly discourse than the manner in which it is discussed among individuals that seem to take the slogan at face value.

Much in line with Hopkins’ assertion, this volume seeks to engage in this greater discussion of globalization, especially through its aim to de-center ongoing discussions of Western-based globalization. As stated previously, the chapters in this volume attempt to emphasize the emergence and continuation of African insertions in international dialogues on development and politics occurring throughout the world. As a result, we see a great need to discuss how African expressive cultures infiltrate these discussions and push understandings of development further in the international
Toyin Falola and Danielle Porter Sanchez

community. Such an immense intervention in these dialogues emphasizes the great complexity of Hopkins’ assertion. There is a great deal of the world within Africa, but there is also a large amount of Africa in the world at large. This very notion fits within the growing complexity of globalization: globalization is no longer a discussion of Americanization or the increasing number of Wal-Marts and Britney Spears outside the continental United States. Rather, we see a growing interconnectedness, typified by a certain push and pull of cultures transcending national, regional, continental, and hemispherical boundaries. This very push and pull is indicative of the growing internationalization and globalization of this age.

Furthermore, the issue of globalization does not end with this transcendence of cultures beyond borders. We can also see the implications of globalization within collective groups within national and regional boundaries. Continuity and change is a major factor in the creation and re-creation of African and diasporic cultures, and this is not something that is merely left in the past. It is a process that continues today and is evident in trends in globalization. Just because cultures and commodities are spreading increasingly fast across national borders does not mean that these factors are adopted at face value. Rather, as this volume seeks to address, there is great power in African cultures, philosophies, and expression that challenge blanket understandings of cultural transmission through processes of globalization. Through these chapters, we see a continuation of philosophies and their applications in international politics; the power of Christianity, Islam, and indigenous religions in the past and in this increasingly global age; and in the uses of African cultures in a variety of national, regional, and international issues relation to sovereignty, corruption, development, and stability. These insertions are indicative of major trends in the study of globalization that must be discussed in greater detail. This volume does not intend to be all-inclusive in its discussion of globalization and African cultures; rather, it is an insertion in an immensely relevant discussion of globalization that does not seem to be going away any time soon.

***

It is evident that there are a variety of factors at play in this volume: internationalism, transnationalism, globalization, tradition, modernity, diasporic connections, stigmas, development, nationalism, and identity formation amongst many other major themes. While this book does not attempt to be all-inclusive or offer any sort of complete and definitive answer to any question on any of the aforementioned factors, it is clear that the individual scholars in this volume have much to contribute to ongoing discussions about Africa, the African diaspora, expressive culture, development, and world politics.

This volume is the product of the 2011 Africa Conference at the University of Texas, the theme of which was Africa and World Politics. The
immense diversity within the pages of this volume reflects the plethora of topics addressed during the three-day conference. In addition to presenting their papers on Africa and world politics, the contributors to this volume participated in a dialogue that extended far beyond conference rooms and the time constraints of their respective panels. They actively engaged with other participants during the conference and used the contributions of moderators, other panelists, and spectators to push their works forward in a productive manner. Furthermore, they focused their efforts on an area that is generally under-represented in discussions of world politics: the power of expressive cultures, especially within the context of Africa. The unique focus on expressive culture, philosophies, religion, tradition, modernity, and rhetoric and the ways in which these things intersect with world politics were intriguing to us as editors and we were immediately drawn to the idea of creating a volume that centered on such a complex, yet under-studied theme. In reading these chapters, it is clear that there is no single straightforward way to analyze or conceive of Africa’s intervention in world politics, especially through the lens of expressive culture. As with most discussions on anything of academic merit, the contributors to this volume offer considerably complex interventions into the subject matter. These interventions are important because they emphasize the multi-faceted nature of African and diasporic cultures and offer voices to those that are often ignored or rejected in larger academic and popular discourses, especially those that center on the topic of world politics.

Ultimately, the contributors to this volume—who range from promising young intellectuals to full professors and come from a variety of geographical backgrounds and academic disciplines—grapple with the important issue of what kinship, daily life, language, religion, rhetoric, expression, music, and “traditional” culture mean in the context of international politics. Furthermore, how are Africans (inside and outside the continent) engaging in international political discourses? What does collective identity or kinship mean in the African diaspora? Finally, what roles do African traditional culture and philosophies have in domestic and international politics?

The rationale behind this volume primarily builds off of the importance of African expressive culture in this period of rapid change. To date, there is no single text that offers such a far-reaching analysis of African expressive culture by examining the multi-faceted nature of the topic and drawing in the African diaspora, rhetoric, language, music, art, African philosophies, and religion. Individual books like Sidney Kasfir’s *African Art and the Colonial Encounter: Inventing a Global Commodity*, Janet Berry Hess’ *Art and Architecture in Postcolonial Africa*, Ritchard Tamba M’Bayo’s *Political Culture, Cultural Universals, and the Crisis of Identity in Africa*, Thomas Riccio’s *Performing Africa: Remixing Tradition, Theatre, and Culture*, and Bernard N. Folon’s *Challenge of Culture in Africa: From Restoration to Integration* offer a beginning to this discussion by focusing on expressive culture and its immediate political implications.
However, this volume expands upon this by pushing the discussion toward the African and diasporic expressive culture and its greater interventions in world politics.

While this may seem like an ambitious task for a single volume, all of the contributors truly come together to offer an insightful examination of the intersection of African expressive culture and domestic and international politics through their discussions of global political trends in the past and present and the ways in which religion, music, language, and many other forms of expression both respond to, and offer uniquely African perspectives to, discourses that largely exclude their voices.

Due to the broad scope of this book, we are able to present an interesting body of case studies that span the entire continent and the African diaspora through a range of time periods. As a result, the reader will be able to see the rich history of expressive culture in Africa and the African diaspora that affects every corner of the globe and spans several hundred years. Such a broad approach is important in this context because it emphasizes the continuation of African voices in a greater international dialogue during the past, present, and future. In other words, African (and African diasporic) expressive culture does not exist within a vacuum; rather, it builds off of the experiences and histories of a body of interconnected people, whether through understandings of the nation or homeland, kinship, or recent advancement of technology. As a result, understanding the intersections of expressive culture and global politics must take into account these diasporic connections over a broad time-span.

Ultimately, the purpose of this volume is to provide a greater understanding of some of the unique ways Africans participate in world politics, and, perhaps, the ways that African world-views and philosophies may provide an interesting way of examining international and domestic politics in the past, present, and future. African agency is at the forefront of this text and is a continuous thread throughout each of the contributors’ chapters. It is only through such a reclamation of African voices (especially those that are often heard in unlikely places) that one can understand the complexity of the African and diasporic experience. However, it is important to note that this volume is just a beginning. These are merely case studies or glimpses into a much larger phenomenon that deserves greater, in-depth attention. It is this volume’s goal to expand discussions of uniquely African insertions in global politics and inspire future works.

***

This volume is divided into three parts that center on the topic of the intersection of global politics and expressive culture in Africa and the African diaspora. The volume begins with Part I: African Philosophies and Philosophies for Africa. The chapters within this section primarily focus on culture and philosophy in Africa and the African diaspora and the ways in
which philosophies for and from Africa shaped understandings of politics both inside and outside the African continent. This broad theme envelops a variety of chapters that include discussions of developmental ideologies for French colonialism in northern Africa; issues of assimilation and Islam in the colonization of Algeria; the importance of African philosophies in world politics and how uniquely African ideologies can help us reconsider the meaning of international politics; the political, cultural, and social implications of religious missions emerging from the African continent; the precarious position of Somalia and what can be learned from what has, perhaps, too quickly been labeled a “failed state”; and finally, the parallel evolution of civil rights and anti-apartheid movements in the United States and South Africa.

The second part of the volume focuses on literature, language, rhetoric, and politics in Africa and the African diaspora. Linguistics, rhetoric, and expressive culture are immensely important, especially in world politics. Thus, this section seeks to address Africa’s unique position in both spoken word and written texts, and how these spaces served as forums for upholding African identities and ideologies, especially as Africans were participating in larger exchanges that extended beyond the continent of Africa. Therefore, Part II includes a variety of chapters that center on this topic and expand our understandings of expressive culture and politics through discussions of language issues in international forums, world memory and the role of African literary works, conflict resolution in African literature, and literary works on religion and political protest in the African diaspora. Such a wide array of chapters allows us to conceptualize the importance of rhetoric on both micro and macro levels when considering Africa’s role in international politics in addition to what these literary and rhetorical expressive devices mean for the creation of diasporic communities.

The final section of this volume centers on the broad theme of culture in Africa and the African diaspora and its influences on international politics and understandings of modernity. Perhaps more diverse than the two previous sections, Part III seeks to confront the meanings of culture and modernity through a variety of far-reaching case studies. As a result, we are able to gain a greater understanding of the multiple layers of identity that make up what is essentially Africa and the African diaspora, and furthermore, how these sometimes divergent identities affect individual and group worldviews in addition to interactions on the stage of global politics. Thus, through chapters on the politics of gender roles inside and outside Africa, understandings of kinship in Brazil, transnational activism and political culture in Dar es Salaam, education and development in the context of Cold War Tanzania, the issue of women and traditional rulership, and the politics of dress in the United States and central Africa, we are able to see historical and contemporary debates on expression, culture, and politics that have far-reaching implications inside and outside the African continent.
NOTES


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid., 2.


7. See Mintz and Price, *The Birth of African American Culture*.

8. Ibid.


Part I
African Philosophies and Philosophies for Africa
This page intentionally left blank
INTRODUCTION

The Saint-Simonian movement was one of the most influential societies of the modern world. However, over the past 150 years, the movement has all but disappeared from history books, despite the major accomplishments of the movement’s members, such as the building of the Suez and Panama Canals, the construction of railroads across much of Europe and North Africa, and publishing the journal *Le Globe*, which influenced Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill. The Saint-Simonian movement was one of the earlier Utopian or Socialist movements in Europe and found contemporaries in the Icarians and Fourier’s *Phalanstères*. Modern references to the Saint-Simonian movement are frequently limited to a discussion of its members’ outrageous behavior such as public parades, costumes, utopian philosophy, and the search for Messianic figures in Egypt and Algeria. While many aspects of the Saint-Simonian movement may appear peculiar in many ways, these “outrageous” actions pale in comparison to the movement’s actual accomplishments, the most notable being the construction of the canals at Panama and Suez and the transformation of intercontinental travel in Europe through the construction of railroads.

This chapter discusses the Saint-Simonians’ involvement in Algeria, specifically their plan to build railroads in the territory. Although much of what was written about the Saint-Simonians in the Arab world refers to their activities in Egypt, the movement had a greater influence over the colonization of Algeria. In Algeria, the Saint-Simonians formulated a plan to colonize the land through the deployment of technology. They intended to transform Algeria into a settler colony similar to eighteenth-century colonial America. What makes the Saint-Simonian approach so novel and relevant to the modern world is the way in which they wanted to colonize Algeria. The movement advocated a form of colonization that was not military in nature. According to the Saint-Simonians, colonization could provide more benefits at a lower cost and at a greater detriment to the local population by invading the country through technological means rather than military occupation. In essence, they proposed that constant communication with
the metropole and the ease of travel between the Arab world and Europe would convince European settlers to relocate to Algeria, thus providing a more effective way to colonize the Arab world. Additionally, it would prevent local resistance to colonization since the local population would not realize that they were being colonized during the initial stages of the process. This chapter argues that the Saint-Simonian design for Algeria should be remembered not for its desire to establish a utopian settler community in Algeria, but rather for the novel way in which they sought to colonize Algeria through their own conception of interconnectedness.

HENRI SAINT-SIMON, HIS PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SAINT-SIMONIAN MOVEMENT

Claude Henri de Rouvroy the Comte Saint-Simon, better known as Henri Saint-Simon, was born in 1760 and died in 1825. He was a self-proclaimed descendent of Charlemagne and grew up in an aristocratic household in France where he was educated by a string of private tutors until he entered the military. Saint-Simon lived a full life that was dramatized by serving in the French army during the American Revolutionary War, living through the uncertainty of the French Revolution, traveling abroad, suffering financial problems, being imprisoned, and developing an academic passion for philosophy and natural science. He has also been credited with being the founder of French socialism, the First American (owing to his participation in the American Revolutionary War), one of the founding fathers of sociology, and the inspiration for Goethe’s Faust.

Almost two hundred years after his death, the contribution to society that Saint-Simon made during his lifetime is debatable although his influence on other social theorists is undeniable. Saint-Simon’s writings and the essays that appeared in Le Globe journal influenced everyone from Karl Marx to Emile Durkheim and Auguste Compte to F.A. Hayek. It is clear from his writings that Saint-Simon anticipated being a pivotal figure in history. In anticipation of this, his followers kept meticulous records of their activities and preserved his body as a relic with his skull in a velvet-lined box. Although he has not become the pivotal world figure his followers anticipated, Saint-Simon’s writings are remembered today because of their influence on future generations.

Henri Saint-Simon would have also been surprised to discover who remained dedicated to his teachings after his death. He desperately tried to win over the brightest engineering minds of France to participate in his ideal scientific utopia, but he never anticipated that Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin, a dropout that he met only once, would become the champion of his legacy after his death. During Henri Saint-Simon and Enfantin’s only meeting, Henri Saint-Simon was apparently rather bored and unimpressed with Enfantin. It is rumored that the most memorable part of their meeting
was when Saint-Simon’s dog bit Enfantin. Henri Saint-Simon would have been also surprised to discover that his philosophical writings were all but forgotten posthumously and that his legacy was mainly associated with the movement that Enfantin headed after his death.

One of the greatest critiques of Henri Saint-Simon’s philosophy was that his vision for society was Utopian. Despite the criticism, the Saint-Simonian movement was very influential throughout Europe during its heyday. Its goal was to create a more interconnected world through new technologies in communication and transportation. In this chapter, I argue that the pursuit of these goals should be seen as a nineteenth century attempt to usher in an age of globalization.

Henri Saint-Simon was able to gain such a large following of prominent engineers and scholars by proselytizing at the École Polytechnique. This prestigious school, established under the rule of The Directory, was the premier institution in France for the study of engineering and other related sciences. In the 1830s, France had a shortage of engineers for the many projects that were being developed throughout the country. Consequently, engineers were in high demand and those who had studied at the École Polytechnique received an elevated social status based on their expertise. Many of the students at the university came from wealthy families and this young generation of France’s brightest and most privileged youths formed a cohort.

The unique mix of students comprising the student body was very susceptible to ideas like Saint-Simon’s, which placed engineers in the upper strata of both French economic and intellectual society. Saint-Simon established a residence near the École Polytechnique so that he could attend public lectures and mingle with the students. He frequently entertained students at his home and offered them financial assistance. Saint-Simon used these opportunities to discuss his philosophy with students from the École. His philosophy was attractive to many of the students because it was presented as a renewal of Christianity. In his version, however, “the clergy shall be composed of philosophers and scientists, rather than theologians.” It was these students who became the core of the Saint-Simonian movement after Henri Saint-Simon’s death.

The following section will focus on one of these students in particular, Michel Chevalier. Chevalier was befriended by Henri Saint-Simon during his days at the École Polytechnique and became an influential member of the Saint-Simonian Movement after the death of Saint-Simon. What made Chevalier, a man who never traveled to Algeria, so important in the colonization of that country were his experiences in America. Chevalier was the first to propose replicating American manifest destiny through the building of railroads and telegraphs as the ideal model for the colonization of Algeria. Chevalier was not the only Frenchman who drew upon experiences in America to understand colonial Algeria and Chevalier was often at loggerheads with Alexis de Tocqueville, another advocate for Algerian
colonialism, in determining which aspects of American society would be replicated in Algeria.

AMERICA’S MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE INSPIRATION FOR THE COLONIZATION OF ALGERIA

On January 1, 1834, Michel Chevalier, an influential member of the Saint-Simonian movement, who had studied engineering at the École Polytechnique, wrote the first of a series of letters about his experiences in America. Chevalier’s letters were filled with his observations about the unique infrastructure that had been established in America. He was a student of transportation engineering, specializing in the construction of railroads and canals. The topics that Chevalier discussed in his letters about America were banking, industry, demographics, roads, railroads, and canals. Chevalier also discussed more politically-oriented topics such as democracy, power and liberty, social reform, revolution, and aristocracy. It was not uncommon for French aristocrats to travel to America to study all aspects of American life. Just a couple years before Chevalier went to America, Alexis de Tocqueville traveled there to study its culture and penned what would eventually become his major text, Democracy in America. There are many parallels between de Tocqueville’s and Chevalier’s experiences. Namely, they were both Frenchmen who were in favor of the colonization of Algeria and they drew upon their previous experiences in America to influence the French government’s design for the colony. De Tocqueville even visited Algeria in 1841 with the intent of establishing a residence there. However, Chevalier and de Tocqueville were completely at odds with one another in regard to what aspects of American society were the most important and should be replicated in Algeria. Chevalier did not see the American political system as particularly unique or effective and de Tocqueville believed that railroads and canals were merely luxury goods that only added to society after they had been firmly established.7

While there are many similarities between Chevalier’s experience and that of Alexander de Tocqueville, they were writing from very different perspectives. America was an escape for Chevalier in much the same way that it was for Tocqueville and his law school colleague, Gustave Beaumont, when they traveled to America to avoid service in the new government of the July Monarchy.8 De Tocqueville was looking for an opportunity to write about the democratic future of Europe by examining the workings of democracy in America. Chevalier, on the other hand, had the dream of remaking France and the rest of Europe by promoting railroad construction across continental Europe, and eventually in settler colonies, similar to the railroads that he observed in America. Chevalier left France at the end of 1833 for America, by way of England, after an argument with Enfantin.
Enfantin had recently become a controversial figure in France when a parade that he orchestrated resulted in all of the influential members of the Saint-Simonian movement being put on trial for soliciting for money and for conducting an “affront to public decency.” Chevalier, who had taken part in the parade, was forced to serve six months in prison. After his release in 1833, Chevalier and the Enfantin had an argument which ended their friendship. However, this break was only between Chevalier and Enfantin, Chevalier would continue to be close with many of the core members of the Saint-Simonian movement, especially the Pereires brothers. Chevalier remained committed to the projects that the Saint-Simonians advocated and to the fundamental elements of Saint-Simonian thought, especially those dealing with the interaction between technology, engineering, and society.9

Chevalier’s letters from his year in America give amazing insight into the mindset of the Saint-Simonian movement and their ideas on society and the structural formation of a new society. Although Chevalier rarely mentions Algeria, the Saint-Simonians mention Arabs and the ‘Orient’ frequently in their writings, and Chevalier’s observations about America are very telling of the Saint-Simonian plans for Algeria. Specifically, in relation to the railway system and the city planning of the new communities that would form around railway stations.

Michel Chevalier begins his writings on America by discussing the transfer of people, ideas, religions, and civilizations. According to Chevalier, Europe was a product of old civilizations from Asia and Egypt moving from east to west, and consequently the history of Europe could be found to exist both in Europe and in Egypt.10 For Saint-Simonians, the prize of the East was the Levant (or biblical lands) because the movement was rooted in Christian belief. Winning Egypt was the original goal of the Saint-Simonians; they initially wanted to travel east in the hopes of establishing a new society there. Egypt was ideal, not only for its biblical heritage, but because the Saint-Simonians believed that engineering and transportation would change the world, and the narrow strip of land at Suez was the idea place to build a canal. This canal would allow for greater transportation throughout the world, which would facilitate the exchange of both goods and ideas.

Chevalier justified the return of French Saint-Simonians to the Orient through the Book of Genesis. According to Chevalier, when this “old civilization” was transported from east to west through the Christian tradition until all that remained in the east were the “the sons of Japhet” (the Turks and Mongols), and the “sons of Shem” (the Arabs)—both of whom were devoid of civilization.11 These two warring factions occasionally mingled and fought, due to the warlike and oppressive nature of the sons of Japhet, as stated in Genesis. Consequently, Arabia was in need of Europe to return to the land of the Arabs to free the Arabs from Turkish oppression and be a model of the “old” civilization that the Arabs lost to
Alexis de Tocqueville did not share Chevalier’s view that the Middle East had been devoid of civilization since the rise of Islam. To the contrary, de Tocqueville began to read the Qur’an before his first voyage to Algeria as a way to better understand Algeria’s religious traditions. Alexis de Tocqueville was very critical of Chevalier’s writings on Genesis and responded to them when he wrote,

Those who have been there (Algeria) know that unfortunately Muslim society and Christian society do not have a single tie, that they form two bodies that are juxtaposed but completely separate . . . The fusion of these two populations is a chimera that people dream of only when they have not been to these places.13

However, both Chevalier and de Tocqueville agreed that France should not hesitate to colonize Algeria. Chevalier believed that immediate colonization was imperative for the Mission Civilisatrice to be successful and that it must start by civilizing the Holy Lands that were currently occupied by Arabs and no longer predominantly Christian. All around the world, Chevalier argued, Europe was spreading Christian civilization from North America to South America and neglecting to restore it to the very land from which it originated.14 However, he predicted that French influence of the Mission Civilisatrice would spread across many lands and change the current world order. The conquest of Algiers and the expedition into Egypt were only two examples of the change which was to come, according to Saint-Simonian beliefs.15 Although he was a proponent of the exportation of European culture, Chevalier did not view France as the apex of European civilization; rather he looked toward England because it was a beacon of technological and industrial development.

Chevalier arrived in England in November of 1833 en route to America. Because he was primarily concerned with engineering and technological advancements, Chevalier was smitten with England—particularly the country’s railroad system.16 He viewed England’s technological superiority over France as being directly related to the physical manifestation of religiosity (i.e. the sheer number of churches).17 In his mind, devotion to Christianity and technological advancement were linked. England had more churches than France, and consequently, they had more colonies and greater technology. Algeria had neither churches nor railroads. The Saint-Simonians believed that these two things could be established side by side throughout the land via French colonization. This idea of side-by-side technological advancement and Christian devotion was one of the cornerstones of their plan for Algeria. However this cornerstone was not adopted during the early years of colonization, as shown by de Tocqueville’s comment in 1847 that,

respect for their [Muslim] beliefs were pushed so far that, in certain places we built them mosques before building churches for ourselves;
each year, the French Government provides free transport to Egypt for pilgrims who wish to visit the tomb of the Prophet.\textsuperscript{18}

When Chevalier was writing his notes on America in 1834, it was before the French railroad system was adequately developed, and he was an advocate for the greater development of railroads in France, as well as in her colonies abroad. He viewed the development of English railroads and their replication in America as a model to be followed both domestically in France and abroad in Algeria. In 1833, France had not fully committed to colonization in Algeria, and Chevalier wrote his treatise on America not only to promote the building of railroads in France, but specifically to study how to develop railroads in the colonies. He believed that building railroads in Algeria would convince the French people that Algeria could be a substitute for the lands lost in Louisiana and could be an important source of wealth by allowing for nearby capitalist colonial expansion, which would operate like America’s westward expansion, rather than Britain’s expansion into India. Even de Tocqueville agreed with Chevalier that Algeria could provide agricultural products that France was currently getting from America, such as tobacco.\textsuperscript{19}

Chevalier began his tour of America in New York. Upon arriving, he immediately began writing about the manifest destiny of the American people. He wrote his second letter from America on January 11, 1834, entitled \textit{Democracy-the Bank}. In this letter he stated,

If individuality had not free elbow room here, this people would fall short of its destiny, which is to extend its conquest rapidly over an immense territory, for the good of the whole human race, to substitute, in the shortest time possible, civilization for the solitude of the primitive forests, over a surface ten times greater than all France, of as great average fertility as that country, and capable, therefore, of accommodating 350 million inhabitants.\textsuperscript{20}

What is interesting is that Chevalier never mentions the existence of Native Americans in his early discussions of Manifest Destiny. During his first two months in America he was in the industrialized settler cities of New York and Philadelphia, and during this time he never made any observations that there had once been an indigenous population which with the settlers contended. He discusses Manifest Destiny in his next letter from Philadelphia on January 5, 1834, stating that, “The American people is a young people, which has a mission to perform; nothing less than to redeem the world a world from savage forests panthers and bears.”\textsuperscript{21} Chevalier had not traveled to Algeria at this point, nor had he accompanied Enfantin to Egypt. His observations were intended to be a plan to encourage the French government to colonize Algeria; however, it is clear that these encouragements had no concept of an indigenous population in America or Algeria.
It was almost as if Chevalier believed that auto-genocide would solve the indigenous question for itself. Consequently, using Chevalier’s observations of America as a model for colonization, a reader could assume that France’s greatest threat to expansion in Algeria would be wilderness, rather than the indigenous population.

By the middle of March 1834, Chevalier had seen a great portion of the eastern American seaboard. He had traveled through New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore to arrive in Richmond, Virginia. There Chevalier wrote his fifth letter, entitled Railroads in America. This letter is particularly curious not only because of the relevance of the subject matter to this research, but also because of Chevalier’s diction. It is this particular letter and the introduction to the volume, Society, Manners and Politics in the United States, that had the most references to ancient history. Throughout his discussions of American democracy and banking he used relatively modern language and references to recent events. However, when discussing railroads, Chevalier used metaphors to relate the building of railroads to the beginning of civilization as we know it. Chevalier even related the following anecdote to his readers:

One day Nectanebus, by his advice, proposed to his rival monarchs this difficult problem; How would you build a city in the air? After they had puzzled their brains without success, Nectanebus prepared to give a solution of the question in the presence of the ambassadors of the Asiatic sovereigns solemnly convoked; Aesop put some little boys in baskets, which were carried up to the air by eagles trained for the purpose, and the boys began to cry out to the astonished ambassadors; “Give us stone and mortar, and we will build you a city.” This old story has often occurred in my mind since I have been in the United States, and I have often said to myself, if Aesop’s boys had been Americans, instead of having been subjects of King Nectanebus, they would have demanded materials not for building a city, but for constructing a railroad. 22

Chevalier uses this imagery to compare what was occurring in America to the building of “civilization” that began millennia ago and moved from east to west. In his mind, the experience in America was very similar for America had never known “civilization.” Thus, the building of railroads in America was the same as the building of ancient cities millennia ago. However, in Saint-Simonianism technical advancement in general was considered a higher goal than the mere building of cities, because it was through technology that the world could once again be turned into the Garden of Eden and true Christianity could take root in this new, more perfect society. Technology would allow the French nation to prosper not only in the Algerian colony, but also within its own territory, thus allowing it to rise to a place of prominence in continental Europe, something that politics alone
could not accomplish. According to Chevalier, “We in France are of people
the boldest in theory and speculation, and we have made the world trem-
ble by our political experiments; but during the last twenty years we have
shown ourselves the most timid of nations in respect to physical improve-
ments [railroads and canals].”

On May 28, 1834, Chevalier wrote a letter called The Yankee and the
Virginian, in which he waxes philosophically about the nature of the Euro-
pean settler in the new world. It was Chevalier’s belief that there were three
distinct groups of settlers in the new world: Yankee, New Englander, and
Virginian. According to Chevalier it was the mingling of ideas and marital
relations between these three groups that accounted for the emergence of
the “American” type “are not yet sharply defined, but are daily assuming
more distinctness; this type is characterized by its athletic forms and ambi-
tious pretensions, and seems destined ultimately to become superior to the
others [Yankees, Virginians and New Englanders].” Chevalier discusses
these “types” as if they are different races and classifiable by characteristics
like a taxonomy. He describes the Yankee, for example, as “reserved, cau-
tious, distrustful; he is thoughtful and pensive, but equable; his manners are
without grace.” Chevalier even discusses how the interbreeding between
these “races” can produce the best “result.” “If we wished to form a single
representing the American character of the present moment three-fourths of
the Yankee race, and to mix it with hardly one fourth of the Virginian.”

Although discussing races in this manner was very common in this time
period, what is most interesting about Chevalier’s observations is how he
relates the mingling of different settlers of European decent as having simi-
lar benefits as the miscegenation between the Orient and Europe:

History shows that the progress of humanity has been constantly pro-
moted by the reciprocal action and reaction of two natures, or two
races, sometimes friends, oftener enemies or rivals. The most general
fact in the history of our civilization is the struggle between East and
West, from the expedition of the Argonauts and the war of Troy, to the
battle of Leptano and the siege of Vienna by the Turks.

This is a process that he views as necessary for the creation of any society,
including a new settler society, either in America or Algeria. Chevalier’s
observations of the Yankee and the Virginian show that there is no need for
miscegenation between the European settlers and the indigenous popula-
tion in Algeria, as long as there is some way to distinguish the European
settlers from each other, as it was with the Yankee and the Virginian.

Halfway through his stay in America, Chevalier began to make empirical
links in his letters about the ability to transform Algeria into a colony like
America. The letter that demonstrates the best evidence of this was written
on June 22, 1834, and entitled The Factory Girls of Lowell. Although the
factory girls of Lowell are a major focus of the letter, much of the letter
emphasizes how excess population could be utilized to a great degree in settler colonies as long as there was adequate infrastructure, like railroads.

In 1834 Lowell, Massachusetts, was a small industrial town with a majority female population. Young girls who were without a dowry could come to Lowell, live in a boardinghouse, and work at one of the local factories. The keeper of the boardinghouse would supervise them and act in loco parentis. The girls could earn the money for their own dowries, thus giving themselves an opportunity for a better-matched marriage, or even to make marriage a possibility. One of the things that made this possible in the mind of Chevalier was that Lowell had a railway station and that these girls had the mobility to travel to and from Lowell. When discussing how the railroad was instrumental in the functionality of a city like Lowell, Chevalier remarked, “Is there any thing which gives a higher idea of the power of man, than the steam-engine under the form in which it is applied to produce motion on railroads?”28 The ability for colonies to change the situation of workers so drastically as America had in Lowell was an inspiration to Chevalier and a sign of the potential societal change that was possible in Algeria. Algeria needed a railway system in order to create a city like Lowell and, just as importantly, France needed a railroad connecting Paris to Marseilles, which was the major port from which boats traveling to Algiers departed. Chevalier ends his letter on Lowell with the following passage:

In America as in Europe, competition among the head-workmen tends to reduce their wages; but the tendency is not increased in America, as in Europe, by the competition among the labourers, that is by an excess of hands wanting employ, for the West stands open as a refuge to all who are unemployed. In Europe, a coalition of workmen can only signify one of these two things; raise our wages or we shall die of hunger with our wives and children, which is an absurdity; or raise our wages, if you do not, we shall take up arms, which is a civil war; in Europe, there is no other possible construction to be put upon it. But in America, on the contrary, such a coalition means, raise our wages or we go to the West. Every coalition which does not amount to this in the minds of the associates, is merely the whim of the moment, an affair of little importance. This is the reason why coalitions, which in Europe are often able to shake the firmest fabric, present no real danger to the public peace in this country, where authority is disarmed. This is the reason why European countries, burdened with an excess of population, need for their safety and welfare a West, into which each may overflow after its own manner. This also is the reason why France is right in keeping Algiers.29

This passage supports the claim that much of his time in America was dedicated to learning how to establish a functioning settler colony. Chevalier wrestled with questions like “how many settlers were needed to make a
town viable,” and “what kind of infrastructure was needed to attract settlers.” America was clearly the goal and the similarities between the Algerian settler cities to their American counterparts were clear to Alexis de Tocqueville, who remarked on his 1841 trip to the Algerian city of Philippeville that “The town looks American. Two years ago, a single shack. Now 5,000 souls.”

Chevalier’s writing about his experience in America is a clear indication the Saint-Simonians were proponents of colonization of Algeria. They had high hopes for the colony and they believed that Algeria could bring all the benefits to France that westward expansion and manifest destiny brought to America. This transformation of Algeria needed to be accomplished in two stages in order to create a viable colony in Algeria. The first of these was the development of a domestic railroad system crisscrossing France, which would allow settlers to migrate to Algeria with greater ease. Second, a railroad infrastructure would also make it possible to travel from Paris to Algiers in just a few days, allowing the government in Paris faster access to Algiers than Washington, D.C. had to California (which, even if a Washington-California railroad line existed, would have taken approximately one week).

Only after France had built the infrastructure to move her excess population to Algeria could the establishment of a railway in Algeria be feasible. Seven years after Michel Chevalier returned to France, the French government passed a piece of legislation that became the backbone of the French railway system, by providing for the construction of many new lines. By the end of 1850, most of the Paris-Marseilles line had been completed. The railway systems, and Saint-Simonian thought, were both given new prestige and respect beginning with the rule of Napoleon III in 1852. When Napoleon III took the throne, a proposal was written by John Wright that urged him to undertake the second half of this project: to build a railroad in Algeria as well.

SELLING NAPOLEON III A RAILROAD: A PLAN FOR THE COLONIZATION OF ALGERIA

In 1852, John Wright, a former director of the London South Western Railway (L&SWR), wrote a “plan for the colonization and industrial development of Algeria” dedicated to His Highness the Prince President of France. This plan is the substantive break where the plans for Algeria transition from being a plan to colonize Algeria through the use of trains, steamboats, and modern transportation, to a plan to colonize all of the Middle East through an early inception of globalization, without the local population even realizing that they were being co-opted into the system. According to Wright, his plan would initiate a “project so vast in its future consequences to French Africa, and which, if successful, cannot fail rapidly
to assimilate the French African Empire to France, and realize your Highness’s magnificent and truly Catholic conception of raising the labouring poor to a dignified position.”

John Wright had previously worked on connecting the London South Western line to the London-Paris railroad line, which was the way he became acquainted with officials in the French government. In connecting the L&SWR to the London-Paris line, Wright had been instrumental in establishing “the first cordial union between French and English capitalists and engineers, in the construction of French railways.” It was in his capacity as an engineer in which he wrote the “plan” for implementing colonialism in Algeria. Although Wright was not a member of the Saint-Simonian movement, in the same way as Michel Chevalier, it is clear by his use of language that his writings reflect the philosophical theories of Henri Saint-Simon and Jeremy Bentham. His profession as a prominent engineer in France working on railroad construction suggests that he, like the students at the École Polytechnique, would have found the philosophy relevant, if not enormously influential.

The French view of how to colonize Algeria wavered between the establishment of settler colonies like America or the establishment of military dominance and the ability to collect taxes like the Dutch Congo. John Wright’s plan would allow for colonization through the establishment of settler colonies. According to Wright,

enormous fortunes have been made by railway contractors from the labour of the poor, I was naturally inclined to think the latter had not received their due share of benefits, but for this grievance I saw no remedy in old countries; for the principle I advocated could only be applied where inhabitants were wanted, and the land in the gift of the Crown, which is precisely the case with Algeria.

In short, poor peasants would want to settle in Algeria if there was work available in railroad construction, and they would want to stay because of the conveniences of the infrastructure that railroads built. The idea of successfully colonizing Algeria through the transfer of the indigent population of France to Algeria, with the promise that the peasants of France could be gainfully employed, had been a dream of those who promoted the French colonization of Algeria for many years. Michel Chevalier wrote about Algeria being an avenue for the gainful employment of the excess French population when he discussed Lowell, Massachusetts, in his letters from North America.

In 1846, at the age of sixty, John Wright visited Algeria. Upon arriving, he “knew” that Algeria was an ideal place to build European settlements. He originally believed the Irish would benefit the most from settling in Algeria, because 1846 was the first year of the Irish potato famine and many Irish were fleeing from Ireland to America. Although when Wright
wrote his proposal in 1852 he had abandoned his plan for transporting the Irish to Algeria, he was still firmly resolved in the belief that Algeria “wanted nothing but railways, and an increase in inhabitants, to be at once assimilated to beautiful France.”

In 1852, Wright submitted a plan entitled *Project for Constructing Railways in Algeria, and Making their Advance Subservient to Universal Colonization, and Extension of Christianity and Commerce*. The plan begins by discussing the logistics of building a railway in Algeria, such as the amount of interest needed to finance the railway, the types and number engineers that would be needed and the risk of the investment. It then moves on to point out that Algeria “may now be reached by steam in less than forty hours from its ports in the Mediterranean,” which was a goal of the Saint-Simonians when they first began to support colonization in Algeria. The idea was that if Algiers was more accessible to Paris than California was to the District of Columbia, then colonization in Algeria could easily be administered from Paris. However, Wright proposes that for France to truly gain all the benefits of Manifest Destiny, first a railway needed to be constructed in Algeria to entice a settler population to move there:

> It is well known that a greater extension of railway communication exists in the United States of America than in any other region of the world; although the sagacious and enterprising inhabitants have rarely given the Federal States guarantees for a minimum rate of dividend. The reason is obvious—in this vast continent, railways were mainly directed to penetrate new countries, under all the uncertainty of how soon either the extract of produce or the increase of inhabitants could make them profitable; so as a substitute for a guarantee of a minimum rate of interest to insure adequate capital, they gave large grants of land on each side of railways; naturally calculating that railways, as they progressed, would give an enormous increase of value to the land, and that concessions which conferred large land grants could not fail to occasion new towns and cities to rise up in a country of such natural fertility. Thus railways would prove an inducement to construct new towns and cities, instead (as has happened in Europe) of two great cities occasioning the construction of a railroad between them.

According to Wright, this system to grant tracts of land along the railroad line not only provided for the financing and the colonizing of Algeria but its Christianizing as well.

Wright’s plan accommodated building a railway through Algeria, and contained solutions for most of France’s social ills, beginning with how to best support the military and what to do with overcrowded prisons. According to his plan, the first railway in Algeria should be constructed at the “eastern side of the city of Algiers” and continue on to the military base at Blida. This way, the initial track could benefit the French army’s
attempt at pacifying the Algerians and build the first track in a region that had been secured militarily. During the building of the initial stages of the railroad, would be hard to convince peasants of the existence of jobs in Algeria working on the railroad lines. Hence, according to Wright, the French government should initially use convicts to build the railways:

As the necessity of making Algeria a penal colony has unfortunately proved the only alternative to prevent bloodshed, and the worst of evils in France, instead of driving these unfortunates to the last stages of despair, whom circumstances have forced into exile; it is proposed not only to employ them in constructing the railways, but also, if after a states period, to be fixed by the Government, every convict who has worked diligently, and submitted to the regulations of the society, to be rewarded with a grant of land, and a cottage ready for the occupation of himself, wife, and family (if so blessed), and if not, as an inducement to marry, and to be allowed to work as a free labourer on the line, when permitted by Government to do so.41

This plan would provide labor to build the railroads and would also supply Algeria with its first permanent settlers. The provision of land, a cottage, and a chance at honest employment would have been a very powerful incentive for a majority of French convicts to stay in Algeria after their sentences had been served. It would have also given the French government the ability to force the undesirable part of the population to immigrate to Algeria by arresting them. The use of convict labor would also give France the opportunity to revive the Christian faith among the convicts before attempting the conversion of the indigenous people.42 Convicts would need to first be restored to Christendom by working alongside religious freemen on the railroad lines:

On Sundays (when all labour would cease) both convicts and freemen would meet in a common place of worship, and no doubt often hear repeated how our common Redeemer, even while in the act of his last sufferings, promised an eternal inheritance in his heavenly kingdom to a penitent culprit, and thus best contrast the preferable policy of holding out the certain reward of a few acres of land to these unfortunates, when contrite and reformed; instead of shunning them as hopeless outcasts, not worth attempting to reclaim.43

Following this conversion of convicts, a second conversion of the indigenous people to Christianity “may fairly be counted upon, by being thrown in daily contact with zealous and religious ecclesiastics.”44 Wright envisioned that there would be plenty of zealous and religious ecclesiastics for the Algerians to be in contact with, because in Algeria, “the wants of the Roman Catholic, the national religion of France, will naturally be first
attended to,” which would ensure that there were always Catholics willing to live in Algeria.45

Wright also viewed the railway as a solution for religious dissidence in Europe. According to Wright, there should be religious freedom in Algeria, but Catholicism would be the officially recognized religion of the colony. As a Catholic colony, Algeria would be able to:

Draw the poor and unprotected Catholics of overpeopled Europe into a country holding out so many advantages of fertility and proximity as Algeria, should not be overlooked. Such an asylum is now rendered particularly necessary, when it is well known that Catholicity would have been persecuted and expelled, from Switzerland, Italy and many parts of Germany, but for the timely assistance of the Prince President and the Emperor of Austria.46

By claiming another area of the world for Catholicism, and by providing a refuge for Catholics facing persecution in Europe, the railway would guarantee that there were enough settlers to colonize Algeria. Unlike the convicts being transferred to Algeria to build the railway, these settlers would be able to patronize the railway once it was constructed. If these settlers were poor when they moved to Algeria, they would have been given a plot of land, clothing, wages, and other provisions if they obligated themselves to work on constructing the railway for a period of one year; after that they would be free to choose another profession such as farming.47 Additionally, France would be justified to import settlers from continental Europe because:

The freehold of the whole of the magnificent Empire of Algeria, as successor to the rights of the Sultan, is entirely his own to give; while that portion along which the contemplated railways are proposed to pass, would never be missed by the natives, who all prefer a pastoral life; and were the event otherwise, they would possess the common advantage held out to all settlers who promoted the colonization of Algeria in connection with the advancement of railways.48

Wright believed that once Algeria became a French colony, and Catholicism took root in the land, then North Africa would once again “resume that zeal and fervour for which North Africa was so celebrated in the early ages of the Christian Church.”49 Subsequently, Wright also believed that once North Africa had successfully “resumed that zeal,” Catholicism would yet again become the dominant Christian sect in Europe.50 Only after Catholicism had vanquished the other sects of Christianity in Europe would France be able to successfully undertake “the conversion of the Mahometans to Christianity.”51

Wright contended that the construction of a railroad in Algeria could solve the social ills of overcrowded prisons, religious dissidence throughout
continental Europe, and also provide a home to Catholics minorities living in Protestant lands. Additionally, he stated that if a railroad was not constructed then the settler population would be cursed to suffer many of the same fates as the local people when engaging in commerce:

Railways would be particularly advantageous in Algeria, where few roads exist, and if they did the great heat at certain periods renders transit by horses next to impossible while the sun is above the horizon. This naturally compels all heavy road work to be performed at night, under the comparative insecurity of, or else accomplished on the backs of mules or camels. No doubt these difficulties of communication have driven the natives to be mere herdsmen.52

However, if a railway were built, then the settlers would not have to face the same difficulties that forced the natives into a nomadic lifestyle. Their society would prosper, and Algeria would be able to harvest “countless mineral productions as well as grain, oil, silk, fruits, wool, and tobacco . . . Timber of the largest dimensions, as well as cork trees.”53 Additionally, to diversify the industry in Algeria, viticulture could be introduced. Wright acknowledged that there were no facilities for producing wine during his initial visit to the region because of the “Mahomedan religion,” but that “the northern part of Algiers stands in precisely the same latitude as Madeira,” a region known for producing quality wines in France.54 At this point, everything in France could be replicated in Algeria. Algeria would be French in language, cuisine, moral, religion, and basically every other way. The idea that all of this would have been possible through the advancement of technology, communication infrastructure (i.e., the telegraph wire that would be constructed alongside the railway and in conjunction to it), and railways is in agreement with the Saint-Simonian doctrine that Michel Chevalier espoused when he studied the railways in America. Chevalier’s comparisons between America and the potential for French colonization in Algeria had a similar tone: that a railroad was all that was needed to create a utopian society in Algeria. Wright’s plan was very similar to Saint-Simonian doctrine because his plan included a belief that Algeria should become a Catholic colony that would restore North Africa to her former Christian glory.

The final advantage for building a railroad in Algeria that Wright presented to Napoleon III was the ability to unite Algeria to the Holy Land of Judea via railroads. By using technology and communication as a way to invade the Holy Land, the French could conduct a crusade to bring the Holy Land under French control without resorting to bloodshed. By bringing the technological benefits of railroads and telegraph lines rather than swords, one would have the native population awaiting his arrival with open arms, thus enabling Europe to have control of Jerusalem. Before connecting Algeria to Jerusalem, he argued, first there must be railroad lines stretching across North Africa, with major railway stations in Tunis,
Tripoli, Alexandria, Suez, and then Jerusalem. The benefit of constructing railways as a way of conducting a crusade was that they could be built by the indigent French in search of work in return for land along the railroad line, which they could later settle and farm, thus making railroad building cheaper and more effective than a traditional crusade. The embodiment of the crusade would be the reclaiming of Jerusalem for Christians and Jews:

The Railways went forth in the annexed map, if once commenced in Algeria cannot fail rapidly to extend through the entire of North Africa, and ultimately, as predicted, from one of the many avenues that are to lead both Jews and Christians into that promised land where all are to be united under one fold and one Shepherd.

However, if they had been completed during Napoleon III’s tenure as Emperor then “he could not fail to unite Europe, Asia and Africa in one common line of railway communication.” Wright contends that “a glance at the annexed map should convince all that such results are merely natural consequences.” Modern technology and communication could transform all societies lacking these conveniences into the colonies that had them. Wright claimed that by bringing European technology to Africa, Africa could be transformed into Europe:

Is the experiment not worth a trial? If railways connected all parts of Algeria together, combined with electric telegraphs, the system would be proved, it would represent one grand fortress; the inhabitants of the towns created along the line would become the safest of national guards, and France would be relieved from its present outlay of sustaining its present large military establishment, and with every prospect of once more becoming a model Christian country to the whole eastern world.

Algeria would be the first. After “less than half a century Africa and Asia could not then fail to be united together in one continuous succession of railway communication, till it reached the land of the Assyrians on the banks of the Euphrates.” Once this experiment had proved successful, colonization would be transformed. As long as Europe and the West were exporting technology, then culture would follow until eventually North Africa and the Holy Land were “European” or “Western” in nature.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARAB WORLD TODAY**

What is important about the Saint-Simonians is that they provide a blueprint for the original conception of colonization in an age of modern industrialized globalization. The Saint-Simonian vision of globalization
differed from the exchange of people and ideas that had been taking place between Europe and North Africa for centuries through trade, pilgrimages, and military expeditions. Their concept of colonization was built on the advancement of technology, which would provide for an interconnected world based on infrastructure for travel and communication, rather than for merchants or military. The Saint-Simonians were the forerunners of the globalized world. They dreamed of an interconnected world through modern technologies, where travel between continents could be accomplished in a matter of days, and where communication via telegraph could move at an even greater pace. The Saint-Simonian vision of globalization differs from our modern idealized vision of an interconnected world. The vision of the Saint-Simonians was not one of cultures interacting, but rather one of cultural domination and colonization through functions that merely appeared apolitical. Saint-Simonians believed that the concept of colonization was misunderstood, and should not be narrowly construed to only include military colonization. Technology provided the perfect platform for invasion and colonization without the cost of conflict. In 1852, most of the Arab world had not yet been colonized and globalization was still a dream, although a more realistic one because the dreamers had important government positions and the education needed to build their dream. There already existed a plan of how to dominate the entire region through technology. It would appear that globalization through technological development was actually a large part of the plan for colonizing the Arab world as early as 1852, and that colonization should not be narrowly construed to only include military occupation.

NOTES

4. Ibid., 47–49.
5. Ibid., 48.
11. Ibid., 10–11.
12. Ibid., 13.
15. Ibid., 17.
17. Ibid., 36.
18. Ibid., 51.
21. Ibid., 68.
22. Ibid., 82.
23. Ibid., 87.
24. Ibid., 114.
25. Ibid., 115.
26. Ibid., 119.
27. Ibid., 121.
28. Ibid., 134.
29. Ibid., 144.
32. Ibid., iii.
33. Ibid., ii.
34. Ibid., iii.
37. Ibid., 2.
38. Ibid., 2–3.
39. Ibid., 3.
40. Ibid., 4.
41. Ibid., 6; emphasis in original.
42. Ibid., 7–8.
43. Ibid., 7–8.
44. Ibid., 8.
45. Ibid., 10.
46. Ibid., 10.
47. Ibid., 11.
48. Ibid., 15.
49. Ibid., 10.
50. Ibid., 10.
51. Ibid., 10.
52. Ibid., 12.
53. Ibid., 13.
54. Ibid., 14.
55. Ibid., 16.
56. Ibid., 19.
57. Ibid., 16–17; emphasis in original.
58. Ibid., 17.
59. Ibid., 17.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


INTRODUCTION

Nineteenth-century European powers were very much interested in expanding their respective empires into Africa in order to profit from the vast resources of the continent. National pride was one of the driving forces that led to such expansions. France was no exception to this as national pride, the desire for prominence, and the spread of French culture and civilization, coupled with political unrest in Europe as the driving forces that underpinned France’s interest in Africa. The French viewed imperialism as a way to enhance their already tarnished reputation as a great European power, especially after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. As a result, French imperialism in Africa became a competition with Great Britain for prestige and national pride.¹

The expansion of French influence abroad for prestige was promoted by many prominent figures including Paul Leroy-Beaulieu who asserted during the nineteenth century that, “Colonization is for France a matter of life or death.”² Similar to Leroy-Beaulieu, Abbe Roboisson expressed his support of colonization through articles that elaborated France’s benefits in trade and prestige in world circles. The same holds for General Secretary J. Bebin, of the Valenciennes Society,³ who stated at a conference dedicated to Africa and colonization, “in order to remain a great nation or to become one, a people should colonize.”⁴

Intellectuals hijacked the idea of colonization and began to chart official state policies to promote colonialism through nationalism. They argued that colonization was a necessary tool to convert the inferior states of the colonized to developed and civilized territories. This is very similar to Britain’s stance through their concept of the “White Man’s Burden” in which they felt it obligatory to bring technology, education, and civilization to people they considered “backward” nations.⁵ What differentiated the French from this concept is they made it an official administrative policy, calling it mission civilisatrice.⁶ For French colonialists and intellectuals, assimilation was deemed an essential method of bridging the cultural deficiencies that made Africans allegedly inferior.
The French were not the first to use assimilation as an official imperialist policy. The Roman Empire made use of this policy through the Latinization of the regions they conquered. The French policy of assimilation that became widespread in Africa during colonialism initially emerged during the seventeenth century. In its original form under the royal edicts of 1635 and 1642 during the time of Cardinal Richelieu, the chief minister of Louis XIII, assimilation was applied more as a religious doctrine than as a cultural one. As articulated in the edicts, once the people were converted to Catholicism they would become “citizens and natural Frenchmen.”

Use of assimilation in French colonial policy progressed during the years of the French Revolution. Article VI of the French Constitution of 1795 noted that: “the colonies are an integral part of the Republic and are subject to the same constitutional law.” Essentially what this meant was the colony was not considered a separate country but an expansion of France; whatever laws applied to France also applied to the colony. Napoleon Bonaparte rejected the policy of assimilation and French colonies reverted to being managed and administered by separate laws. However, in 1848, Charles X reintroduced assimilation as a colonial doctrine and it was during this period that Social Darwinism and evolution played a leading role in the application of assimilation in French colonies. The French thought themselves as an educated and intellectually advanced society that had an obligation to dominate, enlighten, and bring civilization to the “lesser” and inferior peoples of the world.

Their attempt to implement such policies ran contrary to the aspirations and ways of life of the people of Algeria and those elsewhere within the French empire in Africa. This chapter seeks to show that the French policy of assimilation was not only a detriment to the way of life for the Muslims of Algeria; it also created a second class status for Algerians in their own country leading to the war of independence. Thus, this chapter will discuss how the policy of assimilation was used in Algeria and the conflicts it created with the major tenets of Islam. The chapter will conclude by briefly addressing how French colonial assimilationist policies created conflicts in Algeria that plagued the nation after independence.

**French Colonization of Algeria**

In the course of the nineteenth century many European powers began to venture into Africa in search of resources. Dating back to the Austrian Succession War of 1741–1748 and through the Napoleonic Wars of 1802–1815, European powers, specifically the British and French, constantly and successively competed for overseas conquests. This competition would eventually drive the French into Africa. In instituting colonialism in Africa, the
French believed it would bring back the prestige and power that they had lost to Great Britain during decades of war. In 1830 Algeria became one of the first “casualties” of France’s drive to colonize in Africa. The French invasion in 1830 was due to an apparent insult to a French consul when he was struck with a fly whisk in 1827 by the Dey of Algiers. The Dey was not satisfied with the responses given to his inquiries on money owed by the French government to Algerian Jewish traders. The actions by the Dey should not have been any cause for concern, certainly not to a level that would lead to invading and occupying a country. France, which believed it was far more intellectually and culturally superior than other countries, should have had a better political approach to the situation. However, the French were intent on gaining prestige through colonization. Due to Algerian resistance, it would take twenty-seven years for the French to completely occupy the territory.

The reaction to the Dey was a backdrop to France’s main goal of occupying land so that French citizens could emigrate, settle, and establish French culture and laws outside the metropole. The French believed their civilization was the most preeminent and felt it was their duty to extend this to the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria, even though the people in this region were not inclined to accept their alleged sincerities. The French colonial presence introduced the policy of assimilation to instill French culture and laws in Algeria. They took the following five steps to assure assimilation would be executed successfully. First, the Decree of June 22, 1834, stated that Algeria was currently being controlled by France. Following this, the Decree of March 4, 1848, asserted that Algeria was an essential and fundamental polity of France. Similarly, the senaunts-consultes of July 4, 1865, proclaimed all Algerian Muslims French nationals. Shortly after this, the decree of October 24, 1870, organized Algeria into three French departments. Finally the decree of March 28, 1871, appointed a governor-general to take orders from the French Ministry of Interior. These decrees set in motion the concept of assimilation that sought to transform Algerians into civilized Frenchmen. Through their assimilation policies, the French created French schools, instituted French law, and established French political and administrative institutions. Over time assimilation fostered racist policies toward Muslims, setting in motion the rise of Algerian nationalism aimed at ending French domination and colonialism. Instead of succumbing to French colonial policies, Algerians decided to fight French colonial rule to regain their freedoms and land.

After the establishment of French colonial rule, an increasingly large number of French citizens began migrating to Algeria to benefit from the fertile stretch of land near the Mediterranean Sea. The French government made sure these Frenchmen acquired the best land in three ways: public confiscation, the institution of private property, and what was called “cantonnement,” which inherently set limits on land owned by tribes. The Algerian people did not fully grasp the idea of Western private property...
because land was traditionally communal and owned by families and tribes. Therefore, Algerian resistance developed against this new concept of French land occupation. In order to quell Algerian anger, the French manufactured reports to show that a majority of the farms were still owned by Muslims, which of course was not accurate. Examining it from the perspective of size, Europeans held 268 acres compared to only 11.4 for Muslims in Algeria. This was an attempt by the French government to calm the fears of Algerians who increasingly saw the decrease in ownership of the most fertile land.

Furthermore, in order to earn a living, Algerians were supposed to work on French controlled farms producing goods that did not directly benefit them. Jacques Gjoutor, who has researched Algerian resistance under the French colonial system, believes this led to many hardships for Algerian families. The farming industry was a major and crucial part of life for Algerians, and the lands they lost led to many families not having enough land to grow crops to provide for their families on a daily basis. What made farm life even more difficult, as Gjoutor discusses in his work, was the fact that the French were unwilling to provide the Algerians with any technological assistance that would have helped them to increase farm production. Pierre Bourdieu, in his work on Algerian history, concurs with this notion, as the French only provided European settler lands with irrigation systems, and monetary and technological reinforcement. Tony Smith argues in his work, The French Stake in Algeria: 1945–1962, that Algerian Muslim communities were poverty stricken due to an economic system that aided mainly European settlers. This is problematic because it left Algerians with no other options to provide for their families other than working on the European settler lands and aiding in the ever increasing wine growing industry from which they received no benefit. This directly led to poverty, which increased anger and generated a greater urge for resistance against French colonial rule.

The economics of assimilation meant that all economic and financial decisions were made by the French for their own benefit. French merchandise and goods were transported in duty-free and public infrastructures that were administered by French corporations. By 1900, it became apparent to the French that colonial economic expansion did not make a profit for France itself but mostly for independent businesses. This also held true with other European powers, but they continued to colonize, attempting to benefit economically for the state, unlike the French who, as a state policy, colonized for national prestige. France’s main competitor for national recognition was the British, but the French also feared the drive by Belgium into the Congo and Italy in Tunisia, which increased France’s desire to expand into Africa. According to Henri Brunschwig, “The real cause of French colonial expansion was the spread of nationalist fever.” Stephen H. Roberts agreed, stating, “What Algeria meant to the mass of French statesmen was a perpetual war with Abd-el-Kader for an ultimate victory
which would aid nothing except French prestige.” Thus, it is evident that the main goal for the French was to increase their national prominence rather than gain economically from colonization.

The goal of assimilation in Algeria was to extend French culture and inculcate the idea of being French. When we examine the technology and education provided by the French, we see no intention or interest in assisting Muslims, who were kept out of industrial and commercial enterprises. The French sincerely believed that Muslims were inferior to the civilized Frenchmen. In 1962, French historian Robert Aron argued that Muslims were intellectually unable to demonstrate, elucidate, and establish rational arguments, and were more so inclined to be driven by their emotions. France and other European powers were, in a nutshell, convinced that Africans had no civilization, history, or culture before their arrival.

Muslims were not provided educational opportunities because the French were not willing to establish schools as they believed the majority of Muslim Algerians were inferior and were more suited for working laborious jobs. As it will be discussed later, the French only began to provide some sense of education to a greater percentage of Algerians when they felt they were losing their grip on the colony and to quell any thoughts of a revolution. It is surprising and unconventional that a concept that advocates people living like the French offered no assistance for Algerians to attain that goal. Even though a majority of Algerians were not inclined to send their children to French schools because they felt they would eventually lose their culture and Islamic identity, the opportunity was not there, as schools were built in primarily European occupied areas. Thus, only 33,000 Muslim children were enrolled in schools in 1907, and forty-seven years later, in 1954, the majority of Muslim children were still not provided with any formal education, as less than 15 percent of Algerian youths were enrolled in school.

In contrasting French education policies in Algeria to those of other French-controlled regions in Africa, such as Senegal, it is evident that there is a great disparity. In contrast to Algeria, the French built schools in Senegal to instruct Senegalese youths on the basics of French language and culture. Therefore, Muslims in Algeria were essentially in a difficult situation, as they were led to believe in equality as long as they adopted French culture and language, but at the same time were treated as substandard people regardless of assimilating. Basil Davidson’s book, *The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*, depicts the concept of assimilation in Africa very pointedly. Davidson states, “to become civilized Africans they must cease to be Africans, but in order to ensure that this should duly and completely happen, they should never be allowed to become Europeans.” Algerians were encouraged to adopt the French customs and language, discarding their own traditions and culture, but even so Algerians would never acquire the same rights as the French. Edit ok? The French commitment to assimilation only served as an obstacle in the
fundamental civil rights of Muslims.\textsuperscript{45} Due to these policies and the ever-increasing population of French settlers, Algeria became more of a military occupation rather than a French controlled colony that sought to implement a policy of racial uplift through assimilation.

**ISLAM VERSUS ASSIMILATION IN ALGERIA**

Despite a small Jewish population, the majority of Algerians were Muslim when the French arrived in Algeria in 1830. Throughout the French occupation, the majority of Algerians continued to practice Islam, with a steady increase in the non-Muslim population due to the arrival of European immigrants. The French had decided earlier on that citizenship would be granted to all who lived in Algeria including Muslims, upon their acceptance of the French civil code.\textsuperscript{46} This was the crux of the problem for Algerian Muslims, because it meant that they would have to give up the laws of the Qur’an, which were believed to have come directly from God, and replace them with man-made laws. The conflict between Islam and French assimilation would play a major role in the fight for independence. Nationalists used the Qur’an and Islam to unite the Algerian people against French occupation, encouraging them to unite and fight against the disbelieving French occupiers.\textsuperscript{47}

Within the principles of Islam, the Qur’an is believed to be the word of God and the laws within it are implemented throughout many Islamic countries. The form of government is basically the same as in many Western countries, with the exception that Islam is the main focus of the laws and setup of the institutions. There is one primary leader called the Caliph and a council of religious scholars, known as *shura* in Arabic, that help the Caliph make decisions based on the Qur’an and the Prophetic *Sunnah*.\textsuperscript{48} The basics of this principle of governance were still intact before the French colonized Algeria. Thus, the focus in this part of the chapter is how assimilation attacked Muslims and the practice of Islam. This section will examine the issues of marriage, language, culture, women, the wine growing industry, and taxation in colonial Algeria.

**Marriage**

Marriage was a major institution that introduced conflict between the French and Algerian Muslims. According to the Qur’an, a male has the right to marry up to four women.\textsuperscript{49} This was a long standing practice within all Islamic countries. Amongst Arabs, the practice dates back to pre-Islamic times in which there was no limit to the number of wives that a man could attain.\textsuperscript{50} Once Islam arrived, it stipulated a maximum of four wives at one time.\textsuperscript{51} Under the French civil code, however, French citizens were not allowed to have more than one wife.\textsuperscript{52} In Algeria, if you did not
become a French citizen you were considered a subject of the French government and would not be able to receive any benefits. Muslim Algerians who at the time already had more than one wife either had to divorce the others or remain French subjects. From the period of 1899 to 1909 there were only 551 applications for citizenship by Muslims; that number would decrease to 359 between 1919 and 1924.\(^{53}\) It is evident that the majority of Muslims preferred to keep their faith and remain subjects rather than assimilate to French law and customs that affected marriage and other traditional institutions.

**Language**

Arabic is the language of the Qur’an and Islamic scholars encourage all Muslims to learn the language to be able to read the Qur’an in its original form. Some scholars believe that it should be mandatory for all Muslims to learn Arabic in order to precisely understand what they are reading. In Algeria, the goal of the French was for the people of Algeria to learn the French language rather than Arabic, as French was allegedly superior. It is worth noting that Islam does not deter its followers from learning other languages. The problem was in not allowing Arabic to be the prominent language of the country and to discontinue its teaching in schools, as France aimed to do in Algeria. Before French occupation, Arabic was the dominant language in Algeria.\(^{54}\) In line with the concept of assimilation, the French attempted to impose the French language on Algerians while decreasing the role Arabic played in their daily lives.

Their first mission was to build schools to educate Algerians on French history, culture, and language. Naturally, the language spoken in these schools was French. For the most part, schools were predominately erected in mainly European areas; schools were rarely built in Muslim villages.\(^{55}\) Algerian families that possessed some wealth and status sent their children to schools in European areas.\(^{56}\) The majority of Algerians, however, were uneducated and the French did not show much interest in providing them with schools; this was a far cry from the concept of assimilation that purported to raise the people as Frenchmen.\(^{57}\) The greater part of Algerian Muslims had no access to any form of education.\(^{58}\) This did not mean Muslims were not required to learn the French language; the French took other steps in spreading their language. The establishment of the Association for French Cultural Development in Africa (ARFA) was created in order to develop ideas and programs to culturally assimilate Algerians, as well as to teach them the French language.\(^{59}\)

The *Ulama* Association of Algeria, also known as the Association of Reformist *Ulama*, established by Cheikh Abdel-Hamid Ben Badis in 1931, attempted to counter the unequal balance of education in Algeria.\(^{60}\) The *Ulama* Association of Algeria provided Algerians with weekly and monthly articles educating the people on the history of Algeria and the teachings
of Islam that had been lost over time. One of the goals of this organization was to bring religion back into the school system, because the French had established a practice of keeping religion separate. This was in no way a political organization attempting to gain power and clout over the French controlled government of Algeria; rather, their goal was to educate the masses who were left out by the government. Ben Badis was very clear in his objective to avoid any political conflicts with the French government and aimed only to establish the urgency of the Algerian youth to get an education and understand the Qur’an by studying Arabic. This could be seen through their slogan, “Islam is my religion; Arabic is my language; Algeria is my fatherland.” Despite the positive approach of the Ulama Association of Algeria, the French felt they were slowly losing a grip on assimilating Algerians, while also controlling the colony, with the rise of the revolution in 1954. The French colonial government would take two steps of action. The first was to track and intimidate Ulama leaders as an attempt to thwart their efforts. Secondly, the French took seemingly necessary approaches to counter the rise of education the Ulama provided by introducing Arabic and Islamic programs within the public school system. The objectives of these reforms to the school systems were not to cultivate and allow the country to prosper, but to bring about order and peace and quell any thoughts of a revolution.

Culture

One of the main aspects of French assimilation in Algeria was the promotion of French culture. The French used a variety of methods to accomplish this throughout their tenure in Algeria. The school system was integral in the French process of assimilation through the teaching of French culture. The French instituted a curriculum in schools that included texts that displayed how to be French through dress, eating habits, and hygiene; this aimed to bolster the idea of the heightened state of French civilization. At the same time, school texts depicted Muslims working laboriously in the fields while the French served as doctors, teachers, and intellectuals. It is evident that this was a way to downgrade Muslims in comparison to the advanced nature of the French way of life.

Another way in which the French promoted its culture was through celebrations and holidays. Over time, Muslim holidays such as Eid Al-Fitr and Eid Al-Adha were not recognized by the French administration as national and state holidays. The French would attempt to replace them with holidays such as the Centennial, which took place in 1930 and was dedicated to France’s position and omnipresence in Algeria over the past hundred years. Through this celebration, which was declared a state holiday, the French sought to inject French culture onto the people of Algeria. Gustave Mercier, the spokesperson of the event, declared “that this grand celebration be the occasion to better know and love France for Algerian
generations, so that France may allow them to imbibe her ideas, her traditions, her history, her art.”73 Through the school system and state sponsored celebrations, the French were propagandized as a superior and intellectual culture and civilization.

**Islamic Women**

The French also used their school system to specifically target Algerian females in an attempt to indoctrinate the future mothers of Algeria with French culture. The French felt that in doing this these future mothers could potentially pass French culture along to their children. According to Jonathan K. Gosnell, during his research of French colonial administrative reports, the French targeted girls in the school system because “they would eventually become mothers and could supposedly counterbalance the impact of Islam by passing French cultural norms on to their children.”74

In traditional Islamic culture, women are highly regarded as one of the keys to the future of the Muslim community. They are the first teachers of their children; the great scholars of Islam in the past have always had a mother who shaped them and left a great impact on who they would become in the future. The French strived to destroy the Muslim community by attacking it from within, targeting women at a very early age via the school system. Through these actions by the French colonial administration there is a sense that they felt the best way to deter the people from learning Islam was to influence the women. In turn, this would impede any efforts for Algerian resistance, because the offspring would eventually have no ill feelings toward the colonizers. The children would consider themselves French and have no reason to form a resistance. Thus, the French decided to use women to conquer Muslim men. This aligns with Frantz Fanon’s assertion of the colonial administration’s objective: “If we want to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its capacity for resistance, we must first of all conquer the women.”75 Their goal was to remove women from their critical role in building the Islamic community, and use them to shape French society. According to Fanon, the French believed that “converting the woman, winning her over to the foreign values, wrenching her free from her status, was at the same time achieving a real power over the man and attaining a practical, effective means of destructuring Algerian culture.”76

Similarly, the French targeted Muslim women through the hijab, the traditional Islamic head covering. The French stance on the hijab continues to affect Muslim women in France today. Men and women in Islam are required to cover their body accordingly; for women, everything but the face and hands must be covered;77 men are required to cover their bodies from the knees to the navel. The French strived to convince women to remove their hijabs and veils.78 They did this by displaying advertisements of women in Western dress to convince Muslim women of French modernity. Another way the French attempted to remove the hijab was through
food aid. Each time the French handed out semolina they would encourage the removal of the *hijab* and display their animosity toward the garments.⁷⁹ This is a perfect example of how the French attempted to attack Algerian culture and traditions by going after an integral part of Islamic family life: women. The French policy toward *hijab* eventually backfired and it became one of the principal causes of the resistance against French colonial authority.⁸⁰ It would seem the French did not learn from this failure because, as of 2011, French Muslim women are still experiencing this attack on their religious garb with laws prohibiting the wearing of *hijab* in public places.

### Wine Growing Industry and Taxation

As stated previously, French and European settlers were able to occupy and own the best available land in Algeria, and they used this land to grow grapes for wine production. This is another example where the French were indirectly attacking Islam, disregarding its followers and their principles regarding alcohol consumption.

When the French took over Algeria, they began to introduce the growing of grapes for the production of wine on fertile land in the territory. By 1935, there were upwards of one million acres of vineyards in Algeria and railroads were built specifically for the wine growing industry.⁸¹ A majority of the workers on these farms were Algerian Muslims. Because their personal land was unproductive, many Algerians were forced to look for jobs in order to provide for their families and the only available jobs were on European settler farms, producing grapes for wine production.

Islam strictly prohibits wine and alcoholic beverages: this includes its growth, consumption, sale, and transportation. These regulations are stipulated not only in the Qur’an, but also in the statements of the prophet Muhammad who “cursed ten people in connection with wine: the wine-presser, the one who has it pressed, the one who drinks it, the one who conveys it, the one to whom it is conveyed, the one who serves it, the one who sells it, the one who benefits from the price paid for it, the one who buys it, and the one for whom it is bought.”⁸² However, French occupation essentially forced Muslims to work on these lands and produce a product that violated their religious beliefs.

Taxes were a major reason that Muslim Algerians continued working on European settler farms. Taxation was a form of oppression against Muslim Algerians because it demanded a large portion of their small earnings to be funneled back through the French colonial government. On the other hand, French settlers were not initially taxed, in an attempt to enable them to build and expand in Algeria. Settlers would eventually pay taxes, but never at the same rate as Algerian Muslims. Thus, Algerians paid the majority of the taxes, but never saw any real political representation or benefits from that taxation.⁸³
RESISTANCE TO FRENCH OCCUPATION

French oppression eventually led to violent and aggressive resistance from Algerian Muslims. This culminated in a drawn out war that involved terrorist acts by both the French and the Algerians. Jacques Gjoutor stated “if anyone converted Algeria’s Moslems into violent nationalists, it was the Europeans and, standing behind them, the French government.”\(^{84}\) We also find this with Swedish news writer Christian Lilliestierna’s experience in Algerian refugee camps.\(^{85}\) She interviewed a boy of seven, who stated how French soldiers killed his parents and sister and forced him to watch.\(^{86}\) One of the boy’s telling statements was, “There is only one thing I want: to be able to cut a French soldier up into small pieces, tiny pieces.”\(^{87}\)

A major reason behind the violent uprising, which sometimes targeted innocent civilians, can be attributed to French colonial state violence. Atrocities committed against the Algerian people during colonial rule radicalized individuals in their quest to regain independence. Through the many years of oppression, political violence, and lack of educational resources, Algerians were left in a desperate situation after witnessing many acts of state violence enacted by the French. Fanon’s *A Dying Colonialism* gives the reader an in-depth view of the resistance, the causes behind the Algerian Revolution, and tactics used. In the text, Fanon discusses the hesitancy of Algerians in conducting terrorism in the early days of the resistance, and how they called off operations due to the fear of killing innocent lives at times.\(^{88}\) It was the leadership of Algerian nationalists who began to apply and promote the same tactics the French used for so many years against the Algerian people. They did this in order to remove the French colonial occupation of Algeria at any cost. Initially, when the National Liberation Front (FLN) was created, not many Algerians sided with it because of the attacks it orchestrated on innocent civilians. However, Algerians began supporting the organization after the French began operations that targeted members of the FLN and showed a disregard for innocent civilians that were not part of the organization.\(^{89}\)

The FLN was founded in 1954 to specifically combat colonialism in Algeria. It united Algerians in waging guerrilla warfare against the French occupation during the course of the conflict. In order for this to work, part of their ideology and media propaganda aimed at instilling Algerians with a purpose in life that centered on the eradication of colonialism around the globe. The FLN provided Algerians with a path to form an identity as being a major force in the greater good of removing the evil practice of colonialism in the world. This is especially evident in Robert B. Revere’s work on the Algerian Revolution; he stated, “Algerians were not said to be fighting for independence for themselves alone but for the general revolutionary movement which would eventually rid the world of colonialism.”\(^{90}\)

To reach ordinary Algerians, the FLN established its own newspaper publication and radio station, *The Voice of Algeria*. Through these
media outlets, they were able to make Algerians part of the revolution that was sweeping the French colony. The French historically used radio as a tool to attempt to control the Algerian people. Radio-Alger was a key example of France’s efforts to keep the people of Algeria ignorant and subdued. According to Frantz Fanon, “Radio-Alger is a confirmation of the settler’s right and strengthens his certainty in the historic continuity of the conquest.”91 Thus, it is not surprising that everyday Algerians shied away from the radio and were skeptical of the messages broadcasted by the French.92

The FLN on the other hand wanted to use radio broadcasting to their advantage. The use of the radio was seen by the FLN as an opportunity to circumvent the French and reach all Algerians. It provided the ability to preach their message and objectives in the struggle against French colonialism. Furthermore, it allowed the FLN to relay messages of battle victories. Thus, the radio spread the FLN message and provided Algerians with a first-hand perspective of the struggle against the French through the voices of fighters that were actively involved in the battle. Through the Voice of Algeria, Frantz Fanon argued, “The Algerian who wanted to live up to the Revolution, had at last the possibility of hearing an official voice, the voice of the combatants, explain the combat to him, tell him the story of the Liberation on the march, and incorporate it into the nation’s new life.”93 The use of the radio by the FLN evolved into a significant factor in the fight for independence that even the French recognized. Fanon stated that French authorities became cognizant of the considerable role the radio represented and began to enact laws to restrict the use of radios, “The sale of radio was now prohibited, except on presentation of a voucher issued by the military, security or police services.”94 Thus, while the French began using the radio for their own propaganda purposes, they now wanted it eliminated to prevent the adverse affects of the FLN in radio broadcasting.

The FLN united three groups that were fighting against the French separately at the time: the El-Moudjahid, who fought according to the Islamic faith; the National Liberation Army, who were guerrilla warriors fighting with no restrictions; and the Mousselbeline, who were poor and had the most knowledge of the land in Algeria.95 The FLN knew that uniting the three groups would strengthen resistance by uniting Algerians under one banner. Thus, this banner was united under the concept propagated by the FLN as the emancipation of the Muslim Algerian soul from the brutal persecution inflicted on them by the French colonial system.96

The war of independence from French colonial rule would last eight years, leading to the FLN taking power in Algeria in 1962. Even though the FLN itself was not a religious-based organization, it combined two groups of Muslims: those that fought for the sake of Islam and those that fought for national pride. This unification became the core to victory against French colonial rule; unfortunately, the FLN would soon begin to forget this important fact. In the future, the FLN attempted to single out religious
groups from political representation. This eventually led to a violent civil war that cost Algeria many innocent lives.

CONCLUSION

In Algeria, the people not only lost their land and were treated as second-class citizens, but they were also led to believe that by following French culture, customs, and civil codes, they would eventually earn the rewards of becoming first-class French citizens. For the most part, this would not take place, due to many aspects of assimilation that were in direct conflict and contradiction to the major tenets of Islam. Through civic codes, decrees, and the education system, the French attacked the continued prominence of the Arabic language, the institution of marriage, inheritance, Algerian traditions, dress culture restrictions directly linked to the Qur’an, and regulations dictating the prohibition of alcohol production and consumption in Algeria. Over time, these attacks on the Islamic faith and traditions lead to resistance against French colonial occupation. Even though the French eventually officially left Algeria decades ago, several conflicts from colonialism continue today.

One of the major objectives of this chapter was to analyze how the policy of French assimilation in Algeria created an environment of mistrust between Muslims and the West. The turmoil, oppressive governments, and handpicked dictators that we see today in the Muslim world originates from destructive colonial policies. Muslims have been displayed in the West as uneducated, violent, extreme, and inferior. At the same time, the West has been depicted as an oppressive force attempting to destabilize Muslim countries and control their vast resources. These two propaganda tools have been used by some in order to establish a “Clash of Civilizations.” The true solution lies in allowing nations to establish their own governments according to their principles without intervention that would only benefit foreign nations.

In 1989, Muslim Algerians attempted to establish a government based on Islamic principles through the Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front; FIS). After twenty-eight years of single-party government rule by the FLN, the FIS received the majority of votes from the Algerian people. Even though this was the case, the elections were closed by nationalists in control of the government and members of the FIS were targeted and imprisoned. This led to a violent civil war that lasted ten years and resulted in the breakup and collapse of the FIS. As of 2011, there are three Islamic political parties in Algeria: Peaceful Society Movement; the National Renovation Movement, also known as Islah; and the Nahda Movement. Currently the Islah Movement, headed by President Abdellah Djaballah, has been the most vocal in advocating reforms in Algeria as Djaballah stated in a letter to the President of Algeria, Abdelazizi Bouteflika, “to grant the
people their full liberties, in terms of setting up new political parties and newspaper, as well as empowering the people by their right to free and peaceful ways of expression, as well as the right to free and fair electoral participation, either as candidates or as voters.”¹⁰⁰ Not surprisingly, as a very strong Islamic political movement, the nationalist-operated government of Algeria does not acknowledge *Islah* as a political party.¹⁰¹

One underlying principle that was evident during French occupation and today’s nationalist, Algerian controlled government is Islam. This shared religion continues to greatly influence the direction and desire of the people of Algeria. This has been displayed by the willingness of Algerians to keep their Islamic faith and principles under French occupation, even though it subjected them as second-class citizens. Once again during the first multi-party elections after French colonial rule, the Algerian people elected the FIS, which based its political agenda on Islamic principles, to take control of the government from FLN nationalists. Recently *Islah*, the political party based on Islamic principles, has attempted to advocate a new direction for the Algerian people that falls in line with the “Arab Spring,” which has swept across the Muslim world as the people attempt to end the dictatorship and oppressive rule. It is Islam that continues to unite the Algerian people and play a major role in their daily lives. The reviving of Islam and the education of its core principles will be the driving forces which will bring stability and peace to the region.

NOTES

1. Raymond F. Betts, in his work *Europe Overseas: Phases of Imperialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), examines the competition between Britain and France as he discusses the belief of a “Greater Britain” and a “Plus Grande France.” The work looks to analyze the reasons European powers began their explorations into imperialism and Betts discusses the reasons for their drive into Africa. He discusses the humiliating and exasperating defeat France suffered in the Prussia war as a key driving point to venture into imperialism in order to restore their reputation and standing in Europe as a great power along with Britain. Vincent Confer, in his work *France and Algeria: The Problem of Civil and Political Reform, 1870–1920* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), argues that national pride and prestige coupled with economics as driving forces in France’s drive to imperialism in Africa. Henri Brunschwig, in his work *French Colonialism 1871–1914: Myths and Realities* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), argues that it was not an economic factor in France’s drive into imperialism but national prestige. Stephen H. Roberts, in his work *The History of French Colonial Policy: 1870–1925* (London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD., 1963), discusses the competition France had with the British in expanding the empire in turn gaining national prominence.

2. Betts, *Europe Overseas*, 49. This statement was made during the late nineteenth century, in which European powers looked to expand their empire and increase their wealth. Africa was viewed as the key continent because of the vast resources it held. During this period there were other prominent
Europeans who advocated the drive for colonialism, such as German foreign minister Prince von Bulow who stated “We do not want to put anyone in the shade, but we demand a place for ourselves in the sun.”


8. Ibid., 11.

9. Ibid., 12.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 13.

12. This is exactly how Algeria was viewed, as a broadening of France not necessarily connected by land but considered part of the country as one. This view can be found in Stephen H. Roberts, *History of French Colonial Policy: 1870–1925*, 175.


17. Ibid., 21.

18. Stephen H. Roberts, in his work *The History of French Colonial Policy: 1870–1925*, argues that the Dey’s actions were not a driving factor in France’s drive into Algeria. He discusses the political turmoil at home under Charles X, glorification of the Empire, and an economic factor. Roberts states, “A passing craze for *la gloire* and a permanent economic evil thus led France to Algeria” (177). Kjell H. Halvorsen discusses a few reasons for the invasion of Algeria by France, which had almost nothing to do with the Dey’s actions. According to Halvorsen the French used the raiding of pirates as a pretext, the trans-Saharan trade route and grain production controlled by the Turkish administration. The actions of the Dey were used by the French government in order to rile up French citizens. Halvorsen, “Colonial Transformation of Agrarian Society in Algeria,” *Journal of Peace Research* 15, no. 4 (1978): 323–343.


24. Ibid., 334.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 10.
33. Ibid., 152.
34. Ibid., 82–183.
35. Ibid., 182
42. Heggoy, “Education in French Algeria, ,” 185–186.
44. Davidson, *Black Man’s Burden*, 47.
45. Smith, *French Stake in Algeria*, 89.
48. Generally means way or custom, in Islam it is the teachings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad.
49. Qur’an 4:3.
54. Other languages spoken also included Berber dialects.
55. Tillion, *France and Algeria*, 94
59. Ibid., 31.
60. Heggoy, “Education in French Algeria,” 187–188.
63. Ibid., 188–189.
64. Ibid., 188.
65. Smith, *French Stake in Algeria*, 111. Tony Smith mentions the harassment and monitoring of the *Ulama* association but does not go into detail of the steps taken by the French colonial administration.
66. Heggoy, “Education in French Algeria,” 196
67. Ibid., 197
69. Ibid., 46–58.
70. The holiday ending the month of Ramadan.
71. Day of sacrifice, the holiday ending the pilgrimage.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 49.
76. Ibid., 39.
77. There is an opinion by scholars that the face is also required to be covered under certain circumstances, but there is a tradition that was stated by the Prophet Muhammad when he was asked what should be covered in which he replied the entire body except this, pointing to his hands and face. It has been agreed upon by the majority of scholars that the Qur’an 24:30–31 and 33:59 states that God has ordered women to cover themselves in hijab.
79. Ibid., 38.
80. Ibid., 46–47.
82. This statement has been classified by the scholars of Islam to be correct and authentic. It has been narrated by a companion of Muhammad, Anas ibn Malik, and transmitted through *hadith* scholars Tirmidhi and Ibn Majah. “Alcohol: According to Quran and Sunnah,” Muttaqun OnLine, accessed May 26, 2011, http://muttaqun.com/alcohol.html.
84. Ibid., 25.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., 55–56
91. Fanon, *Dying Colonialism*, 71.
92. Ibid., 71–73
93. Ibid., 85.
94. Ibid., 84.
95. Revere, “Revolutionary Ideology in Algeria,” 482.
96. Ibid.
97. Many of the depictions have to do with actions by certain Muslims and also Western media. The use of terms such as “Muslim extremists,” “Islamic terrorism,” and “Muslim terrorists” give a portrayal, not of the actions of the individual, but a generalization of the religion as fanatical and extremist one. “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other:

98. Ibid.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


INTRODUCTION

Many scholars have written about the incessant problems of violence and turmoil in African states with diverse approaches and recommendations toward mitigating these conflicts. The pervasive and crushing effects, which the problem of conflicts pose on security and development, have equally attracted and engaged the attention of the international community and non-governmental organizations. Previous works on this topic have primarily taken legal, political, economical, and historical approaches. In many of these accounts, the proposed solutions tend to only focus on the need for political restructuring, peace education, economic development, and good governance in order to address the problem of conflict throughout the continent of Africa. These approaches have not sufficiently proved effective in reducing the upsurge of violence and conflicts on the continent, as they are conspicuously missing the possible insights and contributions that African philosophy can make toward conflict resolution in Africa. This chapter makes a case for the necessity to theorize on conflict and conflict resolution in African philosophy. It establishes that there are some ideas, values, and beliefs in traditional African cultural systems that, when systematically and thoroughly applied and promoted in contemporary Africa, can effectively aid conflict resolution in an uniquely African context.

The problems of violent conflicts and instability in Africa have been issues of great concern to its people and the international community over the past several decades. The origins, nature, effects, and rate of conflicts in African states are complex and worrisome to many scholars and Africanists. Conflicts in Africa have taken enormous numbers of lives and millions of people are currently displaced, miserably living as refugees in places outside their native homes. As this ugly inhumane phenomenon continues unabated in contemporary Africa, “it has seriously undermined African’s efforts towards long-term stability, development, prosperity and peace for her people.”1

Toward ensuring social peace and achieving conflict resolution in politically unstable regions of Africa, many scholastic efforts have been made in
the intellectual community to comprehend violence and political instability on the continent and how we can transcend beyond these issues. It is with respect to the intensification of such efforts that some scholars are wont to claim that the main problem of conflict and social insecurity in Africa is not that of a shortage of initiatives and ideas on how to maintain peace and security, but rather the absence of the requisite political will of implementation of a subsisting body of ideas on the part of political leaders in Africa. While I agree to an extent with views such as this, it is the strong conviction of this chapter that even at the theoretical level, there are still some issues that must be addressed. It is on this basis that I raise some fundamental questions: Is Africa the most conflict ridden and warring region on the planet (as reported by the Project Ploughshares Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies)? What are the causes of conflict in Africa? What are the existing approaches to conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace in Africa? What are the limitations and challenges besetting such approaches? To what extent is Africa making progress in conflict resolution? What are the inputs of the United Nations, African Union, and other regional bodies toward conflict resolution in Africa? Can there be a violence and conflict-free culture in Africa? What role has the intellectual field of African philosophy had on the mitigation of conflicts in Africa?

While an exhaustive answer cannot be provided for each of the above fundamental questions, at least, in an work of this nature, it is the focus of this chapter to explore the relevance of African philosophy toward conflict resolution in Africa. This chapter is an attempt to theorize on African philosophy in conflict and conflict resolution in the African context. Additionally, it establishes the indispensable roles of African philosophy and African philosophers in conflict resolution in twenty-first century Africa. On this note, the discussion proceeds synoptically, from a note on the idea of African philosophy.

THE IDEA OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

Like the question of what is philosophy, the question of the meaning and nature of African philosophy has been equally controversial since its inception in the written form. It is not the purpose of this chapter to undertake an elaborate discussion on the plethora of conceptions on the meanings and history of African philosophy, nor to revisit the various arguments on its existence or otherwise. In discussing the idea of African philosophy, my intention is to state succinctly, its essential nature, tools, and meaning in twenty-first century conflict resolution in Africa. In this regard, some important definitions of African philosophy shall be given. Gene Blocker is right when he notes that “we cannot resolve the problem of defining African philosophy, until we first of all settle the meaning of ‘African’ and then the word, ‘philosophy.’”
The term “African” is a racial geographical entity—Africa is a continent inhabited by a people of particular race, which are Black, White, Arabian, etc., but definitely with similar cultures, customs, and a common history of colonial experiences. Given this, it therefore becomes difficult to talk of a singular African philosophy because of Africa’s diverse races, cultural traditions, languages, and systems of beliefs, but easier to talk about African philosophies. In spite of the diversities of African cultures, there are some overlying common traits that transcend geographical or linguistic boundaries. Just as there are such continental philosophies like in the European and Chinese philosophy canon, there is also a philosophy particular to the African continent. Such philosophy, whether by an indigenous or non-African, can be categorized as African philosophy inasmuch as its content is in harmony and congruence with the African experience and spirit. It is a distinct philosophy dealing with the various issues in metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, logical, and cultural considerations within the African experiential interstice. It is on this note that Eneh Joseph correctly defines African philosophy as:

A critical reflection, analysis and synthesis of African cultural beliefs in reality. It is more centered on the religiosity of the people. African philosophy is homocentric, in the sense that it is man-centered. It is humanistic, dynamic, concretes and not abstract and static as the Western philosophy.

While it is true that African philosophy is human centered as argued by Eneh Joseph, such nature of philosophy is not unique to African philosophy as claimed by Joseph; Western philosophy is not as abstract and static as Joseph depicts it.

African philosophy can be seen as a rational and systematic inquiry into the fundamental problems confronting the African world, with a view to understanding and providing plausible solutions to them. As a corollary and secondly, African philosophy can be defined as an analytical, critical, and reconstructive evaluation of both African traditional cultural experiences and modern cultural heritage in the pursuit of useful living for Africans.

The nature of African philosophy consists of clarifying concepts, puzzles, and problems that are embedded in issues of life and rooted in African belief systems. African philosophers expose and explain various beliefs, values, and ideas before they begin to analyze and interpret them in their philosophical investigations. In an attempt to do this, they subject all issues and objects of their investigations to systematic reflections. Consequent upon this is critical evaluation, which reflects the argumentative nature of the discipline. By its very nature, African philosophy thrives on mutual criticism in a culture of rational dialogue. It is in this respect that P.O. Bodunrin rightly notes that “the greatest compliment you can pay a philosopher is to criticize his works.”
African philosophy is an intellectual engagement with the reconstruction of values, beliefs, and social norms supposedly held to be obsolete and absolute. In addition, it compares various world views for the purpose of cross-cultural understandings and perspectives. Given this insight into the idea of African philosophy, Francis Ogunmodede sees African philosophy as the rational, coherent, and critical reflections on the African experience. It is the doctrine of reality that is propounded by an African using an African language. He explains further the word “African” in African philosophy. According to him, the African is the African philosopher or scholar who is knowledgeable in the traditions, customs, and historical experience of the African people. He is indeed an African by birth or by naturalization. He is someone who can meaningfully think and communicate with the people in their own language. More importantly, Ogunmodede notes that the African philosopher should have the interest of the people of Africa as his interest and concern, and should be able to advance their progress and development through his rigorous analysis of events, research, prognostications, and publication.

On the part of J. Mbiti, African philosophy is defined as the “understanding, attitude of mind, logic, perception behind the manner in which African people think act or speak in different situations of life.” Looking at this definition, one will realize that it is too generalized because if it is just an understanding, attitude of mind in which African people think or speak, anything even if it is non-sensical, will go for or as African philosophy. P.O. Bodunrin and P. Hountondji argue that African philosophy is the philosophy done by African philosophers. By implication, this definition means that all the research into Western or other cultural philosophies carried out by Africans pass the gamut of African philosophy. This is suspect.

C.S. Momoh holds that African philosophy is the African doctrine on the spiritual, “which is the culture of harnessing the spirit of the whole and the community to enhance and transform the spirit, interests, aspirations and ambitions of the parts and the individual.” This definition is too wide as it admits everything as long as it dwells on spirit as African philosophy. However, Momoh elsewhere amended the definition when he describes African philosophy as “the African doctrine or theories on the universe, the creator, the elements, the institutions, beliefs physical concepts in it.” This definition sounds metaphysical and it ignores other viable areas of philosophical studies, which African philosophy also covers. Oruka also has something to say on the definition of African philosophy. According to him, “African philosophy is the work dealing with a specific African issue, formulated by indigenous African thinkers or by a thinker versed in African cultural and intellectual life.” Here, African philosophy is interpreted to mean the reflection of a scholar (whether African or non-African) on African cultural experience and reality. Omoregbe provides a dual conception of African philosophy. First, he said African philosophy of yesterday was seen as worldviews, wise sayings, proverbs, mythology, etc. Second,
African philosophy of today is a reflective and critical activity. In both cases, “yesterday” and “today,” African philosophy according to Omoregbe is evoked by wonder and concerns about human experience. African philosophy according to K.C. Anyanwu is concerned with the way in which African peoples of the past and the present make sense of their existence, their destiny, and of the world in which they live. With this conception in mind, one can conclude that African philosophy is a cognitive discipline that examines African experiences, that calls into question all the different aspects of African life—religion, politics, social life, morality, economy, technology, and other fundamental issues—by offering new interpretations and synthesis of African experiences. In the light of this conception of African philosophy, I will now examine the issue of what should constitute the tasks of African philosophers in the twenty-first century.

Let us delve into a conceptual analysis of the phenomena of conflict, violence, and social disorder. Such a clarification is necessary first before discussing and situating these issues within the African context.

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

A constant feature of society is violence in its various manifestations. Violence has been observed in different spheres of social action. Thus, it would be inadequate to narrowly view it in terms of physical harm or assault alone, as it equally entails psychic and emotional dimensions, which arguably, could be more destructive than bodily assaults or material destruction. Violence denotes the “international infliction of damage, pain, injury or death by forcible means.” Two points stand out clearly in this conception of violence. The first is the internal or purposive character of violence. The second is that violence entails that there is a violence of some basic ideals or values, as in right to peaceful existence; with the implication that it is wrong to do so.

The phenomenon of violence has a paradoxical character, in that while many people see it as undesirable in itself, they believe that it is desirable as a means of achieving social ends. To scholars like Irving Louis, social progress cannot be recorded without violence. Thus, they conceive of violence as not only inevitable, but also necessary in society. There is a need to separate issues here, as there appears to be confusion between two distinct concepts of conflict and violence.

A.E. Ekanola states, “the notion of conflict connotes struggle, difference and disagreement, while ‘violence’ stands for brutality, aggression, cruelty and fighting. Although it is impossible for people to interact in society without the incidence of conflict, it is possible to handle conflict constructively such that it does not degenerate into violent confrontation.” The implication of this is that conflict may be accommodated in order to bring about positive change in the society. However, Ekanola noted with dismay that
“there are too many cases of conflicts that end up in violence because they are not handled constructively.”

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

It is worrisome that conflicts in Africa have degenerated into a life-threatening culture of violence. The continent in 1998 alone, according to the UN Secretary-General, “had 14 of the 53 countries in armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons.” The consequences of these violent conflicts have taken enormous numbers of lives—from the Biafran war that consumed over a million lives to the Rwandan genocide that liquidated over 800,000 lives in just one hundred days of ethnic rampage. This ugly inhumane phenomenon continues in Africa as some countries are still embroiled in violent armed conflicts. As a matter of fact, over 15 million Africans are currently living as refugees as a result of wars and regional conflicts.

According to a UN Secretary-General Report in 2004, today Africa is afflicted by fewer serious armed conflicts than it was in the past. In his 1998 report, the UN Secretary-General stated that there were fourteen countries in the midst of war and another eleven were suffering from severe political turbulence. However, in his 2004 report, Kofi Annan noted that just a half-dozen African countries were suffering from serious armed conflicts. These conflicts included the states of Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Uganda, and Somalia. It appears as if there is some level of progress in tackling conflicts in Africa. However, such progress is modestly slow, considering there are still daily eruptions of spasmodic conflicts in many African states. These situations perhaps call into question the causes and sources of these conflicts.

The sources and major causes of armed conflicts in Africa include poor, corrupt, and inept leadership; ethnic polarity; religious bigotry; the problems of resource control; socio-economic issues; and artificially established borders by colonial masters through the socio-cultural configuration of African states. All these factors are inter-related. According to Annan, there have been only “modest and slow” advances in alleviating the underlying economic and political conditions that foster tension and strife in Africa. Poverty reduction has been slow, in spite of efforts by African countries and their external partners to implement the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Concerns are rising about high levels of youth unemployment and heightened competition over scarce resources because of demographic pressures. There also has been limited progress in strengthening democracy, enhancing administrative capacity, ensuring independence of the judiciary, and promoting transparency and accountability in African states.

The nexus between all these and emergence of violent conflict is not difficult to see. According to Fawole:
State failure and the total collapse of internal security in many African states after independence were hinged on a number of factors, critical among which were the artificiality and fragility of the post-colonial states that were bequeathed to Africa; the insufficiency of democratic training for the emergent rulers of Africa; the fact that state power was considered as a vital resource to be captured and retained because it guarantees unlimited access to natural resources. . . . Expectedly, groups that felt politically and economically marginalized had no choice than to take up arms to seek redress, leading inexorably to outbreaks of civil wars, intra-state conflicts and violence, state failure and collapse, and their attendant consequences which compromised general peace and security on the continent.31

In addition to the factors identified by Fawole, an essentially hostile ethnic environment has been identified as another factor that has led to a welter of social stresses and considerable disequilibrium in Africa. The presence of competitive regional, ethnic, and intra-ethnic blocs in the African states, have usually culminated in violent conflicts on an escalated scale. Ethnicity, has for instance, been blamed for social discontents, including civil wars in countries like Nigeria, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, and several others. However, this view may not appear totally correct when it is considered that there are some culturally plural societies that do not have a crisis of similar magnitude as those that exist in Africa. Equally, there are some “mono-ethnic” states like Somalia in Africa that are embroiled in violent crises as well.

On the above background, scholars like Chris Uroh argue that ethnic plurality is far from being the cause of violent conflicts in Africa. Rather, Uroh argues, the problem is the failure of the post-colonial state and the problem of regime legitimation that is associated with it.32 Put differently, the African state has failed; it has become “uncaring and most ordinary people experience it as a hostile force.”33 Those who have lost confidence in the state have found succor in their primordial groupings, especially in their ethnic communities. This legitimacy crisis can result in either external or internal violent conflicts. At the external level, a regime may be confronted with such problems as incessant border conflicts, like those that exist between Somalia and Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and Mali and Burkina Faso, in addition to domestic civil strife.34 Internal conflicts come in the form of protests, coups, counter-coups, civil wars, and rebellions, all of which promote political and social instability. Such conflicts have led to the collapse of Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where structures, authority, law, and political order have fallen apart.

It is important to quickly point out that in recent years, the efforts of the UN Security Council, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and that of the African Union in facilitating solutions to the crisis through new peacekeeping missions and signing of peace agreements
in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Burundi, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan’s Darfur region, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are highly commendable. Whereas such efforts have culminated in restoring peace to Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone, in many cases, despite international community interventions, armed conflicts have not ceased fire.

Pertinent among other recommendations and approaches toward conflict resolution and enduring peace are the calls for political restructuring, peace education, and economic development through good governance and leadership in Africa. At the level of the international community, efforts toward conflict resolution have been through brokering peace, promoting peace negotiations and agreement, sending peacekeeping troops to conflict ridden areas, selective sanctions, stopping proliferation of arms, and monitoring and promoting good political, economic, and corporate governance and human rights observance among African states. While all these are necessary, stringent, and commendable efforts toward conflict resolution in Africa, the point is that they are insufficient in effective nurturing and promotion of culture of peace in Africa. This perhaps accounts for why a culture of violence is still at reign in Africa. Given the inhumane effects and consequences violent conflicts have had on long-term stability, prosperity, loss of lives, destruction of values and properties, displacement of people, and other associated problems in Africa, the question is, what can African philosophies do?

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY TOWARD CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Oladipo underscores the relevance of African philosophy to the transformation of African societies. He argues:

The problem surrounding the idea of African philosophy is not that of fashioning an authentic philosophy, which will be true to African cultures and traditions. Nor is it the problem of the division between those who advocate a strong Western orientation in African philosophy and those who take a deviant route. It is not simply a conceptual problem having much to do with the meaning of cross-cultural concepts. Rather, the problem is that of the extent to which African philosophers have been able to put their intellect in the service of the aspirations and struggles of African peoples.35

The point in Oladipo’s argument is that African philosophers have a practical mission in contemporary Africa. This mission is socio-political in character and the task of African philosophers is to be committed to fulfilling their scholarly obligations to their societies. The primary task of African philosophers should be to begin to create a tradition of thinking and discourse whose main focus would be on issues affecting the interest and aspirations of the people.36
In consonance with the above observation of Oladipo, one cannot see African philosophy being a pure abstract discipline with no bearing on the actual living conditions of human beings, rather, it is necessary to view it as a discipline that has a lot to contribute toward conflict resolution in Africa. African Philosophers according to Bertrand Russell, are “both effects and causes: effects of the social circumstances and the politics and social institutions of their time, causes . . . of the beliefs, which mould the politics and institutions of later ages.”

The import of Russell’s claim is that in the process of structuring the scope of tasks for African philosophers in our time, one must not lose sight of the socio-political exigencies of the moment. The dismal condition of social living in Africa, marked by bad governance, poverty, conflict, lack of scientific knowledge, under development, and injustice, are some among other social-political exigencies that should define the task of the philosopher on the continent. This situation offers the philosophers an opportunity to contribute to the process of de-mystifying the forces and institutions that work together to strive for the African promise.

The task of the philosopher in this regard is to theorize on how to reorder political values and institutions for the reconstruction of the present and a design of a new future. Because the theoretical is inevitably the archetype of the practical, there is a need for African philosophers to conceptualize on the ideal system of governance that can meet the yearnings and aspirations of the Africans. Not until the theoretical framework is plausibly strong, can one set out mobilizing strategies to realize them. In order for Africa to launch itself into the path of freedom and development, philosophers must not shirk in theoretical task.

The preponderance of conflicts in its diverse nature on the African socio-political scene poses a great challenge to the African philosopher. It calls into question possible and plausible contributions that African philosophers can make toward conflict resolution and promotion of a culture of peace in Africa. One such way is through theorizing the mechanism of conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa through uniquely African means—attitudes, values, beliefs, social institutions, and structures that enhance peace in its various manifestations and degrees are irresistibly high in the continent. Given this reality, the challenge of African philosophy is how to evolve and nurture a culture of non-violence in Africa through theorizing African politics and conflict resolution. This challenge can be further interpreted as that of rational reflection and articulation on how to develop appropriate criteria for making a distinction between the various interacting cultural elements and values of contemporary African heritage with a view to selecting from them those that are spiritually fulfilling and existentially beneficial to conflict resolution in Africa.

On this note, I shall be arguing in the rest of the chapter that a careful selection of some ideas, values, and beliefs in traditional African cultural system—which, when systematically and thoroughly applied and promoted
in contemporary Africa—can effectively aid conflict resolution. Selected in this regard are such values and beliefs like truth telling, the use of proverbs, living-dead, and communalism. For the purpose of specificity in claims and arguments, the Yoruba experience shall be construed and used as a representative illustration of these beliefs and values in Africa traditional cultural heritage.

The concept of truth is of special interest in African philosophy and a concern of all honest men. A.G.A. Bello, while underscoring the imperative of truth as a philosophical issue, observed that:

A theory of truth is necessary and important. The problem of truth arises precisely because we hold beliefs and make knowledge claims. For theoretical and practical reasons, it is, important that we distinguish between such of our beliefs and knowledge, claims as are true and come of them as are false. We cannot do this unless we know what the truth itself is.39

The word *otito*, according to E.O. Oduwole, stands for truth in the Yoruba language. There are two basic aspects of this word; one is cognitive and the other is moral.40 In its cognitive aspect, truth is a property of statements and propositions. In the moral sense, truth has to do with persons and their character or the motives or intensions behind actions or behavior. *Otito* (truth) in its moral sense is closely associated with character and what is morally good in Yoruba culture. It is regarded as the ultimate good and ultimate moral virtue. In this sense, unlike the cognitive sense, the opposite of truth (*otito*) is lies (*iro*). *Iro*, is further characterized by such words as *eke* (deceit), *odale* (covenant-breaker), and *ika* (wicked person). Regarded as moral virtue, *otito*, for the Yoruba means *ohun-ti-o-to*—(that which is proper) and has synonyms such as *ododo* (honesty), *isedede* (to do what is right or the right thing), *a i seru* (not to be deceitful), and *ohun ti-o-dara*, *eto* (good and right).41

The implication of the above on conflict resolution is that truth, as conceived by the Yoruba, creates life and promotes mutual understanding in society. While truth sheds light on the grievances of disagreeing parties, *iro* (lies) conceals it. Saying the truth and acting truthfully creates new things, situations, and makes things better, but *iro* is destructive and disintegrates conflict parties. Standing by the principle of truth makes confession and acknowledgment of guilt easy. Its absence makes reconciliation impossible; where lies prevail, a conflict becomes more destructive and violent.

One of the major causes of armed conflicts in Africa, as argued previously, is the failure of the state to bring significant improvement in the socio-economic situation or human conditions on the continent. The legacy of politics in many African states has been one of material and moral depression among its citizens and constituencies. The governments of African states have failed in fulfilling the promises laid forth in their mandates, political doctrines,
and constitutional documents. This situation has dire consequences on violent conflicts across the continent. The reversal of this trend requires a new attitude of truth “speaking and doing” toward governance in Africa. The concept of truth becomes more relevant in the processes of peacemaking and peacekeeping missions, which are initiatives of the international community toward responding to conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. In cases where peace agreements are signed by conflicting states or groups, experience has shown that such peace initiatives are hardly adhered to. This is evident in the conflicts in Darfur, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The problem here is fundamentally that of covenant breaking, iro, which the Yoruba frown at as a vice. A promotion of the culture of truth, that is, the cultivation of the attitude of “truth speaking” and “truth doing” will facilitate processes of conflict resolution in Africa.

The use of proverb is another element of African traditional cultural heritage that can be explored in the processes of conflict resolution. Proverbs are the refined wisdom of a given people historically derived over a period of time as a result of observed everyday experiences and interactions involving man, animal, nature, and other socio-natural occurrences. Proverbs, which are normally short and pithy sayings, are popular devices normally used to metaphorically state certain general truths and realities about all aspects of life. To the Yoruba, proverb is translated as owe and is seen as esin oro, oro le sin owo, to’ro ba sonu, owe la fin wa (proverbs are the horses of words, words are proverbs horse. If a word is lost, proverbs are the links to its search).

One important area, in which the philosophical underpinning of proverbs is felt in traditional Yoruba culture, is the aspect of peacemaking and conflict resolution. The prudent uses of proverbs by elders in resolving and consociating disagreeing parties in a conflict have proved effective in disallowing conflicts to degenerate into violence. Through the judicious application of proverbs, the sage or wit promotes a culture of dialogue and reconciles cords of misunderstanding in disputes. While serving as diplomats or mediators, sages in traditional Yoruba culture employ proverbs when encouraging people to develop the habit of tolerating the nuances of other people, especially those within an opposing party. Proverbs among the Yoruba encourage the cultivation of attitudes and institution of non-violent approaches to conflict resolution. Examples of such proverbs are Agbo ejo etikan da, agb osika ni (Claims made by the wicked will not be decided by the wicked) and Bi osika ba rojo, osika konioda (It is the wicked elder that will base his judgment on the statement of only one party). These kinds of proverbs usually guide elders in ensuring that justice and fairness prevail in resolving dispute among various parties.

The belief in the living-dead among the Yoruba is another traditional value that can be revitalized and brought to bear in the effort toward conflict resolution in Africa. The belief in living-dead implies a never-ending process of human and communal relationships, defined primarily in terms of reciprocal obligations and rights. To Africans, becoming a living-dead
(an ancestor) is an ideal that every being must strive for while on earth. Death for the Africans does not end life; it is the inauguration of another life in the form of ancestorhood. Nor does it end the obligations of the living to the living-dead or the privilege that the living enjoy from their ancestors. However, it is recognized by the Yoruba that not everybody is automatically qualified for assuming the status of ancestorhood at death, because the life of the ancestors is pictured as one of dignity and serenity. The belief in living-dead marks the acme of indigenous moral, spiritual, and social uprightness. To be able to qualify as an ancestor, one must have lived an exemplary life of service to humanity and moral dignity. Such a life excludes preponderance to violence, brutality, cruelty, and aggression; all of which are symbolic of violent conflicts in contemporary Africa. The relevant lesson to be learnt from the belief in living dead is that violent confrontations are negative attitudes discouraged by the ancestors and in fact, demerit a person in qualifying and joining the ancestral world at death.

The belief in communalism is one major active way of averting resurgence to violent conflicts and practicing conflict resolution in an African context. The promotion of traditional communal relationships among African states promises to be a viable antidote to ethnic-religious conflicts pervasive in recent times. Modern societies have undergone many transformations such that the traditional relationship between the community and the individual is not as close-knit as it used to be in primitive or communal societies. The implications of this are quite obvious as they relate to the increase in violent conflicts in Africa.

“Given the fact that societies are composed of people of different groups on the basis of ethnicity, social status, gender or religion, people who are conscious of their group differences tend to regard people belonging to other groups as slightly less than human” and opponents against whom they engage in hostile struggle for survival. “This negative attitude towards members of groups different from ours usually produces intolerance, suspicion, fear and prejudice, which quite often degenerate into violent confrontations” as seen in many ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa. Instead of such attitudes of enmity that violence promotes, communalism as explicit in the traditional culture emphasizes common good, solidarity, and social responsibility. The underlying philosophy of communalism—which includes appreciate others, work together with others, dialogue with others, and other communitarian values—are imperative attitudes that must be cultivated and promoted in contemporary Africa if the goals of conflict resolution and averting conflict violence are to be realized.

CONCLUSION

At a time when the phenomenon of violence, conflict, insecurity, and social disorder present itself as an irresistible force and there is an increasing
skepticism about the possibility of squashing or preventing further eruption of the crisis in Africa, as all effort toward conflict resolutions and social stability have proved insufficient and perhaps, impotent, it is necessary that African philosophers resolutely commit themselves to the task and challenges of finding effective solutions. Such a task should consist of promoting African self-understanding; reconstructing the African mind toward positive attitudinal orientation and normative mutual interaction between the governed and government, inter-intra ethnic groups, and among African states; and developing a new African world view that will make peace and social stability its basis.

One of the crucial ways by which African philosophy, and indeed African philosophers, can make their disciple relevant, is by critically and systematically exposing pertinent ideas, values, and beliefs in traditional African cultural systems, which when applied and promoted in contemporary African states, can effectively aid conflict resolution in twenty-first century Africa. This chapter has attempted to display this notion by discussing the philosophical relevance of some selected traditional African cultural values—such as truth, the use of proverbs, the belief in living-dead, and communalism—toward conflict resolution in Africa. While this chapter is regionally limited to a specific area in West Africa, this does not mean that other areas are irrelevant in philosophies of conflict resolution. Rather, it is necessary to continue examining African philosophical cultural precedents that may help aid conflict resolution across the great continent. In doing so, one will be able to transcend regionalisms and address conflict in a uniquely African manner.

The outcome of the investigation is that African philosophy is relevant toward conflict resolution in Africa. The nobility and greatness of the discipline offers new interpretations, new synthesis of experiences, and new plausible solutions to many of the fundamental problems confronting the African world. Given the enormous challenge posed by the threat and consequences of conflict violence in Africa, it is our vivid conviction that the insights from African philosophy, when complemented with other recommendations and perspectives, will sufficiently prove effective in taming the violent conflicts in twenty-first century Africa.

NOTES

3. There is the need to exercise caution in drawing extreme conclusions about conflicts in Africa, it is important to put conflicts in African nations into proper perspective in regional and global terms, rather than sweeping complication of the problem. See *The Armed Conflict Report* produced by Project


6. Ibid.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 3.


24. Ibid.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.


29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 28.
41. Ibid., 14.
The Emergent Church in Africa and the Phenomenon of Reverse Missions

Kelvin Onongha

INTRODUCTION

Since the coming of Christian missionaries from the West to the shores of Africa in the nineteenth century, the religious landscape has witnessed a significant paradigm shift. Although the practice of sending missionaries has not ceased in the present times, the direction they are coming from and going to has radically changed; it is now Africans that are the missionaries to Europe and America. This new trend that has witnessed missionaries, largely from West Africa and mainly from Pentecostal denominations, going into former mission-sending territories is known today as reverse missions. Afe Adogame, a Nigerian professor of religion provides an explanation for this occurrence when he states that,

The rationale for reverse mission is often anchored on claims to divine commission to “spread the gospel”; the perceived secularization of the West; the abysmal fall in church attendance and dwindling membership; desecularization of church buildings; liberalization; and on issues around moral decadence.¹

There are several possible causes for this recent turn of events. Among these are powerful forces of secularism in many Western countries that once were bastions of the great Reformation, and later financed missionary societies, sponsoring and supporting the establishment of mission fields in Africa and Asia. Another factor is the migration of many Blacks from Africa into countries that were alien, whose culture and values were different and where they did not readily blend. Similarly, the expansion of indigenous Pentecostal Churches into Europe and America has been catalyzed by the migration of Africans in the diaspora who desired to continue their religious devotions even though they were in a strange land. Additionally, several of the indigenous Pentecostal Churches, driven by the realization of ambitious prophetic visions, have sponsored pioneering church planters on foreign missions to industrialized countries in order to project their churches as truly possessing an international flavor. The following section
Kelvin Onongha

will examine each of the factors that have contributed to the incidence of reverse missions.

Gailyn Van Rheenen describes secularism as the belief that, “God is either non-existent or irrelevant to affairs of this world.” He goes on further to add that the secularist, one who believes in a closed system, does not accept as true the interference of powers from any spiritual realm. Such a person is absorbed by material, worldly concerns, and would rather seek medicine and therapy for physical illness than rely on the power of prayer.2

In some cities in Europe, cathedrals have become hotels, restaurants, and cinemas. Some churches today, bereft of youth, are becoming the domain of the weak, sick, and dying. Religion, in the West is largely considered a personal issue that is oft the resort of those who are grieving, troubled, or poor.

Educational institutions established by churches, such as Harvard University and Yale, have long ago broken faith with the organizations that gave them birth. Although Harvard University was founded in 1636 primarily for the training of gospel ministers, at the moment, it has been observed that “the study of religion at Harvard is uniquely dysfunctional.”3 The Biblical worldview, which once was the unifying system that dominated the American society, has given way to a philosophical scheme of the “here and now.”4 It has even been cynically suggested that the American motto should no longer be “In God we trust,” but “In God we no longer trust.” Similarly, William Bennett, former Secretary of Education under late President Ronald Reagan, once admitted that America was becoming, “the kind of country we used to send missionaries to.”5 Another American commentator, Brux Austin, stated in an editorial in Texas Business,

We are the truly lost generation huffing and puffing down the fast track to nowhere, always looking to the dollar sign for direction. That’s the only standard we recognize. We have no built-in beliefs, no ethical boundaries. Cheat on your taxes, just don’t get caught. Cheat on your wife, just don’t get AIDS. Simply use a condom. We have been programmed to acquire at the expense of both our personal integrity and our personal fulfillment.6

One expression that has recently been used to describe the religious state of affairs in America is “post-Christian.” In his article in Newsweek captioned, “The End of Christian America,” Jon Meacham observed that the term “post-Christian” means different things in varying contexts to diverse people. However, one explanation he offered for this is that, God “is less of a force in American politics and culture than at any other time in recent memory.”7 Evidently, capitalism, a doctrine promoted by Western nations, has given birth to materialism and its twin sister secularism.

Another factor that has given rise to reverse missions is the migration of Africans seeking a better life to the shores of Europe and America.
According to Roswith Gerloff, mass migration to Europe from the Caribbean began in 1952, while those from Africa started about the 1960s. In many cases the motivation was primarily material, although the huge casualty numbers from World War II also caused immigration restrictions to relax in the West, in order to augment the reduced population at this time. Kalu Ogbu, the late eminent Nigerian scholar, observed that African migration patterns have largely been controlled by European immigration laws, economic forces, and globalization. He further explained that, “Two contradictory forces have shaped European immigration laws: the drop in birth rate and labour needs favour open immigration, while high unemployment and economic changes elicit hostility and closed doors.” The 1980s and 1990s further swelled the tide of immigrants into the West, primarily led by asylum-seekers from countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, and Eritrea.

Migrants to the West firmly carried their religion and worldview along with them. Finding themselves in alien cultures that were not so inviting, they naturally sought churches who understood their peculiarities and an environment that was welcoming. Most often, the only place where they truly found their need for acceptance and belonging satisfied was in the churches established or operated by fellow migrants.

Asamoah-Gyadu distinguishes between churches in the West that are predominantly populated by Africans and those that are founded by Africans, but are not necessarily African in membership. He argues that in the past the migrant churches seemed to only attract Africans, thus the label “African-led” or “African-initiated.” However, recent experiences in churches—such as Matthew Ashimolowo’s Kingsway International Christian Church (KICC), the largest church in the United Kingdom, and Sunday Adelaja’s Embassy of God, in the Ukraine (the largest in the metropolis)—have resulted in a radical paradigm shift. This is especially the case in Sunday Adelaja’s church which is predominantly populated by native Ukrainians. Asamoah-Gyadu observes that Pentecostalism in Africa has attained a transnational significance, and at the center of this endeavor is Nigeria, the most-populous country in Africa.

Besides the fact that the migration of Africans abroad has pressured local congregations to consider opening branches abroad to cater to the spiritual needs of their growing off-shore membership, another factor that has contributed to this occurrence of migrant churches is the desire to be an international congregation. The older mission or mainline churches had always sneeringly referred to indigenous Pentecostal churches as local, one congregation churches, headquartered in one main city. In response, Pentecostal leaders began exploring opportunities to expand beyond the borders, wherever indigenes were found. Indigenous churches introduced the concept of empowered lay leaders, successful in their own rights as professionals or businesspersons, deploying them after commissioning as pastors. This situation was contrary to what occurred in mainline churches, where
ministers underwent specialized training for several years in the seminary before they could qualify to be gospel ministers.

Church planting and church growth seminars became commonplace among these Pentecostals, who saw an opportunity to export their brand of Christianity beyond their local borders. As a result, the largest churches in Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Zimbabwe, and Jamaica were all led by Nigerians. In Europe the experience was similar, with the largest church in UK and the Ukraine headed by Nigerian Pentecostal preachers. In America, the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), whose vast network is reported to extend to over a hundred nations, has recently purchased a 550-acre property in Texas that is its continental headquarters.

The desire to fulfill the great missionary commission of Christ to carry the gospel message to every nation around the world serves as an impetus for many indigenous Pentecostal congregations to make disciples of every nation. In his study on the phenomenal growth of the Embassy of God in Ukraine headed by the Nigerian, Sunday Adelaja, Asamoah-Gyadu reports that Adelaja was impelled by a specific revelation in 1993, in which he was told by God that an end-time group of people would be raised from the former Soviet Union before the coming of Christ; presently, the Embassy of God now has congregations all over Eastern Europe. Two years ago, the RCCG also came up with an ambitious plan, published on its website, to establish a congregation in every country around the world where their church was not yet established within two years. In order to fulfill its ambition of carrying through its mission, RCCG established a school of missions (RECSOM) in 1993 that it claims has trained over two thousand missionaries since its inception.

IS POWER CHANGING HANDS?

Since the missionary movements of the nineteenth century, which brought “Civilization, Commerce, and Christianity” to Africa, Lisa Miller opines that a major shift in the center of gravity, especially in the realm of Christianity, seems to have occurred. This appears to be the case, from the Catholic Church, where the world’s largest seminary is situated in Nigeria, to the Anglican Church, where over 20 million Nigerians account for up to a quarter of the total population of the Anglican Communion; today there are over 360 million Christians in Africa as opposed to just 10 million at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ogbu Kalu, indeed, has stated that reverse mission actually had its roots in the mainline churches. Adogame reiterates the fact that reverse mission does carry “crucial religious, social, political, economic and missiological import for the ‘West’ and the global church, as the non-western world were hitherto at the receiving end of missions till the late twentieth century.” Undoubtedly, this situation has led to a major power shift politically. Evidence of this is seen
in Peter Akinola, the former Archbishop of the Anglican Communion in Nigeria, cited by *Time* as one of the top 100 most influential men in the world. This was due to his stance against the ordination of a gay priest in America, a position that brought an impasse because of the threat made by the Nigerian group to pull out of the world body. Evidently, reverse mission is occurring not only among Pentecostal congregations, but among mainline churches, too. According to Adogame,

> There are growing numbers of African Roman Catholic and Anglican priests in the USA, Ghanaian Methodist priests in England, South African Presbyterians in Scotland. In some cases, African priests are employed in and by host European churches, although they have African congregations as their primary constituency.

Among the African Pentecostal churches in America, the RCCG is the largest, boasting over a hundred parishes across the United States, and at least two in the Chicago area alone. The General Overseer of RCCG, Dr. Enoch Adeboye, was listed by *Newsweek* as one of the top 100 most influential men in the world in its January 5, 2009, edition. In the following section we will examine the Nigerian Pentecostal movement in order to understand the features that have contributed to it becoming such a virulent and aggressive strain.

### Nigerian Pentecostal Movement

One of the earliest forms of Pentecostalism in Nigeria was the group of churches in Yorubaland known as the *Aladura* Churches. They are characterized by their strong belief in the efficacy of prayer. The term *Aladura* means “one who prays” or the “people of prayer.” A significant fact to note is that churches belonging to this category began to emerge during the 1918 influenza epidemic, when Western medicine appeared useless in combating this scourge. Meanwhile, individuals received visions in which they claimed they were instructed to rely entirely on prayer for healing.

Four types of *Aladura* churches are mentioned by Matthew Sadiku in their order of historical evolution. These are the: Apostolic Churches, Cherubim and Seraphim Church, Church of the Lord, and the Celestial Church. Adherents of the *Aladura* were “not fresh converts from paganism, but deserters from the ‘orthodox’ and African churches from which they derived no religious satisfaction or spiritual consolation.”

Among the common beliefs of these *Aladura* churches are the: efficacy of prayer, reality of the spirit world, power of God’s kingdom on earth, ritual of holy water, power of biblical words, extraordinary popularity of the psalms, and power to heal. Directions were usually given on how to use the Psalms, such as rehearsing them three or seven times standing naked in...
the middle of the night or writing them out and keeping them under the
cushion at night in order to achieve a desired end. They, however, rejected
Yoruba traditional religion, as well as native and modern medicine. This
type of Pentecostalism introduced by the Aladura, according to Odugbemi,
did not have a very significant impact until its entry into the institutions
of higher learning in 1970. The Deeper Life Church and the Redeemed
Christian Church of God owed their rapid spread to small interdenomi-
national student fellowships created in the Nigerian universities. Today
there are an estimated 3.9 million followers of the Pentecostal faith in Nige-
ria, making it the third highest ranking in the world.

Characteristic Features of Nigerian Pentecostals

In his discourse on Indigenous Pentecostalism entitled, “African Christiani-
ties: Features, Promises and Problems,” Asonzeh Ukah enumerates a num-ber of features that characterize African Pentecostalism that hold especially
true for the Nigerian strain. These include the unmistakable American
Heritage of the prosperity message due to the powerful influence of Ameri-
can televangelists—Kenneth Hagin, Kenneth Copeland, Fredrick K.C.
Price, and T.D. Jakes. Next is the emphasis on faith healing; some Pente-
costal preachers began specializing in the healing of certain diseases due to
competitiveness. The Laughter Foundation specializes in barrenness; Helen
Ukpabio, a former confessed witch, concentrates on those under witchcraft
possession; Mountain of Fire and Miracles focuses on casting out demons
of all specifications; and T.B. Joshua claims to heal HIV/AIDS. Other fea-
tures are a firm-like structural organization in which churches are run like
commercial enterprises engaged in the production, distribution, and pricing
of religious and non-religious commodities. Ukah also notes the intriguing
role of women as founders or the spouses of founder/owners who become
second in command in the hierarchy of power to their husbands and even
succeed their dead husbands.

Another facet he mentioned was the economic character of the churches,
in which a huge array of videos, magazines, CDs, DVDs, books, pamphlets,
stickers, key holders, and other paraphernalia are marketed all over the
world. Religious advertising and camps are the last two features of these
Pentecostal churches. Billboards and radio and television stations, includ-
ing other electronic and satellite, have been introduced by the Pentecostals
in creating public awareness for their programs. Vast expanses of land have
been bought where regular religious events and services are held.

Although in some circles reverse mission is considered a fad that will
fade with the course of time, there are a few reasons why this phenom-
emon should not be so easily dismissed. Among those elements that have
contributed to its rise and spread are the current wave of interest in the
realms of spiritualism; the vibrancy/dynamism in the African worship cul-
tus; the esoterism introduced into otherwise staid worship patterns; and the
passion and energy displayed and involved in African worship. These will be discussed in the following section.

Around the world there appears to be a growing disaffection against philosophical and ideological systems that have left a state of disenchantment and disillusionment among the masses. Socialism has failed, Marxism is dead, and capitalism is unfulfilling. Furthermore, one finds the great captivation with issues such as magic and the occult that have given rise to the popularity of movies such as *Ghost* and the *Harry Potter* and *Twilight* series. This has been seen as an indication of the spiritual void in Western lives that has led to a quest for the spiritual. African Pentecostalism, steeped in the world of animism provides a platform where these spiritual yearnings can be fulfilled. Contrary to empiricism promoted by the Enlightenment, studies indicate that belief in the existence of the world of the spirits is acceptable today in the West. African Pentecostalism with its holistic worldview therefore provides a meeting point for current Western cosmology.

Another appealing attribute that African Pentecostalism brings to restrained and aloof Western Christian worship is vibrancy and dynamism that is intrinsic to Africans. This is evident in the festivals, celebrations, and worship of Africans. One of the greatest contributions of African Pentecostalism is this fusion of dynamism into church liturgy—the result is an energy-filled, pulsating worship experience. While it may appear that for the moment the Pentecostal Churches in America and the U.K. may only be attracting immigrants, it is becoming clear that for those seeking a more fulfilling worship experience, the African-initiated churches are the places to go; this fact is attested to by the success of Sunday Adelaja’s Embassy of God. Nigerian scholar Jacob Olupona is cited in the *Chicago Tribune* as saying that African Pentecostals are generally characterized by their use of music and dance in the liturgy and the belief that prayer will solve all problems, and their attempts to adapt Christian values to African beliefs and ways of life.32

A third noteworthy strength of African Pentecostalism that contributes to the success of reverse missions in the West is the esoteric nature of the proponents, their liturgy, and methodology. Just as the Athenians in the days of the Apostle Paul gave audience to the “new religion” he advocated, even so is this post-modern world in search of new paradigms, new truths, new sources of power, and new religions. Additionally, because worship in these African churches is anything but lifeless, predictable, or stiff, it has made it possible for seekers tired of a formal religion that appears disconnected from the everyday realities of modern living to find rest from their spiritual quests and a haven of sorts. In addition, the charisma the preachers exude, which gives them a commanding following, lends to the attraction that this new movement has.

Fourthly, one thing that seems to be emphasized more than any other in the African Pentecostal churches is the issue of power. This emphasis is evident in the advertising of their “Power Crusades,” “Power Ministries,” and “Power Miracles”—it is all about power. Ironically, Van Rheenen observes that animism, which is inadvertently promoted by the
African Pentecostal churches, and secularism, epitomized by contemporary American society, are both “philosophies rooted in power.” The emphasis on power carries a magnetic quality, attracting those with various needs, burdens, and cares. In the African Pentecostal churches this power is witnessed in accounts of healings, miracles, and breakthroughs that are experienced among such gatherings. Accordingly, when people attend these meetings they come in a miracle-expecting mode, recognizing that God’s power is present to provide help to meet their emergencies.

Another compelling force that attracts many to African Pentecostal churches is the passion with which everything is done. Praying, singing, dancing, and preaching is carried out with such passion that sweating is inevitable. Intense emotions have been displayed in such gatherings that one popular church is referred to as the “weeping church,” because worshippers are known to suddenly break into outbursts of tears. Ecstatic outbursts of speaking in tongues are not uncommon and the congregational singing of the indigenous songs of worship and praise leave unforgettable memories in the minds of those who attend. All this serves to spice up worship and contribute to the spread of the church that typically evangelizes mainly through its worship and special programs.

**Weaknesses of the Reverse Mission Movement**

Conversely, there are certain limitations that African-initiated churches possess that could in the long term affect the success of the reverse missions endeavor. These factors, which are intrinsic to the nature and operations of African-initiated churches, include issues in contextualization, finance, succession, loss of identity, and supernatural panacea.

The greatest acknowledged success of African Pentecostalism is its understanding of, and identification with indigenous cultures. Scholars admit that this is the major reason for which its rapid rise and spread can be attributed. Regrettably, this may also serve as an impediment to its popularity in Western countries because of its animistic belief that spirits are responsible for poverty, illness, and misfortune. As Olupona has said, “The African mind is one that believes in the existence of witchcraft and evil in the world and the effect of magic and medicine. The Pentecostal church counteracts these forces with the power of prayer and the word of God.” Unfortunately, the mechanistic Western worldview cannot ascribe infirmity and fortune to the workings of spirits and such a teaching results in raised eyebrows and cynicism. Thus the doctrine of causality, which is core to the African religions and worldview, becomes a stumbling block for the reverse mission movement spearheaded by African Pentecostalism.

One of the greatest successes of African Pentecostal churches is their fundraising ability, which has resulted in the ecclesiastical empires that dot the landscape of many West African nations, especially Nigeria. In a single program, millions of dollars could be raised from donors that give cheerfully and
The Emergent Church in Africa

voluntarily. Sometimes, because of the promise that their seed will produce abundant harvest, these members actually rush forward to make their vows and give their donations. While the motives and methodology for the raising of funds may be a subject for another study, the fact remains that these churches possess powerful resources to raise large amounts of money instantaneously. It is from such donations that several of these reverse missions projects into the U.S. have been funded. Regrettably, indigenous churches have lamentably poor records of their financial transactions, which often indicates that they are really operated as private business empires, rather than churches, which usually enjoy tax exemptions around the world. Asonzeh Ukah’s study, “Piety and Profit: Accounting for Money in West African Pentecostalism,” emphasizes that West African Pentecostal Churches on the whole reveal questionable issues in accounting and transparency. Ukah states that,

Aside from beliefs that are mobilised against accounting for money and greater public disclosure, the structure of authority in these churches further hinder public accountability. They are founded and owned by a single individual (and the spouse) who is regarded as the visioner, the channel and bank of charismata through whom God blesses the followers.  

Such practices run afool of acceptable standards in the West and have brought churches such as Ahimolowo’s KICC under the scrutiny of the British government; even the American televangelist Benny Hinn has had his brush with the IRS over tax issues.

Another related matter that may pose a challenge to these Pentecostal churches is the cost involved in carrying out missions overseas in countries whose foreign currencies are stronger than those of the home/base fields. The lack of sufficient funds to provide worship places with comparable comfort and conveniences poses a serious constraint to evangelization in the West by African churches. Perhaps the way around this would be to have the major part of such evangelization carried out through church planting initiated by the existing established branches of such churches in the foreign territory. The drawback with this is that very often such churches remain populated primarily by migrants, as in the case with Steven Hunt’s study of the RCCG in Britain.

Studies done on African Pentecostalism reveal that one principal characteristic they possess is an autocratic, centralized control in which the founders/visioners and their wives hold the most important offices on their boards. These founders/General Overseers, are generally the driving forces behind the success of their ministries and call the shots on all decisions taken by the churches. While these leaders are alive, everything may appear to run smoothly, for whenever any challenge arises all they have to do is call up the founder/owner for counsel and after seeking the face of God for some time, the solution will appear.
Presently, several of these churches are in their first generational phase, therefore no problem may seem apparent. This is because any person who disagrees with the one who received the vision has a simple option of leaving to pursue his own dream rather than cause a schism in the church. However, crises will appear when the founder/visionary dies, as in the case of Church of God Mission International. The demise of the great Archbishop Benson Idahosa, believed to be the driving force in Neo-Pentecostalism in Africa, left a yawning gulf that has not been filled. Although the hierarchy agreed to have his wife succeed him, the church has since lost its place of prominence in the ecclesiastical scheme of things locally and internationally.

While it is commonly known that Adeboye was not the founder but the successor in RCCG, it is clear that what the church today is a far cry from what it used to be in the days of his predecessor. It waits to be seen what will transpire, after Adeboye’s demise, to the empire that he has almost single-handedly built. The experiences from other indigenous African churches—such as the Celestial Church of Christ and Olumba Olumba Obu, which were thoroughly rocked by court cases and divisions, bringing about a loss of focus and diminished fervor—are not distant in one’s memory.

Another related issue is the centralized control that operates in these churches. It is evident that the private nature in which the church enterprise is conducted leaves room for disgruntled feelings and disenchchantment, as Kalu affirms: “Centralization intensifies virulent church politics, nepotism, abuse and conflict. Thus, conflicts arise between the “overseas branches” and the home churches because of power, authority and control or because immigrant churches tend to be more charismatic and adaptive.”

While on the one hand, secularism, a principal characteristic of Western Christianity, provides an opportunity for evangelization by African preachers powerfully driven by the Holy Spirit; it also, on the other hand, poses a danger to the loss of identity of these very agents of reverse missions. This is because as these missionaries attempt to make their message contextual to a new world that exhibits disbelief bordering on suspicion for the world of spirits, they could wind up adopting the secularism and materialism that they condemn. This danger is real for two reasons.

Firstly, the possession or acquisition of wealth appears to have a direct correlation to a dearth of spirituality. Many years ago, some African student missionaries who traveled to Scandinavia selling Christian literature were told by their prospective clients that because the state provided for their welfare, they did not need God. Rather, they asserted, it was the Africans who needed God. The longer African missionaries remain in the West, the sooner they in turn will become acquisitive and materialistic, thereby losing their initial simplicity and power. Ayuk’s counsel that missionaries “should not be thinking of building their own kingdoms here on earth in the name of churches . . . but rather should be looking forward to bringing people to a personal relationship with Jesus Christ” becomes very pertinent.

Secondly, because Western Christianity is relegated to the realm of personal choice with restrictions placed on how it is communicated, there is a
The Emergent Church in Africa

81

temptation to adopt this unobtrusive method of making converts. Such a model will do damage to the boisterous, exuberant nature of the African that is expressive and loud. The result will be akin to what is presently being witnessed in certain mainline churches in Africa, which, in their bid to be Christians, have become more Western than African.

Another fundamental weakness of African Pentecostalism that could limit the success of reverse missions in the West is the promise of a supernatural solution for every problem. Congregants are led to believe that there exists a miraculous cure-all that is attainable by following a prescribed set of rules. The magical worldview of the African makes him predisposed to believe that not only can the solutions to his problems be derived instantaneously, what’s more, he does not need to correct his lifestyle, all he simply needs to do is fast and pray. What this may cause by default is the encouragement of reckless living and lazy habits, besides interminable hours in church activities that could have been employed in constructive labor; as happens in several Pentecostal Churches in Africa today.

Although the African may have no problem accepting that his wife could still get pregnant even after having lost her womb, the average Western mind that has been groomed in rational, Enlightenment thinking may struggle with these supernatural panaceas promised by African Pentecostal churches. American Pentecostal church growth may have plateaued because of the growing disbelief in the efficacy of these promises of healing.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Without a doubt the churches emerging from Africa have become a force to be reckoned with financially, politically, socially, and spiritually. Their missionary activities into the West will continue to grow and expand along the lines of migrant populations, and as seen in the Ukraine, even among Western cultures. However, the next decade or two will prove defining in the phenomenon of reverse missions. It remains to be seen what will become of the driving visions and ambitions of this generation of leaders of the African Pentecostal churches as the baton is passed and the dynamics of social change evolve in the coming years.

The following are recommended if this occurrence is to have an enduring effect:

1. Great care must be taken in selecting the pastors that will lead out in this endeavor to ensure that their primary interest may be the increase of the kingdom of God, rather the pecuniary benefits that may come from ministry abroad.
2. The term for those involved in this missionary work should be short and clear from the start in order to prevent loss of focus, identity, and direction.
3. A succession plan needs to be developed and implemented by the African Pentecostal churches that will enable new leadership to emerge
at the death of the founder, that is representative, rather than allow family ties take preeminence.

4. Accounting standards and practices that are transparent and acceptable need to be adopted by these congregations, especially those involved in missions abroad.

5. Contextual studies of the cultures they seek to enter and the training of indigenous Western ministers in the elements that create the dynamism and exuberance typical of African worship will enable better penetration and results.

Finally, it should be expected that, increasingly, the power, influence, and prestige of these African Pentecostal churches and their leadership will burgeon in the West; like it has all over the continent of Africa, as this amorphous religion whose prominent defining characteristic is accommodation, adapts to meet Western cultures, tastes, and needs.

NOTES


10. Ibid.


16. Miller, “Pentecostal Preacher.”


28. Ibid.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


5 Africa’s Unheralded Contributions to World Politics

Kunirum Osia

Eurocentric and ahistorical biases of many of political and economic theories have influenced the way Africa is analyzed and interpreted. Western political theories have limited relevance for African societies cast in different traditions. It should be noted that African states became politically independent at a time when the general structure and outline of world affairs, interstate relations, and cold war ideologies had been pre-determined. These states could either come to grips with the existing order or seek to alter it.

Because of the Eurocentric perspectives in analyzing world issues, the role of African states has been unheralded at best and ignored at worst. Africans from antiquity employed consultation, mediation, and consensus in the resolution of inter- and intra-community problems. With this model Africa initiated the now famous shuttle diplomacy in its search for peace in the Middle East. When employed years later by Henry Kissinger he received Nobel Peace Prize, while Africa received no publicized approbation.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that rather than being observers in world affairs, Africa contributes efforts to solve intractable world problems, be it the Congo Crisis of the 1960s, the Nigeria-Biafra War of 1967–1970, or the Arab-Israeli conflict of the mid-1960s to early 1970s. We will focus our analysis on the Arab-Israeli conflict which consumed a considerable amount of time of Africa in search of peace in the Middle East. We will look at the following African efforts in a chronological and contextual vein to have a sense of the outcome of African mediatory role in the search for peace in the Middle East: Conference of African States, 1968–1971; African Peace Mission to Egypt and Israel; The Kinshasa Session: Preliminary Arrangements; The Dakar Session: Interim Report; UN General Assembly Debate on Proposals of African Peace Mission; and Visit to the Vatican. These efforts will all be analyzed to affirm that Africa was not merely an onlooker but an unheralded actor in world politics.

INTRODUCTION

African search for peace in the Middle East in the early 1970s should be judged in the light of world politics and not just viewed through the narrow
prism of Afro-Arab-Israeli interactions. Although the search for peace took place four decades ago, it sheds light on our modern day understanding of states it sheds light on our modern day understanding of what Khadiagala and Lyons referred to as “actors, contexts and outcomes” in world politics.\(^1\)

It must be remembered that in a historical and chronological context, African states initiated mediation proposals to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict as long ago as the early 1960s.

The most tangible initiative was taken in the U.N. in 1961, when a number of Afro-Asian states friendly with Israel sponsored a resolution calling inter alia for direct negotiations between the Arab states and Israel.\(^2\)

The then celebrated shuttle diplomacy of Dr. Henry Kissinger was first utilized by African leaders in their peace mission efforts in the Middle East in 1971.\(^3\) At that time it got no publicity beyond the diplomatic corridors of the United Nations (UN) and that of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). When this same style of diplomacy was utilized by Kissinger in 1973 it was acclaimed as and accorded the accolade of science. Similarly, Resolution 242, which had become a pacific straw that both Arabs and Israelis could grasp, was not a novelty. African leaders and governments have echoed similar ideas many years before Resolution 242, but their ideas and suggestions received no comparable publicity and recognition. It was Kwame Nkrumah, then President of Ghana who, in his address to the Fifteenth UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1960, expressed ideas similar to the contents of Resolution 242:

The solution of the Middle East question lies in the recognition of the political realities here. In The light of this, I submit that the United Nations should set up a committee to study and evolve a machinery in which it will be impossible either for Israel to attack any of the Arab states or for Arab states to attack Israel, and to make some sort of arrangement to keep the cold war out of the Middle East.\(^4\)

The outstanding features of the above remarks are a concern for the preservation of peace in the Middle East; an awareness of the danger to peace emanating from continuing hostility between the Israelis and the Arabs; an emphasis on the need for a permanent and realistic solution; and finally the proposal to establish a machinery which would be able to prevent any possibility of one side attacking the other. In other words, an establishment of “demilitarized zones” was being suggested.

On June 21, 1963, Nkrumah again referred to the Middle East conflict during a parliamentary session. He spoke in particular of the dangers of nuclear arms penetrating the Middle East and inevitably engulfing Africa in a catastrophe.
The nuclear arms race in the Middle East is now an open secret. Instability in this area not only heightens world tension but jeopardizes the security of the African continent. In the interest of world peace, a way must therefore be found quickly to end the dangerous arms race between Israel and Egypt, which could easily lead to disaster for Africa, the Middle East and the world.\(^5\)

On September 25 of the same year, Nkrumah explained his position on the Middle East, again in a parliamentary debate, in the following remarks:

For the solution of the Arab Israel problem, Ghana has suggested that the approach to the Middle East question in general should be governed by two principles, namely: (1) the need to keep power bloc conflicts out of the Middle East; (2) recognition of the independence and territorial integrity of each Middle East state by all the states in the area.\(^6\)

In November 1967, Resolution 242 stated in its operative paragraphs:

Affirms further the necessity. . . . for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every States in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.\(^7\)

Lord Caradon, the author of Resolution 242 probably read Nkrumah’s speeches on the solutions to the Middle East conflict. What is underscored here is that the very principles advocated by Resolution 242, which the world body politic accepted as essential instruments for peace in the Middle East had, since 1963 been prescribed by African and leaders of developing nations and governments. Thus, pointing out the fact that although African states tried to sidetrack Arab-Israeli conflict and preferred to regard it as “an extraneous issue,” they kept it in their purview and on occasions expressed their profound concern over the consequences of the non-solution of the problem. Regional and international conferences seem to be the selected forums for voicing their concerns about and suggesting solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

**CONFERENCES OF AFRICAN STATES, 1968–1971**

African countries could no longer avoid discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict in forums where normally only African issues were discussed prior to the June 1967 war. During the Tenth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, from February 20 to 24, 1968, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers discussed the Middle East issue and reaffirmed “its active solidarity with the United Arab Republic and all the Arab countries that are occupied,” and called “for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops from all occupied Arab territories,” urging
all Member States to extend their active support, political, moral, and material, to the just cause of the United Arab Republic and the other countries of the Middle East that have been the victims of the same oppression.9

It is curious to observe that although calling “for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops,” the Council of Ministers did not specifically mention Israel by name. However, the resolution was adopted by acclamation, though about fifteen of forty participating states did not approve the resolution.10 Nevertheless, the Addis Ababa Ministerial Resolution represented a significant tilt toward the Arab position in the Middle East Conflict.

The Fifth Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government, meeting in Algeria, from September 13 to 16, 1968, also reaffirmed “its support for the United Arab Republic” (UAR) and called

for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since the 5 of June 1967 in accordance with the resolution taken by the Security Council on 22 November, 1967, and appeals to all Member States of the O.A.U. to use their influence to ensure strict implementation of this resolution.11

This Assembly resolution was supported by thirty-seven of the thirty-nine states that attended the Conference, with Lesotho and Swaziland abstaining.12 In contrast to the previous Addis Ababa Conference, the Algeria resolution was less extreme in tone.13 Furthermore, the Heads of State and Government did not in their Algiers resolution advocate an outright condemnation of Israel. The apparent consensus regarding the relation between Israeli withdrawal and lasting peace was well summed up by Arsene Usher, foreign minister of Ivory Coast:

The Algiers resolution was adopted unanimously because it was based on the Security Council resolution 242, which links total withdrawal from occupied territories with cessation of belligerence recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of all states in the region, and the right to live behind secure and recognized boundaries.14

Dahomey (Benin), Ivory Coast, and other major recipients of Israeli aid were instrumental in blocking the Ministerial recommendation.

Although overall, the pro-Arab stand of the African states was much stronger and more broadly based than in 1967 in Kinshasa,15 some scholars have given the impression that the Algiers Conference “support of the Arab cause was lukewarm and indirect.”16

The Twelfth Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, which met in Addis Ababa from February 12 to 22, 1969, simply agreed to take
cognizance of the UAR statement, and abide by AHSG Ref. 53 (V) adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in Algiers in September, 1968.\textsuperscript{17}

The Middle East crisis became such a concern for Africans, that it was being discussed even in sub-regional African conferences. The fifth annual conference of West and Central African states, held in Lusaka, Zambia, from April 14 to 16, 1969, discussed the Middle East problem. Addressing the delegations of the fourteen member states,\textsuperscript{18} President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia stated:

still on the debit side the Middle East crisis, which entails part of Africa, still remains unresolved. It is a threat to the peace of Africa, first because it affects part of this continent; secondly, because it is a matter of international peace and security for which we in Africa share concern and responsibility through the United Nations and, in general as members of the international community.\textsuperscript{19}

The Conference reaffirmed their support for the stand already taken by the OAU in its support of the Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967, and “urged that the terms of this resolution should be implemented without delay.”\textsuperscript{20}

The terms of the resolution are as follows:

(a) The establishment of a just and lasting peace between Israel and the Arab states.

(b) The withdrawal of Israeli forces from the cease fire lines would take place only after secure and recognized boundaries had been agreed upon within the terms of the peace treaty.

(c) Peace must be the outcome of an agreement between the parties achieved through these negotiations and not by outside imposition.

(d) Guaranteed freedom of navigation through all the international waterways in the area without limitations or reservations.

(e) The United Nations Special Representative would be authorized to render good offices to the parties and not to act as a mediator presenting them with proposals of its own.\textsuperscript{21}

In June 1969, Israel’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aba Eban, visited Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania to present his country’s argument on the Middle East situation. While in Kampala, Eban issued a statement to all African leaders to help bring peace in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{22} In the same month, Emperor Haile Selassie paid a two-day visit to Cairo to discuss with President Nasser not only the Egyptian-Ethiopian bilateral relations, but also the larger Middle East problem, and the consolidation of the OAU and its role in promoting cooperation and peace—in the Middle East in particular and the world as a whole.\textsuperscript{23}
Though the Eban visit to East Africa did not seem to have accomplished favorable results, at least it did not seem to have hurt Israel. On the other hand, the Fifth Summit of East and Central African States and Selassie-Nasser meeting appeared to have consolidated pro-Arab support, thus paving the way for the forthcoming summit of African States.

When the pre-summit Council of Ministers met in Addis Ababa, from August 28 to September 6, 1969, the Al Aqsa Mosque damaged on August 21, 1969, “as a result of arson committed by a mentally disturbed Australian citizen,” and the Dome of the Rock incident were still arousing the sentiments of the Muslim world. Also, the OAU Secretary-General’s report, which recommended that in the Middle East conflict, “fraternity and solidarity with the UAR must not falter,” adding that “none of our states is safe from similar aggression,” was of some significance, at least in helping to color the thinking of the Heads of State and Government in Arab favor.

The Sixth Ordinary Session of the OAU Conference, at the end of the summit, passed two resolutions on the Middle East situation. The first one, which concerned itself with the “aggression of the Israeli forces against UAR,” was an immediate response of the OAU to news of the mammoth Israeli attack on Egypt on September 10, the last day of the OAU summit. The OAU ignored the fact that Israeli action was a retaliatory response to the “war of attrition” declared by Egypt, which was designed to eliminate the Israeli presence along the eastern bank of the Canal. The Assembly, was “deeply moved by reports of further aggression . . . perpetrated today by Israeli forces against another part of the national territory,” of the state of Egypt. The resolution stated:

1. Condemn this act of aggression, like all other acts of aggression directed against a sister country;
2. Desire to reaffirm in this situation our solidarity with UAR;
3. Appeal to the conscience of mankind to do everything possible in order to spare our continent, which has suffered all too often, from invasion by foreign forces, from becoming a fresh scene of tension and conflict, with unforeseeable consequences for Africa as well as for the rest of the world.

Even more striking and portentous a view similar to that of the Africans, was voiced by King Hussein of Jordan in a statement related to the lessons of the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967:

If there is one military lesson to be learned from the recent battle it is that victory goes to the one who strike first. This is a particularly ironic and dangerous lesson to establish. But one way of establishing it is to reward the aggressor with the fruits of his aggression. The members of this [U.N.] Assembly should ponder well this point, or they will surely
risk setting a precedent which will haunt these halls and the world for decades to come.\textsuperscript{27}

King Hussein was undoubtedly right in drawing attention to the repercussive implications of a war of conquest, particularly among member states of the United Nations, which had voluntarily accepted a law that rules out any gains derived from the use of force.\textsuperscript{28} However, there is a flaw in Hussein’s statement. The flaw is in what he did not say. In order for the United Nations’ law to be respected, it was equally important and necessary that the threat of the use of force against the existence and presence of a member state be fully eliminated. Overt preparation for the use of force and threats to use force have all-too-often been the foundation for the inevitable eruptions of conflict in the Middle East.

The second resolution, moved by Niger, and unanimously passed, condemned Israel for the aggression and called for complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian soil.\textsuperscript{29} The Heads of State also, unanimously, decided to send a message of solidarity with President Nasser, and expressed their condemnation of Israeli raids.

The annual February meeting was preceded, by the Sixth Summit of the Eastern-Central African states, held in Khartoum from January 26 to 28, 1970. The states noted, with concern, the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East which, in their view, resulted from the non-compliance with Security Council Resolution 242. There was, therefore, a call for urgent enforcement of the November 22, 1967, resolution.\textsuperscript{30}

At the end of its Fourteenth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, from February 27 to March 5, 1970, the Council of Ministries passed a resolution expressing “total solidarity and sympathy” with the UAR in its confrontation with Israel, which was sent to President Nasser. The message was adopted as a special motion following a UAR statement made by Gahar, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the situation of his country.\textsuperscript{31} Thirty-four of the forty-one states supported the statement; seven states opposed it. The seven were Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Lesotho, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Rwanda.

The 1970 OAU’s Seventh Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government, for the first time in its history, included the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Assembly’s agenda; previously, it had been raised under “miscellaneous.”\textsuperscript{32} That year, the OAU conference reaffirmed “its grave concern” that “foreign troops” had been occupying “a part of the territory of a sister African State” for over three years; and further expressed its solidarity with the United Arab Republic and appeals to all Member States of the OAU to support the present efforts of the United Nations Special Representative to implement the Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, taking into account that it cannot be implemented conditionally or partially.\textsuperscript{33}
It must be remarked that this resolution only expressed “concern.” The Assembly resolution also urged Member States to support the peace efforts by the UN Middle East Special Representative, Dr. G.V. Jarring.

From the 1970 OAU annual summit, it became clear to the Israeli government that a good many African States were beginning to adapt a posture not altogether favorable to Israel. The Israeli government, therefore, embarked on a diplomatic offensive in June 1971 just before that year’s OAU meeting in Addis Ababa, in an attempt to contain, if not neutralize, what it perceived to be pro-Arab gains already made within the OAU. Abba Eban, Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited seven African states: Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Zaire, and Sierra Leone. Before leaving for Africa, however, Eban announced that Israel was donating IL10,000 (ten thousand Israeli pounds) to the OAU Liberation Committee, in response to an appeal by U. Thant, the U.N. Secretary-General, for food and medical supplies for victims of White racism in South Africa. The donation caused a diplomatic uproar from both the OAU’s Liberation Committee and the Liberation Movements, on the one hand, and the Government of South Africa, on the other. Menahem Begin, then leader of the opposition Herut Party, attacked the donation in the Knesset, charging that OAU was hostile to Israel and that if it was a question of giving humanitarian aid to hapless people, the money should be given to the Red Cross.

The Eban visit, however, appeared successful, as both Ghana and Cameroon expressed sympathy for the Foreign Minister’s message; Sierra Leone agreed to set up an embassy in Israel, with a non-resident ambassador, for which Eban promised to give more aid in return; and President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast gave his assurance that his country would try to galvanize support to block any anti-Israeli resolution at the next OAU conference.

Though overshadowed by the crisis caused by the overthrow of President Obote of Uganda, the OAU Assembly treatment of the Middle East conflict this time was very serious. From June 21 to 23, 1971, the Conference heard the declaration presented by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and head of the UAR delegation. At the close of its session, the Assembly recalled and reaffirmed “emphatically the contents” of its previous resolution; and commended Egypt “for its constructive efforts” aimed at

the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, especially the positive position recently taken in response to Ambassador Jarring’s peace initiative of February, 1971.

Being “seriously concerns” that the “continued Israeli occupation” of Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian territories “constitutes a serious threat to the regional peace of Africa,” the OAU Assembly,

Determined that the territory of a state should not be the object of occupation or acquisition by another state resulting from threat or use
of force, which is a basic principle enshrined in the U.N. Charter and reiterated in the Security Council resolution 242, as well as the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security 2734 (XXV) as adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December, 1970. 39

Furthermore, the Assembly deplored what it characterized as Israel’s defiant attitude toward Ambassador Jarring’s peace initiative of February 8, 1971, and urged it to make a positive reply as Egypt had already done. The summit also expressed its full support for the efforts of Dr. Jarring and again reaffirmed “its solidarity with the United Arab Republic.”40 Taking an unprecedented initiative, the OAU Assembly formed an ad hoc Middle East Peace Mission of Ten States, entrusted: “with the task of seeking the best ways and means of reaching a peaceful, equitable, and honorable solution to the grave Middle East crisis.”41

The Eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government contributed significantly in sharpening the African front on the Israeli position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its Resolution 66 (VIII), 1971, reflected a dramatic change to an openly pro-Arab position, with the Assembly repeatedly mentioning for the first time, “Israel” and the “three Arab” countries affected by Israeli “aggression” of June 1967. It also become apparent that the African States had already formulated an opinion that Egypt was being “more cooperative and reasonable” in its efforts to find a peaceful solution through the UN Special Representative, while Israel remained intransigent. The African Heads of State were thereof, more receptive to President Sadat’s mild and conciliatory approach. By accepting certain proposals and expressing desire for peace, the Egyptian President seriously weakened Israel’s diplomatic posture that it alone desired peaceful settlement.

The 1967 OAU failure to act more positively at the request of the Governments of Guinea and Somalia led the Afro-Arab bloc within the OAU to revise their tactics in order to win the support of the majority if the Member States for their position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Henceforth, the premise was that Israel was no less a threat to the Arab world than South Africa was to the African world, drawing parallels between the two states.42 It would seem, therefore, that the Arab states in North Africa made support for “Palestinian cause” a quid pro quo for cooperation in the OAU especially in the liberation and apartheid questions.

On the other hand, African support for Israel began to diminish as it became evident that the Security Council Resolution 242 could not be implemented, primarily because of the prevailing perception of Israel as “intransigent.” Some African States also began to take seriously Arab warnings about the nature and motives of Israel, which now started to be viewed by many as an ally or client of the United States, thus tarnishing the “halo she wore as a newly liberated state which has much to offer.”43 African governments that are pro-Arab argue, a posteriori, that but for US
military support of Israel, Israel would not be intransigent. Rather than allow the Middle East crisis to engulf Africa, the African government was determined to play a more positive and determined role. The idea of a peace mission was, thus, conceived at the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Organization of African unity.

THE AFRICAN PEACE MISSIONS TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL: THE TEN-MAN COMMITTEE

The by-product of the resolution of the Eighth Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in June 1971, in Addis Ababa, was the formation of the Ten-Man Committee and Four-Man Peace Mission to the Middle East. The entire resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict clearly conveyed both the desire and the determination of the African States to play more active role than ever before in the search for a lasting solution to the conflict. President Leopold Senghor of Senegal defined the context of the African determination when he stated that “Africa feels duty-bound to solve the fratricidal struggle” in the Middle East.

During the debate on the Middle East conflict, the outgoing OAU Chairman, President Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), proposed to the summit that Africa should appoint, from among its leaders, a peace mission to attempt to bring peace in the Middle East. The proposal was reflected in the Assembly resolution which requested, “the current Chairman of the OAU to consult with the Heads of State and Government so that they use their influence to ensure the full implementation of this resolution.” The full implementation of this resolution “meant obtaining Israel’s positive reply” to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring’s memorandum of February 8, 1971, which, in turn, would result in the reactivation of the Jarring Mission, which sought the full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. The main points of Jarring’s memorandum were the issue of withdrawal and peace:

Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraphs 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

Israel responded to the memorandum by emphasizing its willingness to engage in meaningful negotiations with Egypt but reaffirmed that it would withdraw its
armed forces from the Israel-United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines.\textsuperscript{49}

Egypt had responded to the memorandum on February 15, 1971, suggesting, among other things, that it would proffer commitments on various issues indicated in the memorandum and, if Israel complied with certain conditions and adopted the commitments outlined, “the United Arab Republic will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel.” Egypt sought the acceptance of Israel on the commitments beyond those contained in Jarring’s request including “withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip.” Finally, referring to the issue of withdrawal, Egypt stated:

The United Arab Republic considers that the just and lasting peace cannot be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967.\textsuperscript{50}

Undoubtedly, with these apparent diametrically opposed responses on the issue of withdrawal, “the Jarring Mission had reached an impasse.”\textsuperscript{51} This was the situation the OAU thought it could salvage.

The OAU AHG/Res. 66 (VIII) of June 22, 1971, however, offered no clearly defined guidelines of implementation, other than for the current OAU Chairman “to consult with the Heads of State and Government.” Therefore, using both the consensus of his colleagues present in Addis Ababa, and his own discretion, President Moktar Ould Daddah (Mauritania) formed a Ten-Man Committee of Heads of State and Government (hereafter Ten-Man Committee) to implement the Resolution 66 (VIII) of June 22, 1971. In his 1972 report, Daddah writes:

from these discussions, it emerged that there was need to entrust the implementation of resolution AHG/Res. 66 to a group of Heads of State and Government who, under the Chairmanship of the Mauritanian Head of State, would use their relations with the Parties in the Middle East conflict, to hasten a lasting peace in conformity with the OAU resolutions and Resolution 242.\textsuperscript{52}

At its first session in Kinshasa (Zaire) in August 1971, the Ten-Man Committee’s immediate assignment was “to define in clear terms, its mandate.”\textsuperscript{53} A mandate was agreed upon which:

consisted of doing everything in its power to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, and that it was above all, entrusted with the task of approaching the Parties to the Middle East conflict with the view to reactivating The Jarring Mission on the specific basis
of the proposals contained in his memorandum of February 8, 1971, addressed to the Egyptian and Israeli Government.54

The Kinshasa session preferred to limit the peace mission to Egypt and Israel only, even though it was understood that the resumption of the Jarring Mission and the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, was all-inclusive in its terms of reference as far as the other Arab parties to the conflict were concerned.

The focus of the mandate was highlighted when President Daddah and the OAU Secretary-General, Diallo Telli, had discussions with the then UN Secretary-General, U. Thant, and his Special Representative, Dr. Gunnar Jarring on September 24 and 29, 1971, in New York. Both UN Secretary-General, U Thant, and Dr. Jarring, following the discussion they had with President Daddah and the OAU, held the view that,

only a positive reply from the Israeli Government to the memorandum of 8 February would make it possible to resume the mission of the United Nations Special Representative to the Middle East.55

In his Rabat Report, President Daddah wrote that the views of Secretary-General Thant and Ambassador Jarring, therefore, presupposed that any contribution by the OAU towards the search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis through action by the Sub-Committee of Four and the Committee of Ten would amount to the Israeli authorities accepting finally, to reply favorably to the Jarring initiative and thus enable the latter to continue mediating between the two parties.56

Viewing the UN Secretariat position as being of “immense importance,” President Daddah concluded that it actually defined “the scope of action of the Four African Heads of State regarding their mission to the Middle east” and, in particular, “their talks with the Israeli authorities.”57 Therefore, in his letter of October 12, 1971,58 to President Senghor, the Chairman of the Subcommittee of Four, the OAU current Chairman stressed the significance and urgency of a positive reply from Israel to the February 8 Jarring memorandum.

As the chairman of the Sub-Committee of Four, Leopold Senghor’s understanding of the mandate is of considerable relevance. During the UN General Assembly debate on the Middle East situation, Senegal’s foreign minister, Amadou Darim Gaye, explained that: “the OAU mission was essentially concerned with points of contact to overcome the obstacles which paralyzed the settlement of the crisis.”59 This meant, in his view, clarifications and reconciliation, with the principal aim of unfreezing “the deadlock.”60 Senghor emphasized that the OAU Ten-Man Committee was “to find ways of applying the 1967 Security Council Resolution on the
Africa's Unheralded Contributions to World Politics

Middle East.” Also, speaking at the Abedin Palace in response to President Anwar Sadat, Senghor called for the implementation of the November Resolution 242, which he viewed as a “compromise solution” that safeguards the integrity and the dignity of all the people concerned.

African leaders stressed the complementary nature of the peace mission to the overall United Nations efforts for a lasting solution to the conflict. While in New York, President Daddah and the OAU Secretary-General Telli emphasized to U. Thant and Ambassador Jarring that the OAU Heads of State initiative was aimed at sustaining, but not supplanting their efforts.

The Dakar Memorandum to both President Sadat and Prime Minister Golda Meir affirmed that:

today, their main concern is to complement United Nations action so as to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict on the basis of Resolution 242 adopted by the Security Council on 22 November, 1967.

The memorandum further stated:

It is in full support of Dr. Jarring’s efforts to implement Resolution 242, that the Organization of African Unity, at the June, 1971 Session, appointed a Committee of Ten Heads of State to help find a solution.

On Dr. Jarring, the memorandum was emphatic, namely, that the point is not to replace Dr. Jarring as a mediator and, less still, the Security Council, but also to assist him in ensuring the implementation of Resolution 242.

It appears that these assurances were directed to imply a different effort, but not necessarily a supplanting one to the UN. Furthermore, one gets the impression that they were aimed at soliciting the support of the permanent members of the Security Council in particular; it could also mean that the committee was apprehensive of failure and did not want to be blamed for it alone.

The committee was composed of Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Zaire, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Nigeria, Mauritania, and Tanzania. The Ivory Coast, Zaire, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Liberia could be rightly viewed as pro-Israel in their attitudes and actions on the Middle East situation, whereas Senegal, Nigeria, and Cameroon maintained neutral or moderate stances and Tanzania and Mauritania maintained pro-Arab stances. One could say that 70 percent of the Ten-Man Committee were pro-Israel or were sympathetic toward it. The Israelis, therefore, were at an advantage as far as the committee was concerned.

However, the Israelis were still largely suspicious of the OAU initiative. This suspicion was partly because of the OAU’s tendency to pass resolutions critical of Israel and partly because of the distrust toward what Israel considers as foreign interference in its affairs. But at the same time, the Israeli authorities still maintained residual hopes that the Ten-Man Committee
might, in the final analysis, help to modify “the pro-Egyptian positions adopted by the previous OAU resolutions.” And given its diplomatic slip-page in the Third World in general, and Africa in particular, the Israeli Government viewed the OAU Ten-Man Committee as an opportunity to rejuvenate its previous diplomatic stature. Furthermore, it was an exceptional opportunity to explain to the Africans, face to face, their position of “free negotiation” with “no pre-conditions” or “pre-commitments,” as Ambassador Jarring had requested in his February 8, 1971, memorandum. Any subject the OAU states could give to the Israeli position, they reasoned, would provide a welcome opportunity in order to break what Eban had called “the focus of deadlock.” At the same time, the Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir, in her message of August 17, 1971, to the Ten-Man Committee, made it very clear that their initiative would fall through if it should endeavor to implement OAU’s AHG/66 (VIII) of June 22, 1971, which the Israeli considered to be strictly pro-Egypt and anti-Israel.

The Egyptians were also uneasy about the African Ten-Man Committee primarily because of its dominant pro-Israeli outlook. However, they viewed the peace mission as an effort to seek ways and means of implementing the Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. In their view, moreover, the crux of the OAU peacemaking efforts was to solicit an Israeli favorable response to the Jarring memorandum of February 8, 1971, regarding prior commitment on withdrawal. Egypt, therefore, made particular reference to the AHG/Res. 6 (VIII), paragraph 3 of June 22, 1971, which called for Jarring’s “initiative for peace of 8 February, 1971.” The Arabs insistence on “withdrawal” beclouds an important clause of “secure boundaries” for Israel.

During their first visit to Cairo, President Sadat reinforced the view that the Sub-Committee of Four “represented a new and serious attempt by the OAU, in the context of the African Summit Conference of June, 1971, to implement Resolution 242,” emphasizing that “Cairo sees in every attempt to revive the Jarring Mission an attempt to implement Resolution 242.” Therefore, any attempt to replace those terms of reference of February 8, 1971, and June 22, 1971, was objectionable, because it would detract from the issue of prior Israeli commitment on withdrawal. Given these conflicting expectations of Cairo and Jerusalem, it was apparent that the reconciliation of two states would be difficult and perhaps time-consuming. It called for conciliators with considerable skill and experience in order to realize the objections of the Addis Ababa mandate.

THE KINSHASA SESSION: PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS

Following the unresolved issues and apparent impasse after visits to Egypt and Israel there was need for convening another session of the ten-man committee.
The Division of Responsibilities

After the Addis Ababa summit, President Daddah conferred with his appointed Ten-Man Committee on the procedures and preliminary arrangements for the peace mission. He also sent a special mission to confer with President Mobutu Sese Seko in Kinshasa. Out of the Kinshasa consultation emerged General Mobutu’s agreement to host the first session of the committee from August 23 to 25, 1971.

The Kinshasa session was attended by six Heads of State and Government from Mauritania, Ethiopia, Senegal, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Zaire, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya, Minister for Communications of Tanzania, and the Acting Secretary of State of Liberia. Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast was not present in Kinshasa for the session. However, he addressed a special message to the OAU current Chairman, stating his reasons for absence and expressing his best wishes for the success of the session.

The immediate task of the committee in Kinshasa was twofold: first, “to define in clear terms,” of the Committee’s mandate; and second, “to agree on a method of work and timetable to facilitate rapid implementation of this mandate.” President Ould Moktar Daddah, OAU Chairman and, by the virtue of that position, the Chairman of the Ten-Man Committee, undertook to obtain the necessary information from the UN Secretary-General U. Thant, and his Special Representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, on the best procedure for following up United Nations efforts to implement the Security Council Resolution 242. President Leopold Senghor was designated to contact the UN Secretary-General and Dr. Jarring to prepare information for the OAU current Chairman to be available when he visited the Secretariat during the last week of September 1971. A Sub-Committee of Four, composed of Heads of State of the State of Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire, was formed under the Chairmanship of President Leopold Sedar Senghor (Senegal). The members of the Sub-Committee were to visit Jerusalem and Cairo to explore possible “areas of agreement” between the two states, on the basis of proposals to be worked out by the Ten-Man Committee.

The Sub-Committee was directed to finish its Middle East Peace Mission by November 8. Two days later, November 10, the entire Ten-Man Committee was scheduled to hold its second session in Dakar (Senegal), to discuss the Sub-Committee’s report. To facilitate the work of his sub-committee in order to meet its November 8 deadline, President Senghor was requested to make the necessary contacts with the Governments of Egypt and Israel and arrange the dates for the first visits to the two capitals. The Senegalese President was also assigned the responsibility of making an arrangement with the Arab Government to withhold the UN General Assembly debate on the Middle East situation until the OAU Committee had concluded its mission. Obviously, the Committee adopted an extremely heavy schedule.
First Peace Mission to Cairo and Jerusalem

The Sub-Committee of Four visited the Middle East from November 2 to 7, 1971. Before their departure for Jerusalem, their first stop, Presidents Senghor and Ahidjo and General Gowon and their aids met in Dakar to discuss the best approach to adopt when in Cairo and Jerusalem. These discussions were continued in Jerusalem where the three were joined by President Mobutu Sese Seko. The discussions focused on the way to bring about speedy implementation of all aspects of Resolution 242 and the resumption of mediation by Dr. Jarring, using as basis the proposals in the memorandum of 8 February.78

The first round of visits was limited to fact-finding. The Ten-Man Committee formulated a proposal in the form of a memorandum dealing with the following critical areas—a move toward settlement, which should include: (a) the resumption of indirect negotiations under Dr. Jarring; (b) the definition of “secure and recognized” boundaries within the context of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories; (c) the conditions for negotiating and concluding an agreement for peaceful coexistence of states in the region; (d) the possibility of an interim agreement on the opening of the Suez Canal; (e) establishment of demilitarized zones; (f) the status of Jerusalem; and (g) the settlement of the Palestinian refugees.79 So, from November 2 to 7, 1971, the Four Heads of State and Government, recorded responses of top Government officials in Jerusalem and Cairo, including Prime Minister Golda Meir and President Anwar El-Sadat respectively. As Ran Kochan has commented, the Four African Heads of State embarked upon an ambitious attempt to initiate a double dialogue between Cairo and Jerusalem in order to discover possible areas of agreement which would enable both Israel and Egypt to overcome obstacles that prevent peace negotiation.80

The discussions with Government officials in Jerusalem81 and Cairo82 revealed, with varying degrees of clarity, the positions of the two Governments on the issue raised by the Sub-Committee of Four. The responses were later concisely summarized by the Ten-Man committee in the Dakar Memorandum.83 Although both Egypt and Israel accepted the goals, they differed on the order of handling them on the priority accorded in Dr. Jarring’s assignments.84

THE DAKAR SESSION: INTERIM REPORT

Not obtaining concrete answers to the the thorny issues between Egypt and Israel from the number of meetings and sessions convened by the African
leaders, it became necessary to try once more by hosting another session to present an interim report. More importantly there were differing views within the established committee on the interpretation of Ambassador Jarring’s memorandum. Further discussion was necessary to clarify issues at another session.

Report of the Sub-Committee of Four

The Second session of the Committee of Ten, held in Dakar from November 10 to 13, 1971, was attended by Heads of State from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire, as well as the Vice-President of Kenya and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ivory Coast. Tanzania did not attend.

The Ten-Man Committee, in its discussions on the suggestions for considerations by the two governments exhibited differing views on the best approach to follow. President Senghor proposed that the Jarring talks should be resumed without preconditions. This would form the crux of the Committee’s recommendations, and the only common basis upon which a possible agreement could be reached. The delegates from Mauritania and Nigeria objected to this proposal, arguing that recommendations should be more specific, demanding that Israel reply unequivocally to the Jarring memorandum of February 8, 1971. They argued that this requirement was spelled out in the OAU Assembly resolution AHG/66 (VIII), paragraph 5 of June 22, 1971. Both the UN Secretary-General, U. Thant, and his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, lent credence to the operative paragraphs of the resolution during their talks with President Daddah in September 1971. Both Ivory Coast and Zaire, on the other hand, suggested that the Ten-Man Committee refrain from insinuations and confine itself instead to an all-inclusive appeal to both Egypt and Israel to resume talks on the basis of the Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. The differences within the four members of the sub-committee points to the problem created by the clause in Jarring’s memorandum, which recommended withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British mandate of Palestine. Technically, this means withdrawal from all territories, a clause that was unacceptable to Israel by mentioning the boundary between Egypt and the British mandate of Palestine.

President Senghor believed that the first approach, represented by Mauritania and Nigeria, would certainly be rejected by Israel outright thus undermining the OAU’s efforts. The approach advocated by Ivory Coast and Zaire, inter alia, was considered by Senghor to be too general to constitute a significant African initiative toward breaking the impasse. Furthermore, Senghor felt that its scope would be unacceptable to Egypt in particular, and to the Arabs in general. Thus, in the absence of a consensus within the Ten, President Senghor’s proposal was accepted, with only...
one significant change: the phrase, “without prior conditions” was deleted to accommodate the views of the Mauritania-Nigeria group. Ran Kochan observes that,

the omission of this seemingly crucial phrase was another tactical maneuver by the Senegalese President. For it was implicitly understood by all that if no such clause was specified, namely, that Israel reply affirmatively to the February 8, 1971 memorandum, it would mean *ipso facto* that the mission would be resumed without prior conditions.86

With this achieved, the Committee then adopted six proposals for submission to the Cairo and Jerusalem governments for their further considerations. These proposals, in the Committee’s view, would “reconcile the essentials in the respective positions of the two parties.”87 This Dakar Memorandum clearly appealed to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Prime Minister of Israel to accept these suggestions and thereby allow the resumption of the Jarring negotiations and the establishment in that region, of a just peace, which they wish to be lasting as between brothers.88

The Sub-Committee of Four left for the second mission to the Middle East to deliver the proposals contained in the Dakar memorandum. It was also decided at Dakar that the findings of the second mission of the Sub-Committee of Four be brought by the OAU Chairman to the attention of the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative, as well as the Governments of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

**THE SECOND PEACE MISSION TO CAIRO AND JERUSALEM**

After the Dakar session, President Leopold Senghor and General Yakubu Gowon, accompanied by Zaire’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cameroon’s Special Envoy, went back to Cairo and Jerusalem, from November 22 to 25, 1971, to deliver the Dakar proposals of the Ten-Man Committee.

Cairo’s response to the Four was delivered to President Senghor on the day of their departure, November 23, 1971. In Jerusalem, the Sub-Committee found a somewhat cooler reaction to the Dakar memorandum. There was uneasiness about the clause that read that “Israel states that she does not intend to annex any territories and that the point at issue is one of secure and recognized boundaries.”89 “There was a feeling with the Israeli Government that President Senghor was deliberately ignoring Israel’s intention of not returning to the frontiers”90 of June 1967. This position of “no return to the frontiers of June, 1967”91 by Jerusalem definitely posed a dilemma for the Senghor Sub-Committee, especially in view of President
Sadat’s terse statement before that group of November 6, 1971: We are ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel, but no treaty can be concluded through direct or indirect negotiations as long as a single inch of Egyptian territory is occupied.92

However, Israel’s reply of November 28, 1971, together with Egypt’s reply of November 23 and other supporting documents related to the second mission were all delivered by President Senghor to the OAU Chairman on November 30, 1971. The Senghor report stressed what the Senegalese President perceived as positive elements from the replies from both Cairo and Jerusalem.

In accordance with the Dakar directives, and after consultation with the Sub-Committee of the Four, President Daddah immediately submitted the substance of these replies to secretary-General U. Thant and Special Representative, Dr. Jarring. The Daddah report to the Secretariat was delivered by his special mission composed of the Foreign Ministers of Senegal, Nigeria, Mauritania, Zaire, the Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the United Nations, and a representative of the OAU Secretariat. The special mission also briefed the five permanent members of the Security Council on the efforts of the OAU Committee of Ten. But the report was not immediately circulated among the rest of the OAU Member States and the General Assembly as a whole.93

The report of President Daddah’s mission shows that the Egyptian and Israeli stances remained unchanged in their replies. Both governments still maintained their original positions on the issue of the resumption of the Jarring Mission. Israel would have to give a positive response to Jarring’s February 8, 1971, memorandum and accept “prior commitment on withdrawal.” On the other hand, Israel wanted the resumption of the Jarring Mission “without preconditions.” On the other five points, Israel’s replies were conditional “yes,” all depending on the outcome of “negotiations” between the parties concerned. Major emphasis was on “negotiations” and “mutual agreement” between the parties. Egypt’s replies were positive and specific, but again were all based on an Israeli commitment to withdrawal from all territories occupied during the June 1967 war. Egypt withheld response to the proposal that an agreement for the evacuation of occupied territories be defined in a peace settlement.

President Senghor’s “positive elements,”94 while generally true, were not new. They were nebulous and deliberately vague positions adopted by both governments for diplomatic reasons. Yassin El-Ayouty has made the following observations on the second mission:

it becomes apparent that the Jarring-type of African memorandum, which was handed by President Senghor of Senegal to Prime Minister Golda Meir of November, 1971, did not succeed in eliciting the reconciliation of essentials in the respective positions. Aside from providing the parties with the opportunity for agreeing with the basic African
Kunirum Osia

objective—namely, the need for resuming the Jarring talks—the mission accomplished very little.95

Egyptian and Israeli Replies to OAU recommendations show that each side stuck to its position before and after meeting with the delegation96 The impression given by President Senghor’s view of Egypt’s and Israel's replies of November 23 and 27, 1971, reflects some naivety in presuming a success where indeed there was failure in the peace efforts. By stressing the three “positive elements” common to both replies, Senghor was attempting to suggest a success where there was actually none, because the primary element necessary, but still lacking at the end of November 1971, was Israel’s positive response to the Jarring memorandum of February 8. The extent of the confusion in the African positions was even more apparent in the General Assembly debate on the Middle East situation which followed the Peace Mission.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON PROPOSALS OF AFRICAN PEACE MISSION

The debates that ensued as a result of the proposals presented by the African peace mission revealed unusual allegiances as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict was concerned. At the meetings of the African Group, it was apparent that there was very little agreement on the meaning of the findings of the OAU Commission of Ten and, more importantly, what policy position the OAU States should push through the General Assembly. Because the OAU Chairman’s report had not been made available to the African Heads of State and Government and their Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, many African delegates in New York pointed out that

it would be extremely difficult to undertake concerted action during the debate since they had no instructions from their governments, nor the information on the exact substance of the report already submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General and the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council.97

Faced with this awkward situation, Daddah’s special mission, therefore, consulted with the OAU Chairman on the propriety of delivering immediately to the African ambassadors for transmission to their Heads of State, copies of the Dakar memorandum, plus the replies of the Egyptian and Israeli authorities. This was eventually arranged, with copies sent under “confidential seal.”98

Members of the special mission, in consultation with the entire African Group, in general, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt in particular, prepared for the African Group a provisional draft for submission to
the UN General Assembly. The principal purpose of this draft resolution was “to take note of the positive aspects of the work of the Committee of Ten and the Sub-Committee of Four to reactivate Ambassador Jarring’s mission.”99 But the special mission, belabored by confusion and distrust already prevailing among African delegations at Turtle Bay, was successful in its efforts to obtain enough support for their provisional draft resolution. The African Group rejected it and, instead, selected a new working-party, under the Chairmanship of Zambia’s Permanent Representative, who would work in close collaboration with the leader of Egyptian delegation. A new draft resolution was eventually produced. It is instructive to note that by asking the Chairman of the African UN group to work closely with the Egyptian delegation a key role was entrusted to Egypt in the whole peace mission.

Three distinct viewpoints emerged from the discussions of the African Group at the United Nations. First, some African delegations felt that the drafts prepared by the members of the special mission were not available, so the General Assembly had no official knowledge of the committee’s proposals, which they felt were sufficient to reactivate Dr. Jarring’s mission. They also felt that it was sufficient to mention the obligation of both parties to the conflict to abide by the principles reaffirmed in the Security Council Resolution 242. This group argued that it would be a good policy to limit a draft resolution to inviting the parties to the conflict to resume negotiations under Ambassador Jarring with a view to the implementation of the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 242.

Second, a group of OAU states (of which Zambia, Nigeria, and Egypt were part) argued that a resolution could not ensure the reactivation of the Jarring Mission if Israel was not obligated to respond favorably to the proposals contained in the memorandum of February 8, 1971. In their view, more emphasis should be put on the efforts of the Ten-Man Committee, as well as on the conclusion expressed by Ambassador Jarring to the OAU current Chairman and contained in his report to the General Assembly on the Middle East situation. This is why it was insisted that the draft resolution should express the General Assembly support for the initiative taken by Dr. Jarring to implement Resolution 242. Similarly, the General Assembly should express appreciation for the positive reply made by Cairo to the Jarring initiative, as well as appeal to Jerusalem to reply favorably to the proposals of February 8, 1971.

Third, while broadly supportive of the second, they argued that the Israeli Government should be condemned for its negative attitude toward the OAU initiative and over its refusal to implement the UN Resolution 242. Finally, the second viewpoint was generally accepted.

The provisional draft resolution of the working-party was finally approved by the African Group and submitted to the General Assembly as the draft resolution, with nine other non-African states as co-sponsors.100 Of the twelve OAU states which co-sponsored the twenty-one-power draft, five were members of
the OAU Ten-Man Committee—Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Tanzania. Senegal initially co-sponsored the twenty-one-power draft, but eventually withdrew at the instruction of Dakar and, instead, submitted three amendments to the same draft, all of which were rejected.

The Barbados-Ghanaian draft resolution laid emphasis on the efforts of the OAU Ten-Man Committee, but later was withdrawn because of opposition from the majority of the OAU states, many of which felt that the Barbados-Ghana draft resolution circulated the contents of confidential OAU document, which had not been considered by the African Heads of State. Similarly, Barbados-Ghanaian amendments to the draft resolution A/L 650 were also rejected by the General Assembly; The General Assembly equally rejected the Latin American amendment, which tended to favor the Jerusalem Government. Only the European amendments were incorporated in the draft resolution.

Finally, the UN General Assembly passed the draft resolution, as the GA Res. 2799 (XXVI) on December 13, 1971, by a vote of seventy-nine to seven, with thirty-six abstentions. The African vote was twenty-three in favor, and two absent; namely, Mauritius and Swaziland.

Algeria abstained on the grounds that the draft resolution did not take into account the fact that Israel was the aggressor while the Arabs were the victims. Morocco did not vote for the draft resolution because the text was a “bonus for intransigence” with many concessions having been made by Arabs and “none by Israel.” Liberia did not support the draft resolution because it was unrealistic for the Assembly to assume that Israel had not responded favorably to the Jarring memorandum. The OAU mission had come to the conclusion that there was no wide divergence between the positions of Israel and the Arab states.

This was, essentially, the position of Ivory Coast which abstained, particularly because of paragraph five of the draft resolution, which it considered likely to create difficulties and diminish the “constructive work of the OAU mission.”

The General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXVI) of December 13, 1971, was very similar in content and context to the OAU/Res: 66 (VIII) of June 23, 1971. It expressed,


Additionally, it reaffirmed that the “Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November, 1967, should be implemented immediately in all its parts in
order to achieve a just and lasting peace,” in Middle East in which every state in the area can live in security. The General Assembly also requested that the Secretary-General

take the necessary measure to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to reach a peace agreement as envisaged in the Special Representative’s aid-memoire of February, 1971.

Furthermore, it expressed “its full support for all efforts of the Special Representative to implement Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November, 1967.” The Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXVI) also noted “with appreciation the positive reply given by Egypt to the Special Representative’s initiative,” and called “upon Israel to respond favorably to the Special Representative’s peace initiative.” Finally, the General assembly requested

the Security Council to consider, if necessary, making arrangements, under the relevant Articles of the Charter of the United nations, with regard to the implementation of its resolution.

This was a veiled reference to the application by the Security Council of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, especially Articles 39, 40, 41, and 42.

ANALYSIS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE PEACE MISSION

Although the African peace initiative of June-December 1971, has been variously described as “quasi” mediation, a pilgrimage for peace, clarifiers of positions, re-activators or facilitators, there has been a consensus that it was also a collective conciliation-mediation effort on the part of African States. The only outstanding exception, as Ran Kochan noted, was the extreme emphasis on the role of President Leopold Senghor. In his view, this all-African effort was simply “the one-man mission of President Senghor,” emphasizing that “there is no doubt that the generating force behind the African peace mission was President Senghor.” Of course, as the Chairman of the Sub-Committee of Four, and given his experience and international political stature, he was an acceptable leader of the Four Heads of State and Government. It is certainly a misplaced judgment to view the African Peace Mission as an exercise dominated by a single individual and there does not seem to be any evidence for Ran Kochan’s conclusion. It must be reiterated that the Sub-Committee of Four was only carrying out the OAU mandate. The style used by individual members of the committee in executing the OAU mandate should not be interpreted as “one-man mission.”
However, the outcome of the African peace mission has variants of interpretations: inadequate planning; lack of communication; lack of unanimity within the African Group, especially at the General Assembly debates; lack of support from the Super Powers; the intransigence of the Israeli and Egyptian governments; and African States’ partiality.

**Inadequate Planning**

The work of the OAU Committee of Ten lasted nearly 170 days (i.e., six months), from the issuance of the mandate on June 23 in Addis Ababa, to the passage of the UN General resolution 2799 (XXVI) on December 20, 1971—an act that should be considered to have marked the end of the peace mission’s work. Two months had expired by the time the Committee of Ten held its first session for preliminary plans on August 23 in Kinshasa. One month later, the OAU Chairman, President Moktar Ould Daddah, went to New York for consultations with Secretary-General U. Thant and his Special Representative, Dr. Gunnar Jarring (i.e., September 24–29). There was apparent inactivity by the Committee in October. Then from November 2 to 30, the Senghor Sub-Committee and its parent Committee of Ten embarked on a herculean task of conciliation-mediation to be completed before the General Assembly debate on the Middle East situation in December. The Ten-Man Committee, therefore, spent about 130 days on the preparatory work, and only 30 days in actual talks with the parties to the conflict. Inasmuch as thorough planning is essential for a successful international conciliation effort, the Committee obviously spent a disproportionately large amount of its time on phase one and not enough time on the second phase. Given the rigid and meticulous Israeli diplomacy, and their lukewarm attitude toward the African peace initiative, it was a diplomatic miscalculation by African Heads of State to have expected to obtain sufficient concessions from Jerusalem to insure the success of their mission with such a poorly planned timetable.

**Lack of Communication-Engineering**

A second shortcoming of the peace mission was the lack of adequate communication, first within the Ten-Man Committee and then between it and its Sub-Committee of Four. Constant exchange of views and information was essential for the Ten-Man Committee to maintain the effective system of communication necessary for a smooth discharge of their function. The participation in the work of the Ten by Tanzania and the Ivory Coast, to say the least, was marginal, and the disagreements among the Committee of Ten during the General Assembly debates could have been, at least minimized by an enlighten mechanism of consultation.

At another level, there seemed to be a communication gap between the OAU Chairman and the rest of his fellow Heads of State and Government.
From June 24 to November 30, there was no evidence that President Daddah attempted to keep African capitals informed on the progress of his conciliation committee, unless of course, it was believed that publicity could jeopardize the outcome of the efforts of the committee. When he dispatched his special mission to report to Secretary-General U. Thant and Ambassador Jarring on the “findings” of the Ten-Man Committee it would have been more appropriate for President Daddah to do likewise to the various African Heads of State, together with an appeal for the necessity of an African unity behind a common policy position at the General Assembly. Such a judicious move would have facilitated communications between the African capitals and their respective delegates in New York, unless, again, there had been an unspoken understanding among the leaders for silence. This would have helped to minimize the disagreement within the African Group, which confused many non-African States and detracted from the support the OAU should have received for the UN draft resolution.

Furthermore, the manner in which the General Assembly members were notified of the report of the OAU peace efforts was not helpful to the African diplomatic efforts during the General Assembly debates. For instance, on December 9, Israel reported to the United Nations both its November 28 response to the Dakar memorandum, plus the African memorandum from the OAU current Chairman on the “findings” of the peace mission. On the following day, December 10, Egypt responded by supplying the UN members with copies of its November 23 reply to President Senghor.

Lack of Support from the Super Powers

The super powers showed no interest in assisting the African States in their peace missions to Egypt and Israel. Even though Ambassador Jarring’s mission came to a standstill, “the U.S. and the USSR confirmed their desire to contribute to his mission’s success and also declared their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.”

The African States got no assistance even though one of their initial resolves was to put “pressure on the great powers to find a solution to the Middle East conflict based upon the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967.”

Disappointed about this lack of support from the super powers, Senghor added his opinion saying: I have the impression that the Great Powers, the developed countries, believe that it is up to them—to the white—to solve problems, and not the blacks. It is important, however, to note that the limitations and eventual failure of the African peace efforts were inevitable where and “when important interests of the Great Powers and an international organization are involved.” From 1967 to 1971, the African States emphasized in their annual conference resolutions, the crucial role of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This meant, in fact, the role of the five permanent members of the Council in general, but particularly the role of the two Super-Powers.
Lack of Unanimity within the African UN Group

African states were generally in agreement on the need for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, a principle embedded in the OAU Charter in provisions relating to territorial integrity, and on the importance of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. There was, however, no unanimity on the essence of the African efforts to seek peace in the Middle East, which, in turn, led to conflicting interpretations of the Dakar memorandum and the Cairo and Jerusalem replies. The objectives of the elements of peace were not synchronized. The basic conflict centered less on what was to be done than on whether Israel should first withdraw its troops or only after a negotiated settlement had been realized. There was controversy over whether withdrawal meant all territories occupied during the 1967 war or whether territorial changes for security purposes were contemplated.

Secretary-General U. Thant’s report on the Jarring Mission helped indirectly, to maintain this discord. The report clearly made a positive Israeli response to the Jarring memorandum of February 8, 1971, the essential element in the resumption of the Jarring talks. Thant emphasized that

it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassador Jarring’s attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to this question and respond favorably.

Many African delegations supportive of the twenty-one-power draft resolution, therefore, cited U. Thant’s statement to support their understandings of the essence of the OAU initiative, especially in the light of President Daddah’s letter of October 12, 1971, to President Senghor, which underscored the Thant-Jarring briefing in September.

The Intransigence of Israel and Egypt

The attitude of the Israeli government was also a contributing factor to the failure of the OAU initiatives. The diplomatic subtleties in Israeli press communiqués indicated disdain for the Jarring memorandum of February 8, with the effect of pleasing its traditional supporters within the African Group while simultaneously antagonizing the mainstream neutral and pro-Arab group. For instance, Foreign Minister Eban’s remark in the General Assembly that the draft resolution was a “repudiation of the effort by the African Heads of State,” drew a sharp rejoinder from Nigeria’s Permanent Representative:

This is typical of the attitude of trying to divide and rule; trying to embarrass us by saying, will you now go back on the recommendation of your Heads of State? That is not the issue.
The first indication of Israel’s intention to circumvent Dr. Jarring memorandum of February 8 was when Ambassador Tekoah, Israel’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, communicated officially to the UN membership as an annex to his letter of December 9, 1971, to the UN Secretary-General, the African proposals as the basis for resumption of the Jarring talks. This attitude was subsequently reinforced by Abba Eban’s statement in the General Assembly that “Israel accepts this (African formulation) as the occasion and starting point for renewing discussions.”

Of course, the circumventing of the Jarring formulation of February 8 through the vehicle of the so-called African proposals with the concurrence of the African States would have sharply contradicted not only the OAU’s long-standing “full support” of the Special Representative’s peace initiative, especially the proposals of February 8 memorandum, but also the assurance already publicly given to Secretary-General U. Thant and Ambassador Jarring to the effect that the OAU initiative was not a substitute for, but a complement to, Ambassador Jarring’s efforts. Furthermore, many African delegates resented what appeared to be Israeli maneuvers to force their interpretations of the OAU efforts on the Africans and the UN Assembly. President Ahidjo resented Israel’s “negative attitude with respect to initiatives to resolve the conflict partially or completely, and especially its arrogant refusal to retreat from Arab territories occupied in 1967.”

It is unfair to attribute the concept of intransigence to Israel alone at this period. Egypt also was unyielding in its demands that Israel withdraw from its occupied territories. It was “totally disenchanted with Senghor’s initiative” and felt that Senghor had far exceeded the limits of his task, which were as laid down in the June 1971 Addis Ababa resolution. Furthermore, Cairo saw Senghor’s maneuvering as an irritating obstacle, preventing the smooth passage of a resolution calling upon Israel to reply unconditionally and affirmatively to Jarring’s letter.

Egypt’s frustrations with Senghor and its lack of acknowledgement of African efforts are aspects of intransigence. At the UN debate on the African Peace mission,

Foreign Minister Riad and Egyptian delegates seemed less enthusiastic. Indeed Cairo was annoyed when the mission first arrived, believing that the mission was only complicating the situation. And its proposals did not advance Egypt’s campaign a single step.

The African States’ chances to salvage the peace mission were probably lost when there was overt partiality in the final stages of their effort toward Egypt. One would have thought initially that the composition of the Sub-Committee of Four was favorable to Israel.
Evidence of Partiality

Finally, the African peace efforts were weakened by some inkling of partiality to Egypt. This was demonstrated during the General Assembly debates when the head of the Egyptian delegation was allowed by the African Group to play a key role in the formulation of the General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXVI) of December 20, 1971. Egypt could not write a resolution that would condemn itself. President Daddah’s special mission consulted with the African Group in general, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt in particular, in the preparation of the provisional draft resolution. Also, the working-party, under the Chairmanship of Zambia’s Permanent Representative, worked in “close collaboration with the head of the Egyptian delegation,” in preparing its draft resolution.

Other evidence of partially to Egypt was reflected by President Senghor. When asked in 1972 what he thought about Israel’s attitude toward occupied Arab territories, especially on the Sharm-El Sheikh, Senghor explained:

If I were an Israeli, I would understand it. Being an African, I would understand the Egyptian position. Africa ends at the Sinai Peninsula. Territorial integrity has become a myth in our continent and both we and the Semites live on myths.139

That Israel, the other party to the conflict whose cooperation with the African Heads of State was very essential, was not given equal treatment with Egypt was a cardinal tactical error that antagonized Israel and undermined the promise of the OAU conciliation. Perhaps Egypt’s membership in the OAU was a strong factor that weighed heavily in its favor. But the success of any settlement lies in the impartiality of those who bring about the settlement. Egypt’s membership in the OAU should have been the very reason that militated against participation in such a capacity, because it simply reinforced Israel’s view of OAU’s partiality in the conflict and its commitment to support Egypt, a member state.

What is underscored here is the ambivalence of attitudes of the OAU states during the 1971 Middle East peace initiatives. Such ambivalence with built-in partiality is a logical progression inherent in collective internationalconciliation efforts of a nagging conflict like that of the Middle East. And partiality, once perceived by one of the parties to the conflict, inevitably leads to distrust, which culminates in a failure of conciliation efforts. With the passage of the General Assembly Resolution 2799 (XXVI) on December 20, 1971, and Israeli’s negative vote, it was clear that the African conciliation efforts had failed. And even more important, it was equally clear that Israel would not again accept another mission from Addis Ababa under similar circumstances.140
Africa's Unheralded Contributions to World Politics

Mission to the Vatican December 22, 1973

The break of diplomatic relations with the State of Israel did not preclude ancillary efforts on the parts of African States collectively or individually to continue to search for peace in the Middle East. A delegation of four African leaders visited Pope Paul VI on December 22, 1973.

It was not quite clear what these leaders discussed with the Pope. However, from the communiqué issued after the meeting, it was obvious that the Middle East crisis formed the core of their discussion. The Pope was told that, “They believed Jerusalem should not be under the exclusive control of any one religion” and there was the need to find a “just solution to the Middle East crisis, taking into account the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.”

The visit had some religious overtones because the leaders represented Coptic Ethiopia, Moslem Sudan, Christian Zambia, and Christian Liberia in the persons of Emperor Haile Selassie, President Numeiry, Foreign Minister Vernon Nwanga, and Vice-President James Edward Breen, respectively.

CONCLUSION

The discussion and analyses that form the central focus of this chapter have been an attempt to debunk the prevailing assumptions that often times assert that Africa observes from the sidelines of world politics. The lengthy and tortuous role played by African states in an attempt to resolve the impasse in the Arab-Israeli conflict of the late 1960s to early 1970s demonstrate that given certain contextual space they can be important if palpable actors in the world stage.

The Ten-Man Committee expended 130 days in preparing to engage in shuttle diplomacy. Meetings of Council of Ministers and ordinary sessions of the assembly of the Organization of African Unity convened several times between June 1971 and December 1971. While the mandated arrogated to themselves appeared simple: it consisted of doing everything in their power to see that the Security Council Resolution 242 was implemented by Egypt and Israel, with a specific intent on reactivating U. Thant’s Special Representative’s mission of obtaining a settlement between Israel and Egypt. Because Dr. Jarring did not obtain favorable response from Israel following his February 8, 1971, memorandum to both Israel and Egypt, his mission came to a dead end, which the African leaders wanted to assist in untangling. The main points of the memorandum were the issues of peace and withdrawal. Israel objected to the clause that required it to withdraw its forces to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine.

The shuttle diplomacy of four African heads of state led by President Senghor did their best to convince both Egypt and Israel of the need to
allow the resumption of mediation begun by Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. Responses were obtained from the parties. A report of their findings was presented and debated at the UN General Assembly. While the vote on the resolution that emanated from the report of the African mission was favorable as defined by the ratio of seventy-nine to seven, subsequent commentaries did not view the effort as successful. Our analysis has provided six possible reasons for the outcome of the mission. Perhaps the opinion of the leader of the mission, President Senghor said it all in terms of how the rest of the world, especially the super powers viewed African effort in world politics. Senghor expressed his disappointment when he said that the super powers showed no interest in and support for the African mission to the Middle East. This is especially evident in a speech he gave at the United Nations: We have denounced the imperialism of the great powers only to secrete a miniature imperialism toward our neighbors. We have demanded disarmament from the great powers only to transform our countries into arsenals. We proclaim our neutralism, but we do not always base it upon a policy of neutralism. I have the impression that the Great Powers, the developed countries, believe that it is up to them—the whites—to solve problems and not to the blacks”

An analysis of the responses from Egypt and Israel shows that the Egyptian and Israeli positions remained unchanged. Both parties still maintained their original positions on the issue of the resumption of the Jarring Mission. Israel would have had to give a positive response to Jarring’s February 8, 1971, memorandum and accept prior commitment on withdrawal. However, Israel wanted the resumption of the Jarring Mission without preconditions.

What is underscored in this chapter is that the Middle East problem at the time of the African mission was intractable. The Africans employed consultation and mediation, but the nature, situation, and intentions of the contending parties seemed to neutralize their effort. Counting the time devoted to their search for peace and the responses they were able to elicit from both Egypt and Israel and their visit to the Vatican on the same score two years later, demonstrate that Africans were not merely onlookers in World politics, but were credible actors whose efforts often times remain unheralded.

NOTES

3. The African “Peace Mission” is fully discussed in subsequent pages in this chapter.
5. Ibid., 28.
6. Ibid., 27
9. CM/Reso/134 (X), 1968.
13. Kochan, African Peace Mission in the Middle East, 261
15. Argwings Kodhek, then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Arab News and Views 14, no. 1 (November, 1968): 4
17. CM/ST. 10 (XII), February, 1969.
18. The Conference was attended by the following states: Burundi, CAR, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia
19. For full text of President Kaunda’s address, see Africa Quarterly: A Journal of African Affairs 10, no. 1 (April-June, 1969): 48–52. Emphasize added to highlight the perception of African leaders and government as far as the Middle East crisis was concerned.
20. Ibid., 41–42.
25. West Africa, September 6, 1969, 1069. Many states subsequently objected to attempts by Diallo Telli, the OAU Secretary-General to introduce the Middle East issue through the back door.
34. West Africa. June 25, 1971, p.716
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. “Most significant was the fact that this resolution marked a distinct departure from previous OAU stands in regard to the conflict, for it was the first time that the collective body of African States had conceded openly that ‘the continued Israeli occupation constitutes a serious threat to the regional peace of Africa’ and thus was the direct concern of OAU states. This was an important turning point which led eventually to a complete switch in the African States’ attitudes towards the conflict, and most particularly—toward Israel.” Kochan, “African Peace Mission,” 262.
40. Ibid. Also, it should be noted here that the 7th Summit of the East-Central African States met in Mogadishu, Somalia, from October 18 to 20, 1971, and reaffirmed “its total support for the solution of the OAU AHG/Resol. 66 (VII) calling for the immediate withdrawal” of Israeli forces from Arab lands. See Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record* 4: 17. The Mogadishu summit expressed solidarity with Egypt, which appreciated its positive reply to Ambassador Jarring’s peace initiative of February 8, 1971, and urged the OAU Peace Mission of Ten, and its Subcommittee of Four, to exert all efforts to secure from Israel as soon as possible before November 10, 1971, a similar positive reply. Four members of this group were in the Peace Mission: Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Zaire. (The Peace Mission is discussed in the following section of this chapter in detail).
42. This line of reasoning led to the ejection of the Israeli Ambassador from the OAU Summit in Kinshasa, in September 1967; similarly, an Israeli observer was refused participation at the Tunis session of the UN Economic Commission for Africa.
47. AHG/Res. 66 (VIII), para. 6, June, 1971.
49. UN Document A/854 (s/10403), 30 November 1971, Annex III.
50. U.N Document A/854 (s/10403), 30 November 1971, Annex II.
52. OAU Doc. AHG/60, 2; Previous OAU resolutions on the crisis in the Middle East are: AHG/Res. 53 (V), September, 1968; AHG/Res. 57 (VI), September, 1969; AHG/Res. 62 (VII), September, 1970; and AHG/Res. 6 (VIII), June, 1971.
53. OAU Doc. AHG/60, 2.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., 4.
56. Ibid., 5.
57. Ibid.
Africa’s Unheralded Contributions to World Politics 117

58. Legum, “Israel’s year in Africa,” A126
63. Memorandum from the OAU Committee of Ten, November 13, 1971.
64. Ibid., 3.
65. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
74. OAU Doc. AHG/60, Annex III, 2; also see West Africa, September 3, 1971, 1010.
75. Ibid., 2.
76. According to Ran Kochan, the membership of the sub-Committee was initially proposed to be five, with Ethiopia included, but the Emperor declined to be in the Sub-Committee. He also asserts that though Senghor was the Chairman, the Chairmanship of the Sub-Committee had been offered to Daddah, Mobutu, and Selassie, but all of them declined for various reasons; see Ran Kochan, “An African Peace Mission in the Middle East,” 190.
77. OAU Doc. AHG/60, Annex III.
78. OAU Doc. AHG/60, 6–7.
82. Ibid., discussions of November 6, and 7, 1971, Jerusalem.
84. Ibid; Jon Woronoff, op. cit., 41.
85. Tanzania did not attend the Dakar session because it was protesting against Committee’s deviation from its original terms of reference as stipulated by OAU Resolution 66 (VIII) of June 23, 1971.
86. Kochan, African Peace Mission in the Middle East, 190.
88. Ibid.
89. OAU Doc. AHG/60, 7, Annex VI, s/ccttee OAU/4/2
90. OAU Doc. AHG/60, 7, Annex VI, s/ccttee OAU/4/2
91. OAU Doc. AHG/60, 7, Annex VI, s/ccttee OAU/4/2
92. OAU Doc. AHG/60, 7, Annex VI, s/ccttee OAU/4/2
94. OAU Doc. AHG/60, 12
97. OAU Doc. AHG/60, 14
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid. See also Legum, “Israel’s Year in Africa,” A131.
100. The draft resolution was co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Spain, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, and Zambia; see UN Doc. A/L, Add. 1 and 2 of December 10 and 11, 1971.
104. The so-called Latin American amendment was co-sponsored by Costa Rica, Haiti, Uruguay; see Doc. A/L 652, Add. 1.
106. The seven “no” votes were cast by Israel, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Uruguay.
107. The following states voted for the resolution: Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Rwanda.
108. The sixteen abstentions were: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, CAR, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Senegal, Upper Volta, Zaire.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. OAU Resolution AHG/66 (VIII).
115. Ibid.
117. GA Res. 2799 (XXVI), para. 4.
118. Ibid., para. 5.
119. Ibid., para. 6.
120. Ibid., para. 9.
130. Ibid.
Africa’s Unheralded Contributions to World Politics

134. Ibid.
137. President Sadat pointedly mentioned the Jarring Mission, but never made any allusion whatsoever to the OAU Peace efforts in the Middle East in his article, “Where Egypt Stands,” Foreign Affairs 51, no. 1 (October 1972): 114–123
140. Kochan, op. cit., 196.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Decalo, Samuel. “Israel’s Foreign Policy and the Third World.” ORBIS 11, no. 3 (1967).


INTRODUCTION

What we think we know about Somalia—piracy and lack of governance, for example—bears little resemblance to the experience of half the Somali population, in what is now Somaliland. To the extent that Somalilanders have built effective systems based on local political and economic institutions, however, they warrant our examination. Local, participatory processes, such as those in Somaliland, are one of the keys to creating more resilient and sustainable societies in Africa and elsewhere in the face of increasing global uncertainty.

Somaliland might well be “the first, indigenous, modern African form of government to achieve stability through a regime employing traditional social systems within a democratizing framework, while maintaining an emphasis on individual and collective self reliance.” However, it also has significance beyond Africa in the scope of international politics. Many recognize that we are at the beginning of a new era, one that calls for greater local resilience. Rob Hopkins, leader of the Transition Town movement, argues that we have entered the long emergency of the triple crises of peak oil, global climate change, and economic instability. This emergency can be successfully met, he goes on, through the formation of locally focused (though not totally self-sufficient) resilient communities. Similarly, in the early 2000s Chris Lewis, professor in American Studies at University of Colorado, Boulder, wrote that as global industrial civilization collapses, “our hope lives in the creation of local and regional cultures and economies that can truly solve these problems by focusing on sustainable development, the health of local peoples and communities, and the redemocratization of everyday life.” Finally, Sujai Shivakumar, a senior program officer for the Board on Science, Technology, and Economy, argues that to achieve a “democratic civilization in this new century, we have to constitute self-governing societies where individuals as citizens are capable of participating effectively in the public realm.” Somaliland helps to point the way to some effective means of addressing basic human needs that most mainstream analyses in the United States, at least, have yet to pay much attention to.
In this view, African peoples can play an important role in helping us to question dominant ways of thinking about political organization and free us to imagine different forms of organization and the ways in which they might be, first, better suited to African realities and second, better able to respond to the environmental and economic challenges that many predict will profoundly shape our future.

That few know about Somaliland stems in part from the fact that the global political system marginalizes some African nations by labeling them as failed states—states that do not have centralized governments able to exert control over the populace within colonially determined boundaries. The 2010 Failed States Index is a good example of such labeling. The index is based on twelve degrees of failure; on all but one indicator, external intervention, African states lead. On this exception, Afghanistan is the leader. In all the other indices, such as human rights, factionalized elites, and economic decline, an African state or two or three lead the rest of countries in their exhibition of the trait. In regard to economic decline and illegitimate governments, an African country shares the highest ranking with one other non-African country, North Korea and Afghanistan, respectively. Somalia has been the number one failed state for three years in a row.5

Of course, the failed state judgment is only the most current form of Western-judged African exceptionalism. Before that, the focus was on other signs of Africa’s political and economic weaknesses—African dictators, corruption, and military takeovers. For example, Freedom House’s “Map of Freedom” has displayed the countries of the world based on whether they were “free,” “partly free,” or “not free” for decades. Since at least 2002, the preponderance of countries in the last two categories is in Africa and Asia.6

Failed states follow from a view of the modern state that assumes “all states are essentially alike and function in the same way” by controlling their borders, having a monopoly on the use of force, and generally supervise the management and regulation of economic, social, and political processes in accordance with Western standards.7 The broader assumption, as Goran Hyden puts it, is “that if African states only adopt the policies used successfully in other parts of the world, they would move ahead and prosper. There is little, if any, sensitivity to contextual differences, especially in the cultural realm.”8 Nor is there any sensitivity to the fact that a changing global political and economic environment might call for different political models.

Negative judgments and partial information reflect a power dynamic—one that often goes unacknowledged. If failed states were a truly global phenomenon, then, one might be inclined to consider that we are entering a new historical era marked by the rise of failed states.9 However, since the preponderance of so-called failed states are in Africa, one has to wonder if this is another example of Western domination or neo-colonialism, of outsiders determining what is normal and what is not and imposing often
ill-considered actions on those so-judged.\textsuperscript{10} Martin Boas and Kathleen Jennings argue that “the use of the failed state label is inherently political, and based primarily on Western perceptions of Western security and interests.” There are numerous states where the “recession and informalisation of the state” occur, but those labeled failed are ones that are perceived to be threats to Western interests, such as Somalia.

Other states with similar recession of state power, such as Nigeria, facilitate an “enabling environment for business and international capital” and are not labeled as failed states.\textsuperscript{11} Boas and Jennings continue that the West tends to regard failed states as a security threat and, increasingly, as possible havens for terrorism. Because such categorizations are generally made without context or historical knowledge, they tend to encourage analysis and intervention that is superficial and ill informed.\textsuperscript{12} Boas and Jennings argue that labeling states “failed” “delineates the acceptable range of policy options that can be exercised against those states.” Thus, Afghanistan’s, Liberia’s, and Somalia’s failure is to be handled militarily. Nigeria’s and Sudan’s (after 1998) are not.\textsuperscript{13} In this view, the label serves Western interests rather than satisfactorily explaining local development or offering effective strategies for change.

Moreover, as U.S. interests become increasingly interventionary, an awareness of labeling and what it obscures is important. During the same interval of rebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan, people in a region within larger Somalia, Somaliland, have been rebuilding their own political systems despite dozens of failed external nation-building attempts.\textsuperscript{14} As Somali scholar Iaon Lewis notes, the failure of internationally led peacekeeping and nation-building efforts in Somalia over the last twenty years and the consolidation of a democratic state in Somaliland, “says more about the character of contemporary international affairs than about . . . largely home-made Somali institutions.”\textsuperscript{15} It is imperative that as much attention go to successful political rebuilding as to political failures, particularly if coverage of such failures is serving powerful political and economic forces.

Our attention should be on how African states serve the needs of their population, not how they meet external criteria or concerns. As economic and cultural globalization continues to be a powerful force around the globe, part of the challenge is to retain awareness of a variety of economic, cultural, and political models and the particular geographical and historical circumstances in which they arrive and thrive. Thus, students of both African history and African politics have been intrigued by Somalia over the last thirty years and rightly so. Failure is a description that does little to help us understand the particularities of this place and its people. It is also one that after several decades might more aptly describe foreign state-makers than Somali people. Pham argues that the prolongation of the decades old crisis is a “failure of imagination.”\textsuperscript{16} After all, our global and historical reality, including the last few decades, is one of immense diversity and adaptation to place.\textsuperscript{17}
Thus, with an understanding of the failures and dangers of Western labels, we are in a position to depart from narrow, Western-concerned ideas and to embrace not only African realities but also potential models for a more resilient future. Some U.S. scholars of the twentieth century who were interested in creating more humane and ecologically sensitive societies wrote about the importance of regionalism and the public, as opposed to the nation-state. In addition, those writing about economic development have long recognized that local development, rather than externally oriented development has been the key to economic success historically, despite contemporary calls for freer international trade as a panacea. Using these theories as a foundation for rethinking what is happening in Somaliland and in the world in relation to Somalia is one way of beginning to turn ill-informed judgment into a better-informed respect for the ways in which Somaliland helps to illuminate how peoples might have to respond to upcoming crises such as global climate change, peak oil, and economic decline. The ideals of the nation-state and unregulated free trade are likely too limited for the challenges of our present and future.

SOMALI REALITIES

One way to read recent Somali history, as foreign policy analyst Seth Kaplan argues, is that “persistent efforts to reequip Somalia with a centralized state—carried out despite the repeated failures of such efforts in the past—show a lack of appreciation for the informal institutions that drive Somali society.” Somalia has unusual ethnic homogeneity for Africa, thus most Somalis share a common language, religion (Sunni Islam), and culture. They also share a common economy, one that mitigates against state formation. The majority of Somalis, at least 60 percent, are nomads or have nomadic affiliations. A small percentage of Somalis are cultivators, either alone or in conjunction with livestock keeping. The persistence of livestock keeping in Somalia’s history is long-standing. Iaon Lewis notes that despite increasing urbanism in the last half of the twentieth century,

from the president downwards, at all levels of government and administration, those living with a modern lifestyle in urban conditions have brothers and cousins living as nomads in the interior and regularly have shares in joint livestock herds. Civil servants commonly invest in livestock, including camels, that are herded by their nomadic kinsmen.

As one scholar has noted, “The very idea of the state is totally alien to Somali culture and was unknown before the colonial period. . . . Nomad society is essentially anarchic.” In addition, the rugged individualism and suspicion of others with whom one might have to compete for pasture and water make Somalis far less likely to submit to a “higher sovereign authority.”

The best-known institution in Somali society is that of the clan and lineage. Goran Hyden, drawing on work by H.P. Mueller argues for Africa more generally that “state institutions play a limited role in societies where extensive lineage systems still prevail.” Any type of governance in the area has to reckon with the fact that Somalis do not share (and have never shared) a common large-scale political structure. Family genealogies provide basic group structure and identity. Somali are divided into six clans and some minority groups. Each clan has numerous sub-clans that “join or split in a fluid process of ‘constant decomposition and recomposition.’” Clans might trace their common ancestry back twenty generations or more. A primary lineage has a span of six to ten generations and marriage is forbidden among its members. These large groups are broken down into smaller dia-paying groups that have more day-to-day salience. The dia-paying group is “the basic jural and political unit of northern Somali society,” wrote Ioan Lewis. It ranges from four to eight generations and could have three hundred to several thousand male members. This group’s primary responsibility is to collect and render payment of blood compensation. If a group member is wronged, the group exacts revenge or achieves reparations collectively. In the reverse situation, the members would be collectively responsible for reparations. Dia-paying members are bound by formal contract. At every level, all male elder councils, shir, are held to make decisions. In addition, customary law governs behavior. Councils and customary law have long histories and continue to operate independently of the modern state.

During the colonial period, the Somali’s land was divided between the British (in the north), the Italians (in the south), the French (Djibouti), British-run Kenya, and independent Ethiopia. British colonialism in Somaliland was marked by caution and appeasement, after a twenty-year engagement with the “brilliantly resourceful” Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan’s guerilla movement between 1900 and 1920. For example, the British never implemented a poll tax and there was little investment in education. Thus, many Somaliland institutions remained relatively strong. Yet, important changes did take place. During the colonial era, the British and Italians chose clan chiefs, whose decisions then held more authority than the meeting of all adult males. Centers of trade introduced possibilities for relaxing clan identities and commitments as well. For example, a town dweller might choose to collect money in a bank rather than invest it in livestock. Despite these changes, dia-paying groups were still important and ties with the lineages and rural kin remained significant.

At independence in 1960, the British and Italian halves merged and many Somalis harbored desires to bring all Somali people together under one leader. Today, about half of Somalis live outside Somalia in Africa and elsewhere. Such desires were at the heart of Somalia’s efforts to bring Ogaden, Ethiopia, under its control almost fifteen years after independence.

Clan politics dominated the first era of Somali independence. Mohamed Siad Barre came to power in 1969 in response to increasing dissatisfaction
with Abdirashid Ali Shermaake’s rule. Barre adopted a scientific socialist platform in 1970 that relied on unity and self-reliance. He viewed lineage politics and multipartyism as obstacles to success. Barre banned collective payment of blood money and lineage genealogies and emphasized marriage as a personal rather than kinship contract. People were settled on communes where clans were deliberately mixed and Somalis were not to refer to a person’s clan affiliation, but to call each other “comrade.” These were unpopular steps. Yet, when threatened with loss of the presidency, he began to favor the sub-clans to which his family members belonged, demonstrating something his citizens already knew: clan ties remained integral to Somali society.

In 1977, in the chaos after the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, Somalia attacked the Ethiopian garrison in the Ogaden. But, newly gained Soviet support of Ethiopia lead to Somali defeat in 1978. This defeat galvanized already-present resentment against Mohamed Siad Barre’s brutal dictatorship. It also brought refugees from Ogaden into Somalia and upset existing clan structures. Guerilla groups, both clan-based and regional, formed to bring down Barre’s regime and civil war broke out in 1988. One element of this violence was located in the north. After the failed invasion of Ogaden, more than a million Somalis left Ethiopia for Somalia and half of them settled in the north. Barre provided aid, jobs, land, and weapons to the new citizens. But, instead of using the weapons for another attempt to liberate Ogaden, many formed the Somali National Movement to overthrow Barre’s government. Due to these efforts and others, Barre was overthrown in 1991. The chaos that has ensued has been the primary lens through which Somalia’s current events have been examined. More than two million Somali became refugees in other African countries, the Middle East, Europe, and North America by the late 2000s.

There were two important developments during this era to note. The first is the increasing contact that Somalis of different clans had with each other, as a result of the Ogaden conflict, but also as a result of famine in 1974–1975 and the resettlement of thousands of northern Somalis, mostly in the south. Since the civil war, though, most Somalis returned to their original clan areas, reinforcing local, clan-based institutions. The second is that as a result of the Cold War the area was flush with weaponry that otherwise would not have been available. The United States, under Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), gave $500 million in military aid to Somalia, $100 million more than the United States had given Ethiopia during their twenty-five-year relationship. Without the weapons, it is far more likely that these conflicts would have been settled in ways other than violent ones. And, this must be taken into account when we hear or read, as journalist Charles Lemos contends that, “Since the early 1990s, [Somalia’s] civil war has been one of the most destructive in recent African history.” Another effect of the Cold War, according to Pham is that it likely postponed the dissolution of the Somali state.
CHAOS OR ORDER?

As scholars and citizens concerned about our collective future, we can focus on the fourteen international agreements and the fifteenth change in broader Somali government since 1991 as Lemos’ comment and most Western media coverage does, and lament the lack of progress in building a nation-state. Or, we can look at the evidence of successful, localized forms of political, economic, and judicial control in Somaliland and to a lesser extent in Puntland. Overall, the areas of Somaliland and Puntland are home to almost two thirds of Somalis.

There are many historically rooted institutions that have served to meet the needs of Somalis over the last twenty years. Koranic schools, for example, fill some social needs. And, sharia-based Islamic courts have become the main judicial system. They are the basis of the ICU (Islamic Courts Union) that managed to gain control of the southern part of the country in 2006 in place of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The ICU brought stability, particularly to Mogadishu, and even managed to reopen the international airport there. It was precisely as the ICU gained some effective control that the United States and Ethiopia militarily intervened to depose the ICU and attack terrorist targets in 2006. Local clan militias as well as the “indiscriminate violence perpetrated by the US-backed ‘Counterterrorism Alliance’ also strengthened the ICU.” The TFG, a creation of the United Nations, with support of the United States and Great Britain, in comparison, was weak. Political scientist Brian Hesse argues that the current TGF hangs on by a thread and that “a complete dissolution of Mogadishu-based central governance would not necessarily lead to absolute anarchy” because traditional sources, such as the shir (elder discussions) and sheikh (religious jurisprudence), still exist. Other institutions, such as the dia-paying groups offer “security to Somali pastoralists through the threat of collective retribution” and the xeer, “a tradition of ad hoc covenants” govern relations between clans regarding common resources such as grazing land and water. No other externally introduced governments have achieved as much security and normalcy as the ICU did.

And, even more importantly and significantly, arising out of the ashes of the thirty-year experiment in Somali nationhood is the Republic of Somaliland, in the northwestern part of what was Somalia, incorporating almost half of the population of the former Somalia. According to Kaplan, Somaliland has held “three consecutive competitive elections since its constitutional referendum in 2001, has a parliament controlled by opposition parties, and boasts a vibrant economy dominated by the private sector.” In contrast to the ICU government, the Somaliland government is based on clan decision-making. Clan authority is typically emphasized as the root of Somalia’s problems but Somaliland has been able to rebuild by integrating “traditional ways of governance with a modern state apparatus.” This bottom-up approach also strongly contrasts with the experiences of their
southern neighbor, where foreign-styled and foreign-led attempts to create national governments have been forged many times only to fail, with the exception being the locally produced and internationally feared ICU.\textsuperscript{56}

The Isaaq clan, comprising 70 percent of the region’s population, dominates Somaliland. Somalilanders share a different colonial history than southern Somalia and suffered discrimination after integration into an independent Somalia. In fact, six months after union with former Italian Somalia, an unsuccessful coup sought to restore Somaliland autonomy.\textsuperscript{57} And, more than half of northerners rejected a provisional constitution to unite the two territories after independence.\textsuperscript{58} Southern peoples and culture dominated the new government and discriminated against northerners. Northerners filled most of the technical posts and southerners most of the political ones in the new national government. As civil war erupted in 1988, one target was the Somali National Movement, closely affiliated with the Isaaq clan and formed in the late 1970s, after the failed Ogaden invasion. Isaaq clan ties were integral to the success of this movement, particularly abroad in Saudi Arabia and Britain. Further, clan structures defined how membership was chosen and financial contributions were made by lineage, like blood compensation.\textsuperscript{59} Barre responded to this movement by bombing Somaliland’s two largest cities, “killing an estimated fifty-thousand people and making refugees of a million more.”\textsuperscript{60}

All of this has brought Somaliland several advantages in comparison to the rest of the region and the continent: a relatively homogeneous population, limited wealth differences, fear of the south, a lack of foreign involvement, and strong traditional institutions.\textsuperscript{61} It is worth noting, however, that clan homogeneity is really not the most important factor for success in this instance. For, as Lewis notes, once the Isaaq were able to make peace with non-Isaaqis “they were more likely to be divided internally.”\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, the Somali civil war, as well as previous events as noted above, also weakened traditional institutions of inter-clan cooperation.

**LOCAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS**

Out of these experiences, the Somalilanders have managed to forge a remarkably successful state from the bottom up, one that allows for governance and clan membership. Somaliland has yet to be recognized by the international community out of fear of escalating the regionalism and factionalism in the area and due to an international commitment to the nation-state.\textsuperscript{63} Lack of recognition has allowed them unusual latitude in political construction. As Somali experts Walls and Kibble put it, they have “a system that combines elements of traditional ‘pastoral’ male democracy in the context of the Westphalian and Weberian state.”\textsuperscript{64} This system has increasingly incorporated more voices and concerns through successive Boroma conferences and debate in the early and mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{65}
The upper house of Somaliland legislature is a House of Elders, or *Guurti*. Clan communities select this house in traditional ways. The *Guurti* can return questionable legislation to the lower house and introduce bills on religion, culture, and security. Less formalized elder influence has also been important. President Igal (1993–2002) consulted prominent paramount chiefs who were not members of the formal government body on several important issues. Thus, peripheral interests and internal pressure groups had access to state-led politics. Moreover, the traditional institution, *xeer*, manages arrangements for sharing grazing land and water resources and has been integrated into the new government. After the fall of the Somali republic in 1991, some clan elders in Somaliland sought to revive *xeer* in order to ensure well-being for their clans and others. Government officials in the capital, Hargeisa, have accepted the authority of these local leaders and this is reflected in a new 2001 constitution. Now *xeer* stands alongside *shari’a* and secular law as sources of jurisprudence. The lower house, the House of Representatives, has members from no more than three political parties and all legitimate parties must get at least 20 percent of the vote in four of Somaliland's six regions during a general election, in an effort to prohibit political parties from being regional- or clan-affiliated. This lower house has the power to “initiate, amend, reject or approve legislation from the president’s council of ministers; approve or reject ministerial appointments and the national budget; and impeach the president.” By 2003, the International Crisis Group reported that the Somaliland government administration covered 80 percent of the territory.

In addition to building a successful government that has had several successful transitions, Somaliland managed to demilitarize through a series of clan rituals with little international help. One of the government’s tactics has been to remove weapons from clan control and in exchange to grant a number of recruits for the national army. It has also resettled over one million refugees and internally displaced persons. The government has also proactively confronted piracy and international terrorism. All of these processes have created trust and confidence among the sub-clans, helping to promote stability. A combination of multiple traditional political and economic organizations and institutions alongside more modern ones is inherently more resilient.

Somaliland has also provided for active citizen engagement in government. Somaliland’s experience outside the nation-state model fits with a variety of political and ecological thinking about appropriate political scale for a successfully engaged public. Somaliland’s current experiment in building a small political unit instead of a nation reflects the early history of the United States, founded first as a collection of townships and regions rather than a nation. Somaliland’s political rebuilding is also a testimony to the value of polycentric governance, or multiple overlapping arenas of political authority. Tocqueville noted that polycentric governance was one of the strengths of early American society in *Democracy in America*. 
Kirkpatrick Sale, an independent scholar, also emphasizes that diversity on all levels, including the political one, is an important part of the bioregional project (to be explained further below).

Increased political engagement is a potential benefit of a smaller-scale state as well. Sujai Shivakumar argues that the “idea of a unitary state—one that has asserted itself in the literature and practice of development from the postwar period to the present—limits the creative potential of individuals to improve their mutual well-being through crafting capabilities for self-governance.” Further, he contends, an emphasis on state-led development has destroyed capacities for locally based problem solving. Earlier in this century, John Dewey was writing about the nature of the state and reaching similar conclusions about the need for states to arise out of the “facts of human activity,” about the vital role of public engagement, and the importance of diverse and experimental forms of government. According to this view, external attempts to rebuild are doomed to fail because they cannot adequately engage the local population in problem solving. Somaliland offers an example of some of this thinking in application.

For both Kirkpatrick Sale and Lewis Mumford, independent scholars of the twentieth century, regional governance and planning provided for a more humane existence than national government and planning. Bioregionalism, Sale explains,

expressed in a deep and comprehensive form the essential ideals that I think are crucial for a viable human society on this singular planet: ecological understanding, regional and communitarian consciousness, nature-based wisdom and spirituality, biocentric sensibility, decentralist planning, participatory politics, and mutual aid.

The last three characteristics fit most closely with our current discussion. Sale and Shivakumar call for planning that comes from the bottom up. Shivakumar warns that decentralization is usually a “top-down process of reallocating the authority to problem-solve,” while polycentricity builds on “bottom-up processes of problem-solving where citizens involve each other in policy experiments.” This is in keeping with the majority human experience as Sale notes,

Throughout all human history, even in the past several hundred years, people have tended to live in separate and independent small groups, a “fragmentation of human society” that Harold Isaacs, the venerated professor of international affairs at MIT, has described as something akin to “a pervasive force in human affairs and always has been.”

The primary locus of decision-making, according to Sale, should be the village of 1,000 or the community of 5,000 to 10,000 (about the size of a dia-paying group). Decisions made at this level are more likely to be correct
and carried out well. Even misguided decisions will not be likely to do significant damage at this scale.⁹⁰

Perhaps most importantly for Africans, the majority of whom have experienced significant disconnection from colonial and post-colonial political power, polycentricity allows for responsibility and engagement from its citizens. In Africa, the state has primarily become a gatekeeper state, to use Frederick Cooper’s term. Such states face the outside world and are primarily concerned with maximizing rents and increasingly show little regard for their citizens.⁹¹ Local autonomy, as much economic self-sufficiency as possible, and a high level of civic engagement would mark Lewis Mumford’s region.⁹² Thus, Somaliland shares several features of Mumford’s and Sale’s regionalism—a smaller-scale unit than the typical state and democratic institutions designed by its inhabitants.⁹³

**LOCAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS**

Somaliland has had to rely on local and regional economic resources as well. Without international recognition, Somaliland cannot receive bilateral aid or funds from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. Its currency is not recognized outside its borders and foreign investors are wary of locating in an area within a failed state. It has garnered very little attention or assistance from the international community, and that, actually, might be contributing to its success.⁹⁴ As Kaplan, Lewis, Dambisa Moyo, and many others have argued, foreign attention and the aid that normally follows often have negative impacts.⁹⁵ Shivakumar writes, “rulers of aid-dependent states are often found to be less responsive to their own people than are rulers of more aid-independent states.”⁹⁶ From a historical perspective, Somaliland’s economic situation, isolated as it currently is from international recognition and aid, is possibly the best position to be in.

Somaliland’s urban areas boast a thriving economy and access to basic services.⁹⁷ In the late 2000s, the capital, Hargeisa, was one of the safest in Africa.⁹⁸ Edna Adan Ismail, Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote in 2003 of Somaliland’s industrial revolution, which included aluminum factories for doors and windows, a flour mill, a mineral water drinking plant, a nail factory, stone cutting, brick making, and plastics production. Ismail concludes, “Judging by the steady progress and increasing investments that have been poured into trade and commerce by the private sector, economic development in Somaliland has become the envy of many African nations that enjoy international recognition.”⁹⁹ The industries Ismail highlights are basic industries that have historically been at the foundation of building an industrial economy.

Current economic development within Somaliland is in keeping with the ways in which other areas have historically developed. Scholars like Antonio Serra in the seventeenth century and Jane Jacobs in the twentieth
have recognized that “most wealth was to be found in the cities,” not states. Cities that maximized the number of different professions and activities were the ones that achieved economic development. Ensuring innovation, protecting manufacturing, promoting import-substitution, and the multiplier effect of industries are keys to success according to Erik Reinert, Walter Rodney, and Jane Jacobs. Somaliland, free of international pressure, is able to promote import substitution and protect manufactures, even if it means an inefficient industrial sector. Somaliland, and particularly the cities of Hargeisa and Berbera, is pursuing internally led development, increasingly from thriving city centers, rather than foreign-led development.

Much of this economic development has been driven by remittances. Estimates are that 30 to 50 percent of the Republic’s GDP comes from them. An estimate from the early 1990s indicated that annual remittances were two to three times the total Republic’s exports. Somalia is the fourth most remittance dependent country in the world, approximately $750 million to $1 billion a year. Two thirds of Somalia’s urban population relies on remittances and 80 percent of startup capital comes from them as well. Because Somalia does not have a banking system, Somali remittance firms fill the void. These specialized hawala remittance agencies operate on trust. Trust is an essential element in many smaller-scale societies and often an elusive element in modern African economies. The fact that such a large percentage of the Somaliland economy is based on trust suggests that they have the capacity for “more abstract collaborative trust . . . essential to operation of both state and market.” Even though these remittances come from outside the country, they are Somali to Somali links, not foreigners giving to Somalis. Some view remittances as an ideal tool for development as they involve little overhead, minimal corruption, reach those who most need them, and are more stable than most private capital flows. They are also reinforcing an urban-rural divide and increasing income equality. Most remittances are sent to cities and middle-class Somali.

Another important feature of the Somali economy is their effective tax collection. According to Pham, Somaliland has “largely been self-supporting with respect to government finances.” The government collects taxes, licenses, and fees from businesses and real estate owners, and import duties on khat trade, imports, and exports. Taxation, Pham continues, has historically been a means to raise revenue and build stronger relationships between state and citizens. In post-colonial Africa, by contrast, most states have virtually no taxation and little relationship to their societies. Yet, Jhazbhay quotes Peter Hansen that in the early 2000s Somalia was a free trade zone where imports and exports were not taxed. This suggests that there is a functioning state revenue collection system but that it does not extend to the import/export trade.

Clearly, Somaliland does not exist in economic isolation nor has it for a long time. Northern Somalis have a long history of labor migration and
overseas employment, in the Arabian Gulf states and on ships’ crews.\textsuperscript{111} And, Somaliland livestock exports still primarily go to the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and other states to the east.\textsuperscript{112} Somaliland has economic woes as well. Through remittances, they are very dependent on employment and educational opportunities elsewhere. The open economic environment has lead to the privatization of government services.\textsuperscript{113} There is poverty, poor infrastructure beyond the cities, and the risk of international exploitation of resources.\textsuperscript{114} Yet, their development is largely Somali-driven rather than driven by Western governments and aid organizations, as is the case in much of the rest of Africa.

Somaliland bolsters the argument that “development is always a local phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{115} Such a stance contrasts strongly with the dominant paradigm of development as pursued by the International Financial Institutions, such as the World Bank; major national development agencies, such as USAID; most African leaders; and many non-governmental organizations as well. For these organizations, the goal is to transform societies with large populations of poor people into societies of rich people, from developing to developed, through state policy and action.\textsuperscript{116} Clearly, Somaliland is not a perfect example of local development, but its combination of traditional institution-driven government and Somali-driven development represent important steps in creating a more resilient and bottom-up state.

**CONCLUSION**

Somaliland also boasts challenges, common to many countries, such as weak rule of law, an under-educated citizenry, and challenges to freedom of speech.\textsuperscript{117} Since 2003, President Dahir Riyale Kahin extended the House of Elders’ term twice by presidential decree, each time with the House voting to agree with the president’s move. Members of the House of Representatives have been politically weakened by this move, by redistricting under Riyale and by the House of Elder’s vote three times to postpone Riyale’s term in office.\textsuperscript{118} Yet, in 2010 the postponed elections were held and the opposition candidate, Ahmed Mohammed Silanyo, defeated Riyale.\textsuperscript{119} Heavy reliance on foreign remittances also indicates the education and opportunity gap that still exists between Somaliland and other Western and Arabian countries. And there are concerns about limited roles for women in the current government structure.\textsuperscript{120} Some also worry that the pursuit of democracy by some in power in Somaliland might be more for the sake of international recognition than for the sake of securing the needs of Somalilanders.\textsuperscript{121} Its future, autonomy, and success are not guaranteed, but it is an important example of what can happen when local institutions are promoted and given political and economic legitimacy.

Rather than trying to fit all human political creation into one unitary ideal, it is time to appreciate the political and economic wisdom behind
Somaliland’s thirty-year experience with smaller-scale, locally rooted political and economic organization. Not only is such appreciation fair, but also Somaliland’s embodiment of some of the most critical thinking about human institutions over the last century might be the kind of experience the world needs to learn from right now. None of this is to say that, in the future, Somaliland might not successfully merge in some fashion with a larger Somalia; one can envision a number of scenarios where this might be the appropriate response. But, such a merger would be far more successful if it was the result of strong local institutions first. And, on the eve of the southern Sudanese independence, one has to wonder if an independent southern Sudan is similarly necessary so that such local institutions can be built. Then, perhaps, some day, these will serve them well either as an independent state or within a larger state again.

NOTES

10. Boas and Jennings argue that the “Western world has become increasingly concerned with failed states in the global south.” Boas and Jennings, “‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure,’” 483.
11. Ibid., 476.
12. Ibid., 477–478.
13. Ibid., 478.
Failed State or Political Inspiration?

135


15. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, ix.
17. Harm de Blij, The Power of Place: Geography, Destiny, and Globalization’s Rough Landscape (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 3. He notes that, “Earth may be a planet of shrinking functional distances, but it remains a world of staggering situational differences. From the uneven distribution of natural resources to the unequal availability of opportunity, place remains a powerful arbitrator.”
20. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 19; Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 3–6.
21. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 56.
25. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 222.
30. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 4–5, 22; Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 31.
32. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 130–131.
33. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 123–125.
35. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 150–151.
36. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 222.
38. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 224.
40. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 1.
41. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 62–64.
44. Lemos, “Somali State of Mind.”
45. Pham, “Peripheral Vision,” 86.
47. Pham, “Peripheral Vision,” 86.
49. Boas and Jennings, “Failed States’ and ‘State Failure,’” 480.
50. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 85–86.
53. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 88.
56. Ibid. It is closely supported by the Hawiye, opponents of the Darood clan that dominates the TFG. But, they also mobilized other sub-clans by offering them positions in local administration, 147.
57. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 177.
58. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 35.
59. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 180, 202.
62. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 77.
64. Walls and Kibble, “Beyond Polarity,” 32.
70. Pham, “Peripheral Vision,” 89.
74. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 93; Jhazbhay, “Somaliland’s Post-War Reconstruction,” 64.
75. Pham, “Peripheral Vision,” 87.
77. Tadesse, “Somaliland Orchestra.”
81. Ibid., 70–71.
82. Ibid., 9.
83. Ibid., 5.
85. Ibid., 67.
86. Ibid., 33–34, 44–46.
89. Sale, *Dwellers in the Land*, 93–94.
90. Ibid.
94. Arieff, “DeFacto Statehood?” 69–70. The European Commission and some European countries distribute aid in Somaliland. Ethiopia has both economic and political ties to Somalia.
95. Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, xi; Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009); Kaplan, “Remarkable Story of Somaliland.”
101. Reinert, *How Rich Countries Got Rich*, 81–85; Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982), 180–185. Rodney shows through the example of Unilever the economic and technological impact of colonial trade on British industry. By 1960, the company had four laboratories on two continents that employed over three thousand people, one-third of whom were highly educated. Moreover, the soap industry led to numerous by-product industries, the development of other raw materials, and retail interests.
105. Ibid., 3, 24–25.
138 Kathleen R. Smythe


7 A Parallel Evolution


Myra Ann Houser

INTRODUCTION

During the 1960s and 1970s the Southern Africa Project of the Washington, DC-based Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law connected attorneys working in southern Africa and the United States. South African attorneys, along with their American counterparts, employed the human rights rhetoric of the late twentieth-century to create negative public opinion surrounding apartheid. Although the system had denied native South Africans many basic civil rights, it resulted in remarkably few official casualties as a result of state violence, creating none of the high mortality rates that often generate concern from outside observers. Thus in order to tear down apartheid lawyers demonstrated that the country’s government did not follow basic human rights standards. This eventually led to increased public pressure and economic sanctions, which contributed significantly to the system’s decline.

Beginning in 1963, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law helped create and enforce federal civil rights laws, defended Black civil rights activists, and worked to abate racial tensions in the American South. During the late 1960s, as the Civil Rights movement in its own country lost some momentum, the Lawyers’ Committee expanded its work internationally by engaging in struggles against White supremacy in Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, and South Africa. The Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers’ Committee financed anti-apartheid work, provided assistance to attorneys working in southern Africa, assisted political exiles, exposed and publicized apartheid abuses in the United States, and published books by and about Steve Biko that exposed Americans to the horrors of apartheid. Anticipating the success of sanctions enacted by the international community during the late 1980s, it sued American corporations for their involvement in South Africa. While these actions were invaluable, the organization’s work long necessitated a low-profile, leaving it out of many discussions regarding the international anti-apartheid movement, even as it brought African politics to the center of worldwide discourses.1
During the summer of 1963, violent conflicts between segregationists, policemen, and civil rights demonstrators reminded Americans of the severity of civil unrest a century after passage of the fourteenth amendment granting Black citizenship. As ordinary citizens young and old continued fighting for these rights, President John F. Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy lamented their own inability to control bloodshed in the South. Despite some civil rights gains like *Brown v. Board of Education* and the integration of Little Rock Central High School, bus boycotts, the 1960 founding of the vibrant Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and the charismatic leadership of Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, there remained a long road ahead. King and other civil rights leaders were in the midst of planning the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom to push Kennedy toward enacting meaningful civil rights legislation and end racial discrimination in employment.

Just a month before the August 1963 March on Washington, demonstrators in Birmingham felt their skin peeling off as they were sprayed by firehouses, and policemen sent their dogs into protests to attack and scatter the masses. Four young women would die later that summer in the bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, an event that illustrated to anti-segregationists the deeply institutionalized hatred that they fought. In Jackson, Mississippi, White supremacist Byron de la Beckwith assassinated Medgar Evers in his own driveway as Evers’ wife and children ducked under their beds and listened to the hail of bullets that killed him. That summer’s violence would extend to the fall, and the president himself eventually became a victim. In November, the long period of national unrest extended into a deep national mourning after Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas.²

By July 1963, President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, and Attorney General Kennedy met with 244 lawyers in the East Room of the White House to create the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Frustrated with the conflicts in the South, the Kennedys and Johnson hoped that enforcing existing laws could produce change more quickly and efficiently than protest marches and other efforts to change public opinion regarding race relations.³ Kennedy knew that quiet legal activism could be as effective as the more public and divisive civil rights protest campaigns of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, and Congress of Racial Equality.

As former Howard University Law Dean and NAACP Legal Defense Fund leader Charles Hamilton Houston had shown with his army of trained civil rights lawyers like Thurgood Marshall, legal activism had
already proven effective at dismantling Jim Crow segregation and mandating school integration, and the attorneys gathered at the White House hoped it could be just as effective at helping Black Americans acquire equal voting rights and obtain access to higher education and other public facilities. The Lawyers’ Committee was to enforce the legal victories secured by Houston, Marshall, and other NAACP lawyers in a series of landmark cases that culminated with *Brown v. Board of Education* and included cases such as the 1936 *Murray v. Pearson*, *Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada* in 1938, and *Sweatt v. Painter* in 1950. That summer Kennedy held eleven meetings with leaders in various fields—such as education, medicine, and religion—in hopes that an alliance of devoted citizens could succeed in mediating conflict where federal troops had failed. The founding of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law remains an important yet understated aspect of Johnson’s and the Kennedy’s legacies.

The Kennedys and Johnson knew they were walking a tightrope within their party, seeking support from both “Dixiecrat” segregationists and the Black citizens who had put them in the White House. They needed to show civil rights leaders that they intended to act seriously on the issue, while also demonstrating to conservative southerners that they were not too radical. In calling for the Lawyers’ Committee’s formation, they managed to help found an organization that acted independently of the administration while also using its status as the “President’s Committee” to gain legitimacy.

Jack Greenberg, a member of the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund (LDF), writes that the Lawyers’ Committee began its work at a time when civil rights activism seemed so “glamorous” that an increasing number of groups and individuals clamored to become involved. Howard University’s law school had, since the 1920s, trained civil rights lawyers such as Marshall, but one Black attorney wrote that most law schools did not prioritize public interest work, choosing instead to teach students how to make a profit practicing corporate law. A number of attorneys, including Marshall and Houston, had fought tenaciously for Black students from kindergarten to law school to be allowed an education. However, aside from those working with the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund, few attorneys had been willing to associate themselves with the struggle for equal rights. Telling their audience that attorneys had thus far “failed miserably” to uphold the rule of law in desegregation, Johnson and the Kennedys hoped that their speeches would prompt the audience to consider using their valuable training for service, rather than self. The time had come for attorneys to be, as Houston said, “social engineers rather than parasites on society.”

Following the meeting, attorneys began campaigns in the South, aimed at upholding constitutional freedoms and advancing past 1954’s landmark ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*. Bernard Segal, a corporate attorney in Philadelphia and future American Bar Association president, and Harrison Tweed, who often volunteered with Legal Aid, received the task of co-chairing the new committee. Although they officially formed
the group later in the summer of 1963, several members of the Lawyers’ Committee had already begun petitioning Alabama governor George Wallace to admit Black students to Alabama’s public university.

Much of the Lawyers’ Committee’s early work centered around helping to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Kennedy had introduced the former just two days before his meeting with the attorneys. Following its creation, members of the Lawyers’ Committee lobbied for passage of the bills, while at the same time beginning to work in Mississippi. By 1972 permanent offices opened in Atlanta, Beverly Hills/Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, DC. The organization soon established its permanent headquarters in Washington, DC. This work became important because, as Abram argues, it was easier to take legal action against segregation than it was to argue that segregation and segregationists were evil. Enforcing existing laws and protecting constitutional freedoms took precedence over altering public opinion as members of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law found their niche.

BEGINNING WORK IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

If politics “has always been the systematic organization of hatreds,” as Henry Adams claimed, then the Lawyers’ Committee certainly became counter-political. Its members had become cause-lawyers, attorneys who paradoxically advocated for strict adherence to federal and constitutional rules while often arguing that local Jim Crow laws needed to change. These lawyers were able to use their legal knowledge to benefit clients, rather than themselves, and may have become more connected to their work in the process. Cause-lawyering has been treated by some legal scholars as a conservative means to advance a liberal agenda, using systems already in place. In the United States, attempts to avoid “lynching in the courts” had become an important part of the civil rights movement, pioneered by the NAACP’s LDF and continued by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Ultimately, the Lawyers’ Committee achieved what Greenberg suggests was the ultimate measure of success in cause-lawyering: it received pleas for help from other minorities, as well as one majority engaged in a similar struggle on a different continent.

United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy played an important role not only in the founding of the Lawyers’ Committee, but also in its expansion. In 1966 he visited South Africa and spoke at the invitation of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) chapter at the University of Cape Town. A lawyer named Joel Carlson listened in the audience. Carlson had been involved with the Treason Trial in Namibia, a legal proceeding similar to South Africa’s famous Rivonia Trial, where prominent SWAPO leaders faced treason charges that could carry capital
punishment. Carlson, intrigued by the attorney general’s comparisons of the United States and South Africa, decided that Kennedy’s country could provide the financial assistance he needed to save Namibia’s freedom fighters from the gallows. With the banning of the International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF), Carlson had lost his main source of funding and had begun looking elsewhere for donors. Upon hearing Kennedy’s speech he traveled to New York, hoping that Americans would help him find alternate sources of support.

Reddy met with Carlson, who expressed concern for the safety of both his clients and himself. Prior to IDAF’s banning Carlson had already received a number of death threats, and afterward acts of violence against him and his family began increasing. Knowing that he might soon need to emigrate, Carlson charged slightly higher fees than similar attorneys and needed a “respectable legal source” through which to funnel his IDAF monies. While the United Nations continued to support IDAF, Carlson sought an alternate source—one that might not arouse so much suspicion against him, his family, and his clients. To this end, Reddy arranged meetings with Swedish ambassador to the United Nations Sverker C. Astrom, who also served as chairman of the Committee of Trustees of the UN Trust Fund for South Africa, and this led to meetings with Justice Arthur Goldberg, the United States’ ambassador to the organization, and, finally, with Robert Kennedy himself. Carlson urged Goldberg and Kennedy to pressure the South African government through sanctions and trade restrictions, and to encourage Americans to increase their own anti-apartheid activism.

In addition to meeting with these public officials, Carlson spoke to church leaders and members of organizations, such as the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), in an attempt to gain private support for South African defense lawyers. A major connection came when Charles Runyan, assistant legal advisor for African Affairs at the Department of State, introduced Carlson to Morris Abram. Abram in turn asked his colleagues to begin providing assistance to the South African struggle for civil rights. Shortly after his return to Johannesburg, Carlson received a letter with instructions for seeking and the much-needed funds. In his memoir, Carlson wrote about the beginnings of his communication with the Lawyers’ Committee:

All of this was of great importance in that it provided a channel of communication along which a full exchange of information flowed. It was a link with professional colleagues dedicated to upholding civil rights in America, who fully understood what was necessary for lawyers working in a police state. Of the many worthwhile results coming from my trip, this was of inestimable value.

This “worthwhile result” led to a partnership between Carlson and the Lawyers’ Committee, which spent the next few years establishing its Southern Africa Project. In order to finance its initial trials, the Southern Africa
Project received a $5,000 grant from the UN Trust Fund, as well as an additional $5,000 from the Marshall Field Foundation.27

With his newly-found financial support, Carlson began concentrating on his first case—a frustrating one that had taken much of his time and made clear to him the importance of outside assistance. His saga had begun in 1967, when an associate in London wrote Carlson about the inhumane prison treatment of several detainees, including SWAPO leader Andimbe Toivo ya Toivo. Detention laws permitted South African officials to arrest and indefinitely “detain” individuals accused of subverting the government, and several Namibian political leaders languished in jail after their arrests for working with SWAPO between 1962 and 1967.28 Namibian officials charged several of the defendants with trying to intimidate policemen and government employees, and with receiving military training both in and outside the country—acts that fell under the new, broad definition of terrorism.29 When Carlson visited the South West Africa section of Pretoria Prison, he quickly discovered that the Namibians had been detained for nearly a year.30

Additional contingencies of the Terrorism Act placed heavy restrictions on the number of visitors each detainee could receive and provided for the prisoners to be represented by a public defender, but not by a personal lawyer. This almost certainly guaranteed detainees an unbalanced, biased trial.31 Amazingly, Carlson successfully argued that none of the thirty-seven defendants should receive capital punishment. This positive outcome would have been impossible without the assistance of the Lawyers’ Committee and the lobbying efforts by the United Nations, which pressured the South African government to spare the defendants’ lives. Much like the Rivonia defendants, survivors of the Treason Trial became icons in the struggle for independence. Many, such as ya Toivo, continued the freedom fight from exile and returned to become government leaders in a new and independent Namibia after 1990. This victory set the stage for future relations between Carlson and the Lawyers’ Committee. In subsequent cases, however, the two found less success in the courtroom. Thus, they changed tactics and struggled to procure civil and human rights for all southern Africans. In the United States, the Lawyers’ Committee had won most of its cases, but in South Africa losing cases became the way to fight apartheid—drawing attention to an unjust system, rather than expecting to find real justice for clients.

MORE THAN JUST “DABBING”: CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA

In 1968 the inquest into the death of James Lenkoe provided an opportunity for the Lawyers’ Committee to become more involved in South Africa. After the assassinations of King and both of its Kennedy founders, the Lawyers’ Committee found itself fighting a civil rights battle that was
losing momentum. Working in southern Africa gave the organization an opportunity to expand its work, both at home and abroad. While Carlson lost the Lenkoe Inquest, its precedent of involvement became important. The Lawyers’ Committee established itself as an observer of southern African trials and began sending money and expert witnesses to assist with defending detainees.

In March 1968, Carlson received a request to help the family of James Lenkoe, who had died in police custody. The family needed legal help to prove that the deceased had been brutally killed, rather than hanging himself, as the officers alleged. Carlson arranged for a delayed burial and enlisted Dr. Jonathon Gluckman to examine the body. After Gluckman found a “curious mark” on Lenkoe’s right foot, Carlson contacted the Lawyers’ Committee, which told him to act on behalf of Mrs. Lenkoe and pledged to give as much assistance as possible. To begin, they sent Dr. Alan R. Moritz, an American expert on burns, to examine photographic material sent to him by Carlson and encouraged Gluckman to determine conclusively whether Lenkoe’s injury was the result of an electric shock. The doctors discovered of traces of copper on Lenkoe’s skin that indicated electrothermal treatment and determined that his death must have occurred within two to twelve hours of the torture.

As the inquest continued, Carlson was denied access to photographs of Lenkoe’s body in his cell, but he did elicit testimony from prison officials who mentioned discovering Lenkoe, tied by his belt to a cell window with his right arm raised above his head. As a result of the investigation, Carlson had his passport confiscated. Arthur H. Dean and Louis F. Oberdorfer, co-chairmen of the Lawyers’ Committee, continued to encourage Carlson, and member Burke Marshall made a public statement praising his work.

The court ultimately ruled that Lenkoe had died after hanging himself. Carlson anticipated the verdict, but not the enactment in 1969 of laws amending police jurisdiction and creating a new force, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). This came, Carlson believed, as a result of the Lenkoe trial. Although they lost the inquest, working together on it solidified the relationship between Carlson and the Lawyers’ Committee. The two continued working together in South Africa for about a decade; during the late 1970s Carlson and his family received increased death threats, survived several assassination attempts, and decided to leave the country. The Southern Africa Project initially assisted Carlson with moving to London and then helped him relocate his entire family to Great Neck, New York. During this process Southern Africa Project members wrote letters to American leaders, helped finance the Carlsons’ move, and also navigated through some of the legal concerns Carlson expressed while seeking refuge.

The Southern Africa Project’s work increased during the 1970s as the organization actively aided Joel Carlson with prisoner death inquests through sending money, expert witnesses, and other legal advisors. Lawyers’ Committee members George Lindsey—a partner at Debevoise and
Plimpton, the New York corporate firm where McDougall would soon begin her career (and now called Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyon, and Gates)—and Peter Connell decided that the organization had been merely “dabbling” in southern Africa and needed to become more involved. Thus, they created a list of South African attorneys who might be interested in working for the Lawyers’ Committee and decided to help them by providing funding, legal assistance on issues where laws were similar in South Africa and the United States, and expert witnesses. Raising support for the new program proved to be difficult, as some Lawyers’ Committee board members opposed it on the grounds that international work would detract from the original mission of furthering civil rights in the United States.

In addition to funds from private foundations, Lindsay also applied for continued funding from the United Nations Trust Fund, which provided money to legal organizations that worked on behalf of political prisoners and their families. During the late 1970s, U.S. ambassador to the UN Andrew Young announced that his country would begin making a $300,000 annual donation to the Fund, which it did each year, and the UN began awarding the Southern Africa Project an equivalent amount. This continued throughout the Jimmy Carter administration. During the Reagan and Bush administrations these donations discontinued, but after she became Project Director, McDougall lobbied Congress each year to continue the funding. As a result, UN Trust Fund grants to the Southern Africa Project dramatically increased—from fifty thousand dollars in 1978 to around half a million dollars during the 1980s—more than the Project had received under Carter. With increased funding, the group’s activism also grew.

THE SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT DURING THE 1970S

During the Southern Africa Project’s first decade its struggle against racist regimes in Africa involved three components—aiding exiled leaders, trying to hold accountable American companies involved in southern Africa, and raising awareness about the region’s problems. These activities laid the groundwork for the organization’s future contributions, which eventually included increased legal activism and the oversight of transitions to majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa.

In addition to giving funds and arranging for expert testimonies in political trials, the Southern Africa Project enabled Africans to continue their activism by helping them find new homes in the United States, away from the threat of death or detention. After numerous death threats and attempts on his life, Carlson enlisted the organization’s assistance for his family’s move to New York. The organization helped arrange for passports and other documents necessary in seeking asylum. Additionally, Southern Africa Project workers also wrote letters and petitions on behalf of Theo...
Ben-Gurirab, a SWAPO leader who had moved to the United States to attend Temple University in Philadelphia before going to New York, where he served as SWAPO representative to the United Nations. Ben-Gurirab had some problems obtaining a visa that would allow him to stay in the country, and Project leader Millard Arnold assisted him with reapplying in 1975.47 With his visa approved, Ben-Gurirab remained in the United States until 1990, serving as representative to the United Nations until 1986, when he became SWAPO’s secretary of foreign affairs.

Shun Chetty, lawyer to Steve Biko’s family, grew fearful for his family’s safety, just as Carlson had, and fled into exile in Botswana and then Great Britain. By the time he left South Africa in 1979, Chetty’s passport had been confiscated, and he feared he would be unable to obtain asylum. Arnold kept in close contact with Chetty—speaking to American newspapers about the sad plight of South African lawyers—and served as an advisor during his transition into exile.48

Both Carlson and Ben-Gurirab continued their activism while in exile, but Chetty kept a low profile once in Britain. Carlson remained in the United States until his death, and his widow and children remain there. Ben-Gurirab returned to Namibia following independence and served in the country’s cabinet, eventually becoming prime minister from 2002 to 2005. Chetty stayed in Britain until 1985, when he and his wife began working for the United Nations. He returned to South Africa in 1999 and applied to have his legal credentials reinstated, but died during a heart operation before this could happen; posthumously, he received back the privilege of practicing law. For all three men, living as exiles had become the only way to protect their own lives, as well as to continue their work, and assistance from the Southern Africa Project allowed them to do this.

Along with helping obtain visas for Africans, the Southern Africa Project began a creative, albeit largely unsuccessful, campaign to punish American companies for doing business with racist regimes on the continent. In law suits against the *New York Times*, Civil Aeronautics Board, Department of Commerce, Polaroid, a Colorado contracting company, and the International Society of Travel Agents, the Southern Africa Project represented groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the New York Commission on Civil Rights in an effort to stop Americans from indirectly supporting apartheid. They also considered filing suits against corporations such as American Express, JCPenney, and Ralston Purina. In taking this legal action, the Lawyers’ Committee followed the NAACP’s mandate that economic sanctions against South Africa could be effective in the struggle against apartheid, an idea that activists had touted since the 1940s, although sanctions did not take place until the mid-1980s.49 All of these cases demonstrate that the Southern Africa Project took concerted
legal action with the goal of ending apartheid. The third component of its pre-1980 work—raising awareness about southern Africa—may have been more obviously successful than this second one.

Arnold’s most successful public awareness campaign came when he published books by and about martyred Black Consciousness leader Stephen Bantu Biko. Without his efforts, anti-apartheid activists in the United States would have been much less familiar with Biko, and his tragic death would not have become such a rallying point for civil rights and anti-apartheid activists. Prior to his 1977 death, Biko had communicated with Arnold and Southern Africa Project lawyer Michael Peay, and afterward the Southern Africa Project sent Dean Pollack as an observer to the trial against the state brought by Biko’s family. In addition, The Lawyers’ Committee kept in close contact with Shun Chetty, the Biko family’s lawyer, and Arnold told the Washington Post that Biko had died of head injuries inflicted by police, rather than a hunger strike—making him one of the first public figures to bring attention to the tragedy. Despite the Southern Africa Project’s undeniably important role in publicizing Biko’s death and helping his family find top-notch lawyers, the group received criticism from American lawyers, who said that it had strayed from its original mission of fighting for civil rights in the United States.

Arnold, however, continued working and kept a number of letters, editorials, and essays written by Biko, which he contributed to the posthumously published I Write What I Like in 1978. Because many anti-apartheid activists did not release their autobiographies and memoirs until the mid-1980s, Biko’s writings were among the first glimpses into South African politics that some Americans—even those already concerned about southern Africa—had read. I Write What I Like and Arnold’s Steve Biko: Black Consciousness in South Africa became part of the canon, books that inspired anti-apartheid and civil rights activists in the United States toward action. They soon found their way onto college syllabi and into classrooms, where teachers emphasized the cruelty of Biko’s death and used it to illustrate the need for increased anti-apartheid work and solidarity in freedom struggles both at home and abroad. Thus, the Lawyers’ Committee’s involvement in southern Africa also helped it remain true to its original mission of advancing civil rights in the United States. Much of the outrage over Biko’s death—and his subsequent canonization as a symbol of apartheid’s cruelty—would not have taken place if not for Arnold.

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT: GAY MCDougALL, THE SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT, AND THE DEATH OF APARTHEID

During the 1980s the Southern Africa Project shifted course. Under McDougall’s direction, it became the type of transnational outlet for activism that David Hostetter and Donald Culverson wrote about, although it remains
absent from the historiography their work comprises.\textsuperscript{54} As it expanded its mission in Africa, it also became instrumental in creating changes in America, finding itself at the center of a pivotal and unprecedented event. Using her relationships with Americans and Africans, Gay McDougall became a leader in a group of African Americans who, for the first time, changed the course of U.S. foreign policy by successfully lobbying for and enforcing comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. Following this, apartheid crumbled, and McDougall once again became a central figure in an important struggle and invaluable during the transitions to democratic rule in Namibia and South Africa.

In 1980 Arnold stepped down and eventually began working in the State Department, and McDougall assumed his role as Project director. While it remained committed to helping political prisoners through monetary support of their attorneys, recruiting expert witnesses for trials, and sending observers to them, the Southern Africa Project had a new focus. In contrast to the previous tactic of working primarily within the American anti-apartheid movement, McDougall and her staff focused on maintaining relationships with activists working in Africa and later, on gathering information that would help in rewriting the constitutions and designing elections in Namibia and South Africa.

A Yale Law School Graduate, McDougall earned her LLM degree from the London School of Economics, meeting exiled leaders such as Oliver Tambo and the Mbeki family. These contacts allowed McDougall to bring a new outlook to the Southern Africa Project.

Most African liberation movements had active offices in London, and McDougall found herself “taken in by all of them; (I) got to know that community very well.” These contacts allowed McDougall to bring a new outlook to the Southern Africa Project. “There was a real sense of involvement on the ground, even at a distance,” she said. “We were able to bring that ground to the movement here.”\textsuperscript{55} Indeed, relationships with Africans, as well as with Europeans and Americans, allowed McDougall to bring a rare perspective to the United States and to mobilize activists in her own country.

At home, McDougall proved effective at demonstrating the need for increased U.S. involvement in southern Africa, as well as at mobilizing attorneys to actively oppose apartheid. Perhaps one of McDougall’s largest roles in American anti-apartheid activism came during the 1984–1986 demonstrations outside the South African embassy. After several years of consideration, TransAfrica and a group of activists, including McDougall, decided to protest outside the South African embassy in Washington, DC, for a week.\textsuperscript{56} McDougall created Lawyers Against Apartheid, an organization that encouraged and mobilized “stodgy, corporate lawyers” to become active in anti-apartheid work.\textsuperscript{57} More than one thousand attorneys joined the group and picketed the embassy during the protest. “It created so much play that we decided to keep it going for a while,” McDougall said. Thus,
the Free South Africa Movement came into being. The protests continued for nearly two years, and each day several activists attempted to enter the embassy and were arrested. “Designer arrests,” as they came to be called, helped demonstrate to Americans the connection between fighting for civil rights at home and against apartheid abroad; Black and White leaders demonstrated the significance both struggles held for them. The most prominent protesters included politicians such as Detroit Mayor Coleman Young; Washington, DC, congressman Walter Fauntroy; DC Mayor Marion Barry’s wife Effie; Ron Dellums, Charles Rangel, Julian Dixon, and all but two members of the Congressional Black Caucus, and Ben Cardin; celebrities such as Rory and Douglas Kennedy (children of Lawyers’ Committee founder Robert Kennedy), Stevie Wonder, Arthur Ashe, Paul Newman, and Harry Belafonte; and several prominent civil rights activists. Coretta Scott King marched, along with her children Martin III, Bernice, and Yolanda, and Jesse Jackson brought all five of his children; both activists, along with their families, found themselves under arrest after attempting to enter the South African embassy. On December 1, 1985, Rosa Parks commemorated the thirtieth anniversary of her arrest on a Montgomery bus by participating in the demonstration and then spending the night in jail. McDougall became responsible for visiting DC’s jail daily and arguing that the prisoners be released based on their own recognizance. She performed this service for more than three thousand people.

At the American Bar Association’s annual meeting in 1985, McDougall and her colleagues at the Southern Africa Project sponsored a panel where American attorneys heard South African lawyers speak about the illegal harassment, lack of due process, and ill-functioning courts in their country. During the panel, McDougall’s guests spoke about the strong history in both countries of gaining social and political justice through proper use of the law and convinced their American colleagues to pass a resolution opposing apartheid and asking their own government to condemn it as well. The group also held hearings before the Senate Banking Committee, recommending that the United States impose sanctions against South Africa. Major Washington law firms sent hundreds of lawyers to the day of lobbying on Capitol Hill.

The following year, McDougall arranged for an unofficial Congressional hearing on South African children in detention. Not content to simply let lawyers and public officials speak about apartheid, the Southern Africa Project gathered together fifteen senators and representatives, as well as a panel of South African citizens, to testify before them. The group of lawyers, psychologists, counselors, social workers, children, and mothers of detainees became the first “ordinary South Africans” to testify before members of the United States Congress. Members of the House and Senate cosponsored the unofficial hearings in the Rayburn House Office Building, and McDougall told participants that when activists mentioned cases of detention and torture of South African youth in the future, “nobody on the
Hill should be able to say they didn’t hear about it.\(^6\) This activism of the mid-1980s eventually resulted in the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAA), when McDougall and other participants in the Free South Africa Movement successfully lobbied for the override of a presidential veto in order to create the legislation. After the CAA’s enforcement began, she continued urging Congress to abide by the CAA, rather than half-heartedly supporting the sanctions it imposed—writing reports and lobbying to keep her government responsible.\(^67\)

McDougall brought to the Southern Africa Project a network of African contacts. When she became director of the Southern Africa Project in 1981, few South African lawyers worked with political prisoners. Through contacts in London, McDougall became acquainted with Griffiths Mxenge, a Durban attorney whose main practice consisted of defending political prisoners. The Southern Africa Project’s support of Mxenge was short-lived, but illustrated to McDougall her organization’s importance. Shortly after she and her colleagues began funding Mxenge, the news of his “brutal assassination” reached them.\(^68\) Mxenge’s death in his own driveway had been a punishment, McDougall discovered, for receiving funds from international organizations, including the Southern Africa Project. His wife Victoria, who assumed his case load, fell prey to assassination in 1986. The organization continued meeting with and funding a number of attorneys defending political prisoners, including those representing Winnie Mandela and others during the Trial of the Twenty-Two. Shortly after Mxenge’s death, the South African government announced its new tricameral government for White, Indian, and colored citizens. As riots and a state of emergency followed, the Southern Africa Project increased its funding—sending upward of two million dollars per year into the region during subsequent years.\(^69\) During one series of Johannesburg township riots, where more than 10,000 children went to prison and solitary confinement, the Southern Africa Project helped form an “elaborate method of communication” to help attorneys gain freedom, or at least stays of execution, for their clients.\(^70\) This led to continued involvement with political prisoners, and the Southern Africa Project eventually funneled money to defense lawyers in all three 1987 treason trials and sent an observer to one of them.\(^71\)

One of the Southern Africa Project’s final assaults on apartheid occurred during the mid-1980s. Project employees had been involved with the Legal Resources Center in Windhoek. David Smuts, director of the LRC, visited Washington, DC, and asked the Southern Africa Project for assistance with the Kassinga Detainees, a group that had been in prison for several years. McDougall and Smuts drafted a “Habeas Corpus-like appeal” for the presumed detainees.\(^72\) After Smuts argued his case before a South African court, the detainees were unconditionally released—a “fantastic, joyous thing” that McDougall claims was one of the largest, although most unanticipated, international successes during this period.\(^73\)
After being denied entry into Namibia and South Africa during apartheid’s height, in 1990 McDougall received a visa to legally visit both countries—observing Sam Nujoma’s inauguration as president of the newly-independent Namibia, and seeing the results of an election that she had almost single-handedly designed. McDougall then traveled to South Africa for about six weeks, and shortly thereafter began building the New South Africa.

Utilizing this information, the Southern Africa Project co-sponsored—along with the African National Congress and the Centre for Legal and Constitutional Studies at the University of Witwatersrand—a February 1993 conference and workshop on constitution writing. McDougall served as a chief counsel to the ANC and provided reports and analysis of comparable constitutions. During the four years leading up to the multiracial elections, McDougall spent up to six months each year in South Africa, where the ANC had asked her to organize a system for the party to request legal research from the Lawyers’ Committee during constitutional negotiations. The Lawyers’ Committee organized volunteer teams of researchers to provide quick answers to ANC questions and arranged for prominent international constitutional scholars to advise the party. Thus, McDougall found her niche in the politics of a changing South Africa, and in 1994 she received perhaps the highest honor of any American involved in the process. Her relationships and credibility within South Africa, as well as the United States, made her an ideal candidate to lead both countries in implementing the new democratic structures her organization had sought to develop over four decades.

In 1994 the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa monitored voting. The sixteen Commission members included five foreigners and one American—McDougall, the woman who had “organized South Africa’s nearly flawless elections.” After being nominated for the position by the ANC and approved by all political parties, McDougall served as the IEC’s vice chairman and began the eight-month process of helping design the elections and educate citizens about voting rights and procedures. Along with IEC Deputy Chairman Dikgang Moseneke, McDougall received the additional responsibility of monitoring elections in KwaZulu Natal. The province had become a particularly difficult area, due to a feud between Inkatha we Sizwe president Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the ANC. McDougall and Moseneke, however, ensured that the election would continue and educated citizens about voting procedures in the hope of mitigating fears of violence. They also oversaw the operation of about nine hundred polling booths. While nearly two hundred people died in violence leading up to the election, IEC members such as McDougall arranged for army and police forces to guard polling stations, keeping loss of life at a minimum during the transition.

On April 25, the day before the elections, McDougall and her colleague received word that Mandela had decided to vote in their province, and that one of them needed to accompany him to the ballot box. McDougall—despite
exhaustion from not having slept well in several days—stood at his side as he cast the first vote of his life and became president under the constitution she and her colleagues had helped create.

CONCLUSION

The 1994 image of an “integrationist baby” standing next to Mandela as he voted illustrates the prominence of African politics in international discussions during the twentieth century. That the Southern Africa Project been catalytic in so many arenas is important to note, and this project represents a step toward bringing them into the discussion of anti-apartheid activism, as well as discussions on legal advocacy. They belong in the historiographies not only of African liberation movements, but of civil rights struggles in the United States and around the world as well. Indeed, the Lawyers’ Committee is an important part of the legacy of John and Robert Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and these men’s early contributions should not be forgotten. Scholars and biographers should remember the fateful meeting the three held in 1963 and note that the organization they envisioned succeeded even beyond their own expectations. Historians of gender will note McDougall’s role in standing next to the man, literally in 1994, and throughout the movement as she dominated an area of politics for which men are most prominently known. Finally, this chapter supports the emerging trend of viewing global civil rights movements as connected and interactive during the late twentieth century. Carlson, Arnold, Chetty, McDougall, and their colleagues who fought segregation in the United States and apartheid in southern Africa, stand as proof that leaders of civil rights movements during the late twentieth century deeply influenced, and were influenced by, each other—a parallel evolution indeed.

NOTES

1. Ann Garity Connell, “The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law: The Making of a Public Interest Law Group” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 1997). This dissertation, written more than a decade ago, and a handful of newspaper articles, mostly in Washington Post’s Metro section, focus on the Lawyers’ Committee or Southern Africa Project. Even in these articles, few details suggest that the organization is important.

The closed records of the Lawyers’ Committee also hampered efforts to construct a comprehensive narrative of the organization’s work. According to a phone conversation with McDougall, about half of the Southern Africa Project’s records will remain sealed until 2024. These contain reports from studies undertaken by the Southern Africa Project and documents referencing political trials the Committee monitored and supported. In addition, several boxes of files contain information about the Southern Africa Project’s role in forming new laws, constitutions, and election systems in Namibia and South
Africa. The author initially received permission to examine these documents, but Lawyers’ Committee personnel revoked the privilege before this project was complete, citing “lawyer client responsibilities” (Joe Moore, e-mail to author, August 4, 2008). While supplemental information has been available in other archives—such as the Library of Congress, the E.S. Reddy papers at Yale University through Reddy, and through interviews with McDougall and her colleagues—it still paints an incomplete picture of the scope of the Southern Africa Project’s achievements. Perhaps as more documents from the era become public, so will those of the Southern Africa Project and researchers will be able to gain a more complete view of their work.


9. Lester, “Lawyers’ Committee.”


12. Ibid.


15. Austin Sarat and Steven Scheingold, eds., *The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure and Agency in Legal Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 1, 64, 203, 241. Sarat and Scheingold argue in their conclusion that anti-apartheid activists, particularly Mandela, should be seen as cause lawyers. These individuals, they claim, become more connected to their work than “regular” lawyers, because they seek a social or personal compensation, rather than a monetary one. In struggling for justice, cause lawyers often act paradoxically, using the law to their advantage (as in the cases mentioned above), while simultaneously fighting to change it (466–467). Linda Malone, a human rights lawyer and law professor at the College of William and Mary disagrees, saying that cause lawyering does not usually call for the restructuring of an entire legal system. In this instance a cause and a need for legal reform coincided, perhaps causing Sarat and Scheingold to reach this conclusion. Linda Malone, e-mail correspondence with author, November 12, 2008.

17. Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts, 487.
18. For more information and detailed legal analysis, see Joel Carlson, No Neutral Ground (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1973), beginning on 190.
20. Reddy, e-mail.
22. Connell, “The Lawyers’ Committee,” 270. In 1968, the church-based, ecumenical American Committee on Africa was the largest anti-apartheid lobby in the United States and sought to educate Americans by publishing information on South Africa. The ACOA also lobbied the executive and legislative branches concerning matters related to apartheid.
23. Carlson, No Neutral Ground, 199.
24. Ibid, 270.
28. Carlson, No Neutral Ground, 154. Most of the detainees were arrested in 1966 and tried under the 1967 Terrorism Act, which defined a terrorist as anyone who aimed “To further and encourage the achievement of any political aim by violence or forcible means, or by the intervention of, or in accordance with the direction or under the guidance of, or in cooperation with, or with the assistance of, any foreign or international body or institution . . . to embarrass the administration of the affairs of the state.”
29. Ibid, 163.
31. Ibid, 155–156.
33. Ibid, 225–226.
34. Ibid, 226–227. The burn on Lenkoe’s second toe is described in the pathology report as “a traverse linear mark on the superior surface, broken up into two positions; a medial one measuring a quarter of an inch, and a lateral one, measuring an eighth to a sixteenth of an inch in thickness.”
35. Ibid, 227.
36. Ibid, 227–228. In 1947, Moritz published slides of electrical shock injuries similar to Lenkoe’s in the Journal of American Pathology. He had also served as the chief consultant pathologist to the United States armed forces and been an attending pathologist to the autopsy of President John F. Kennedy and adviser to the Warren Commission; Reddy cites this incident as an example of the Lawyers’ Committee’s creativity in battling apartheid using not just attorneys and defense funds, but all available resources.
37. Ibid, 228. The margin of error for such Moritz’s atomic spectrographic test is one in one million.
38. Ibid, 228. Pathologists found cysts just beneath the skin of Lenkoe’s toe evidencing that a blister had begun to form but was not completed before his death. This allowed them to estimate Lenkoe’s time of death.
39. Ibid, 256.
41. Lawyers’ Committee Document Box 86.
42. See, for example, Carlson’s description of his work with the James Lenkoe death inquest in No Neutral Ground.
44. Ibid, 289–290.
45. Ibid, 311.
Reddy, e-mail, February 5, 2008. After IDAF was banned in 1966, the Trust Fund stopped publishing records of the names of its grant recipients. According to Reddy, however, the Southern Africa Project’s grants from 1970 to 1990 amount to the following: 1970—$5,000; 1971—$15,000; 1974—$30,000; 1975—$40,000; 1976—$40,000; 1977—$35,000; 1978—$50,000; 1979—$50,000; 1980—$50,000; 1981—$200,000; 1982—$250,000; 1983—$250,000; 1984—$300,000; 1985—$350,000; 1986—$400,000; 1987—$550,000; 1988—$525,000; 1989—$350,000; 1990—$500,000. Reddy credits this successful lobbying to McDougall’s “creativity,” a trait he connected to the Southern Africa Project’s subsequent success.

Lawyers’ Committee Document Box 86.


Lawyers’ Committee Document Box 83, 90–92, 506.


Whitaker, Eyes on the Prize.

Lawyers’ Committee Box 498.


McDougall, interview by author, October 5, 2008.

Robinson, Defending the Spirit, 156.

McDougall, interview.

Robinson, Defending the Spirit, 156.

On December 1, 1985, Parks—a seamstress and former secretary for a National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) branch office—refused to leave her seat in the Whites-only section of a Birmingham bus. Her subsequent arrest resulted in a massive boycott of the city’s public transportation by its Black citizens; Robinson, Defending the Spirit, 156–157; Field documentary.

Ibid, 156.


Ibid.

McDougall, interview.

The Lawyers’ Committee gives annual reports and budget to Congress. This is the first instance I have found, however, of the organization initiating a Congressional hearing in order to argue for policy change.

McDougall, interview.


McDougall, interview.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid. McDougall did not elaborate about these communication methods and I had trouble finding more information about them. Like much of the Southern Africa Project's work, this situation necessitated a secrecy that still exists, and perhaps the unsealing of records in a few decades will help shed more light on it.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid. Due to the length of captivity for these detainees, the exact identities of many of them was unknown. McDougall said that she and Smuts drafted their list of possible detainees by looking at a group of people who had disappeared around the time that detention might have begun.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Reddy, e-mail.
76. Knight e-mail interview.
78. Robinson, Defending the Spirit, 284.
79. McDougall, phone interview.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Hill, Sylvia. E-mail interview by author. November 20, 2008.


Houser, George. E-mail interview by author. September 24, 2008.


Malone, Linda. E-mail interview by author. November 12, 2008.


A Parallel Evolution


Part II

Literature, Language, Rhetoric, and Politics in Africa and the African Diaspora
Ensuring that Africa’s Voice is Heard in International Forums in the Future
The Language Issues Involved

Ann Albuyeh

INTRODUCTION

In order to suggest the complex nature of the language issues involved in Africa’s having a voice in global politics, this chapter compares the linguistic situation and issues of language planning in five countries across the continent. Algeria in the north, South Africa and Botswana in the south, Tanzania in the east, and Nigeria in the west, illustrate a wide range of linguistic realities and government language policies. While African governments post-independence have not lost sight of the importance of enhancing their country’s role in both regional and global political contexts, the more immediate need to promote national unity and ensure functioning and stable public services has necessarily taken precedence. The governments of these five countries have addressed these often conflicting goals within the context of ideological agendas, ethnic rivalries, and varying levels of multilingualism.

An important factor to consider when talking about “Africa’s voice” is the number of spoken languages. Across the continent this number varies widely due to historical factors. G. Tucker Childs explains, “To the north is the Sahara where there are not many languages spoken anymore, and to the south, roughly speaking is a desert of linguistic homogeneity, the Bantu expansion.” Significantly, however, there is a large swath of the continent where hundreds of languages are spoken, first referred to as the “Sub-Saharan Fragmentation Belt” by David Dalby in 1970. As illustrated in the map below, the linguistic fragmentation belt stretches from the coast of Senegal in the west to the Ethiopian and East African Highlands. This belt runs along the southern border of the Sahara and is approximately 3,500 miles long, with an average width of approximately 700 miles (see Figure 8.1). Childs attributes the existence of this area featuring a proliferation of languages to extensive population shifts and language contact, probably implying a great deal of ethnic and linguistic overlap. In other words, the
The history of this area has resulted in the development of many dialects of the various languages that came into contact, which, over time, resulted in non-mutually intelligible distinct languages. 

Some fragmentation has also occurred in the southernmost Bantu areas where small populations of Khoi and San people remain. Referring to the earlier research of Wilmsen, Childs stated that “the lack of close and reconstructible [linguistic] relations may be attributable to the antiquity of the [linguistic] stock and the Khoisan people being organized into small and transitory groups . . . rather than to their isolation or lack of interaction.” The “antiquity of the stock” refers to the fact that the Khoisan people are known to have inhabited southern Africa before the arrival of Bantu speakers, who completed their expansion in the south during the fourth century AD and came to ethnolinguistically dominate the area. As will be discussed below, speakers of endangered Khoisan languages live in both Botswana and South Africa.

Any discussion of numbers of languages is, of course, approximate, because counting discrete languages versus dialects is difficult. In theory, mutual-intelligibility is the rule of thumb for determining whether speech systems are separate languages or only dialects of the same language. However, the reality is that dialects and languages exist in a continuum. Moreover, in practice, arbitrary political borders, issues of identity, historical relationships, and other factors can play a role in whether two forms of speech are regarded as different languages. Nonetheless, it is clear that the language situation in these six countries is substantially different, no matter what the exact figures are claimed to be for each.

Because this chapter considers how the linguistic situation in each country affects communication, it is worth noting that no direct correlation is implied between number of languages and either local or global communication issues. This is because countries with the most languages also typically enjoy a high degree of multilingualism, which alleviates the communication problems that language diversity might be assumed to cause. Moreover, large numbers of languages tend to strengthen the use of lingua francas, including the ex-colonial languages, which play an important role in global communication.

Figure 8.1 shows the location and estimated number of languages claimed for the countries examined in this chapter, which are outlined in bold. Note that many languages are, of course, spoken in more than one country, and that ethnic groups and languages commonly exist across borders of neighboring nations.

Of the five countries chosen, Algeria has the fewest languages, with approximately 18, and illustrates the linguistic situation described by Childs for northern Africa. Botswana and South Africa, with 29 and 24 languages, respectively, illustrate the relative homogeneity resulting
Ensuring that Africa’s Voice is Heard

from the Bantu expansion. Tanzania, with approximately 128 languages, shows the effects of being partly within the sub-Saharan linguistic fragmentation belt. Nigeria, with a staggering estimate of 514 languages, tops the list and exemplifies the highest level of linguistic fragmentation within the area. The following section begins by examining the factors that have impacted language planning in Nigeria, including the varieties of English that continue to play a role in national life. Both Nigeria (with many languages) and South Africa (with relatively few) have official and de facto language policies that give multiple languages roles in the functioning of the country.

Figure 8.1  Aproximate area of sub-Saharan fragmentation belt; estimated number of languages in five countries. 
Note: Where there is shading within the linguistic fragmentation belt, a greater number of languages are spoken. Map by author; Estimated number of languages from Ethnologue 2009.  

from the Bantu expansion. Tanzania, with approximately 128 languages, shows the effects of being partly within the sub-Saharan linguistic fragmentation belt. Nigeria, with a staggering estimate of 514 languages, tops the list and exemplifies the highest level of linguistic fragmentation within the area. The following section begins by examining the factors that have impacted language planning in Nigeria, including the varieties of English that continue to play a role in national life. Both Nigeria (with many languages) and South Africa (with relatively few) have official and de facto language policies that give multiple languages roles in the functioning of the country.
Nigeria and South Africa illustrate widely different linguistic situations, not the least being the huge disparity between the numbers of languages spoken in each. Nonetheless, both governments have adopted a multilingual policy, with eleven national or official languages stipulated by the South African government and a relatively modest nine claimed for Nigeria. However, in the latter case the linguistic picture is more complicated due to the number of languages that fulfill an official or semi-official role within regions or states in Nigeria. The following section outlines how Nigeria balances language issues, politics, and communication needs.

Nigeria Manages a Multitude of Tongues

Because language issues in Nigeria are often quite explosive and conflict ridden, censuses never have items or questions on languages.

—Efurosibina Adegbija

With almost four times the number of languages of even Tanzania, Nigeria is a unique. Indeed Nigerians speak a greater number of languages than can be found in any other African country. To put this into perspective, consider the fact that Nigeria has three times the population of South Africa, but twenty-one times the number of languages. Therefore, it is not surprising that relatively few of the 514 languages claimed for Nigeria are major languages, that is, languages with over a million speakers. Ethnologue lists eleven. In contrast, South Africa, with only twenty-four languages, has nine with over a million speakers. Moreover it is not surprising that with so many languages potentially in competition, Nigeria has the most minor and endangered languages, fifty-four, in contrast to Tanzania’s six, Botswana’s four, South Africa’s three, and Algeria’s zero. What the presence of minor and endangered languages reflects is ongoing language shift. Bilingual and multilingual populations can shift from their heritage language to a more prestigious or more dominant or more “useful” language. Table 8.1 summarizes some of the relevant information for Nigeria.

In 1960, Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe became Nigeria’s first president after the country gained its independence from Britain. Azikiwe’s government adopted policies that further codified the language status quo inherited from colonial period. Nigerian linguist Efurosibina Adegbija asserts that this situation has continued more or less to the present day. Table 8.2 adapts information from Adegbija’s approximate hierarchical analysis of some of the functions of Nigeria’s languages, with the addition of other
### Table 8.1  Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>923,768 sq km (356,669 sq mi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>152 million (2011 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>137 persons/sq km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>$2,300 (2009 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>c.250: Hausa and Fulani (north), Yoruba (southwest) and Igbo (southeast) 65% Edo, Ijaw, Ibibio, Nupe Tiv, Kanuri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Muslim (50%), Christian (40%), Traditional (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Living Languages</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Immigrant Languages</td>
<td>7 + 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National or Official Languages</td>
<td>9: Edo, Efik, Adamawa Fulfulde, Hausa, Idoma, Igbo, Central Kanuri, Yoruba, English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Languages &gt; 1,000,000 speakers</td>
<td>11: Anaang (1,400,000); Edo (1,000,000); English (1,000,000); Fulfulde, Adamawa (7,611,000); Fulfulde, (1,710,000); Hausa (18,500,000); Igbo (18,000,000); Izon (1,000,000); Kanuri, Central (3,000,000); Nigerian Pidgin (30,000,000); Yoruba (18,900,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor and Endangered Languages &lt; 1,000 speakers</td>
<td>54: Abon (1,000); ṣe空中 (300); Ambo (1,000); ãn’wá (300); Ayu (800); Bassa-Kontagora (10); beele (120); Bete (50); Bukwen (1,000); Bure (500); Buru (1,000); Cent७m (200); Cori (1,000); Daba (1,000); Defaka (200); Fali of Baissa (few left); Fam (1,000); Fungwa (1,000); Gbaya, Northwest (very few in Nigeria); Gwa (980); Gyem (1,000); iyive (1,000); Jilbe (100); Jimi (1,000); Ju (900); Juun Takum (11); Kapya (200); Kinuku (500); Kiong (100); Kudu-Camo (42); Limbum (few in Nigeria); Luri (2); Mangas (100); Mashi (1,000); Mundat (1,000); Mvanip (100); Nkukoli (1,000); Nyam (100); Odut (20); Putai (50); Sambe (6); Sheni (6); Shuwa-Zamani (1,000); Somyev (18); Tala (1,000); Tamajaq, Tawallammat (few in Nigeria); Tha (1,000); Ukwa (100); Vono (500); Vute (1,000); Yamba (few in Nigeria); Yangkam (100); Zangwal (100); Zeem (400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidgin/Creole Languages</td>
<td>3: Barikanchi, Gibanawa, Nigerian Pidgin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy Rate</td>
<td>57.1% (1995 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Use/% Penetration</td>
<td>43,982,999/28.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

facts relevant to language use in Nigeria. Although not spelled out by Adegbija, a hierarchy of language use reflects, for example, the number of speakers of the language, whether it is used as a lingua franca, and whether a language possesses a writing system.

Table 8.2 The Status and Function of Languages in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Languages</th>
<th>Languages</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Official, high status language, spoken by the powerful&lt;br&gt;Spoken by &lt; 20% of the population&lt;br&gt;Most frequently used in media&lt;br&gt;An important language of the international and local Internet&lt;br&gt;National and international lingua franca&lt;br&gt;Spoken and written in various forms&lt;br&gt;May be viewed as a tool of Christianity by Nigerian Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo</td>
<td>Co-official with English, but largely regional&lt;br&gt;Spoken by a politically and numerically powerful class&lt;br&gt;Very frequently used in media&lt;br&gt;Have writing systems and are used on the Internet&lt;br&gt;Regional lingua franca, also spoken in neighboring countries&lt;br&gt;May be associated with religion (e.g. Yoruba and traditional religion, Hausa and Islam)&lt;br&gt;Various religious rites conducted in these major languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tiv, Idoma, Efik, Kanuri, Fulfulde, Ebira, Ijo, Edo, Nupe, Igala, Ibibio</td>
<td>Other major languages but primarily restricted to one or more states&lt;br&gt;Frequently used in media&lt;br&gt;Have writing systems&lt;br&gt;May be used on the Internet&lt;br&gt;Various religious rites conducted in these languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 435</td>
<td>Okpe, Oko-Osanyi, and others</td>
<td>Minority languages; largely restricted to communities or local governments&lt;br&gt;May be used in media, but most are not&lt;br&gt;Around 280 lack writing systems&lt;br&gt;Use on the Internet not documented&lt;br&gt;May be especially associated with traditional religious rites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
Despite the ethnic, religious, and political conflicts that have beset Nigeria’s history, Nigeria has had a lot of experience coordinating the use of local, regional, and international lingua franca at levels of varying geographic scope, as the table above illustrates. That language use, nonetheless, remains in Adegbija’s words “explosive and conflict ridden” suggests not only that people are sensitive about issues like identity and ethnicity, but that there may be many Nigerians concerned that their voices are not being heard within Nigeria. Because the goal of ensuring that African voices are represented in international forums is not limited to voicing the concerns of African elites, the linguistic complexity of Nigeria is a significant factor as to what degree this goal can be achieved.

However, in Nigeria more than anywhere else in Africa, information communication technology (ICT) appears destined to have a future impact on communication among Nigerians across the multilingual nation, between Nigerians and other Africans, and Nigerians and non-Africans. The Australian website Buddecomm, of Paul Budde Communications, which claims to be the largest telecommunications research site on the Internet, reported in February 2011 that Nigeria is “Africa’s largest mobile market expected to reach 100 million subscribers.” Although the report’s author Peter Lange, gives the penetration rate (i.e., what percentage of the population access the technology), as 58 percent for mobile phones and 44 percent for the Internet (Internet World Stats gives a more conservative penetration of 28.3 percent), both far outstrip the 0.6 percent penetration rate for fixed-line telephony. Thus, the future of Nigeria’s voice in international 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Languages</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Various dialects, Nigerian Pidgin English</td>
<td>Widely used, especially in certain domains and among certain populations, for example, in markets and informally by university students. No official recognition. Used in advertising, radio, and TVIs written, but no standard orthography. Is present on the Internet, especially in certain domains such as popular music lyrics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Arabic</td>
<td>Not widespread. Spoken primarily by Muslim clerics. International lingua franca. Significant international language for the Internet, but use by Nigerians not documented. Has an important symbolic function for Nigerian Muslims. May be interpreted as the sign of a Muslim fanatic by non-Muslims.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, adapted from Adegbija (2007).
forums will significantly reflect its unique linguistic history in the context of its ongoing technological progress.

South Africa Spotlights Indigenous Languages

How easily and naturally the story shifts from politics to language. It has been stated openly that Afrikaans is the price that Afrikaners will have to pay for apartheid. . . . Was it not a debate for years on Robben Island: What do we do with the language of the boere?

—Antjie Krog

If you speak in a language they understand, you speak to their head.
If you speak in their own language, you speak to their heart.

—Nelson Mandela

Although, South Africa does not have that many languages, relatively speaking, its unique history has mandated that its multilingual heritage be officially recognized, even emphasized. To this end, almost half of the languages in the country, eleven out of twenty-four, have been given the status of official languages. As can be seen in Table 8.3, nine of the official languages are major languages spoken by more than a million people.

Table 8.3 South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1,223,201 sq km (472,281 sq mi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>49.99 million (2011 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>35 persons/sq km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>$5,787 (2011 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Blacks (79.4%) nine ethnic groups: Zulu (22%), Xhosa, Pedi, Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga, Swazi, Ndebele, and Venda. Whites (9.2%) mainly Dutch ancestry (Afrikaners 75%), also British, German, and French Huguenot (Protestant) Coloreds (8.7%) mainly Black and Afrikaner ancestry Asians (2.7%) mainly Indian ancestry, also Malay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Christian (majority), Traditional African, Hindu, Muslim (2%), Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Living Languages</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Immigrant Languages</td>
<td>14+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National or Official Languages</td>
<td>11: Afrikaans, Ndebele, Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho, Swati, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa, Zulu, English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
Language policy has long been controversial in South Africa. When the policy of apartheid was instituted by the National Party in 1948, the language policy, known as Article 15, stated:

The teaching and education of the native must be grounded in the life and world view of the whites, most especially those of the Boer nation. . . . The mother tongue must be the basis of native education and teaching but . . . the two official languages [Afrikaans and English] must be taught as subjects.31

This policy was implemented through the Bantu Education Act of 1953 establishing Afrikaans and English as the official languages, and as the media of instruction in the fifth year of education. South African Blacks overwhelmingly opposed this act, perceiving it to be a tool of the regime’s oppression.32 Students boycotted schools to protest the enforced language choice, carrying banners proclaiming “Down with Afrikaans.”33 The boycott culminated in the Soweto riots of June 1976, in which hundreds died at the hands of South African police. The government was forced to withdraw its language policy one month later and Black schools were able to choose their preferred language as the medium of education from the fifth year onward. Although English was an ex-imperial language, nonetheless, 96 percent of the parents chose it as the medium of education.34 South African linguist Nkonko Kamwangamalu explains:

Thus, for the black people English became the language of liberation, despite the fact that prior to the rise of Afrikaans both the Boers and the Blacks viewed English as an instrument of domination.35

The Soweto riots galvanized opposition to the apartheid regime, as illustrated by the millions of South Africans who boycotted their jobs on its
ten-year anniversary. african national congress leader, nelson mandela was released from prison in 1990, after twenty-seven years, and the apartheid era finally came to an end in 1994. as president mandela’s government set about redressing old wrongs, it focused on education and language. a multilingual language policy was adopted, in which students were allowed to attend any school and be taught in the language of their choice, and would study one other approved (minority) language from the third grade on. the language policy of the 1996 constitution recognizes eleven languages (see table 8.3 for the alphabetical list) and states:

[R]ecognizing the historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages of our people, the state must take practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages. . . . [A pan-south african language board will be established to] promote and create conditions for the development and use of these (african) and other languages.37

however, practical challenges to this multilingual policy soon surfaced. representatives in parliament who supported the multilingual policy have pointed out that it is often too expensive for the government to pay for necessary interpreting services, archiving of multiple copies of documents, etc.38

ironically, the well-intentioned language policies of the 1996 constitution have probably had the unforeseen effect of strengthening the use of english. kamwangamalu points out:

if anything has changed at all in terms of the language practices, it is that english has gained more territory and political clout than afrikaans in virtually all of the country’s institutions, including the legislature, education, the media, and the army.39

south africa has undergone almost five hundred years of shifting language policies involving the imposition of the language of a minority elite on the rest of the population: the so-called dutchification in the earliest colonial period, anglicization under the british, and afrikanerization. kamwangamalu has named the current era “language democratization,” but not all south africans agree.40 jon orman, in his 2008 book, language policy and nation-building in post-apartheid south africa, states:

the end of apartheid in 1994 did not signal the end of tendencies toward elite closure [that is, when vested interests motivate elites to use language to keep power in their own hands]41 in south african society, however.
There has merely been the replacement of one political elite (white, Afrikaans-speaking) with another (mostly black, English-speaking).42

Thus, to the extent that the new elite are willing to put forward the concerns of all South Africans, more South African voices will be represented in international forums. An example can be seen in the recent history of the San people who speak some of the languages considered endangered in South Africa and Botswana, discussed below. Their languages are known to linguists as “click” languages, which feature relatively rare click-like consonants; these languages are a subset of the Khoisan language family (also found in Botswana as noted below).43 During their fight with international pharmaceutical companies wishing to make money off the San knowledge of plant properties, members of the community won a 1999 court case that transferred 100,000 acres of White-owned farmland on the edge of the Kalahari. Certainly the San people’s legal victories caught the world’s attention when they demanded recognition of their contribution to global science and technology and inclusion in the accruing economic benefits.44

Moreover, if practical considerations have stalled the implementation of South Africa’s multilingual language policy, advances in global science and technology may provide untold future solutions. Lange reported on Buddecomm that: “With its relatively well-developed and diverse infrastructure, South Africa is also taking a regional lead role in the convergence of telecommunication and information technologies.” He added: “South Africa’s telecom sector boasts the continent’s most advanced networks in terms of technology deployed and services provided.”45 Therefore, it seems too soon to declare the multilingual language policy dead, nor to assume that speakers of minor languages, like the San, are doomed to remain unheard in a global context. Moreover, the de facto promotion of English claimed by critics has the effect of ensuring global participation by the country as a whole.

LANGUAGE POLICIES FOCUS ON UNITY AND ASSIMILATION: ALGERIA, TANZANIA, AND BOTSWANA

This section examines three countries in which post-independence governments attempted to legislate language use with the goal of achieving linguistic and cultural unity within the boundaries of the new nation. Algerian governments have promoted an international lingua franca, Arabic. Tanzanian governments have supported the spread of a new regional lingua franca, Swahili. Botswana governments have privileged the local language Setswana. Each country’s approach has had different ramifications for what views are communicated nationally, regionally, and internationally.
Algeria Emphasizes its Arab Heritage

[The role of the Revolution] is above all . . . to restore to Arabic—the very expression of the cultural values of our country—its dignity and its efficacy as a language of civilisation.

—Tripoli Programme (June 1962)\textsuperscript{46}

As outlined in Table 8.4, there are approximately eighteen languages spoken in Algeria, the fewest of the countries examined in this study. Algeria has three major languages with more than a million speakers: Algerian Arabic and two of the so-called Berber languages. The population of Algeria has traditionally been divided into two ethnic groups, Arabs and Berbers. This distinction, however, actually refers more to language choice than ethnicity.\textsuperscript{47}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Algeria}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
Area & 2,381,740 sq km (919,595 sq mi) \\
Population & 36.3 million (2011 est.) \\
Population Density & 12 persons/sq km \\
GDP per capita & $4,470 (2010 est.) \\
Ethnic Groups & Arab, Berber, mixed Arab-Berber (99%) \\
Religions & Sunni Islam (state religion, 99%), Christian, or Jewish (1%) \\
Number of Living Languages\textsuperscript{48} & 18 \\
National or Official Languages & 1: Standard Arabic \\
Major Languages > 1,000,000 speakers & 3: Arabic, Algerian Spoken (20,400,000); Kabyle\textsuperscript{49} (2,540,000); Tachawit (1,400,000) \\
Immigrant Languages > 1,000,000 & 0 \\
Minor and Endangered Languages <1000 speakers & 0 \\
Pidgin/Creole Languages & 0 \\
Adult Literacy Rate & 69.9 % (2004 est.) \\
Internet Use/\% Penetration & 4,700,000/13.4\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Sources: Ethnologue 2009, Africana, US State Dept.; Internet World Stats 2011.\textsuperscript{50}
Ensuring that Africa’s Voice is Heard 177

Arabic was introduced into Algeria from the seventh century on, until, as a colony of France from 1830, Algeria underwent a policy of “Frenchification.”\(^{51}\) French policy caused Arabic literacy to be almost halved in only twenty years.\(^{52}\) When Algeria gained its independence from France in 1962 and created a new republic, language was at the forefront of the government’s concerns. That language was of paramount importance to the new regime is reflected in the words of Paulin Djité, who states: “Nowhere else in Africa has the language issue been so central in the fight against colonialism.”\(^{53}\) Language policy in Algeria, more than elsewhere in North Africa reflects a tendency, as D.C. Gordon points out, to be “the most vociferous in proclaiming its Arab Muslim identity.”\(^{54}\)

In fact, one could argue that, despite the difficulties experienced by countries with many more languages to contend with (e.g., Nigeria), language policy has remained a divisive issue in Algeria to a greater extent than in the rest of the continent. In his 2002 book, *Algeria in Others’ Languages*, A.E. Berger characterized the language issue as “the most severe problem of Algeria in its present state.”\(^{55}\)

The perceived ideological intransigence of the Algerian leadership provoked a backlash among various segments of the population, including the Arabic-speaking majority. An important issue was the extent to which colloquial Algerian Arabic was rejected in favor of Classical Arabic and international varieties. For example, at various points post-independence, Algerian governments have supported the recruitment of thousands of Egyptian or Iraqi teachers, because their Arabic was presumed to be more “pure” than that of native Algerians.\(^ {56}\)

Algerian governments have at times attempted to placate Berber speakers, for example with the opening of university departments of Amazigh (Berber) Language and Culture (1990, 1991), but have then reverted to imposing stricter measures in support of Arabization/Islamization such as the infamous Act No 91—05 of 1991 which called for “total Arabization.” In addition, there have been renewed calls for the use of French in the government and elsewhere.

Ephraim and Mala Tabory have characterized the linguistic conflict thus:

> The Algerian situation is complex, as it is at a crossroad of tension between French, the colonial language and Arabic, the new national language; Classical Arabic versus colloquial Algerian Arabic; and the various Berber dialects versus Arabic.\(^ {57}\)

Conservative government ethnolinguistic policies are also challenged by twenty-first century technological advances. As the so-called Arab Spring of 2010 illustrated, Arabic speakers are increasingly exploiting communication technology to reach out beyond national boundaries. Lange of Buddecomm reports that: “Algeria has one of the highest teledensities in
Africa” attributable in part to its relatively well developed infrastructure. In other words, among African countries, Algeria has one of the highest levels of mobile and fixed-line penetration. In fact, Algeria appears to have the greatest potential in northern Africa.

Although the rigid ideological stance of the majority of post-independence Algerian governments has motivated exerting strong control over both freedom of expression and the languages used, the fact that a majority of Algerians speak Arabic, an international lingua franca, alone suggests that their voices might be assumed to have a better chance of being heard directly within the international forum than the citizens of more multilingual African countries. The continued use of French in Algeria is also a positive factor in its international reach. For example, although English is the number one Internet language according to Internet World Stats, with 536.6 million users, Arabic comes in at number seven with 65.4 million and French is number eight with 59.8 million. These statistics illustrate the potential for global communication in these two languages.

Tanzania Cultivates Kiswahili as a Neutral Lingua Franca

The Arusha Declaration and our democratic single-party system, together with our national language, Kiswahili, and a highly politicized and disciplined national army, transformed more than 126 different tribes into a cohesive and stable nation.

—Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere (December, 1998).

In Table 8.5, the number of languages given for Tanzania is 128, of which only three are spoken by a million or more people. Ethnologue reports the 2009 estimate of 350,000 Kiswahili speakers in Tanzania. In fact, Kiswahili did not start out as the language of a major group, which, as discussed below, was perceived to be an advantage in choosing a national lingua franca.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.5 Tanzania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Density</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Groups</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
Julius K. Nyerere became the first president of Tanganyika (formerly German East Africa) after it gained its independence from Britain in 1961.65 In 1964, a year after Zanzibar became independent, The United Republic of Tanzania was created, uniting the two countries. Nyerere, whose mother tongue was Zanaki,66 made the establishment of a national language a high priority, and supported the adoption of Kiswahili as Tanzania’s unifying language. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 and subsequent “Education for Self Reliance,” signified the beginning of an intensive nation-building campaign built around a new Tanzanian identity based on the doctrine of Ujamaa (from the word “familyhood” in Kiswahili),67 loyalty to the state, participation in the economic self-reliance programs, and a common language.68 Government officials were not dissuaded by the possible negative impact which the spread of Kiswahili could have on minority and endangered languages.69 (See, for example, the six listed in Table 8.5.)

The fact that Kiswahili was neither the colonial language nor that of a dominant ethnic group appealed to radicals who called for the complete Swahilization of the society at the expense of all other Tanzanian languages. The existence of a centuries-old, pre-colonial literary tradition in Kiswahili, especially poetry, appealed to traditionalists, on the other hand, who emphasized historical continuity and the ethnic origins of Kiswahili, the language of the minority Waswahili people.70

Joshua Madumulla and his colleagues, assert:

---

*Table 8.5  Continued*

| Religions                                | Indian, Pakistani, and Goan ancestry  
|                                         | Arab and European ancestry            |
| Number of Living Languages               | Traditional (33%), Muslim (33%), Christian (33%) |
| Additional Immigrant Languages           | 7+                                      |
| National or Official Languages           | 2: Kiswahili, English                  |
| Major Languages > 1,000,000 speakers      | 3: English (1,500,00); Gogo (1,440,000); Haya (1,300,00); (Kiswahili: 350,000, monolinguals: 313,200) |
| Immigrant Languages > 1,000,000          |                                         |
| Minor and Endangered Languages <1000 speakers | 6: Aasáx (350); Hadza (800); Ngasa (250); Logooli (300); Nindi (100); Zaramo (few speakers) |
| Pidgin/Creole Languages                  | 1: Cutchi-Swahili (Swahili based)       |
| Literacy Rate                            | 67.8 % (1995 est.)                      |
| Internet Use/% Penetration               | 676,000/1.6%                            |

In a debate in which one side defended an “ethnic” Swahili—a politically undesirable stance—and another an “un-ethnic” Swahili—a falsified stance—there was little hope for a compromise, and the project of complementing the politically unified nation with a culturally unified nation (based on the “one nation, one culture, one language” view) was doomed to fail.\(^{71}\)

However, economic events overtook cultural considerations as from 1974 on, the increased need for foreign economic support caused even Nyerere to declare that “Tanzanians would be foolish to reject English.”\(^{72}\) Reflecting on the resulting linguistic ambivalence, Tanzanian educators such as Benjamin Nkonya stated in 2009:

> We want the two languages [Kiswahili and English] as mediums of instruction to be introduced at the secondary school level so that students may decide which way to go.\(^{73}\)

Nonetheless, the fact that Kiswahili seems to be growing in influence among Tanzanians and neighboring Kenyans alike already gives many Tanzanians a greater voice. As does the fact that Tanzania has reluctantly continued to teach English to its educated elite. Although the Internet usage in Tanzania appears quite small, Lange of Buddecomm reported in 2008 that mobile phone use was growing at 50 percent per annum and had passed the ten million subscriber mark that year.\(^{74}\) Thus, Tanzania’s communication potential rests on its growing regional lingua franca, the continued need for the most widely-used international lingua franca, and an anticipated potential for exploiting information communication technology despite the hindrance of economic difficulties.

**Botswana Privileges the Largest Local Language**

[Do not] spoil the prevailing peace and unity in the country by fighting for ethnic language groupings to take precedence over Setswana, . . . tribes insisting that their languages become media of instruction within their respective areas would break up the nation.

—President Sir Ketumile Masire\(^ {75}\)

As presented in Table 8.6, approximately twenty-nine languages are spoken in Botswana, of which only one, Setswana, is reported to be a major language spoken by more than a million people. Although the number of languages spoken in Botswana is similar to that of South Africa, the population of the former is much smaller, with the result that an estimated 50 percent of the Batswana are reported to speak the same language. However, with approximately 50 percent of Batswana speaking twenty-eight other languages, language planning has not been easier for the Botswana government than that of its larger neighbor.

The independent Republic of Botswana was created in 1966 after more than a half century of being governed by the British as part of the Bechuanaland
protectorate. Initially economically dependent on the British, Botswana experienced a major economic boost a few years after independence with the discovery of significant diamond fields. The U.S. State Department signaled its approval of the Botswana government’s economic policies in 2011:

Botswana has enjoyed one of the fastest growth rates in per capita income in the world since independence. . . . Botswana’s impressive economic record has been built on the foundation of widely using revenue generated from diamond mining to fuel economic development through prudent fiscal policies and a cautious foreign policy.

Continuing its upbeat tone, the U.S. State Department notes that Botswana was ranked as Africa’s least corrupt country and ranked ahead of many other countries worldwide by Transparency International in 2010.

Yet the one shadow cast on the future in this approving U.S. document is Botswana government policy toward the Basarwa (San) people,
traditionally nomadic hunter-gatherers who speak Khoisan languages, which has resulted in this minority being marginalized politically, socially, and economically. Because the four endangered languages listed in Table 8.6 are Khoisan languages, the State Department document might have also pointed to the Barsawa minority being linguistically marginalized as well. In fact, most of the languages spoken by the smallest populations in Botswana belong to the Khoisan language family.81

It is not only Khoisan language speakers who are linguistically marginalized in Botswana. The languages of other ethnic groups, while strictly speaking not endangered, appear to be undergoing a language shift. Lydia Nyati-Ramahobo points to the Wayeyi who were subjected to slavery by the dominant Batawana more than any other group. Nyati-Ramahobo claims that most of the Wayeyi have become assimilated and cannot speak their language, Shiyei, and those that do often deny it because its association with slavery has caused the language to have low status.82

While some minority languages have been inevitably undermined by the socio-cultural history of their speakers, Nyati-Ramohobo accuses the post-independence Botswana government of purposefully working toward this goal: “At independence, the Government of Botswana adopted the orientation that language diversity was a problem and aimed to eradicate all minority languages.”83

Nyati-Ramohobo reports that critics of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party are labeled “tribalistic” and “engineers of ethnic conflict.”84 Like Nigeria, Botswana does not include questions regarding ethnicity and language in its censuses, however, Nyati-Ramahobo claims that in the case of Botswana, this is intended to support the impression that the thousands of speakers of other languages are even fewer than in reality. She further asserts that “The definition of majority and minority [is] non-numerically determined,” pointing to pre-independence censuses with much higher figures for groups such as the Wayeyi.85

Although it was assumed post independence that English, as the official language of the country, would be the medium of instruction in schools at all levels, it soon became clear that this was difficult, if not impossible, to follow in practice. The First National Commission on Education argued in 1977 that:

The introduction of English as a medium of instruction as early as Standard 3 . . . clearly discriminated against the national language. The Commission feels strongly that every nation ought to give a prominent place to its language in its education system.86

The commission recommended the use of Setswana for the first four years of primary education, with a transitional model of bilingual education for students who did not speak Setswana as a mother tongue in which they would gradually shift to Setswana. The proposal to accommodate minority
language speakers was not adopted by the government in 1977, or by that of the Second National Commission on Education in 1993, which recommended that minority languages be included in pre-primary education. The Botswana government has continued with its policy of assimilation, while retaining a role for English. Deborah Adeyemi reports that currently Setswana is the medium of instruction for the first two years, with English as the medium of instruction from then on. According to Adeyemi, the government has left it up to the individual schools to respond to parents’ requests that other languages be included in school curricula and concludes:

Certainly, in a situation where the incentive or government backing for the development of other languages is half-hearted and left to poor communities to arrange for their children’s language of instruction, not much can be achieved.87

Although its goals were opposite those of South Africa, whether intended or not in Botswana an important result of language policy has been to enhance the importance of the use of English in the country. Nyati-Ramahobo claims that “more resources continue to be directed toward the use of English in all social domains, including education” and points to the fact that it is used in the judiciary and in administration, and that government correspondence and records are in English.88 Thus, there exists the tension between the various local languages and Setswana on the one hand and between Setswana and English on the other.89

Although the use of English can positively affect to what extent Botswana makes itself heard in international forums, the ethnolinguistic tension that exists clearly indicates the extent to which many Batswana feel their voice is mute. In a 2010 article entitled “An Inclusive Framework for Botswana: Reconciling the State and Perceived Marginalized Communities,” K.C. Monaka and S.M. Mutula explored the progress made by minority groups in using information communication technologies to further their cause and express their views.90 One of their examples was: “e-knowledge with women in Southern Africa (EKOWISA) . . . [which] uses technology to generate, analyse, translate, repackgage, and disseminate locally relevant information for better livelihoods.”91

Many non-Setswana-mother-tongue speakers are now supported by cultural organizations, but according to Monaka and Mutula, the advocacy groups can be regarded as intrusive by the Botswana government. For example, some of the San advocacy groups are based in South Africa or Namibia; others have connections to the New Apostolic or Lutheran churches. Monaka and Mutula present concrete suggestions toward furthering the goal of “multi-pronged approaches including institutional (international, regional, and national), indigenous frameworks and use of ICT.”92

The future potential of information communication technology in Botswana, as well as the rest of Africa cannot be overstated. Monaka and
Mutula cite the telecommunication program known as Nteletsa, Setswana for “call me,” in which the Botswana government has invested some 96 million dollars US. Nteletsa I and II provide almost 300 of Botswana’s 515 villages with basic telephony. The Botswana government is also utilizing international resources to develop ICT in Botswana. For example, the government has partnered with the Bill and Melissa Gates Foundation in a project designed to equip all public libraries with Internet access and computers throughout the country. Internet use has been steadily increasing, for example, Monaka and Mutula state that by 2007, 235 of the 270 secondary schools had access to the Internet. And although Internet penetration for the whole population is low, Lange of Buddecomm reports that Botswana has one of the highest mobile market penetration rates in Africa.

Botswana, thus, presents a situation where the growing use of English, a growing backlash by linguistic minorities, a strong economy, and the unknown ramifications of the Information Age combine in a complex context within which the issue of ensuring the Batswana’s voice is heard internationally must be considered.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria and South Africa have pursued policies recognizing the status of a multiple of languages, which has proved to be a difficult task. Although attempts to direct language policy, post-independence, are perceived by critics to have foundered, some five hundred languages, nonetheless co-exist in Nigeria in a complicated functional and functioning distribution. The three biggest indigenous lingua franca, Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo, have a wide distribution in West Africa, and the status of English within the nation’s linguistic hierarchy guarantees the country, if not all its citizens, an international voice. In South Africa, both the end of the colonial era and the recent end of apartheid have directed language policy toward a linguistic inclusiveness that has ironically favored the current international lingua franca, English, which some would see as fortuitous.

Algeria, Tanzania, and Botswana, on the other hand, have pursued language policies aimed at creating a single unified voice within the country. Algeria has pursued the policy of “Arabization” following the fall of the French, a policy whose relative success has spurred political and social unrest. Yet with some 221 million speakers worldwide, the use of Arabic has obvious international advantages for Algerians. In Tanzania, the language policies of two colonial regimes, German and British, morphed into the nationalist promotion of a regional lingua franca, the “Swahilization” policy of President Julius K. Nyerere. While Kiswahili is spoken internationally—Ethnologue reports some 780,000 speakers worldwide—Tanzania’s economic situation has rendered the use of English hard to eliminate. As Swahili adds new speakers and English continues to be learned around
the world, Tanzania’s striding the fence on language planning may benefit
its expressing its citizens’ concerns in international forums.

That neither attempting to be inclusive as in South Africa, nor exclusive as
in Botswana is guaranteed to be a successful national policy has been borne
out by the difficulties both countries have experienced. That ex-colonial lan-
guages like English and French continue to be important post-independence
in fulfilling the need for lingua franca appears hard to avoid.

In discussing colonial language policy, Alastair Pennycook observes that:

[I]n order to make sense of language policies we need to understand
both their location historically and their location contextually. What
I mean by this is that we cannot assume that the promotion of local
languages instead of a dominant language, or the promotion of a domi-
nant language at the expense of a local language, are in themselves
good or bad.95

Pennycook’s point is illustrated by how language policies in these five Afri-
can countries have evolved. These policies, which have responded to both
ideological and practical concerns, have attempted to satisfy the contradic-
tory goals of unifying these nations and enhancing their functioning and
growth while facilitating the expression of their concerns within the global
political context.

That English continues to play a large role in communications worldwide
is currently the case; nonetheless, languages across Africa have entered the
so-called information highway, and it seems clear that their participation
can only increase as the twenty-first century unfolds. Nigerian linguist Ayo
Banjo spells out the linguistic challenge that having a role in the interna-
tional political arena entails:

The dominance of the English language at this stage of modernization
is inevitable, but the situation is evolving rather than static. In that pro-
cess of evolution, all the languages have a part to play, and if Nigeria
is to make a distinctive contribution to human civilization, it will have
to be as a result of the symbiotic relationship between English and the
indigenous languages, a pooling of the resources of all the languages
without foreclosing the contributions that any of them can make.96

If the voice of the continent is to be heard around the globe and the aspi-
rations of its many citizens are to be conveyed, the challenge spelled out
by Banjo has to be met within such diverse linguistic, social, and political
contexts as the five countries discussed here exemplify.

However, that what has gone before is no predictor of the future is clear
from the exponential spread of access to means of communication, such as
wireless technologies. For example, it is obvious from just the expanded
use of cell phone access on the continent that access to the communication
satellites that circle the globe is capable of “leapfrogging” the once insurmountable problem of inadequate landline infrastructure. Buddecomm reports that large parts of Africa gained access to international fiber bandwidth for the first time via submarine cables in 2009 and 2010. There have also been massive investments in terrestrial infrastructure, which have taken new bandwidth to population centers in the interior and across borders to landlocked countries. The rapid spread of mobile data and 3G broadband services has brought Internet access to many areas outside major cities for the first time. Lange concludes: “New competition in international fibre bandwidth is set to revolutionise the market.”

It is not only “the market” that is going to be revolutionized by these developments. More importantly, communication within and without the African continent appears destined for an enhanced international voice. Each country’s potential will follow a unique trajectory as it exploits information communication technology within its own political, economic, and ethnolinguistic context as an examination of Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Tanzania, and Botswana amply illustrate.

NOTES


2. George Tucker Childs, An Introduction to African Languages (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2003), 165.


5. An example of this type of fragmentation is the development of the large Indo-European family of languages, which involved migration of peoples and varying contact situations. Older languages became fragmented over time into non-mutually intelligible new languages, which nonetheless shared some hereditary characteristics. A well-known example is Latin under the Roman Empire, and the resulting development of the modern Romance languages.


7. The term Khoisan was adopted by linguists of South Africa’s University of Witwatersrand to replace the stigmatized labels “Bushman” and “Hottentot.”
Ensuring that Africa’s Voice is Heard 187

10. For example, the distinction between the historically related languages Spanish and French becomes blurred when one considers the dialectal variants that exist on the geographic continuum between Paris and Madrid. What one calls what is spoken halfway between the two capitals depends as much upon on which side of the Spain/France border the dialect is spoken as any linguistic criteria.
11. The outline of the fragmentation belt is redrawn from Dalby, “Reflections,” 167 (as presented in Childs, *Introduction to African Languages*, 165); the boundaries have been adjusted by the author to accommodate recent data in Paul M. Lewis, ed., *Ethnologue Languages of the World*, 16th ed. (Dallas: SIL International, 2009), Ethnologue, online version, http://www.ethnologue.com. Regarding language density; the darker shading approximates Ethnologue information (on the website this information is mapped as dots to locate the geographic center of living languages on the African continent). In other words, where the darker shading appears, greater numbers of languages are spoken. However, it is understood that this is a crude representation and cannot do justice to the amount of overlap, especially where so many languages are spoken.
12. Lewis, *Ethnologue*.
14. Two countries in the world are reported to have more languages than Nigeria: Papua New Guinea (830) and Indonesia (719). The Democratic Republic of the Congo (215) has the second highest number of languages on the African continent. Lewis, *Ethnologue*.
15. Lewis, *Ethnologue*.
16. The Ethnologue states that there are also other immigrant speakers of “languages of Lebanon, and Europe.” Lewis, *Ethnologue*.
17. Pidgins and creoles are not easily defined, but they are mixed languages that come into being due to intense language contact situations and the need of ethnic groups who do not speak each other’s languages to devise a way to communicate. Pidgins are usually simpler in syntax, vocabulary, etc., and creoles are usually regarded as a full language that may be a mother tongue for some speakers. The elements of the language are drawn from multiple sources. For example, Nigerian pidgin has a vocabulary derived from English, as well as elements from indigenous languages of the area.
21. That language exists in a continuum is readily illustrated here. Varieties of Nigerian English belong to the larger family of international “Englishes”
found around the globe, all exhibiting a unique combination of phonological, syntactic, and lexical features.


23. But, for example, speakers of Yoruba and Hausa also practice other religions.

24. This does not imply that speakers of these languages are illiterate. Because of the high degree of multilingualism, speakers whose heritage language does not feature a writing system could be literate in one or more other languages, depending on their education.


26. Lange “2011 Nigeria—Telecoms, Mobile, Broadband.”.


29. Ethnologue 2009 lists fourteen immigrant languages ranging from Eastern Yiddish to Hakka Chinese. Of those on the list only Portuguese has more than a million speakers. However, Ethnologue notes that there are actually more immigrant languages spoken in South Africa and estimates some 2,700,000 people speak “languages of nearby countries” not on their list. Lewis, *Ethnologue*.


32. Ibid, 120.


34. Phaswana, “Contradiction or Affirmation?,” 121.


38. Phaswana, “Contradiction or Affirmation?,” 125.


40. Phaswana, “Contradiction or Affirmation?,” 128.

Ensuring that Africa’s Voice is Heard  189


43. African click languages belong to the language family Khoisan (Khoi-San) or Khoesan, of which the San languages are considered a subset, although there is controversy surrounding how some of these languages should be classified. Childs, *Introduction to African Languages*. See Ann Albuyeh, “Post-Colonial Environmental Issues in Africa: Globalization, Science, Technology and the Language Question,” in *Perspectives on African Environment and Technology*, ed. Toyin Falola and Maurice Amutabi, forthcoming, for a discussion of both scientific communities and the San people and issues surrounding the use of English. Xhosa, one of the major languages, belongs to the Bantu group, but has borrowed about 15 percent of its vocabulary from Khoisan languages and as a result features click consonants, Lewis, *Ethnologue*.


45. Lange, “South Africa—Telecoms, Mobile, Broadband.”


47. Benrabah, “The Language Situation in Algeria,” 32. See Benrabah, 37–40 for the early history of Algeria, especially the pre-colonial “Arabization” resulting from two waves of Arabs spreading their religion and language.

48. Living languages include sign language. For example, this figure includes Algerian Sign Language used by the deaf in Algeria and in northern Morocco.

49. The language is also known as Tamazigh.


56. Ibid., 57.

57. Ibid., 26.

58. Lange, “Algeria- Telecoms, Mobile, Broadband.”


61. Ethnologue estimates there are 787,630 speakers of Kiswahili worldwide. Its list of countries (in alphabetical order) where Kiswahili is spoken is Burundi, Canada, Kenya, Libya, Mayotte, Mozambique, Oman, Rwanda, Somalia,

62. Appiah and Gates, *Africana*. The 2011 U.S. State Department report claims that 63 percent are now Christian and traditional, Sikh, Hindu, and Baha’I together account for only 2 percent, U.S. State Department website for Algeria.

63. Ethnologue estimates that there are additional speakers of “languages of Europe (70,000), Rwanda (25,000) and Mozambique [in unspecified numbers].” Lewis, *Ethnologue*.


65. A colony of Germany, which took direct control of mainland Tanzania in 1891, it became a possession of the British in 1916 midway through World War I.


68. Ibid., 313.

69. See e.g. Strom 2009.

70. Madumulla et al., “Politics, Ideology and Poetic Form,” 334.[Full citation is given in note 67.]

71. Ibid., 334.


76. This figure is from Appiah and Gates *Africana*. The US State Department website claims Christianity has grown to 70 percent and traditional religion shrunk to 6 percent.


78. Ibid, 68–69. Nyati-Ramahobo states that it is not clear whether Setawana is a creole or a dialect with some lexical code-switching. She further states that Tsotsitaal may be being imported into Botswana from South Africa: “The current situation concerning pidgins and creoles in Botswana is that none of the varieties have really been studied by scholars in a detailed manner.”
Ensuring that Africa’s Voice is Heard


81. Lewis, Ethnologue.

82. Nyati-Ramahobo, “Language Situation in Botswana,” 36–37. Ethnologue estimates that the total ethnic population is 47,000 for Botswana and neighboring Namibia of whom 24,000 speak the language. Twenty thousand of the Shiyeyi speakers reside in Botswana. In other words, some 50 percent of the Wayeyi have shifted to other languages. Lewis, Ethnologue.


84. Ibid., 45.

85. Ibid., 35–36.

86. Ibid., 44


88. Ibid., 45, 52.


91. Ibid., 59.

92. Ibid., 55

93. Ibid., 61.

94. Lange, “Botswana—Telecoms, Mobile, Broadband.”


97. Lange, “Nigeria—Telecoms, Mobile, Broadband.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Ensuring that Africa’s Voice is Heard


9 Strongmen and Strategists
Perspectivising Models of Conflict Resolution in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart and Anthills of the Savannah
Alexander Kure

INTRODUCTION

Because the causes of conflicts in any human society differ from one situation to another, so also are the different approaches and methods adopted to tackle conflict resolution. Historically, from the beginning of human existence, human societies have been embroiled in having to choose to coexist in harmony or in conflict and debating the rights and wrongs of both war and peace. With the dynamism that has attended human existence as reflected in the advances in civilization and emergence of a plethora of religious proclivities, the genesis of conflict, which often gives birth to violence and war, lie invariably within factors that include the search for identity, ethnicity, power struggles, inequality of shared resources, oppression, and so on. This chapter discusses conflict and its resolution, not as a literary construct in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart (1958) and Anthills of the Savannah (1987). Rather, it explores how the use of this literary device to resolve the literary conflicts in the novels, foregrounds Achebe’s contribution to the on-going discourse and search for efficacious methods for resolving conflicts that often engender violence, wars, and other destructive tendencies, which are inimical to human existence in any part of the world.

Pointedly, the chapter contends that conflict could either be intra-personal, inter-personal, or group. It also contends that since time immemorial, various concerted efforts have been employed to resolve conflicts at various levels. However, the chapter argues that while these efforts are being employed, little effort is being made to factor in the contributions of African literatures (oral and written) thereby connecting the foci of these literatures to international discourses, such as those of finding solutions toward resolving conflict. For example, it is common to read and celebrate how the writings of the Indian writer Rabindranath Tagore and other non-African writers influenced the discourse on conflict resolution. However, African writers, too many to list from the very rich literary African continent, timeless and over-celebrated as they and their works are, are often discussed only at the level of their relevance to the emergence, growth, or development of African literature. This is a negative trend because it, among many other things, not only disconnects
African literatures from their contribution to the development of world literatures and other related discourses, but may eventually deny African authors and literatures, in the oral and written forms, the chance for a consideration or inclusion of their contributions to the development and growth of the literary canon and the search for ways to resolve aspects like those in conflicts throughout the world.

Thus, this chapter explores how Achebe shows why the use of the fist, which is akin to the use of violence or counter-violence, to maintain discipline as exhibited by the stereotypical difficult, egoistic, harsh, uncompromising, and violent prone male character, Okonkwo, in *Things Fall Apart* (henceforth *TFA*) is a less productive enterprise to resolve conflict, as compared to the use of non-violence and other very subtle strategies by the stereotypical soft, patient, and long-suffering female character, Beatrice, the stereotype in *Anthills of the Savannah* (henceforth *AS*). Interestingly, Achebe communicates his perspective in the lucid expositions when he considers the issue in line with the idea of the kind of leadership style that can be wielded in the context of the effort to resolve conflict to ensure effective realization of the desired goals. Therefore, using Peter Calvert’s postulation that individual leaders are not necessarily revolutionary leaders, the chapter compares the two characters, first as revolutionary characters and second as revolutionary leaders. It confirms that although Okonkwo is a revolutionary character, he fails as a leader because he ends up without supporters. On the other hand, Beatrice is more fruitful in her endeavor; hence she ends up as an exemplary revolutionary character and leader because of her numerous followers at the end of the novel.

In essence, because literature reflects the human existence, Achebe, using Beatrice, challenges the popular assumption that is portrayed in present day politics—that conflict can best be resolved using the iron hand or mailed fist. Therefore, this chapter concludes that Achebe posits that until the big and powerful nations (leaders) or any set of people as it where, aided by their superiority or vast technological advancement, cease their desire for territorial expansion and control over the smaller nations or people, peace could never be achieved. The choice of these two novels is very obvious and strategic: to contextualize the argument that as early as 1958 and as late as 1988 and beyond, modern African literature has been playing the role of being socially committed not only at the continental, but also international levels depending on how they are interpreted. Intrinsic in this argument is the call against the parochial and insular perspectives that are often brought to bear in most critical studies of modern African literature.

Structurally, the chapter is divided into subsections. It explores time-tested approaches and methods that have been in use to resolve conflict. It explores Achebe’s proposed models, which also reflect the broad approaches in the previous subsection, that is, violence or non-violence, using the selected characters in the selected novels. The chapter then concludes by submitting that, from the interrogation of the characters and leadership
styles of the selected characters (Okonkwo and Beatrice), it becomes incumbent for powerful world leaders, leading powerful and un-powerful nations, groups of peoples, and individuals to adopt non-violent diplomatic strategies to resolve conflicts of whatever nature when they occur. However, and interestingly, too, Achebe keys in on the gender discourse of the feminist proclivity to suggest, by implication, the need to recognize the worth of the female gender in the entire struggle for conflict resolution. Indeed, concluding on Beatrice, Achebe conjectures that the mode, tone, tenor, and temper of the existence of the female gender are arguably the most suitable to impact on the struggle at conflict resolution at all levels the world over.

SOME TIME-TESTED APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict resolution has been part of human experience for ages. There are many causes of conflict and the methods employed to resolve them differ from one individual to another. Conflict resolution involves freely accepted conditions by all parties involved in a conflict. None of the parties would sacrifice any of their important values, especially those they do not wish to repudiate. On the other hand, settlement refers to negotiated or arbitrated outcomes of disputes in which a third party deals with the conflict on terms dictated. Meanwhile, while settlement merely reduces the intensity of the conflict, resolution removes its very ground. Hence Heitler defines conflict resolution as “the attainment of a solution that satisfies the requirements of all the seemingly conflicting forces and thereby, produces a feeling of closure for all participants.” For Olawale Albert, conflict resolution is aimed at “containing the problem immediately and thus checking it.” Accordingly, he adds that the effort serves three basic purposes, namely: minimization of chances of destructive conflicts; stabilization of cessation of destructive conflicts so as to prevent escalation; and prevention of outbreak of a full-flown conflict done by uprooting the basic reasons for the rancour. Interestingly, Heitler emphasizes that a process of conflict resolution should entail the following: the positions, explore the underlying concerns, and joint problem solving. These solutions, she posits, should equally complement each other’s needs irrespective of their incompatibility. Therefore, in a nutshell, Heitler surmises that,

>The movement from initial positions to exploration of underlying concerns enables a cooperative process of information gathering to evolve, eventuating in the creation of mutually acceptable solutions.

As stated earlier, there is no one single way to resolve differences. For the purpose of this chapter, the foregoing discourse is a summary of the different, very prominent approaches that have and are still being employed to
resolve conflicts whenever they arise. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the different methods that issue from the approaches and critically comments on the efficacy of such with a view to keying in on the relevance of the model proposed for adoption by Achebe.

There are, in broad general terms, three approaches to conflict resolution: top-down, middle-range, and grassroots. The top-down approach entails that the peacemakers are usually eminent personalities with public profiles. The work of these people is usually supported by the government or international organizations considered to be a neutral party in the conflict. The peacemakers in this kind of setting shuttle between the top-level leaders of the conflict, believing that any agreement reached with these people will trickle down the line. Secondly, the middle-range approach is based on the understanding that those who lead community conflicts belong to the middle range and that if properly integrated in the peace process, they might be very instrumental in facilitating sustainable peace. The approach can be operationalized in three different ways: conflict management training, problem-solving workshops, and establishment of peace commissions or committees. Thirdly, the grassroots or bottom-up approach is the situation where the grassroots population in any society usually has an intimidating numerical strength. Peace initiatives developed from this point could be intimidating to the leaders of a conflict. Peace initiatives come directly from the people either because they are tired of fighting or because they can no longer cope with the costs of continued hostility. The best way to sustain a grassroots peace agreement is to follow it up with a problem-solving workshop or conflict transformation training for the affected parties on how to respond constructively to future conflicts.

However, in specific terms, one could still breakdown this broad general categorization of approaches into three more methods: traditional, modern government, and non-governmental organizations. In respect to the traditional method, it is very dangerous to relegate culture to the background in conflict resolution. Although culture is a marker of social differences, it should not be regarded as an obstacle to conflict resolution in multi-ethnic societies. More often, people interpret social action and social reality through their indigenous conceptions and knowledge; therefore, understanding the local indigenous theories of conflict is essential to their solution. The importance of this observation rests on the fact that the many inter-ethnic conflicts in, say, Nigeria for example, are based on historical grounds, ethno-philosophy, and even myths surrounding original and settler claims to land, water, and grazing land resources in contemporary times.

Nader, quoted in Shade Ifamose, identifies three major structural levels at which conflict occurs, that is, “intra-family, intra-community and inter-community.” This anthropological insight indicates that there are also institutional means for conflict resolution, even in traditional societies. According to Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, quoted in Shade Ifamose, “conflict resolution in non-western societies is not necessarily identified
with specialized political offices.” Building the above point further, Nader points out that other means or agents of resolving or regulating conflicts in indigenous societies include the “diviner, shaman, chief priests and town or village councils.” Often referred to as the council of elders, when seated according to designated order, they make pronouncements that shift rapidly from political to judicial to conflict resolution. The elders may not have physical power to enforce decisions, but they rely on leaders of various age-grades or youth associations to bring about and monitor peace on the basis of the negotiated terms in particular conflicts. The town council or elders council are agents of conflict resolution because of the people’s surviving confidence, trust, and reliance on culture as a means of rallying and mobilizing people to behave in patterned ways. In a related development, the above method is what Achebe also explores in *TFA* to show its futility at the dawn of a new era in the communities he discusses.

Traditional religious beliefs and practices are still strong even among practitioners of Islam and Christianity in most parts of the African continent. The world of ancestors is an extension of the world of the living and the supernatural beings are part of the African systems of thought. Ancestors and predecessors, royal and non-royal, like other deities and shrines are believed to impose decisive rightful verdicts in controversial issues of conflict within and between communities. For example, kola hospitality are cultural instruments in various Nigerian societies that had been employed to settle intra-family and intra-ethnic conflicts in the open glare of an attentive audience in town or village squares or at the shrines of common deities, ancestors, and predecessors. By so doing, they involve the living and the dead in the process. There is also the use of African hospitality, commensality, reciprocity, and belief system. In addition the use of simple common language and metaphor often make positive contributions to conflict resolution.

The traditional systems of conflict resolution have stronger potency in protracted conflicts and enhance everyone’s satisfaction with the decisions. Its use in the post-Rwanda crises is a case in point even though its success is somewhat limited. It also reduces the reoccurrence of conflicts. As in modern Westernized situations, those involved must be capable of demonstrating patience, sincerity, wit, physical endurance, wisdom, and probing skills. Whereas these attributes involve trained specialists in some cases in modern societies, the traditional African management profile generally involves almost everybody with authority in several areas of life in the society. In some African societies, some functionaries who may ordinarily be regarded as innocuous may be the ones holding the key in the traditional setting to conflict resolution. For example, among The Nuer of Sudan, the Leopard skin chief is a specialist with ritual power and the capability to resolve an impending intergroup feud, violence, and conflict by allowing his house to function as a culturally prescribed sanctuary for those who committed the serious offence of intended or unintended murder, while he emendates
and negotiates compensation, restitution, reconciliation, sacrifices, ritual cleansing, and atonement. Conflict resolution process in the traditional setting is, therefore, akin to an institutionalized activity that can be described as a near equilibrium restoring instrument in the society.

Secondly, there is a modern government method of conflict resolution. Once conflict erupts, the first step government takes is its constitutional duty of maintaining law and order by deploying security to the crisis point for the purpose of restoring order and peace. Once the violence dies out, the security operatives are withdrawn from the area, based on the assumption that the conflict is over. In many cases, the violence escalates few days, weeks, or months after such a departure. In some very desperate situations, the government permanently stations a contingent of “peacekeeping” security-like soldiers in the conflict prone area.

The courts could also be involved in conflict resolution. In Nigeria, for example, there are sectional provisions in government ministries, such as the Ministry of Labour and Productivity, where arbitrations in wage-labor disagreement, disputes, and conflicts are referred to for such management devices as mediation, conciliation, an industrial arbitration panel, and then to the National Industrial Court. As a way of showing commitment to conflict resolution, the Nigerian government has also established the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), which works in conjunction with the civil society and many local and international non-governmental organizations in the area of peace and conflict studies. In context, there are five academic departments in the institute, namely: External Conflict Prevention and Resolution (ECPR), Internal Conflict Prevention and Resolution (ICPR), Democracy and Development Studies (DDS), Defense and Security Studies (DSS), and Research and Policy Analysis (RPA). ECPR deals with conflicts beyond Nigeria’s borders and their implications for the country. ICPR deals with conflicts within Nigeria and the strategic problems they could pose for stability within and beyond Nigeria. The DDS looks into developmental problems vis-à-vis conflicts. The issue of small arms and light weapons in Africa has been a major preoccupation of DDS. It is important to note that IPCR is a parastatal in the Ministry of Co-operation and Integration in Africa. This ministry has done a lot of work to mop up small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the West African sub region. Also the IPCR has paid adequate attention to some conflict areas in Nigeria, such as in the Jos (minus those of the 2010/2011) crisis and the age-long Ife/Modakeke crisis.

Furthermore, setting up Commissions of Inquiry to look into civil disturbances that usually follow the cessation of physical violence in the feuding communities in Africa is another form of the government’s attempt at conflict resolution. The members of the commissions may include traditional rulers, government personnel, and certain individuals in the society with proven integrity. Sometimes the panels are separated in terms of personnel composition, such as the 1997 Royal Peace Commission led by
the Oluwo of Iwo and the 1981 Justice Ibidapo Obe Judicial Panel, both on the Ife-Modakeke crisis. Such a commission would be expected to take evidence from all parties to the conflict. The report of the commission is usually presented to the government at a widely publicized occasion and although the people never hear anything after that, until another round of violence breaks out in the area.

As members of the public wait endlessly for the panel’s report to be released, those who want to keep the conflict alive would go to town with an analysis of “insider knowledge” of the report’s content. The party that considers itself to have been disadvantaged by the report will again start to mobilize toward redressing the supposed injustice done to them. For example, in Nigeria, various panels of inquiry were set up to look into the Ife/Modakeke crisis. The most popular were those set up to look into the 1981 and 1997 incidents. None of the panels came out with a permanent solution to the problem. With the publicity given to and resources pumped into the Ibidapo Obe Panel of Inquiry in 1981, the peace initiatives of the traditional rulers in Osun State in 1997, and the NARECOM visits to Ile-Ife in 1997, one would have expected some concrete policies to have been formulated to end the crisis as at 1998. On the other hand, the report of the Royal Peace Committee was submitted to the government in 1997, but was consequently not made public. The failure or refusal of government to publish the report and the desperation of the people to get the report through unofficial sources constituted another issue in the conflict, rather than the expected solution.

Thirdly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also contributed to resolving conflict. NGOs are privately organized and privately financed agencies formed to perform some philanthropic or other worthwhile tasks in relation to a need that the organizers feel is not adequately addressed by the public or governmental efforts. As representatives of civil society, NGOs are important components of the peacemaking process, capable of promoting sustained reconciliation at the grassroots level in societies split by civil war or ethnic and religious strives. Their presence in conflict situations and increasingly active role have affected the whole spectrum of international responses to conflict resolution, as they bring more actors into peacekeeping, conflict resolution, peace building, and creating the conditions for private people and institutions to intervene as third parties.

NGOs could be defined as private, self-governing, not-for-profit institutions dedicated to alleviating human suffering; to promoting education, health, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; or to encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. This broad definition covers a wide spectrum of institutions—from humanitarian organizations to human rights activities to religious groups to thinly disguised political parties. They can be distinguished from other organizations in the civil society in the following ways: they are voluntary, financially independent, managed by independent
volunteer board of directors elected periodically by the membership with a clearly defined constituency, and are accountable to that constituency. They have formal legal status, permanent headquarters, and employ professional or volunteer staff. They are self-serving, but geared toward humanitarian objectives and programs. They play four major roles in conflict management around the world: conflict resolution, conflict resolution training, peace building, and preventive diplomacy through conflict resolution training and workshops.

In discussing these organizations, it is important to distinguish between international NGOs, which operate in more than one country, and local or indigenous organizations, which confine their operations to one country, region, or village. Although both international and local NGOs are affected by the political environment, laws, and security procedures of the host government, local NGOs are more vulnerable to state harassment in cases where international NGOs have more resources than the local ones but the local ones have more connection to the people and problems at hand. There are three types of NGOs namely: humanitarian, human rights, and conflict resolution organizations. Humanitarian NGOs include the Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and so on. They specialize in responding to humanitarian crises. Human rights NGOs include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and, for example, the Nigerian-based Legal Aid Council. The goal of organizations active in human rights is to seek out, research, and address specific and general situations where repression occurs. In gathering information, the staff, volunteers, and members of NGOs visit vulnerable areas as observers, interview local NGOs, religious groups, community groups, activists, and professionals and seek relevant official documentation. On the basis of this research, they mount systematic campaigns to alert the public and officials to the plight of particular victims, whether individuals or entire populations. Campaigns consist of testifying before government committees, international organizations, and other influential policymaking and law making bodies and reporting abuses to the world press, thereby not only educating officials and the public but also exerting pressure on institutions to condemn offending parties. For example, the Legal Aid Council in Nigeria is involved in resolving conflicts out of court or funding cases of the less privileged seeking redress in case of human rights abuses.

Last, but not least, there are NGOs that focus on conflict resolution. These organizations are dedicated to averting crises through preventive measures or to acting as intermediaries in an active conflict. They work with opposing parties, facilitate negotiations, and help to uphold accepted solutions. In some cases they initiate and catalyze dialogue between parties, in others, they monitor and expedite it. Using any of the approaches listed above, they focus on different levels of the society and different groups. Some focus on opinion leaders, potentially explosive elements of the society, while others concentrate almost entirely on the grassroots level.
For instance, the Washington-based Strategic Initiatives of Women teaches Somali women conflict management skills and trains them to develop peace-building networks and increase their political participation. In Bosnia, the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ program on preventive diplomacy holds training sessions that bring together clergy and laity from the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Muslim and Jewish communities. The London-based organization International Alert operates in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, the countries carved out of the former Soviet Union, and Sri Lanka to support peacemaking and peace building efforts, working with officials and non-official groups to increase institutional capacity and to offer parties to conflicts a chance to discuss issues and to establish relationships in an informal setting. One Nigerian-based NGO in this category is the Academic Associates and Peace Works (AAPW). The main thrust of the organization’s activities is on peace building and preventive diplomacy through conflict resolution training and problem solving workshops. The organization’s primary goal is to empower Nigerians with the necessary skills for non-violent conflict resolution and by so doing contribute toward promoting and sustaining peaceful environment. Organizing training programs is the core activity of AAPW. AAPW does not only teach people how to make or build peace, it also intervenes in community conflicts and has successfully done some commendable work in a number of places in Nigeria, such as Tafawa Balewa, Zango Kataf, Igbo Ora, Tiv/Jukun, Ugep, Mangu/Bokkos, Ife/Modakeke, and Warri. Through embracing training workshops, which are tailored toward the requirements of the participants, AAPW convinces warring factions that it was possible for antagonists on both sides of the conflict to hold legitimate grievances and still get the conflict resolved without recourse to violence.

However, how successful have those approaches and methods been to resolve the perennial conflicts that have continuously plagued mankind? Pieces of evidence are in great abundance, the world over, that they have not been majorly effective, because great powers and leaders, as either individuals or groups of individuals, have often resorted to the use of the iron fist (violence or undue enforcement of their desires). Since the adage “violence begets violence” has remained sacrosanct, there has remained no end to violence/wars. Indeed, the recurring decimal of conflicts has remained the failure to resolve the last. So what does Achebe propose?

INTERROGATING ACHEBE’S PROPOSED METHOD

The foregoing discussion sets the tone and tenor to approaching the perspective and model Achebe would wish was adopted to resolve conflicts the world over. From all indications, he links the whole exercise to the idea of leadership, because even at the individual or group level leadership plays a tremendous role to shape whatever method is employed to resolve conflict
at all times. Interestingly, Achebe’s method issues from an amalgamation of all the methods hitherto discussed to emphasize the intrinsic value of the individual personality in the entire effort at resolving conflicts. For Achebe, the personality (whether individual or cooperate) who leads or seems to be very relevant at whatever level of discourse in the pursuit of conflict resolution, has to be one that possesses certain characteristics, failure at which will render the whole effort effortless. Therefore, this chapter links the author’s to the claim by the sociologist Peter Calvert that,

Unless individual leaders, whatever their psychological drives, call up some kind of response in a body of supporters, they cannot become revolutionary leaders or indeed political leaders of any kind.12

The “individual leader,” in broad terms, the individual who wields some authority in the group, is of relatively high status and is a candidate for overall leadership. From this assertion, one realizes that Okonkwo in TFA and Beatrice in AS are both individual leaders in their respective communities, and they validate Calvert’s claim that an individual leader can never become a revolutionary leader without supporters.

Although much has been written on Okonkwo and Beatrice separately, critics have failed to factor in the fact that they bear comparison in this area; that is, as revolutionary characters and as revolutionary leaders. Writing on Okonkwo from a fresh perspective for instance, Umelo Ojinmah notes his aggressive tendency, which is normally a virtue in leadership, but not his revolutionary potential; he accuses him of “abuse of power,” which is manifested in his “tendency to overreach himself [and] his inability to control himself.”13 Again, writing on Beatrice, Kez Okafor identifies her as a leader, but without reference to her effective leadership style when he says, “After the death of Ikem, Chris and His Excellency . . . Beatrice is the rallying point for the characters left to pick and remould the splintered vision of struggle.”14 In essence, no one has apparently noticed that a comparison of the first and most recent of Achebe’s great dissenters provides insight into two parallel political careers in a world that is analogous with Nigeria. Okonkwo, the strongman, would change his world by main force, whereas Beatrice, the strategist, would change hers by words and wiles. The two can be conjectured to be rebels, but only one succeeds as a rebel leader. Hence this chapter compares Okonkwo and Beatrice as revolutionary characters, but notes Okonkwo’s tragic venture into leadership and Beatrice’s triumph in the same venture to link it to what it portends to contemporary society’s efforts at conflict resolution.

One might not be wrong to question the idea that Okonkwo is a revolutionary. Indeed, he is, in fact, one of the first protagonists in the African novel to exhibit “the obsessive mentality” of many revolutionary personalities, if one applies Calvert’s claim on him. Okonkwo is obsessed with the desire to revolutionize the outlook of his clan; its “philosophy of acceptance,” as
termed by Wole Soyinka.\footnote{Soyinka further states that acceptance is “the first principle” in Umuofia} and Ojinmah buttresses this by adding, “The society’s ability to adapt to any situation . . . is a survival mechanism.”\footnote{Undoubtedly, acceptance and adaptability are deeply embedded in the clan’s psyche. For example, one of its proverbs, quoted twice in the novel for emphasis says: “Eneke the bird says that since men have learnt to shoot without missing, he has learned to fly without perching.”} In other words, a shrewd man learns to bow to the situation, particularly when he cannot change it.

The above suggests this chapter’s postulation that Okonkwo is revolutionary. He does not and has never shared the belief that a situation must be accepted. The disparity between his way of thinking and that of the everyday villager is neatly summarized in the famous argument between himself and his mother’s kinsman. The kinsman asks:

When a man blasphemes, what do we do? Do we stop his mouth? No, we put our fingers into our ears to stop us hearing. That is a wise action.\footnote{As far as Okonkwo is concerned, the tribal culture is being repressed, the people are conceding, as usual, and the society is in disarray. The philosophy of acceptance is killing the community; it must be jettisoned immediately and a new principle embedded in stubborn and violent resistance must take its place.}

Okonwo retorts thus:

Let us not reason like cowards . . . if a man comes into my hut and defecates on the floor, what do I do? Do I shut my eyes? No! I take a stick and break his head.\footnote{For the nineteenth-century Umuofian, such resistance was irregular, but for the twentieth-century student of revolution it was nothing extraordinary. Okonkwo is merely propagating a Fanon-like approach to colonialism. Robert Fraser sums up the hypothesis of the Black radical, Franz Fanon, in these words: “Violence not only emancipates [a people] from foreign control; it also, more crucially, helps them to emancipate themselves from abject awe in the face of the industrialized world.”}

The staunch refusal to put his fingers into his ears and submit is typical of the revolutionary temper. It appears to others as irrationality, notably when dealing with an enemy as formidable as colonialism. But Okonkwo cannot see things their way for the simple reason that he sees things in black and white. He is the type of radical that social scientists term “the fanatic,” “single-minded, dedicated . . . prepared to tear away at history with their bare hands.”\footnote{Okonkwo perceives correctly that “abject awe” is the root of the clan’s problem. The White man’s court, his government and the affluence he brings have become structures of intimidation for “the warlike men of Umuofia who
had suddenly become soft like women.” Okonkwo wants his people to fight to the death, if it warrants it, and mindless of the rules. His approach is unorthodox in the eyes of his contemporaries, but entirely feasible, as countless terrorists and guerrilla fighters today can testify. Nonetheless, as is well known, Umuofia “puts its fingers into its ears.” It will not be led into battle, at least not by Okonkwo.

In the context of the above arguments, it is not untoward to visualize Umuofia as a microcosm of Africa, or any other colonial habitation or oppressed part of the world. Gilbert Phelps underscores this point when he says that TFA “was in effect the archetypal African novel in that the situation it describes—the falling apart of a traditional rural society as the result of the coming of the white man was a traumatic experience common to all the colonies or former colonial territories.” Like Umuofia, Kangan in AS is a miniature Africa, or any part of the world, only this time the nation is under military government. Kangan is a twentieth-century, predominantly urban country, but it remains a post-colonial habitation, complete with its ethnic diversity, vitality, corruption, and, significantly, its faithfulness to certain traditions. One such tradition is an idea that men are born leaders. In respect to leadership, the men of Kangan view their women with amused indulgence. Women are inept from the beginning, hence Chris remarks to Beatrice,

Eve caused Adam to fall in Genesis, and Woman provoked Sky to ascend in anger carrying God away from the earth in ancient African mythology. Years of reparation by Woman have failed to clear her of the charge of ineptitude.

Kangan still believes quietly that men make better rulers. Throughout the novel, only the men play partisan politics; the women are kept permanently on reserve, a position that the majority do not contest. Beatrice is a nonconformist, however, so she is infuriated by it. She tells Ikem:

The way I see it is that giving women today the same role which traditional society gave them of intervening only when everything else has failed is not enough . . . it is not enough that women should be the court of last resort because the last resort is a damn sight too far and too late!

All the same, women in Kangan are onlookers or, at best, indirect participants in the national drama. The president’s dinner party serves to exemplify this. Political “big shots” (virtually all male) assemble at the presidential mansion, plus a few female guests invited to make the party colorful. Beatrice and a White American girl, called Lou, are the two most distinguished ladies present. They are model specimens of womanhood in their own ways. Lou is exceptionally pretty; “The dark-haired girl would have fitted [a] stereotype of an Italian beauty.” Beatrice is brilliant; “The
only person in the service, male or female, with a first-class honours degree in English. And not from a local university but from Queen Mary College, University of London.”\(^{29}\) However, neither beauty nor brilliance gives them access to the decision-making process. The men handle them like toys, tolerating Lou’s prattle and disdaining Beatrice’s sagacious counsel. The implication is that White or Black, goddess or genius, a woman’s contribution is immaterial. When Beatrice tries to insist that they take her seriously she is sent home; taking her seriously would be tantamount to giving her more than her share of the action.

Beatrice invariably takes the doctrine of Kangan and wipes the floor with it, proving beyond reasonable doubt that women can make better leaders. In fact, no man in Kangan can match her for astute public relations, sensitivity, or intelligence. Her IQ makes her a national celebrity. Of this, His Excellency boasts: “Our Beatrice beat the English to their game. We’re very proud of her.”\(^{30}\) Intelligence and competence secure her a coveted appointment as Assistant Secretary of Finance. They lever her into the world of “the high and mighty” and she manages her office more prudently than any of the three male protagonists, Sam, Chris, and Ikem. Beatrice alone outlives the power tussle. At the close of the novel, the men who gloried in their statesmanship eliminate one another, and without saying “I told you so” she does the unprecedented in leadership without compunction, by taking the survivors under her wings. Representatives from all walks of life, some holding crucial political posts gather around her: Braimoh, who represents the common man; Agatha, who represents the religious; Emmanuel, representing the students and intellectuals; Captain Abdul, representing the military brass; and Elewa’s mother and uncle, representing the elders.

If Beatrice is brain, Okonkwo is brawn. Okonkwo’s brawn incidentally leads this discourse back to the issue of leadership and followership that Calvert raises in the opening of this sub section. Calvert informs that individual leaders must “call up some kind of response in a body of supporters” if they wish to become “revolutionary leaders, or indeed political leaders of any kind.”\(^{31}\) From every indication, the use of the brain is more effective in calling up this response than the use of brawn, which can be inferred from the quality of Beatrice’s flock and the magnitude of Okonkwo’s isolation. Okonkwo is notoriously bereft of supporters, and it is not hard for the reader to figure out why: he relies excessively on force. In view of his background one should, perhaps, not be too surprised. His rock-like physique had been his major asset:

He was still young but he had won fame as the greatest wrestler in the nine villages. He was a wealthy farmer and had two barns full of yams . . . and had shown incredible prowess in two inter-tribal wars. And so, although Okonkwo was still young, he was already one of the greatest men of his time.\(^{32}\)
Strength is a yardstick for measuring achievement in Umuofia, and Okonkwo has plainly used his own well. It is therefore his bad luck that he cannot discriminate between “incredible prowess” and brute force, and, indeed, his lifestyle and his fashion of leadership are captured in one word: “muscle.” Muscle determines his relationships, in particular with his subordinates: he beats his wives, bullies his son, and cuts down his ward. Even at kindred meetings, the most placid of social get-togethers, he is known for a tendency to “muscle out” the opposition: “The old man bore no ill-will towards Okonkwo . . . but he was struck, as most people were, by Okonkwo’s brusqueness in dealing with less successful men.” Such a person can hardly win the public mandate. In spite of all the trappings of success, Okonkwo is known for clamping down on others and his public image is too poor to allow for avid supporters.

It is revealing to draw a parallel between Okonkwo and Beatrice, and observe how he offends all groups of people just as she reconciles them to herself. He offends the common man, represented by his untitled kinsman; he offends the religious, represented by the priestess of Ani; he offends the introspective, represented by Nwoye; the top brass, represented by the colonial authorities; and the village elders, represented by the old man. He offends one time too many when, at last, he turns his muscle against himself and commits suicide. In so doing, he makes universal and fixed his rejection by the populace:

“It is an abomination for a man to take his own life. It is an offence against the Earth, and a man who commits it will not be buried by his clansmen. His body is evil.”

The clan shies away from his corpse—Okonkwo, the strongman, has become repellent. In the facing camp, the strategist pulls a crowd. There is no mystery about their different destinies, it is a matter of what attracts people and what scares them off. The moral lesson one learns from Okonkwo’s story is that leadership by hammer and tongs has its limitations. Tactical leadership apparently does not. Beatrice changes tactics at every turn with near-absolute success. With the scholarly, like Ikem, for example, she is scholarly; whereas with the unlearned, like Elewa, she is unassuming. The self-righteous, such as her house help, can be placated with an apology; irate elders, like Elewa’s relatives, can be disarmed by cool composure, and so on. Beatrice has a knack for meeting others at their own level, and this talent is metaphorically expressed in her verbal versatility. She speaks with ease to the educated in standard English, to the semi-literate in pidgin, and to rural dwellers in the vernacular. Irrespective of the audience, she knows how to “communicate.” It is significant that Okonkwo lacks this prized possession of words. While Beatrice is a master of language, he is prone to inarticulacy, which is again a metaphorical expression of his struggle to “reach” his hearers: “He had a slight stammer, and whenever he was angry
and could not get his words out quickly enough, he would use his fists.”

Okonkwo ultimately fights himself into a corner. Beatrice, on the other hand, becomes the focal point of a new generation. This major point of victory, in the use of a selected method at conflict resolution, Achebe endorses when at the end of the novel he says “all eyes turned to [her].”

CONCLUSION

A final comment by the political scientist Okwudiba Nnoli helps to explain the statement made in the novels and the perspectives explored in this chapter. According to Nnoli, world leaders generally have come to the realization that diplomacy is a more potent political weapon than duress:

As the importance of force declines [in the international community] power increasingly becomes the art of subtly making other political actors see the world the way one sees it, and making them behave according to that vision.

In the context of the foregone discussion, therefore, TFA and AS portray an imaginary world that bears this comment and assertion out. It is evident that the inhabitants of Umuofia and Kangan are no different from other human beings, fictional or otherwise, in that they are more obliging when they are handled discreetly. Umuofia’s vote of no confidence in Okonkwo is an index of its misgivings; it will not trust him with its future, despite the fact that he is a renowned chief and a bona fide revolutionary. In contrast, Beatrice’s ever-increasing group of devotees justify her liberal and yet organized style of leadership. One must conclude that, as far as revolutionary leadership is concerned, the strategist is more able than the strongman. Moreover, as far as the citizen of the world is concerned, there are grounds to conclude that the whip is certainly becoming outdated.

NOTES

5. Ibid., 21
6. Heitler, From Conflict to Revolution, 62
7. Ibid., 72
9. Ibid., 124.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 12.
18. Achebe, Things Fall Apart, 16.
19. Ibid., 113.
20. Ibid., 113.
23. Achebe, Things Fall Apart, 7
24. Ibid., 7
27. Ibid., 91–92.
28. Ibid., 74.
29. Ibid., 75.
30. Ibid.
31. Calvert, Revolution and International Politics, 58.
33. Ibid., 19.
34. Ibid., 147.
35. Ibid., 3.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established by President Nelson Mandela in 1995 to deal with the crimes of the apartheid era. One of the most scrutinized phenomena in Africa’s political history, the TRC attempted to come to terms with South Africa’s racist past and has helped with conflict-resolving initiatives around the world. Responsible for post–civil war commissions in Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, South Africa’s well-televised public confessional indicted the apartheid system for preying on its non-White citizens on the basis of color and ethnic identity, and helped re-create a country whose new constitution is now, according to the historian Allister Sparks, “perhaps the most progressive in the world.”

The Afrikaner poet Antjie Krog covered the TRC hearings as a radio reporter for the South Africa Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and sensitively recorded the unraveling of “the web of infinite sorrow” that had been woven into the tattered fabric of South African life since the imposition of separate development in 1948. In a self-conscious memoir, written in English and entitled Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa, Krog’s “extraordinary reportage,” in the words of the Nobel Prize-winning novelist Nadine Gordimer, “stared into the filthiest places of atrocity” and was “not afraid to go too far.” Part apologia, part crié de coeur, part invective, Krog’s idiosyncratic, fragmented, and compassionate account touches on all the aspects of enquiry covered by the TRC—amnesty, reparations, rehabilitation, language, identity, guilt, cruelty, forgiveness.

Charlayne Hunter-Gault notes, in her introduction to Country of My Skull, “Some balm would be needed to dress, if not heal” South Africa’s “wounds.” As such, all South Africans would have to learn as much as
possible about the causes, nature, and extent of the human-rights violations under apartheid. In order to forge a future, the nation would have to honestly and squarely confront its past.6

The formation of the TRC,7 and its mission to produce a report to Parliament, would “paint the most complete picture of the abuses that occurred between March 1, 1960, and May 10, 1994.8 With the exception of poet Ingrid de Kok’s *Terrestial Things*, which includes an embedded poetic sequence entitled “A room full of questions” devoted to her impressions of the TRC,9 Krog’s *Country of My Skull* is seminal to an understanding of South Africa’s coming-to-terms with its horrific past.

As a woman raised on a farm on the high veld of the Free State province, Krog is not only acutely aware of her identity as an Afrikaner and as a poet who writes in Afrikaans, but also of her duty as a writer to expose and understand the ethnic abuses that marginalized South Africa since the state imposition of apartheid by the National Party of Prime Minister Daniel Malan in 1948.10 That Krog chose to write in English—a stepmother tongue—and not in Afrikaans, sets her apart from a twentieth-century poet she admired, Paul Celan, who insisted on writing in German, the language of national socialism, to emphasize the real horror of the Holocaust.11 When Krog reported the testimony of certain Afrikaners groveling for amnesty, she ridiculed their English pronunciation, the “apparent relish . . . through clenched teeth . . . the ‘r’ . . . rolled half a second longer than usual . . . the dry scraping ‘g’ [that] catches in [the] throat” as if to give terrible utterance to the unspeakable.12 Ironically, English was the master language of the former British colony, the accented tongue of the British settlers who traditionally belittled the Boers whom Krog describes as “bullies with their wives—the chatty women with impressive cleavages and well-behaved children. The mustached men, who, for decades, turned life on the platteland into a spiralling inferno of destruction, brutalization, and fear.”13

Krog agreed with Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal, and Ronald Suresh Roberts, who, in their book *Reconciliation through Truth* (1997), state “very precisely [that] the truth Commission will not be able to fulfill its implicit mandate to create a new moral order if it does not make a distinction between those who fought against apartheid and those who defended it.” She also supported the opinion of Thabo Mbeki, the leader of the African National Congress (ANC) before becoming president of the republic in 1999,14 that “apartheid forced the individual to abdicate his or her personal morality” and that “The only thing that will heal [South Africa are] is large doses of truth . . . and the truth is that apartheid was a form of genocide and a crime against humanity.” 15

Krog’s *Country of My Skull* is not strictly a straight narrative of the proceedings of the TRC; rather it is a compilation of narratives—sometimes verging on stream of consciousness—in which different points of view relating to a single incident or a series of events are spoken by a cast of characters who include the author herself, amnesty seekers, victims, and
witnesses whose testimonies depended on the circumstance in which they found themselves. It is also a montage of a-chronological moments, anecdotes, sound-bites, flash-backs, poems, songs, memories, quotations, and reflections written—spoken—in often dazzlingly poetic prose, without ascending into pure poetry. Unlike her compatriot Ingrid de Kok who believes that the poet should speak out and that “whole words . . . deep sea anemone vowels,/ birth-cable syntax, rhymes that start in the heart/ and verbs, verbs . . . move mountains,” Krog accepts the German sociologist Theodore Adorno’s famous pronouncement that “to write a poem after Auschwitz is barbaric.”

III

At a workshop organized for the two hundred or so international journalists in South Africa who would be covering the first hearings, Krog recorded that one of the candidates for the TRC described the Zulu ritual of “the ilala.” This process involves “a grass blade milked for palm wine.” When “two people have had a fight, they sit opposite each other milking this blade while they confess . . . the emptier the blade becomes, the emptier the heart of anger.” The catharsis implied in the ceremony underpins Krog’s desire to give voice, to bring sound and light to the “speechless darkness”—especially between African and Afrikaner—that at the time of the TRC
hearings still muzzled South Africa’s need to be heard, and discolored its standing in the world.\textsuperscript{21} Despite regime change, the Republic of South Africa was still a two-nation state, divided into White \textit{haves} and Black \textit{have-nots}; a country that Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd’s ghost still haunted in the corridors of parliament.\textsuperscript{22} The blood of the murdered prosecutor of state racism, it was rumored, still marked the carpet, thus highlighting the apparently indelible stain of apartheid in the eyes not only of many South Africans but also of the international community.\textsuperscript{23}

As in Chile after the fall of General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, a consequence of regime change in in South Africa was the formation of a TRC in December 1995,\textsuperscript{24} which aimed at healing the country’s “wounded memories.”\textsuperscript{25} This had been foreshadowed by the confession of a government hit man named Butana Nofomela on the eve of his execution for murder. Nofomela’s confession lead to the exposure (by the English language \textit{Rand Daily Mail} and the Afrikaans’ \textit{Vrye Weekblad}\textsuperscript{26}) of the repugnant activities of government-sanctioned death-squads and specifically to the trial of a former policeman Eugene de Kok for multiple murders carried out at Vlakplaas,\textsuperscript{27} a top-secret death-farm near Pretoria in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{28} Vlakplaas and its \textit{manne} (“guys”) are central to Krog’s narrative as she pits the good intent of the TRC against the “securocratic” brutality of the apartheid state.\textsuperscript{29}

The first hearing of the TRC was convened in East London in 1996. The Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, “that prince of compassion,”\textsuperscript{30} was entrusted to chair the hearings in town halls and other venues around the country to listen to the often agonizing testimony of violence perpetrated not only by the apartheid state but also by those who resisted it with concomitant violence: mothers whose sons had been drugged, shot, and \textit{braaied};\textsuperscript{31} wives whose husbands had been falsely imprisoned; and men and women whose kin had been beaten, raped, tortured, poisoned, disappeared, or necklaced\textsuperscript{32} by pro-ANC or Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) mobs,\textsuperscript{33} or brutally killed by Pretoria’s security forces and its proxies between the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the inauguration of President Mandela in 1994.\textsuperscript{34}

The internationally-known Tutu was chosen to head the TRC in order to give dignity to the South Africa’s commitment to lay bare the truth and reconcile the differences of a country notorious on the world’s stage for its fierce opposites. Krog recalls that “He caressed” everyone “with pieces of hope and humanity.”\textsuperscript{35} The Archbishop brought as his credo the Bantu concept of \textit{Ubuntu}: “people are people through other people.”\textsuperscript{36} This concept embraces the essence of being human and is the Ur-text or template of Tutu’s reconciliation theology, which was fiercely tested by the hours of harrowing testimony he presided over. This included his intuition that Nomande Calatas’s primeval wail at the first hearing (which reduced Tutu to tears),\textsuperscript{37} was a foreshadowing of “a new earth being slowly engendered.”\textsuperscript{38}
The workings of the TRC under Tutu’s chairmanship were initially rocked by both the ANC’s and IFP’s refusal to apply for amnesty on the grounds that they had prosecuted a just resistance against apartheid. This was further exacerbated by the embattled National Party’s excuses for separate development, enforced resettlement, the pass laws, the banning of opposition parties, the imposition of Afrikaans as the official language, murder for hire, and the implementation of a policy of “Total Strategy,” all in the belief that “black people were not human,” that “they were a threat, [that] they were going to kill us all, and waste away the country until it was nothing but another African disaster area.”

Tutu was often the victim of his own Christian decency because he saw a basic humanity in all people. For example, the trial of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, who faced charges that she had ordered a member of the Mandela United Football Club to murder a fourteen-year-old activist called Stompie Seipei, and then infer falsely that the Rev. Paul Verryn, a Methodist priest who had given the boy brief sanctuary, was a paederast. Acknowledging Madikizela-Mandela’s role in the history of the struggle against apartheid, Tutu was unable to move the president’s former wife to admit that things went wrong, to ask for forgiveness, or to simply to say sorry. Madikizela-Mandela, who denied every allegation of human rights abuses made against her and alternated “between the words ‘ludicrous’ and ‘ridiculous,’” was
able to force Tutu to whisper, “I beg you.” Realizing that the archbishop “has risked everything,” Krog wrote:

I hear my blood slushing in my veins.
It leaps, suddenly, in me—up.
It bursts through my skin.
Ah, the commission! The deepest heart of my heart. Heart that can only come from
this soil—brave—with its teeth firmly in the jugular of the only truth that matters.
And that heart is black. I belong to that binding black African heart.
My throat bloats
up in tears—my pen falls to the floor. I blubber behind my hand, my glasses fog up—
for one brief shimmering moment, this country, is also mine. Yes, this is how it appears on page 338; the final quotation at the end of the paragraph is on page 339.

Emerging from her reverie, Krog hears Madikizela-Mandela respond to Tutu’s plea: “I am saying it is true: things went horribly wrong and we were aware that there were factors that led to that. For that I am deeply sorry.” But, Krog interjects, “she didn’t mean it . . . she didn’t mean it! She simply aped the words that Tutu put in her mouth—she aped it for the benefit of international media coverage.”

IV

Early in Country of My Skull, Krog quotes the Freedom Front leader General Constand Viljoen’s opinion that “the ultimate reconciliation should be between Afrikaner and African.” This can only happen, Viljoen argued, “if the Truth Commission does not vilify the Afrikaner into being worse than we are.” Everyone failed, Viljoen concluded, because “We all used violence to get what we wanted. The terror of the tyrant invited the terror of the revolutionary.” While the TRC and many Afrikaners did not accept Viljoen’s implication of collective guilt—“You suggest that all Afrikaners are murderers—an outraged anonymous caller yells at Krog over the telephone, I have nothing to do with all of this. I live on a farm in Hofmeyr and I will not allow you make me an accomplice”—there was a palpable feeling that a whole culture was being asked to apply for amnesty. Quoting from one of her mother’s essays after Hendrick Verwoerd was stabbed to death—“to write in Afrikaans is not a right, but a privilege bought and paid for at a price”—Krog wonders if “Afrikaans is the price that Afrikaners will have to pay for apartheid.” Of Verwoerd’s Nazi-like conviction that protecting the honor and dignity of the
Afrikaner meant that anything was permissible, even the most dishonorable policy, Krog asks:

Was apartheid the product of some horrific shortcoming in Afrikaner culture? Could one find the key to this in Afrikaner songs and literature, in beer and braaivleis? How do I live with the fact that all the words used to humiliate, all the orders given to kill, belonged to the language of my heart? At the hearings, many of the victims faithfully reproduced these parts of their stories in Afrikaans as proof of the bloody finger-upon them.

If many Afrikaners felt under siege—a situation the TRC under the leadership of Archbishop Tutu tried, with mixed success, to discourage—Krog partly down-plays accusations of Afrikaner-bashing and “Boer-hatred” with her critical review of the “Human Rights Violation Hearing into the Activities of the Mandela United Football Club,” unofficially nicknamed “the Winnie hearing.” Beginning a chapter entitled “Mother Faces the Nation,” Krog asks: “Why is it that a woman, a black woman from a long-isolated country, creates such an unprecedented media frenzy? Is it because Winnie Madikizela-Mandela answers to the archetype Black and beautiful? Or because she answers to the stereotype Black and Evil?”

Categorizing Madikizela-Mandela as a parliamentary backbencher who “seldom speaks,” as a politician “who plays to different constituencies in very different ways,” as a “trashy tabloid” who “lusts after men and they after her,” as a “pre- and postfeminist,” as a Lady MacBeth with “vaulting ambition” for whom “the smell of blood will not leave her hands,” Krog describes the president’s ex-wife as “a defiant, unrepentant black woman” that “the world has come to watch us burn as a witch.” While her bitter comments dismiss Madikizela-Mandela as spectacle, as a woman who has lost face in the eyes of her followers, who are now obliged to admit that Winnie “killed for us” and “things went wrong,” Krog is content that “the killer and the tyrant for the first time [are] contained in the same frame as the rest of us.” She concludes: “Isn’t that some kind of beginning?”

With exception of the state torturer Jeffrey Benzien, the Vlakplaas killer Dirk Coetzee, and the agent provocateur William Harrington, none of apartheid’s manne seem to insense Krog as much as Warrant Officer Paul van Vuuren, Brigadier Jack Cronje (commander at Vlakplaas from 1983 to 1985), Colonel Roelf Venter, Captain Wouter Mentz, and Captain Jacques Hechter (depicted from left to right in Figure 10.3).

In February 1997, Van Vuuren, Cronje, Venter, Mentz, and Hechter appeared before the TRC in Pretoria. They were applying for amnesty for
more than forty murders between them and had come forward with the “purpose of cleansing our souls from the darkness of the past and to let the truth be spoken about our deeds.” In 1987, Van Vuuren, Hechter, and Cronje, with the help of an askari, a brutal killer named Joe Mamasela, strangled and shot a policeman and suspected ANC sympathizer, Richard Mutase, in his house and then murdered his wife Irene. Given the testimonies of decades of similar atrocities, the Mutase murders would not have caused much of a ripple at the TRC, except for the contradictory testimony given by Hechter, Van Vuuren, and Mamasela, as to who killed whom and how.

Entitling her discussion “Guilt Is on the Move with All her Mantles,” Krog asks the question: “What is narrative?” Quoting Roland Barthes, the French literary critic, she writes: “Narrative does not show, does not intimate; rather, its function is not to represent, it is to constitute a spectacle.” There is no doubt that Hechter strangled Mutase, that Van Vuuren smothered him with a pillow and then fired the four shots from his AK-47 that killed him, and that either Mamasela or Hechter killed Mutase’s wife. As Hechter and Van Vuuren gave their versions of what happened, Krog wrote that while “their stories became part of a whole circuit of narratives: township stories, literature, Truth Commission testimonies, newspaper reports,” the murders of Mutase and his wife are “the clay,” and “the political climate, the amnesty conditions, the presence of Tshidiso Mutase and his grandmother, the lawyers—all these were the hands forming the clay,” and that “there are actually two stories: the story and the understory, the matrix, the propelling force determining what is left out, what is used, how it is used, and at the heart of this force are the amnesty conditions.” Once the political motivation for the murders has been explored and “the gory finer details of the murder” discussed, there is an “impression of full
disclosure” and every one of Krog’s SABC listeners “can [decode] the story in terms of truth.”

In order to emphasize the problems that the TRC had with “testimonies” from amnesty seekers like Van Vuuren and his fellow thugs, Krog cites the popular South African crime novelist John Miles’ fictional account of the murders in *Kroniek uit die doofpot* (1991), in which Mutase is simply “he” and the killer or killers simply “someone” or “they.” In turn, Miles cites the newspaper *Sowetan’s* matter-of-fact report: “A former Bophuthatswana policeman and his nursing-sister wife were shot dead in their home in Temba township, near Hammamskraal on Monday night.”

Admitting to “a textual reading” of the Mutanse murders, Krog imagines the mood of her “invisible [radio] audience” trying to make sense of the same “iconic images”—of Hechter “sketching the dark house with the flickering TV,” of Van Vuuren describing “the struggle, the choking, and the shooting” then intimating sensitively that he knew Hechter’s wife was divorcing him, of Miles imagining that the house after the murder was “full of feathers,” of Mamasela noticing that the murdered couple’s sleeping child’s face “mirrored the face of my own child.”

Despite commenting at length on Benzien’s frightening demonstration of the use of the wet-bag to extract information, observing Coetzee’s girlfriend “lacquering her nails” as he related the details of the unspeakable death of Siswe Kondile, and Harrington bursting “uncontrollably into tears,” when questioned about his activities for the state, the killers of Richard and Irene Mutase, despite being given “a wide berth” as they walk through the foyer of the amnesty venue in Pretoria, are foregrounded in *Country of My Skull*. “We all know,” Krog reports, that “they were the doers. Killing, for them, was not dressed in the official pastels of ‘eliminate,’ ‘remove,’ or ‘take out.’ Their task was not to make speeches or shuffle papers. Their task was to murder.” Watching them from the corner of her eye, Krog admits that “a slushy fear invades” her. Once the amnesty hearing is underway, Krog manages to sit close to them: “To look for signs—their hands, their fingernails, in their eyes, on their lips—signs that these are the faces of killers, of the Other. For future reference: the face of Evil.” Krog, as an Afrikaner, is sympathetic that the five policemen are all from relatively poor families, that they share a common devotion to the Dutch Reformed Church, the National Party, hunting, and the role their fathers played in their lives. Venter and Mentz, for example, “talk of their fathers as ‘Pa,’” but prefer “the Old Testament term ‘Vader’—in Afrikaans a term reserved only for God.” What Krog cannot accept is that “the five policemen say they did it for us.”

VI

Much of the guilt—criminal, political, moral, and metaphysical—as to what happened in South Africa in the years leading up to the presidency
of Nelson Mandela fell squarely on the shoulders of those who supported the apartheid system. Quoting the German philosopher Karl Jaspers, Krog records:

Thousands in Germany sought, or at least found death in battling the regime, most of them anonymously. We survivors did not seek it. We did not go into the streets when our Jewish friends were led away; we did scream until we too were destroyed. We preferred to stay alive, on the feeble, if logical ground, that our death could not have helped anyone. We are guilty of being alive.73

Using Jaspers’ sentiment vicariously, Krog takes upon herself the burden of the poet: the one who must say when others do not, will not, or cannot; she becomes the “we” of all those who stood aside and did not, would not, or could not see what was happening to a collective people on the southernmost tip of the Africa continent. In doing so, she reiterates the necessity of the Zulu ritual of the “ilala,” of the need to empty the South African heart of hatred and anger, to say not that “We Afrikaners are indigenous. We are here to stay. We are not perfect, but we are genuine and honest,”74 but that “we” South Africans “are indigenous. We are here to stay. We are not perfect, but we are [all] genuine and honest.”75 In Country of My Skull, Krog quotes the leader of the (New) National Party, Martinus van Schalkwyk’s, defining of “an Afrikaner in a way no Afrikaner politician had done before: ‘The biggest battle the Afrikaner fought was, however, not a physical one against someone else . . . it was a psychological battle with itself. Apartheid was the Afrikaner’s self-imposed concentration camp of the mind.’”76

While condemning both the “moral vacuity”77 of apartheid and the “ideological morgue”78 of South Africa’s system of separate development, Krog portrays in a unique style commensurate to the complexities of a divided society seeking—through the TRC—to redress itself on the world stage and emerge as a viable member of the international family. If her narrative is at times jagged; if the way that she presents her witnesses, the voices they use and the stories they tell, are contradictory or even fictitious; if her own omniscient voice—the radio broadcaster, the poet, the Afrikaner woman from a farm called Middenspruit in Kroostad, the South African—intrudes angrily, exasperatedly, exhaustedly, then it is because she has come close to an evil which, she comes to understand, transcends both the system of apartheid and the resistance to it.

Krog’s voice in Country of My Skull is a confessional one, it is a voice craving catharsis, it is a voice that speaks the numberless narratives of South Africa,79 in the hope that those who had been at one another’s throats might, in Desmond Tutu’s words, “try to live amicably together.” If Krog’s voice goes unheard, if the efforts of the TRC fail, then, as the Afrikaner poet Ingrid Jonker warned, an oppressed and oppressing South Africa will remain “in the location of the cordoned heart.”80
NOTES

1. “The apartheid system worked like a finely woven net—starting with the Broederbond* who appointed leaders. In turn, these leaders appointed ministers, judges, generals, security forces, courts, administrations were tangled in. Through Parliament, legislation was launched that would keep enforcement out of sight.” Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999), 60. All citations are to this edition.

*In The Mind of South Africa historian Allister Sparks notes that the Broederbond dates from 1918 and is “a remarkable organization, perhaps unequalled in the world for its pervasive back-room power wielded over nearly every aspect of natural life. It has been the nucleus of the Afrikaner Nationalist movement, exercising its influence over both church and state and establishing a wide network of social, cultural, and economic institutions to help uplift the Afrikaner people, weld them together, and mobilize them politically.” Sparks, The Mind of South Africa (New York: Knopf, 1990), 177.

2. Looking back on the Mandela presidency, Sparks wrote in Beyond a Miracle: “We have a Constitutional Court presided over by world-class jurists to interpret and defend it, and we have established a number of other institutions to give effect to the Constitution, including an Independent Electoral Commission, a Human Rights Commission and a Commission for Gender Equality. Not least we have managed a smooth transition from the Founding Father [Nelson Madela] of our new nation to his young successor [Thabo Mbeki] in a continent which is rare. We have scrapped all the old race laws, guaranteed freedom of speech and the press, abolished the death penalty, legalized abortion on demand, protected the rights of gay people, and advanced women in many spheres of life.” Sparks, Beyond the Miracle: Inside the New South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 3.


4. Blurb on the cover of Krog, Country of My Skull.

5. “Reconciliation,” for example, in English means “to make friendly again” (Oxford English Dictionary), but the word in Xhosa means “forgiveness.” Citing the Afrikaner Dictionary, Krog notes “reconciliation” is defined as “to accept” or “to restore to friendship,” Country, 50, 143.

6. Hunter Gault, a CNN Africa correspondent, cites South Africa’s interim constitution:

“The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu [the African philosophy of humanism] but not for victimization.

“In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted to respect to acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date which shall be the date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993 and providing for mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with any time after the law has been passed.” See Krog, Country, vi.

7. Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s sixteen multi-ethnic commissioners included doctors, lawyers, ministers of religion, and others from the civil sector of
South African life. The TRC, which was made up of three committees—human rights violations, reparations, and rehabilitation and amnesty—had subpoena powers. It held hearings and gave, in Charlayne Hunter-Gault’s words, “victims an opportunity to tell the world their stories of pain, suffering and loss. And it would question victimizers about how and why they had caused that pain, suffering, and loss, with a particular emphasis on just how widespread the human-rights abuses had been and to what extent they had been sanctioned by the apartheid government. Gross violations of human rights were defined as murder, attempted murder, abduction, and torture or severe ill treatment.” Krog, Country, vii.

8. Ibid., v, vii.

9. De Kok’s “Room full of questions” is a twelve poem sequence that describes apartheid South Africa at the time of the TRC hearings as a “stained place” where clergymen weep, where victims are tongue-tied, where cruel men deny their guilt, where bearings are disoriented, where “Old sorrow holds down anger like a plug. / And juridical questions/swab swab the brains and blood off the floor.” See Ingrid de Kok, Terrestrial Things, (Plumstead, South Africa: Kwela Books-Snailpress, 2004), 21–37.

10. Malan had broken away from the mainstream National Party to form a “Purified” alternative in 1934. When Malan retired in 1954, Prime Minister Hans Strijdom intensified the NP’s apartheid policies.

11. Krog writes: “Every educated German knows the line: ‘Der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland’. . . ‘After the Second World War, it was said in Germany; it is barbaric to write a poem after Auschwitz. Yet Paul Celan wrote this indescribably beautiful Fugue of Death. The reception of the poem was ambivalent. Isn’t the poem too lyrical? Just a bit too beautiful? Is the horror not too accessible? In the end, Celan himself felt this ambivalence and asked anthologists to remove the poem from their books.” Krog, Country, 312. Celan’s “Todesfuge” (Death Fugue) begins with the haunting refrain:

Schwarze Milch der Frühe wir trinken sie abends
wir trinken sie mitags wir trinken sie nachts
wir trinken und trinken

(Black milk of daybreak we drink it at sundown/ we drink it at noon in the morning we drink it at night/ we drink and we drink). See Paul Celan, Poems of Paul Celan, trans. Michael Hamburger (New York: Persea Books, 1989), 60–62.


13. Ibid., 113.

14. The ANC was founded in 1912 as a liberation movement. The party, banned after the Sharpeville massacre, declared war on the apartheid governments between 1960 and the presidency of Nelson Mandela.


17. This is not dissimilar to Ingrid de Kok’s technique in “A room full of questions.”

18. De Kok, Terrestrial Things, 21

20. Leaves of the ilala palm are used for thatch, the weaving of mats and baskets, and the manufacture of palm beers. In the case of the latter, the tapped stems produces a sugary sap that is fermented by natural yeasts into a kind of a ginger-beer tasting drink called “ubusulu” or “iNjemana.” The palm is found in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province and all over East Africa.


22. Verwoerd was prime minister from 1958 until his assassination in 1966.

23. Meeting a cleaner in the Old Assembly Hall of the South African Parliament in Pretoria, Krog is told: “This stain is where Verwoerd’s blood spilled. They’ve gotten professionals to come and wash the carpets, but after a day or so, the stain is back again.” Krog concludes: “The national party left a large blood stain for months. Later it was covered by a light carpet. After months all the carpets in the hall were dry-cleaned—and a day or two later. the stain was back.” Krog, *Country*, 161. Apocryphal or not, “Verwoerd’s ghost” haunted the early days of the Mandela presidency. In towns like Ventersdorp, for example, in the North West Province, his specter commands more influence than the murdered paramilitary leader Eugene Terre Blanche and the far right-wing secessionists of the Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging (AWB). It was also the chosen home of apartheid’s matriarch, Betsy Verwoerd, the erstwhile ghost’s widow.


26. The *Rand Daily Mail* closed in 1985. It had an eighty-three-year-old reputation for treating non-Whites as human beings, and its pointed coverage of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, for example, ruffled political feathers in Pretoria. The *Vrye Weekblad* was founded in 1988 and continued publishing until 1994. It was notable for its disclosures of government-sponsored death squads, and of the existence of Vlakplaas in particular. The journalist Jacques Pauw, who was on the editorial board, has called its editor Max du Preez “daring and fearless” and the paper “independent and free-thinking.” (See Jacques Pauw, *In the Heart of the Whore* (Halfway House, South Africa: Southern Book Publishers, 1991), 19. This refers to Pauw’s remarks in the previous sentence *Vrye Weekblad* folded after being unable to bear the costs of defending itself against a libel suit brought by one Lothar Neethling whom the paper had justly accused of supplying poison to the South African Defence Force (SADF) to be used against the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups.

27. De Kok was known throughout South Africa as “Prime Evil” and is a symbol of the apartheid system’s ruthlessness. He is said to have been personally involved in over seventy killings for *Volk en Vaterland* (Folk and Fatherland). He is serving a life sentence for murder. Pumla Gobodo-Manikizela, a TRC commissioner and a practicing psychologist, after interviewing de Kok in prison, asked: “Was evil intrinsic to de Kok, and forgivness therefore wasted on him?” She answers her question by remembering Albie Sachs’ insistence that it was very important “to see these men’s humanity.” Sachs, a human rights lawyer, lost an arm during an assassination attempt in Maputo, Mozambique, in 1988. *A Human Being Died That Night: A South African Woman Confronts the Legacy of Apartheid*, 45.

28. Vlakplaas is a death-farm on the banks of the Hennops River near Pretoria that is synonymous in South Africa with brutality, torture, and murder. Seeing photographs of the Vlaplaas *manne*, Jacques Pauw was struck by how “suspiciously homoerotic” their cavorting was as they paraded their boepies (beer bellies) and “playfully pulled one another’s swimsuits down.” Pauw,
Dances with Devils (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2006), 146. Comparing the Amabutho, a KwaZulu-Natal group, who worked with the SADF, Krog notes the similarity of rituals between it and the Vlakplaas manne: bonding in small groups, drinking beer, collectively choosing a victim, arming themselves, and then “getting to together for the Big Kill.” Krog, Country, 62.


30. Sparks’ phrase. Beyond a Miracle, 160.

31. A euphemism for the burning of human remains. To conceal evidence, this was done on the traditional Afrikaner braii (barbeque) after a victim had been beaten, drugged, and then shot to death. An infamous case in 1981 involved the political activist Goimisiwe Kondile who, having aroused the suspicions of the security forces, was arrested, given a spiked drink, shot, then “burned on a pyre of bushveld wood,” while his captors, including the amnesty-seeker Dirk Coetzee, sat around drinking beer and roasting their own meat. Pauw, In the Heart of the Whore, 52–55.

32. A particularly vicious method of execution in the 1980s and 1990s, necklacing involved forcing a tire over a victim’s arms and chest, filling the interior with gasoline, and then setting it on fire. This method was often imposed by peoples’ courts in the Black townships on men and women who had been accused of collaboration with the apartheid regime. Winnie Madikizela-Mandela endorsed the method, when she ran the Mandela United Football Club in Soweto.

33. The predominantly Zulu IFP was founded in Natal by Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi in 1975.

34. Sharpeville was a township south of Johannesburg and the scene of a massacre by police of sixty-nine people protesting the pass laws, which restricted the movement of Black South Africans into the cities.


37. Krog records that “The starting point of the human rights hearing was the indefinable wail that burst from Nomande Calata’s lips in East London.” Krog, Country, 75. In Alex Boraine’s A Country Unmasked, a memoir of his time as a commissioner on the TRC, Calata’s wail is remembered as “primeval and spontaneous.” Boraine, A Country Unmasked (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 102. Desmond Tutu wrote: “Mrs. Calata broke down with a piercing wail. In many ways her cry was the defining sound of the TRC—as a place where people could come to cry, to open their hearts, to expose the anguish that had remained locked up for so long, ignored, and denied.” Tutu, No Future, 148.


40. Apartheid was also known as “separate development.” Correct

41. The pass laws were introduced in 1923 and were designed to segregate and curtail the movement of non-White South Africans. They were repealed in 1986, twenty-six years after the Sharpeville protests against them led to the infamous massacre in 1960.

42. In 1956, a policy of teaching in both English and Afrikaans on a 50–50 basis was introduced. By 1976, opposition to apartheid and to Afrikaans as the “language of the oppressor” came to a head in Soweto, a “township” of Johannesburg. On June 16, 1976, an estimated 15,000 protestors (mainly high school students) marched into the streets carrying such slogans as “Blacks are not dustbins—Afrikaans stinks.” The uprising, which lasted months, took the lives of 172 people, including many in their teens, who were

43. Sometimes known as “Total Onslaught,” this was President P.W. Botha’s instruction to a newly-formed National Security Management System (1984), which effectively declared war of any form of opposition to the apartheid system both inside South Africa and beyond its borders.

44. Krog quotes Sean Kaliski, a state psychologist with ties to Vlakplaas.

45. Stompie Seipei, on the run from the Orange Free State police, had taken refuge in the manse of the Rev. Paul Verryn (later a Methodist bishop). Found guilty of kidnapping Seipei from the manse, Madikizela-Mandela accused Verryn of sodomy. The false accusation was damaging, but unsubstantiated, and yet Verryn had the good heart to forgive Nelson Mandela’s former wife, despite being “profoundly, profoundly affected by some the things she said to him,” Verryn assured her that “I long for our reconciliation.” (Krogg, Country, 327). The “coach” of the Mandela United Football Club, Jerry Richardson, was later found guilty of murdering Seipei, whose decomposed body was found on the veld in early 1989.


47. Constand Viljoen, a moderate right-winger and former commander of the SADF, registered the Freedom Front—a political party formed to protect Afrikaner rights—with the Independent Electoral Commission so that it could take part in the 1994 April election. Other right-wing Afrikaner parties refused to register on the grounds that the election was unconstitutional.

48. Krog quotes the Polish philosopher Adam Mischnik, who quotes the German sociologist Jürgen Habermas: “Collective guilt does not exist. Whoever is guilty will have to answer individually. At the same time, there is such a thing as collective responsibility for a mental and cultural context that makes possible crimes against humanity.” Krog, Country, 32.

49. Hofmeyr is a town in the Eastern Cape.

50. Krog, Country, 125.

51. Ibid., 126.

52. Braaivleis is translated as “barbecue.”


54. “Winnie Madikizela-Mandela took young men, mostly homeless boys regarded by the government as the ‘lost youth’ into her house. In order to win international funding, the group was turned into a soccer club with a coach and tracksuits; the members who served Madikizela-Mandela and her family as bodyguards, soon turned into a vigilante gang, sowing terror and destruction in the area.” Ibid., 318.

55. Ibid., 319.

56. Ibid., 320.

57. Ibid., 321.

58. Ibid., 319–321.

59. Ibid., 340.

60. Benzien was apartheid’s torturer. Feared nationally, he excelled with the electrode, the rectal probe, and the infamous wet-bag (a forerunner of waterboarding). Krog recalls that the sight of this “bluntly built white man” in a stuffy hall in Cape Town, “squatting on the back of a black victim, who lies face down on the floor, and pulling the bag over his head remains one of the most loaded and disturbing images of the Truth Commission.” Krog, Country, 93.
61. It was Coetzee “dream to become a member of the elite corps, the cream of the crop, the handpicked core of the security forces.” His “unofficial” task at Vlakplaas was “to train a hit squad that could be called out to take care of activists.” Krog reports that Coetzee and his manne “developed [their] own body language” where “The wink of an eye, the nod of a head, could spell someone’s end.” Krog, Country, 79. More infamously, Coetzee drank beer with other manne at Vlakplaas while one of his victims—Siswe Kondile—was braaied.

62. Harrington armed the IFP in its conflict with the ANC in the 1990s in what was known as the Seven Day War in and around the city of Pietermaritzburg. Krog reports Harrington’s testimony: “I fired on any ANC house or group from my vehicle, I distributed weapons to IFP chiefs, I transported Inkatha members and ammunition. It was days of death and blood.” Krog, Country, 90. Harrington was refused amnesty.

63. Albuyeh, 2011


65. Askari is the name for a former ANC guerilla recruited by the SADF.


67. Translated as Deafening Silence.


69. Ibid., 105, 106, 112, 110.

70. In a poem entitled “What kind of man” written in answer to a question asked of Benzien by one of his torture victims, Tony Yengeni, Ingrid de Kok wrote:

What kind of man mounts another
in deadly erotic mimicry,
then puts a wet bag over his head
to suffocate him for the truth?

Let her baby cry for her
from a nearby cell
threatens to stop the crying?

Roasts meat on coals
while a man is burning on a nearby pyre?


71. The Dutch Reformed Church upheld apartheid theologically until it saw the light in 1994.


73. Ibid., 123.

74. Krog quotes Constand Viljoen, 380

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert’s phrase. Quoted in Pauw, Heart of the Whore, np.


79. In Image Music Text (1977), Roland Barthes writes that “The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances—as though any material were fit to receive man’s stories,” 79.
80. Nelson Mandela read Jonker’s poem “The child who was shot by soldiers at Nyanga” at the opening of the first democratic parliament in May 1994.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Evangelism as Political Protest in Nineteenth Century African Diaspora
Appraising Julia Foote’s Spiritual Autobiography, *A Brand Plucked from the Fire*¹

Samantha Manchester Earley

INTRODUCTION

In her spiritual autobiography, *A Brand Plucked from the Fire*,² Julia Foote discusses her early childhood experience in the African Methodist tradition in Albany, New York, and her subsequent life journey to become a preacher. *A Brand Plucked from the Fire*, which specifically and continuously references the Old Testament book of Zechariah,³ details not only Foote’s call to embrace Christianity and eventually preach, but also stands as Foote’s exhortation to African American women to accept nothing less than equal, civil rights. In this case, Foote is advocating that women and African Americans be allowed equal access to social institutions such as education, government, the judicial system, and so on. Moreover, she strongly believes that in order to allow this access, social policies, such as segregation, must be dismantled immediately. She realizes that the system she lives in does not allow all human beings to work, live, and thrive—to operate at their fullest human potential. Changing access to the power structure, that is, opening the social, political, and economic institutions for women and all ethnic/racial minorities to exist and flourish within them, would bring the United States’ practices in line with its egalitarian principles as stated in the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.

Foote was an evangelist influenced by the cultural and spiritual forces surrounding her, and she preached in the time and location of the fledgling African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church.⁴ In the early to mid-1800s, America was consumed by what is now known as the Second Great Awakening. This movement, which lasted through the 1870s, was known for its revivalism, camp-meeting style. The major religious and cultural focus was on individual responsibility as a moral being and also on individual salvation.⁵ A number of social reform movements sprang up during this time, as well, including the anti-lynching movement, the African American women’s club movement, and the temperance movement. In *A Brand Plucked from the Fire*, much of the account of Foote’s preaching and teaching emerges
from her own particular life circumstances in relationship to her gender and position as a servant in mid-nineteenth century New York, as well as her conviction that, as a saved individual, she had a right and a duty to do and say what she knew to be correct.

This chapter contextualizes the socio-political protest in Foote’s autobiography, generally within the negotiated tensions with the dominant White culture, within the writings of Richard Allen (one of the founders of the AME Church), and within proscriptions about appropriate gender roles within the Church. Richard Allen, first bishop of the AME Church, outlined the beliefs and practices of the denomination in 1817 in *The Doctrines and Discipline of the African Methodist Episcopal Church*. This publication gave a brief history of the founding of the Church, along with the tenets of the denomination. These tenets include the belief in the triune God, a declaration that all should read the Bible, a statement that humans are saved by grace through faith, and the premise that good works “follow after justification” but are not enough to ensure salvation. Foote was resolute in using prophesy and evangelism to protest political realities and encourage action that ran against the grain of popular thought, both in the dominant White culture and in her own African American community. In this process, she stood resolutely for what she believed was morally and scripturally correct—that women could and should preach the gospel and minister to those in need and that African American people should persevere in their fight for moral political and social action, exhorting her reading audience to work for these outcomes. In her spiritual autobiography, Foote pushes her readers to ask questions of the existing social order, such as why were called and sanctified women unable to preach and why were financially sound African Americans unable to purchase first class passage on railroads in segregated society. Then, she strives, through her scriptural references, her logical reasoning, and her own revelatory experiences, to suggest to her reading audience that mere access to status quo practices may not be enough. Indeed, on some level, Foote advocates and exhorts for changes in existing hierarchies that lead to unfair power differences among human beings.

Julia Foote traveled extensively within the United States on the East Coast, in the Midwest, and into the South, preaching and exhorting to various groups at camp revival meetings and in individuals’ homes. She was especially effective in religious revival meetings in the Holiness Movement, which was an evangelical off-shoot of the American Methodist Church. The Holiness Movement advocated that humans adhere to John Wesley’s doctrine of “Christian perfection,” the tenets of which were: 1) regeneration by grace through faith, which leads to an assurance of salvation, and 2) sanctification, received by divine revelation and enabling one to live a sin-free life. The revivalism upon which holiness rested was a significant part of the Second Great Awakening and emphasized the need/call for personal holiness. While this emphasis on personal holiness melded well with Julia Foote’s calling through preaching and evangelism to save individuals
Evangelism as Political Protest

from sin, it also increased the power of her literary message that Black people and women must assert their needs for equal civil rights.

This chapter analyzes Foote’s Christian rhetoric and her construction of self as a sanctified being through John Wesley’s holistic understanding of Christianity. Wesley comes out of a Reformed tradition in the middle of the sixteenth century that followed *sola Scriptura* (Scripture alone) along with the Anglican approach that, according to theologian Don Thorsen, attempted to “integrate various sources of religious authority in a spirit of catholicity.”11 Wesley’s distinctiveness appears in the way in which he develops a theological method—a “framework in which theological questions are handled” and theological issues are examined—through historical references, logical reasoning, and personal revelatory encounters.12 This method has come to be known as the “Wesleyan quadrilateral.”13 In this quadrilateral, Wesley asks that Christian practice be understood and developed through four different but interconnected realms: tradition, reason, experience, and scripture, with scripture having ultimate religious authority. Tradition, reason, and experience relate back to scripture in order to uncover the meaning of scripture to be able to (re)apply it to the ways Christians should live and behave.

In this sense, “tradition” is the context of the whole of Christian history, with Wesley advocating that Methodism be “the orthodox succession of true, or genuine, Christianity, reflecting the most elemental manifestations of religion.”14 It should be understood that Wesley appealed to Christian tradition “for spiritual reasons, rather than for theological or ecclesiastical continuity, which was generally the case with Christian appeals to tradition.”15 In other words, Wesley believed that Methodism should be the true religion, the “heart-religion,” the religion that was concerned with the ways in which humans should interact with God and with each other. Julia Foote also followed this path, by focusing on the ways in which Christianity could allow its followers to interact with God and with each other in harmony and righteousness.

In Wesley’s theology, the role of reason is the use of rationality in order to think about and unlock the meaning of scripture, again, with the ultimate goal of being able to be “Christian” in the “truest” sense of the word. According to Thorsen, Wesley would reference “‘the plain scriptural rational way’ in presenting the plan of salvation; any other way seemed an overly enthusiastic mysticism or a spiritless form of rationality.”16 These sorts of appeals to reason as plain, simple ways to develop and understand the meaning of scripture are found in Foote’s spiritual autobiography, as well. Her example, for instance, about being excommunicated by her pastor and denied the right to preach by the members of the General Conference is developed rationally. She states of these instances, “Fiery trials are not strange things to the Lord’s anointed.”17 Her analysis of this example relates directly back to an interpretation of scripture: God’s chosen are often persecuted and they must continue to bear up in the face of such torment.
Wesley was one of the first theologians to advocate the role of personal experience as “a source of religious authority.” In fact, Wesley understood that religion/scripture, along with tradition and reason, would of necessity be processed by individuals through their own realm of experience. According to Thorsen,

Wesley believed that the truths of Scripture are (or will be eschatologically) confirmed in experience. Consequently, we must respond that which God has revealed historically through Scripture and at present through the work of the Holy Spirit. Although the confirmatory role of experience pertains especially to the assurance of salvation, it also pertains to other truths of Scripture and to doctrines of orthodox Christianity.

In this manner, Foote can lay claim to her historical ability to preach as coming from the biblical role that women played in disseminating Christ’s word, along with the assurance that it was not “a short-lived impulse or spasmodic influence that impelled” her to preach, but a genuine working of the Holy Spirit in her life and her heart.

Finally, scripture was for Wesley the ultimate religious authority, as well as the guide for human beings for God’s will and plan for them in their earthly and spiritual endeavors. According to Thorsen, “Scripture served as the only sufficient source commonly available to people for investigating the nature of God and of life.” Foote uses this focus on scripture as the way to understand her calling in life and also as a way to show others that she is called to preach. In other words, she both understands and explains her call to preach through the lens of the book of Zechariah and the revelation that the prophet has about his call.

In sum, scriptural authority is given primacy in Wesley’s writings, but tradition, reason, and experience are also sources of religious knowledge that can corroborate scriptural truths. In this sense, the Christian tradition’s long, well-documented history provides a detailed and developed analysis and interpretation of scripture. Wesley also affirms belief in the reasonable, in light of the Word, through the use of critical and scientific thought processes. Finally, Wesley expected that adult Christians who had reached the stage of sanctification would have had experiences that they would use to affirm/reaffirm scripture.

The unique strength in Wesley’s theological method lies in the “recognition, delineation, and application of the unconflicting sources of authority of tradition, reason, and experience in contribution to and in correlation with the primary religious authority of Scripture.” Because Foote developed out of a Methodist and Episcopal tradition, with an African American sensibility, using the Wesleyan quadrilateral to read and analyze her text makes sense. Julia Foote was not necessarily reading John Wesley or engaging in the theological and/or philosophical debates over his interpretation of scripture or religion. However, as Foote developed
her religious, and to a certain degree cultural, sensibilities emerging out of a Wesleyan tradition (the combination of Methodism and Anglicism/Episcopalianism), it is appropriate to use the Wesleyan quadrilateral as a heuristic for analysis.

To analyze Foote’s resistance to the status quo, a cultural studies approach, which emphasizes an interdisciplinary examination of issues of power in social orders, is both useful and advantageous. In this case, Michel de Certeau’s theoretical framework, developed in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, is useful in describing Foote’s advocacy of protest and resistance.\(^{22}\) Michel de Certeau (1925–1986) wrote about the constructs of culture through the lens of both materialism\(^ {23}\) and psychoanalysis.\(^ {24}\) In his analysis of culture, de Certeau “wanted to identify the creative and disruptive presence of ‘the other’—the outsider, the stranger, the alien, the subversive, the radically different—in systems of power and thought.”\(^ {25}\) De Certeau’s framework is applicable to analyzing Julia Foote’s text, because she was one triply outside the realm of power by virtue of her being: 1) a person of color, 2) a woman, and 3) an evangelist in the Holiness Movement. De Certeau asserts that discursive systems used by marginalized figures can be studied to examine and solidify the practical dimensions of political and social life. Using De Certeau’s analytical strategy, combined with Wesley’s four-pronged approach structuring thought on religious matters, this chapter examines (sub)textual meaning in the exhortation for political and social change within the church and in American society in Julia Foote’s spiritual autobiography, *A Brand Plucked from the Fire*.

**RESISTING THE STATUS QUO—FOOTE’S USE OF SCRIPTURE**

Foote’s position on individuals and her call for them to fight for their rights emerges from the ways she reports her practice of everyday life. For instance, when her pastor, Beman, and his committee of elders excommunicate her “because [she] had violated the rules of the discipline by preaching,” she details her struggle to overcome this prejudice.\(^ {26}\) She writes a letter to the national conference of the AME denomination, “stating all the facts.”\(^ {27}\) She informs the readers that the leaders of the conference took no notice of her letter, and then uses verbal irony to move the readers, declaring that “it was only the grievance of a woman, and there was no justice meted out to women in those days. Even ministers of Christ did not feel that women had any rights which they were bound to respect.”\(^ {28}\) The juxtaposition here of “ministers of Christ” with the notion that they were disrespecting fellow human beings calls into question the scriptural/theological platform upon which the ministers would base such a decision and practice. Foote, then, structures the rest of her narrative by using biblical terms and imagery to foreground the method by which she dealt with society’s and the AME
Church’s opposition to her call to preach. In the process, she lays bare the un-Christian attitudes of the Christian ministers who had attempted to force her to accept social and religious subservience, which would have thereby ruined her call and her livelihood, bringing this analysis back to the material.

Foote made use of the discourses of the dominant, especially that of scripture and religion, in order to create a sphere of autonomy to evangelize political and social change, including equal access to socio-economic advancement for women and Black people. To this end, her narrative is structured with an exhortation at the close of nearly every chapter—these exhortations call for readers to work to enact various social changes, including, among others, to support prohibition of alcohol, to teach children to respect their elders, and to disallow capital punishment.

Julia Foote used the religious and scriptural discourses that undergird the religious structure that denies her the opportunity to move into a position of leadership, in order to force those in positions of authority, along with the citizens who participate in the religious system of the day, to capitulate to her call for change. Many of her close-of-chapter calls bolster the overall message behind her text—that those who are called and have indicated sanctification should be enabled, indeed encouraged, to express, evangelize, and preach their faith. For instance, many of her chapters conclude with the call for people to aspire to various aspects of Wesley’s “Christian perfection.” These include her message that only through grace is one saved by faith, preaching should have the power of the Holy Ghost, and that she would not be shaken in her faith in her own sanctification, which allows her to rejoice in her own persecution in the face of that call. In her argument that only through grace is one saved by faith, Foote calls on a long-standing cultural construct that emigrated to the New World with the Reformed Puritans and Separatists of the mid-1600s. She also references Wesley’s doctrine of Christian perfection and the ninth “Article of Religion” of the original AME doctrinal platform. In her staunch adherence to the notion that humans are saved only through grace by faith, Foote strengthens her rhetorical arguments by referencing the Reformed Christian tradition of her nation. More importantly, the Christian tradition of her denomination, as a sociological outgrowth of Methodism, is referenced here as well. She then uses reason and her own revelatory experience to justify and uphold her position that those who are called to preach, no matter their gender, should be embraced and commissioned for the task.

In her assertion that preaching should be undergirded by the power of the Holy Ghost, Foote draws significantly from the book of Ezekiel, Chapter 34, especially in its warning to preachers and followers who are approaching religion as a mechanism to increase themselves, rather than support the advancement of all people. The book of Ezekiel suggests that these types of leaders are false and should be neither trusted nor followed.
These references appear in Foote’s text in the context of the pastor of her church visiting her and informing her that she must desist from preaching and teaching, especially to those who are older than she. He informs her: “you must remember that you are too young to read and dictate to persons older than yourself, and many in the church are dissatisfied with the way you are talking and acting.” Her interpretation of the pastor’s admonition implies that he and the elders of the church did not want her to sway the congregation away from their authority. Her reading of the book of Ezekiel, especially the warnings that the shepherds of flocks should feed and care for the flocks rather than protect their own positions of earthly authority, calls into question the motivations of the ministers and elders and elevates Foote’s purity of motives.

Moreover, the message behind this reference is that those preachers of the word who are not imbued with the Holy Spirit are neglecting the souls of their church members. In other words, those who have not allowed Julia Foote, who has been sanctified, to preach and tend to the spiritual needs of the people, are examples of those who “eat the fat” and “clothe” themselves with the “wool” from the sacrifices of their congregations, yet they neglect to “feed the flock.” The pastor and elders, she suggests, are using their positions to create a material realm of power for themselves, while neglecting the spiritual needs of the congregation, needs that she is able to tend by virtue of her sanctification and call. Her exhortation that she will rejoice in her persecution (being excommunicated and not being allowed to follow her calling) makes reference to both Ezekiel and Revelations, as well as being an oblique parallel to Christ teaching the elders in the Temple. Rejoicing in this persecution suggests that she is like the Old Testament prophets and Christ Himself, thus deserving to lead others to find their spiritual paths. The references also suggest to the audience that a change in the cultural structure of the church as an institution may be desirable.

De Certeau argues that all people living within a culture are knowledgeable of and use, to one degree or another, the methods of representation that are popularized as “the key to socioeconomic advancement.” In the framework of analysis that he delineates, de Certeau suggests that those who want to understand the uses of discursive systems “must first analyze [their] manipulation by users who are not [their] makers. Only then can we gauge the difference or similarity between the production of the image and the secondary production hidden in the process of its utilization.” In other words, the keys to socio-economic advancement are located within discursive systems produced and driven by the dominant culture. Quite often, when protesting their subservient position in the status quo, those who are not part of the privileged set of the dominant culture use the discursive structures of that culture to produce images (or ideas or objects) that are discordant with the version of “reality” that those in power propagate. In this way, those who are protesting utilize
both the rhetorical and discursive devices that undergird those in power to dismantle the seeming logic of the status quo. Therefore, de Certeau’s theory suggests that we can understand the usage of dominant discursive systems in shoring up the status quo by analyzing the ways in which those who are not in positions of power use these systems to critique their own position(s) of subservience.

As Foote’s case demonstrates, by analyzing the ways in which those people who are not of the dominant group use the rhetorical and discursive tools of the dominant group to construct and deconstruct their positions relative to the hierarchy of their society, we can draw conclusions about the “political dimension to everyday practices.” De Certeau asserts that “the relation of procedures to the fields of force in which they act must therefore lead to a polemological analysis of culture.” One can, in other words, produce an analysis of social/historical/cultural life by reading the texts of those who are not of the powerful group against the discourses that construct the assumptions of the powerful. In so doing, it is possible to lay bare the apparently arbitrary basis by which those who are in power retain power. One also uncovers the physical/material basis and consequences for the status quo.

In the previously cited example from Julia Foote’s text, for instance, she shows that the ministers/leaders of the national conference were not interested in following religious precepts such as love and respect for fellow human beings. Instead, as her narrative leads the readers to believe, the ministers/leaders were aiming to carve out an economic/social niche for themselves that both 1) resembled the dominant White culture (i.e., “I am better than you because I can exclude you, and I am better than you because I can deny you access to the positions of power by which you might acquire more material wealth and consequently more power”), and 2) accused the dominant White culture (i.e. “Black men are as good as White men because we can use hierarchies to exclude and consolidate power just like you.”).

At the crux of their denying Foote access to the position of preacher in their organization is a fundamental negation of their own humanity, as well as a denial of Foote’s human worth. If, indeed, the ministers/leaders wanted to create a more just and equitable earthly social order, they would change the social hierarchy/social order within the sub-element of society under their control: they would form an egalitarian group that eschewed discrimination. Instead, the ministers/leaders mimic the discriminatory hierarchy that predominates over the society in which they live and that caused them to form their own church. With this example of her excommunication and her letter to the national Conference, Foote provides a tidy metaphor for part of the multi-layered purpose of her book: to show that African Americans should not merely want access to the dominant White power structure, but that they should advocate a truly revolutionary position—a change in the structure of power to an egalitarian model.
USING DOMINANT DISCOURSE—ECHOING THE STRUCTURE OF ZECHARIAH

In order to advocate for changes in the structure of social institutions, Julia Foote goes back to a dominant text, the Bible, and a dominant tradition, Christianity, to propose that an egalitarian society be enacted on earth: “Bless the Lord, O my soul, those this wonderful salvation, that snatched me as a brand from the burning,” even me a poor, ignorant girl! And will he not do for all what he did for me? Yes, yes; God is no respecter of persons. Jesus’ blood will wash away all your sin and make you whiter than snow.” Foote’s reference to Zechariah (“a brand from the burning”) in conjunction with her explanatory appositive, “even me, a poor, ignorant girl” suggests that multiple levels of social hierarchy should be dissected. In other words, those who are “poor,” without access to economic power and material wealth, are those who are worthy of saving. Likewise, those who are “ignorant,” without access to the educational system and the power that knowledge and training provide, are those worthy of saving. Further, those who are “girls,” who have been historically denied access to power positions in multiple social systems (including religion and family), are those worthy of saving. Because “Jesus’ blood will wash away all . . . sin,” people should be placed on a level field—earthly hierarchies should be dismantled in favor of egalitarian access to the benefits that society can provide.

In this retreat to the Bible and the Christian tradition, Foote participates in what de Certeau deems “the tactics of consumption, the ingenious ways in which the weak make use of the strong, thus [lending] a political dimension to everyday practices.” As a specific instance of this consumption, Julia Foote echoes the language and story structure of the prophet Zechariah in the whole of her narrative. In the parallel structure of her narrative, Foote lends a social and political statement to her personal story of redemption. Zechariah’s narrative focuses on leading the people who have just returned from exile into a rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem. Foote’s narrative follows Zechariah’s in the sense that: 1) she has a call to preach/prophesy, followed by 2) a denial, 3) a second call, 4) a vision where she meets God and is baptized and re-clothed, 5) a charge to work among the people, and finally 6) an acceptance of the charge. The story and journey of Julia Foote reiterates the story and journey of the prophet, infusing a “holy power” to her message and causing her readers to question the dissonance between the precepts and accepted practices of a Christian society. Foote appears to be challenging her readers to ask the question: if Zechariah, who was part of the subjugated group under the Gentiles, advocated a re-building of the Temple that included the Gentile kingdoms, why couldn’t she, who had experienced a similar call to prophesy and preaching/priesthood, advocate a new, different, and all-inclusive structure of power in society?

Both Zechariah and Julia Foote indicate in their books that they are called to preach with an initial vision and an admonition from the Lord.
In Zechariah 1:3, the Lord says to Zechariah “Turn ye unto me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will turn unto you, saith the Lord of hosts.” In this case, Zechariah is called to lead the Israelites to a rebuilding of the Temple and a reunification of the scattered tribes of Israel. Zechariah is also asked to reinforce the message of the Lord to the people: God will not turn away from them, if the people will turn to God. Zechariah is thus charged with the difficult task of rebuking the people for sinning (turning away from God) and entreatining them to change their ways (turn back to God).

Julia Foote narrates her own call to “work in [God’s] vineyard” in a similar vein. She claims that she is visited by an angel carrying a scroll with the words, “Thee I have chosen to preach my Gospel without delay” written upon it.45 As she interprets it, this calling is to “promote the glory of his kingdom in the salvation of souls.”46 Both Zechariah’s and Foote’s call focuses on the necessity of building the kingdom by guiding people’s attention to what isn’t right about their behavior/attitude and redirecting them. As the people called by God, Zechariah and Foote are to be leaders in these endeavors.

Following a long line of prophets who are initially called, both Zechariah and Foote are overwhelmed by the vision and the magnitude of the calling. At first, neither wants to embrace the call to prophesy and evangelize. In the book of Zechariah, for instance, the word came to Zechariah in “the eighth month in the second year of Darius” that the Lord had been displeased with his ancestors, but wanted to make a fresh start with the people.47 Zechariah was informed that he was the one to bring them this message and lead them in the endeavor. He evidently was not immediately responsive, as he was revisited by the word of the Lord three months later: “upon the four and twentieth day of the eleventh month, which is the month of Sebat, in the second year of Darius.”48 Evidently, Zechariah needed time to think, to search his soul, or to ascertain whether or not the call was from God.

Foote also had a difficult time accepting the burden to carry God’s word to the people. When she was visited the first time, she cried “No, Lord, not me” and “Lord, I cannot do it!”49 She describes her physical/emotional state in facing the enormity of the task: she becomes physically ill and begs God to “remove this burden” from her.50 In this instance, Foote is both following the prophetic line by protesting that she is not worthy to pursue this task, as well as indicating to her reading audience that she did not set out to flaunt the AME structure, which does not recognize women as preachers or church leaders. In the same manner God responds to Foote, as Zechariah was visited a second time, with an angel. The angel visiting Foote had written upon his chest: “You are lost unless you obey God’s righteous commands.”51 She was still afraid and shrank from embracing the call, yet she was consumed with fear that she would “die or go crazy” with worry.52 Again, the message to her readers is that she really didn’t want to step outside the social norms to take up the call to preach. In her echoing of
Zechariah in her own text, Foote draws on the power that the Old Testament prophets held in the popular imagination of the people of her day. Her narration of her call in this manner indicates to the reading audience that God has chosen her to be a leader/preacher of His word in order to build His kingdom.

To comfort herself in her state of anxiety over the social and material ramifications of taking up this call, Foote reads and re-reads the sixth chapter of the epistle of Paul to the Hebrews. This chapter of the book of Hebrews encourages the people to “go on unto perfection.” Moreover, in this chapter, Paul sends out this assurance: “God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labour of love, which ye have shewed toward his name, in that ye have ministered to the saints and do minister.” This chapter and these verses surely resonate with Foote, who has an affinity to the “Christian perfection” notion of Wesley and is significantly apprehensive about the repercussions she might face as a woman going against the gender restrictions forbidding women to preach, evangelize, and teach to mixed company. Hebrews 6:10, especially, offers God’s promise of reward for “work and labour of love” done in His name. Foote’s retreat to New Testament Hebrews for solace draws attention once again to the nature of her calling, draws the socially perceived power of Paul’s words to her cause, and gives notice to her and her reading audience that even if her contemporaries do not appreciate her efforts, God will reward her “labour of love.”

Foote was evidently a fairly well-known and sought-after preacher and teacher in the Methodist tradition, especially in the camp-revival branch called the Holiness Movement. Thomas K. Doty, who published the Christian Harvester newspaper out of Cleveland, Ohio, wrote in his 1879 introduction to her narrative: “The author of this sketch is well known in many parts of Ohio, and in other days was known in several states, as an Evangelist.” Moreover, her message must have held sway within the church itself, for in 1894, she became the first woman ordained in the AME Zion Church. Thus, the message in her text published in 1879, along with the more immediate yet ephemeral example of her preaching, teaching, and living, were persuasion enough for the Zion branch of the AME Church to ordain her as a preacher, with all the rights and responsibilities of the office.

Foote’s text is convincing in its call for this sort of social change, partially in its appeals to the Christian tradition, as has been discussed previously, but also in its use of descriptive personal revelatory experience (i.e., with her rhetorical rendering of her own experience with God as an insight into scripture). She rhetorically connects her own revelatory experience with God’s angel with Zechariah’s revelation, thus linking her personal experience with Christian tradition in order to interpret scripture and advocate for social change.

For instance, two months after her initial call, Foote is once again visited by an angel with the message, “You have I chosen to go in my name and warn the people of their sins.” In fact, her rendition of her charge from the
angel reproduces almost directly the edict given to Zechariah: “Therefore say thou unto them, Thus saith the Lord of hosts; Turn ye unto me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will turn unto you, saith the Lord of hosts.”58 God promises Zechariah that he has been called for a holy purpose and to deliver a holy message: “for he that toucheth you toucheth the apple of his eye.”59 The promise/reward for turning back to God would appear to be material prosperity, for God says to Zechariah: “Cry yet, saying Thus saith the Lord of hosts; My cities through prosperity shall yet be spread abroad; and the Lord shall yet comfort Zion, and shall yet choose Jerusalem”60 and “Thus saith the Lord of hosts; if thou wilt walk in my ways, and if thou wilt keep my charge, then thou shalt also judge my house, and shalt also keep my courts, and I will give thee places to walk among those that stand by.”61 Zechariah and Julia Foote are being cast as the chosen messengers. A further point showcased in these exchanges is that those who follow God and his directives will be cared for. Of course, in the context of the revelations described, this means that both Zechariah and Foote have assurance of God’s care for them. More pointed, however, is the notion that those who follow Zechariah and Julia Foote will fall under the protection of God as well.

The revelations of Zechariah and Foote fall into roughly the same pattern: both are visited by angels and taken to a location where they have an audience with God. In each case, they are asked to make their choice to follow God’s plan for them. In Foote’s vision, God speaks to her: “Before these people make your choice, whether you will obey me or go from this place to eternal misery and pain.”62 As Foote constructs it, her choice is clear: either do as God asks and preach and teach or be relegated to hell. A similar choice and need for a decision is indicated in the book of Zechariah; in this case, God stands as an angel before the adversaries Joshua and Satan, with the question being: how could God bless his people who were in such a fallen state, as signified by the dirty clothes that Joshua was wearing? In other words, how could the people be moved into God’s favor and be blessed?

This question is answered by God: “And the Lord said unto Satan, The Lord rebuke thee, O Satan; even the Lord hath chosen Jerusalem rebuke thee: is not this a brand plucked out of the fire?”63 This answer is the appellation, “a brand plucked from the fire,” with which Julia Foote labels herself throughout the narrative. The passage lays clear the pathway of salvation for those who wish to know and to follow. Moreover, the parallels in the narratives, as well as Foote’s equating herself continually throughout her text as the brand plucked from the fire, indicate that Foote is, indeed, using scriptural authority and appeal to the Christian tradition to position herself as one to be followed.

At this juncture, when given the choice to follow God’s directives or to be sent to hell, Foote capitulates, stating “Lord, I will go.”64 As with the prophet Zechariah, Foote must have more than one revelation before she agrees to carry God’s word to the people. Her use of this structure of call
and response is one of the ways that she constructs herself in her narrative as a legitimate leader and preacher. Politically, she indicates through this biblically based structure and language that she is not one of those who approach religion as a means to increase herself, as indicated in Ezekiel 34, but as a true prophet of God. In this construction, she also echoes the text of Zechariah, who has been told that he will carry God’s word and effect God’s changes “not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord of hosts.” In other words, neither Zechariah nor Julia Foote will be able to turn the people to God’s ways through military encounters or through access to the power hierarchy of their times. They will, instead, lead change through God’s word, which will touch their audiences’ hearts through the power of the Holy Spirit.

In both Foote’s and Zechariah’s narratives, a change of clothing occurs, indicating an acceptance into God’s order and a new life upon which each will embark. In Foote’s narrative, she reports that God says to her “You are now prepared and must go where I have commanded you.” Likewise, in the book of Zechariah, God takes away the filthy clothing and gives Joshua a new white robe, telling him: “I have caused thine iniquity to pass from thee, and I will clothe thee with change of raiment.” New clothing in each case comes with new status and new responsibilities.

In Foote’s narrative and in Zechariah’s dream about Joshua, neither of the newly chosen is still quite sure of their capabilities in handling the call. For instance, Foote explains that she tells God that if she goes out to preach “they will not believe me.” In Zechariah’s dream, Joshua has the same apprehensions. Both are given God’s reassurance. In Foote’s narrative, God gives her a “letter of authority” and tells her: “put this in your bosom, and, wherever you go, show it, and they will know that I have sent you to proclaim salvation to all.” Zechariah’s dream shows similar promises given to Joshua: “Thus saith the Lord of hosts; If thou wilt keep my charge then thou shalt also judge my house, and shalt also keep my courts, and I will give thee places to walk among those that stand by.” These charges to Foote and to Zechariah (via Joshua in his dream) have multiple implications for the reading and interpreting audience.

Foote’s reassurance from God that she will be able to fulfill the mandates of her call comes in the form of a written document, a “letter of authority” that she is to place in her bosom. In this instance, she alludes to two of Wesley’s methods of interpreting and applying scripture. The letter is a written text, which follows from a written tradition of Christianity as well as from the inspired written scripture itself. Moreover, Foote is directed to keep the text in her bosom, next to her heart, which presumably indicates that her own heart, her own personal relationship with God and the Holy Spirit will sustain her in her endeavors.

In fact, Foote reports that, when she awakens from her reveries, she cannot find the letter. In response to her consternation, her friends tell her that “it was in [her] heart, and was to be shown in [her] life, instead of in
In short order, she is tested in her resolve, as her pastor Jehiel C. Beman comes to sneer at her and her professed experience. When he tells Foote that she doesn’t “know anything,” she can respond with confidence to both her pastor and her husband: “my business [is] with the Lord and wherever I [find] a door opened I [intend] to go in and work for my Master.” According to Kathleen Housley, in her article about the life of Jehiel Beman, it is unclear why Rev. Beman was opposed to women speaking in public. However, part of his rejection of Foote as a preacher may have stemmed from “Julia’s theology of sanctification, ‘her holiness stuff,’ which was causing a rift in the church.” It would appear, then, that Julia Foote’s criticism of her pastoral leaders as caring mainly for themselves and their own earthly powers rather than about the spiritual needs of their congregation is partially true. Rev. Beman is not interested in Foote’s expounding upon her revelations or in her preaching because he doesn’t want his church members to follow her as an authority.

Foote, however, follows her own call, as she reports in her text, as well as the call that is the Lord’s charge to Zechariah: “Execute true judgment, and shew mercy and compassion every man to his brother: And oppress not the widow, nor the fatherless, the stranger, nor the poor; and let none of you imagine evil against his brother in your heart.” By constructing her text and her call parallel to Zechariah’s text and call, Foote implies that the promise made to Joshua and the call to Zechariah has import in her own position. Joshua/Zechariah have the responsibilities to keep God’s charge, as does Foote. The outcome that is promised to Joshua/Zechariah is access: Joshua/Zechariah will be the one or among those who “judge my house” and “keep my courts,” implying a pivotal role in the economic and judicial systems of the time, as well as respect from others. The phrase “places to walk among those that stand by” suggests that people will draw back and allow Joshua/Zechariah to pass through them with an attitude of awe and reverence. Moreover, Foote and Zechariah appear to be charged with a rendition of Christ’s mission on earth: to love all humans and work for their good. It is but a small step to conclude that Julia Foote is asking her audience to question the AME Church’s and American society’s stricture against women preaching and teaching the Scripture. Her call must have worked, as in 1894, she was the first woman ordained to preach in the AME Zion Church. Her words and her living example in her ministry must have eventually changed the minds of not only the lay population, but also those in positions of power in the structure of the organization.

The power of Foote’s position, of course, emerges from the cultural perception of “holiness.” The reading/listening audience recognizes the holy power of the words and the holy nature of the story. However, the message is political: racial and gender equality. The parallels to Zechariah and Foote’s powerful exegesis of the scripture obviously persuaded her audience that she, and other women, could preach. In Foote’s case, she is not White, male, or an accepted leader in a church tradition. However, she
uses the male traditions of prophesy, evangelism, preaching, and scriptural quotations to emphasize her point: women and Black people have a right to be fully productive members within the social structures of the day. For instance, after she has accepted her call, she devotes a full chapter to “Women in the Gospel,” and she concludes her work by drawing her readers’ attention back to promoting holiness in the church. Both of these calls would necessitate the full participation and acceptance of women and Black people in the fabric of the Church and society.

In her presentation of her arguments and her description of the events in her life, Foote made use of the discourses of the dominant White culture as well as the discourses of the newly emergent and popularly developing AME Church. The founders of the AME Church are also, of course, borrowing and using the discursive methods of the dominant White culture in order to establish themselves and their religious platform during this time. Julia Foote understands and capitalizes on both the dominant discursive systems, as well as the AME’s newly emerging doctrinal decrees, in order to create a sphere of autonomy to evangelize her own perception of needed social and political change.

NOTES


2. Zechariah 3:2 reads, “And the Lord said unto Satan, The Lord rebuke thee, O Satan; even the Lord that hath chosen Jerusalem rebuke thee: is not this a brand plucked out of the fire?” All references are from the King James Version of the Bible.

3. Zechariah is an Old Testament prophet whose name in Hebrew means, “God has remembered”; the book of Zechariah is the penultimate book of the twelve minor prophets in the Old Testament and is attributed to him. Zechariah was the prophet who focused on rebuilding the temple; his book details aspects of returning from exile, quality of life, and visions of the coming apocalypse. The structure of Julia Foote’s spiritual autobiography closely follows this format.

4. The African Methodist Episcopal Church was founded in Philadelphia in 1816 by Rev. Richard Allen, who was elected the denomination’s first bishop, along with Absalom Jones and several others. These men were motivated to start their own congregation after experiencing discrimination in their local Methodist congregation, including being denied communion. They structured their organization in the manner of the Episcopalians, while their doctrine follows closely the Methodists.

In the 1890s, African Americans were nominally free, as the American Civil War had ended in 1865 and Reconstruction following the war had also concluded. However, African Americans faced difficult social and economic times, including economic segregation, lynching, and denial of access to social institutions such as education, healthcare, and the justice system. The turn of the twentieth century saw, for African Americans and Whites alike, what W.E.B. DuBois termed America’s national problem: the color line. For a more detailed discussion and analysis of African American-White tensions in the late 1800s through the early 1900s, please see Barbara Blair, “Though Justice Sleeps 1880–1900,” in To Make Our World Anew: A History of African Americans (2005), 2: 3–66; and James R. Grossman, “A Chance to Make Good 1900–1929,” in To Make Our World Anew (2005), 2:67–130.


8. Ibid., 16.

9. Ibid. Regeneration by grace through faith is one of the central tenets of Reformation theologies. This tenet affirms that salvation comes through divine grace, not through good works, and that this grace regenerates the soul and allows the one who has experienced that grace the assurance that he/she will be saved (end up in paradise on Judgment Day). This tenet closely corresponds to the original doctrine of the AME Church, as written by Richard Allen, which states, “We are accounted righteous before God, only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by faith, and not for our own works or deservings.”

10. Ibid., 17. Many of the Reformed traditions also believed in sanctification, which is that God’s power would work in the lives of individuals in order to enable them to live a sin-free life. They believed that individuals would be cognizant of such sanctification after a revelatory experience, self-examination, and introspection. This tenet of sanctification, which Foote espouses and uses as justification for her travels and her preaching, would appear to be in conflict with Doctrine XII (Of Sin After Justification) of the AME doctrinal platform. Doctrine XII states: “therefore they are to be condemned, who say they can no more sin as long as they live here.”


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 93.

15. Ibid., 94.

16. Ibid., 107.


18. Thorsen, Wesleyan Quadrilateral, 129.

19. Ibid., 130.

20. Ibid., 77.

Evangelism as Political Protest


23. Materialism in this case would be described as historical materialism in the manner of Marx and Engels. This type of materialism focuses on the ways human beings act and produce and the impact of such action and production on cultural institutions.

24. Psychoanalysis is a type of psychological theory to explain human behavior and human conditions. Its first iteration, was developed in the late 1800s through the early 1900s by Sigmund Freud, but it has emerged in multiple forms since. At its base, psychoanalysis assumes that humans have multiple levels of consciousness and that they act in response to basic drives. Human behavior and psychological illnesses can be explained, according to psychoanalysts, by the conflict between these states of consciousness and the innate drives that motivate behaviors.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 207.

29. Ibid., 168.

30. Ibid., 172.

31. Ibid., 174.

32. Ibid., 181. The biblical reference she expounds upon is Ephesians 2:8, which reads “For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God.”

33. Ibid., 183. The biblical reference here is Ezekiel 34:2–3: “Son of man, prophesy against the shepherds of Israel, prophesy, and say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God unto the shepherds; Woe be to the shepherds of Israel that do feed themselves! Should not the shepherds feed the flock? Ye eat the fat, and ye clothe you with the wool, ye kill them that are fed: but ye feed not the flock.”

34. Ibid., 189. In this instance, Foote references Ezekiel 36:25, which reads “Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you.” Revelations 7:14 states, “These are they which came out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb.” Both of these passages are referenced in her statement that she will boldly face her persecution. Moreover, these references suggest that Julia Foote, who has experienced the power of sanctification, is also bound to lead others into the path of righteousness.

35. Ezekiel 34:2–3


37. In Luke 2:46–50, Mary and Joseph have gone looking for Jesus, who hadn’t returned home with them after the close of the feast in Jerusalem. “And it came to pass, that after three days they found him in the temple, sitting in the midst of the doctors, both hearing them, and asking them questions. And all that heard him were astonished at his understanding and answers. And when they saw him, they were amazed: and his mother said unto him, Son, why hast thou thus dealt with us? Behold, they father and I have sought thee sorrowing. And he said unto them, How is it that ye sought me? Wist ye not that I must be about my Father’s business? And they understood not the saying which he spake unto them.”
38. de Certeau, *Practice*, xii.
39. Ibid., xiii.
40. Ibid., xvii.
41. Ibid.
42. This is in reference to Zechariah 3:2: “And the Lord said unto Satan, The Lord rebuke thee, O Satan; even the Lord that hath chosen Jerusalem rebuke thee: is not this a brand plucked out of the fire?”
44. de Certeau, *Practice*, xvii.
46. Ibid.
47. Zechariah 1:1–6.
48. Ibid., 1:7.
50. Ibid., 201.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
54. Ibid., 1:7.
58. Zechariah 1:3.
59. Ibid., 2:8.
60. Ibid., 1:17.
61. Ibid., 3:7.
69. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Kathleen Housley, “‘Yours for the Oppressed’: The Life of Jehiel C. Beman,” *The Journal of Negro History* 77, no. 1 (1992): 22. Jehiel C. Behman was elected in 1838 as the pastor of an AME Zion Church that had formed as an offshoot of the Revere Street Methodist Church.
75. Housley, “‘Yours,” 24.
76. Ibid.
82. Ibid., 234: “Now, dear reader, I conclude by praying that this little work may be blessed of God to your spiritual and everlasting good. I trust also that it will promote the cause of holiness in the Church.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Part III

The Politics of Culture in Africa and the African Diaspora
This page intentionally left blank
INTRODUCTION

A standard definition of a society is “a group of people who live in a particular territory, are subject to a common system of political authority and are aware of having a distinct identity from other groups.” Societies have specific roles and institutions that act to maintain stability, perseverance, and harmony. Societies are stabilized through some form of hierarchy that is defined by social, political, or economic status. It is through hierarchy that social positions within societies are clearly defined and communicated to everyone. “Non-centralized polities,” which lack complex empirical structures, social stability, and harmony, are diffused and maintained through simpler local institutions. As such, subjects understand their positions in relation to others, their economic duties, and familial obligations. Social roles are assigned through various institutions, such as marriage, head of household, and inheritance. Marriage has an impact on spouse’s domestic and economic responsibilities. The position of head of the household identifies one person as the political and social representative of that particular family or kinship group. Inheritance is an institution that legitimizes claims to belongings, fortune, or property. In patriarchal societies, hierarchies, and thus social roles, are determined on the basis of gender. Institutions constructed by patriarchal societies assign men to dominant positions in the community. Therefore in marriage, men are responsible for the economic subsistence of the family, while women are responsible for domestic labor. In many such societies, men, or the eldest males, serve as head of households, representing the family socially and politically. Inheritance is constructed in a patrilineal manner in many societies, recognizing sons as heirs and allowing them to inherit their father’s properties, businesses, and finances. All three institutions are responsible for the heightening and/or perpetuation of patriarchal attitudes.
The above notwithstanding, gender roles and social institutions in some patriarchal societies have been manipulated, allowing women access to economic, political, and social privileges that are typically reserved for men under particular circumstances. In some societies, specifically the Igbo of West Africa, the Nandi and Kikuyu of East Africa, and the Gheg of North Albania, there exist institutions that create gender anomalies allowing for the manipulation of traditional gender roles and social norms. Among the Igbo, Nandi, and the Kikuyu, women could assume the role of a “female husband” or a “male daughter.” Among the Gheg, women could assume a male role through becoming “sworn virgins.” These anomalies serve to maintain social stability while addressing social inconsistencies. By comparatively analyzing these societies, we can better understand how and to what degree these women gain privileges and rights in traditionally patriarchal societies. Such an understanding will enable scholars to decide whether these anomalous social positions offer women liberation as some have suggested.3 Among the Igbo, Nandi, Kikuyu, and Gheg, the manipulation of traditional norms have given some women access to political, social, and economic independence when they become female husbands, male daughters, or sworn virgins. These women are not necessarily challenging patriarchal norms; they only gain such access to privileges and rights by assuming traditional male roles. Because these roles continue to embody male characteristics and even further strengthen patriarchal ways, they continue to restrict the larger female population to inferior social positions.

GENDER MANIPULATING INSTITUTIONS

Cross-culturally, patriarchal societies are typically characterized by a division of labor that is based on gender. It is important to note however, that the rigidity or flexibility of that division is reflective of each specific culture. Patriarchal societies are patrilineal in kinship ties and patrilocal with regards to living situations. In general, males provide economic support in the form of food, shelter, and material goods for the family. Females are seen as subservient and as property of males supporting them, whether it is a father or husband or any male guardian. The female’s responsibilities lie in domestic work and in rearing children.

The institution of marriage reinforces these gender roles. The marriage ceremony usually consists of bride price, in which the husband compensates a woman’s father for taking a “domestic worker.”4 The woman’s duty is to cook and take care of her husband and the children. A married woman is also expected to provide a male heir. As mentioned above, the rigidity of these norms is reflective of each individual society; in some societies women have the opportunity to work as traders and control their own businesses.5 In more rigid societies, however, such privileges are reserved for men.6 In these societies, women can gain access to these privileges through assuming
a designated role in the community such as that of a “female husband,” “male daughter,” or “sworn virgin.”

Although patriarchal in nature, the institutions of marriage in Northern Albania and in Eastern and Western Africa hold inherent differences, which have shaped the distinctions of these social constructions. Northern Albanians are traditionally monogamous and do not allow men to be simultaneously married to more than one wife; in contrast, the Igbo, Nandi, and Kikuyu societies practice polygamy. This undoubtedly affects the construction of female husbands, male daughters, and sworn virgins.

Among the Igbo of Eastern Africa and Kikuyu of Kenya, women who have the means to pay the bride price for a woman, can legally marry a wife and assume the role of female husband and head of the household within that marriage. Woman-woman marriages observe the same ceremonial traditions as woman-man marriages. Female husbands may already be married to either a man or woman and may marry if they have the financial ability to pay another bride price for another woman. The female husband and the wife choose a consort for the wife. All children born by the wife are legally the children of the female husband. The male consort that is chosen for the wife must take an “oath declaring that their relationship would not threaten the woman-marriage and the lover would not run away with her.”

Among the Igbo of Western Africa and the Nandi of Eastern Africa, the social phenomenon of male daughters exists. In a family that lacks a male heir, the youngest daughter may be declared a male daughter and assume the same role as that of a male heir. This is done through rituals, designating the male daughter’s legitimate claim to the family’s inheritance. This also ensures that patrilineal and patrilocal traditions are not challenged and the socio-economic stability of that family is maintained. If an heirless family loses its patriarch, that family is left to the mercy of paternal male kin members or possibly a male family member that has been married into this particular kinship group. These male outsiders could assume control of the family’s property and/or business, essentially leaving the wife/wives and children of the deceased patriarch homeless and destitute.

In Northern Albania among the Gheg, there exists the institution of sworn virgins. Like male daughters, sworn virgins assume the male role of head of household when a family lacks a male heir. Through oaths and rituals, the woman must swear she will not have relations with either a man or a woman and must thereafter completely adopt a male identity to the fullest extent in both public and private life. Sworn virgins must look like men, cutting their hair and dressing as men do, as well as behaving like men in every social interaction, whether it is a public or private affair. They sit amongst, work alongside, and associate only with men. Even in her own household, relatives will treat a sworn virgin as if she were a male in the family.

The institution of male daughters and sworn virgins are similar in that the woman attains the role of a male inheritor; but there are still major
differences between the two. Sworn virgins are strictly prohibited from having any sexual relations with anyone. The Gheg society has strict and rigid social rules that sanction such prohibitions. The legal code followed by the Gheg’s, the “Kanun I Lek Dukagjinit,” is extremely hard on women. According to the law a woman is seen as “a sack, made to endure.” Her sole purpose in society is to provide a kinship unit with children and labor. Whereas, male daughters in African societies such as the Igbo of Nigeria are allowed to have a lover and give birth to children that belong to the female husband’s paternal lineage. Male daughters may later become female husbands, further ensuring the security of the father’s property.

AUTONOMY AND GENDER MANIPULATING INSTITUTIONS

Scholars have not seriously addressed the role of sexuality in gender manipulating institutions. Some feminists have used woman-woman marriages to support arguments concerning lesbianism, while others such as Ifi Amadiume strongly disapprove of this. Sexuality has been intentionally excluded from this chapter because culture and gender ideologies must be thoroughly understood before making assumptions concerning sexuality. The rigidity or flexibility of gender roles and relationships and the nature and purpose of these institutions must be fully understood and taken into account when arguing for pro-feminism or pro-lesbianism.

Autonomy is another facet of the discussion on gender manipulating institutions. Through each of these social constructions—female husbands, male daughters, and sworn virgins—women are only gaining autonomy through assuming a male social role. These institutions were created to maintain stability and maintain the patriarchal structure of society. Therefore, all issues that lead to problems are settled by creating a way for women to fulfill a male role, while not contradicting the nature of their society.

In addition to understanding the nature of these institutions, it is also important to understand the nature of the conceptual understanding of terms such as marriage, husband, and wife. Njambi and O’Brien argue that the connection between the role of husband and male is western in origin and scholars that use this as a basis for understanding marriage and gender relations are imposing the ideologies of one society upon another. Each society is unique and maintains a particular set of gender ideologies, which reflects the degree of autonomy of an individual. Scholars such as Njambi and O’Brien have deemed the use of the term “husband” in describing female husbands as an imposition of western ideology. Additionally, Njambi and O’Brien argue that the term “female husband” does an injustice to the egalitarian relationship within a woman-woman marriage.
The Igbo of Western Africa

The Igbo peoples of southeastern Nigeria have flexible gender ideologies, compared to other patriarchal communities. Conceptualizations and definitions of “man” and “woman” are not strictly connected with notions of gender. The Igbo also have a flexible system of living patterns and kinship descent. They follow dual descent kinship laws that recognize matrilineal heritage. The Igbo also use a genderless expression to identify the head of household. The flexibility of Igbo gender ideologies was prevalent on arrival of European colonizers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, where it was described as adhering to a “dual sex political system.” Under this social and political organization, agricultural land followed matrilineal descent, while residential property followed patrilineal descent.

The Nandi of Eastern Africa

The Nandi, from present-day Kenya, have a more rigid patriarchal society than the Igbo or the Kikuyu. The Nandi are both patrilineal and patrilocal. Traditionally, a daughter cannot inherit property, thus a family lacking a male heir could resort to one of three options. Firstly, adoption is possible, however finding a son may be both costly and difficult; there is also an additional risk of the child not living to reach adulthood. Secondly, “marrying the house,” or otherwise referred to as selecting the youngest daughter to be a male daughter. In this case the male daughter could have children with a selected sexual partner and the children she bears will belong to the mother’s paternal lineage and serve as their male heir. Thirdly, a wife may participate in a woman-woman marriage, where she will be able to use her wife as a vessel for bringing more children into her husband’s family. The Nandi women that participate in woman-woman marriages essentially become men and may even have to “adopt some extent of male dress.” The female husband must also end any sexual relations, possibly because if a female husband became pregnant the “issue of inheritance and the issue of their roles as men would be thrown into confusion.” Among the Nandi, female husbands are observed most clearly in contexts that involve inheritance and property rights. Their social roles and conceptions reflect the inflexible gender ideologies of the Nandi.

Kikuyu of Eastern Africa

The Kikuyu, also from present-day Kenya, make up the largest ethnic group withing Kenya. Their conception of woman-woman marriage is more similar to that of the Igbo in western Africa rather than that of the Nandi, in regards to the flexibility of gender roles and relationships. Kikuyu female husbands do not have to assume a male role or identity.
Njambi and O’Brien discuss that woman-woman marriage in the Kikuyu society are a “flexible option available to women within which they may pursue any number of interests: political, social, economic, and personal.”

A Kikuyu woman-woman marriage would be legitimized through traditional sources and customs. As well, through the work of Njambi and O’Brien, some women involved in woman-woman marriages voice their desires and happiness with their independence and egalitarian sentiments. These women view participating in woman-woman marriages as having more freedom because they are not being controlled or subjected to a social position where they are subservient to a man. The wives of female husbands express content in living without a man and explain that they maintain relationships with men only for pleasure or procreation. They explain that they have become independent by no longer relying on men and that they are part of a marriage that is based on respect and equality.

MOTIVES OF FEMALE HUSBANDRY

Exact motives driving woman-woman marriages are unclear. Although there are several reasons attributed to motivating woman-woman marriages, most scholars agree that the driving motive is functional, to attain a male heir. In traditional societies around the world, wives have essentially been considered capital. Women are used to provide their husbands with productive and reproductive resources, offering their labor and ability to procreate. Others reject the argument that marriage was intended for socio-economic purposes. However, traditional societies that rely on the kinship networks for socio-economic purposes utilize marriage as a tool. Those who criticize the functionalist purposes of woman-woman marriage argue that more complex personal and emotional reasons drive women to participate in such an institution. Hopefully there do exist emotional motives that ultimately lead to the happy union between any two people, and admittedly, their personal reasoning to willingly join a woman-woman marriage will be complex. However, historically and socially, there is much more to woman-woman marriage than complex emotional and personal reasons. Igbo female husbands who have no children have the potential to achieve the social position of dike nwami, which is traditionally considered one of a heroine or warrior woman. A dike nwami would be entitled to much more land than a female husband.

Although functional motives are not exclusively the factors that drive woman-woman marriages, they are the most prominent. Emphasizing the role of emotional and personal reasons creates an inaccurate historical portrayal of woman-woman marriages. As well, traditional pre-colonial and more recent post-colonial woman-woman marriages may have very different motives. Women who are currently involved in woman-woman marriages may find personal preferences, independence, and equality as
their motives. However this is not necessarily the case with women who participated in woman-woman marriages before colonization, which was a time where dependence on kinship networks was crucial to survival. In this setting, socio-economic motives can be seen as the strongest motivator behind woman-woman marriages.

According to Jean Cadigan, a woman may become a female husband if she is in one of the following three circumstances: first, is barren or a widow who is marrying another woman in order to have an heir and/or children; second, is rich and is marrying a woman to gain prestige and wealth; and third, in cases where a women has a right to a daughter-in-law and thus marries a woman to a non-existent son. Under all of these circumstances, the woman-woman marriage serves a functionalist purpose and manipulates the social institution of marriage and gender roles in order to satisfy socio-economic needs. In societies that are dependent on the productivity of the kinship unit, a woman’s fertility is crucial. Barren women are seen as social failures because they cannot fulfill their duty of procreation. In addition, a woman with no children has no claim to her husband’s property and may be forced to leave after his death. To stabilize and increase her socio-economic status, a barren woman may be motivated to enter a woman-woman marriage by becoming a “female husband.” Children born to the wife of a female husband would become the legal children of the female husband; the biological father has no legal claim to the children. If the female husband was a barren woman already married to a man, the consort chosen for her wife would most likely be a kin member of her husband’s family. The children born in the woman-woman marriage can then be part of her male husband’s kinship network. Thus the barren wife would be able to fulfill her duty of providing her husband with a male heir. Among the Kikuyu, a widowed woman may become a female husband and use her children from a woman-woman marriage to add members to her deceased husband’s lineage. This is done so the widow can either gain social respect in the family and/or solidify her claims to property. In other cases, a barren woman who is not married to a male can utilize the woman-woman marriage to expand her own kinship group. These children would then be part of her paternal kinship network; this works along the lines of the social construction of male daughters.

Wealthy women are another subgroup of women that may initiate woman-woman marriages. Just as with men, “the accumulation of wives, the acquisition of wealth, and the resultant exercise of power and authority” was something attainable for female husbands. This motive is most prevalent among West African societies where women have historically had greater economic opportunities working as traders. Wealthy Igbo women could free themselves from domestic responsibilities by marrying a wife who would fulfill those duties for her. Women who worked as traders would have the freedom to continue working and maintaining their own businesses without being hindered by domestic obligations. In addition
female husbands, just as male husbands, would have access to a stable labor force, in their wives and children.

The third circumstance discussed by Cadigan is a woman exercising her right to have a daughter-in-law. In this type of woman-woman marriage, the relationship between the women is more similar to that of a mother-in-law/daughter-in-law rather than a female husband/wife. Under these circumstances the woman pays a bride-price for a daughter-in-law to marry a nonexistent son. The purpose of doing so would be to gain social respect that she would be otherwise denied because she does not have a son. She would be able to attain the social status and prestige that comes with being a grandmother, as well as assuming the role of head of household and having grandchildren as heirs. In addition to having heirs, the mother-in-law will also have labor assistance for domestic and farm duties.

THE INSTITUTION OF MALE DAUGHTERS

In addition to woman-woman marriages, the societies of the Igbo, Nandi, and Kikuyu also have an institution known as male daughters. In order not to lose his property to other male kin members, a man that does not have any male heirs may select a daughter to have the legal rights of a son. Through this institution, as well as that of woman-woman marriage, customs of patrilineal descent and patrilocal residence would not be violated, and social stability would be maintained. Similar to the relationship between a female husband’s wife and a consort, the lover of a male daughter had to take an oath promising he would not run away with her, which could potentially lead to confusion. A male daughter did not necessarily have to become a female husband. The institution of male daughters is strictly intended to address inheritance problems.

The woman-woman marriage system and the Igbo institution of male daughters differ from other societies particularly because of their unique understanding of gender roles and relationships. Igbo women have had the opportunity to work as traders, earning themselves some extent of financial support. Igbo women who needed to provide heirs for their families or needed another woman for domestic labor were thus able to afford a bride-price. Among the Igbo, female husbands were usually childless women, wealthy women, and male daughters. According to Amadiume, female husbands were not expected to behave or dress like men as the female husbands of other societies, such as the Nandi of Kenya.

Male daughters legally assume the role of a son, the extent of assuming this role is also reflective of the flexibility of gender roles in that respective society. Similar to the institution of male daughters, the institution of sworn virgins in northern Albania also addressed inheritance problems, albeit to a much greater extent.
THE GHEG OF NORTHERN ALBANIA AND SWORN VIRGINS

Gheg society in northern Albania follows extremely rigid gender ideologies. According to the most widely used set of traditional laws, the *Kanun I Lekë Dukagjinit*, a woman is described as a sack made to endure. Gheg society is both patrilineal and patrilocal. A woman who marries into a family is never fully conceptualized as a member of her husband’s clan. She does not have any rights over children or property. A woman must remain subservient to her parents, her husband, and her husband’s family. Traditionally, marriages were arranged. If an engagement or a marriage was broken a blood feud may be invoked between the two families involved and both would face some degree of social disgrace, the greater of which would be felt by the family of the woman. Polygamy among the Gheg is not very common. The only occasion when a man may have more than one wife is: if he had a leviratic wife, where he marries the wife of his deceased brother; if the first wife is barren; and/or if the Gheg is a religious Muslim that has the wealth and status to support another wife. Traditionally among the Gheg, women are seen as valuable in society primarily because of their ability to “increase the number of males in a clan.” Women did not have any rights of inheritance, unless they became a sworn virgin and socially accepted as a man.

Becoming a sworn virgin meant that a woman could gain inheritance rights, own property, participate in blood feuds, carry a weapon, and move about freely. She must, however, assume a male identity in its fullest extent. She is required to cut her hair, dress, behave, and work as a man. She must completely deny her womanhood in every way. The sworn virgin is also required to swear a life of celibacy in front of the town elders. Oaths among Albanians are held to with the utmost priority and seriousness. Any oath that was given and later broken may be punishable by death and the entire clan of a person who breaks an oath will face disgrace that usually lasts for up to seven generations. In addition, female chastity was highly valued and directly associated with family honor. The legal rights of a sworn virgin were dependent on the *Kanun* governing the respective region. There are six different *Kanuns* that are known to govern Albanians. All have been orally passed down from as far back as the fifteenth century and were written down at various points in history. The *Kanun I Lekë Dukagjinit* and the *Kanun I Skënderbeut* have been used by northern Ghegs. They are very similar, although there are some notable differences concerning the rights of a sworn virgin. *Kanun I Lekë Dukagjinit* is the most popular among the mountainous areas of what are now parts of Northern Albania, Montenegro, Kosova, and Macedonia. The *Kanun I Skënderbeut* has served as the canon for Gheg Albanians in Northern and Central Albania and parts of Macedonia. The rights of a sworn virgin are relative to the gender ideologies of each region. According to the *Kanun I Lekë Dukagjinit*, sworn virgins “are not distinguished from other women,
except that they are free to associate with men, although they have no right to a voice in the assembly.”46 The Kanun I Skënderbeut grants more political power to sworn virgins, and socially sees her as a man and the head of the household.47

Motives of Sworn Virgins

There are three motives that drive women to become sworn virgins in this context. First is that their family lacks a male heir. Under this circumstance, a woman may become a sworn virgin upon the death of her father. A family with no male to assume control faced social humiliation and was usually brought under the household of an extended male family member from the paternal kinship network. In addition, a women may choose this path if her family has no surviving males as a result of a blood feud. Blood feuds are institutionalized in the Kanuns and revenge is just as directly linked with honor as chastity is.48 If a woman finds that all her brothers have been killed, she may become a sworn virgin to be able to participate in the blood feud and honor their deaths by killing their murderers.

The second reason a woman may choose to become a sworn virgin is if she is unhappy with her arranged marriage. The only honorable way a woman may break up her arranged betrothal is if she lives life as a man and vows to remain chaste. However, it should be noted that her decision to break up her engagement may incite a blood feud between the families. The third reason a woman may choose to become a sworn virgin is if it was a path she wanted for herself. These sworn virgins want to live independent lives, without the social restrictions of being a woman.

Antonia Young has completed extensive work on sworn virgins. According to Young, the three types of sworn virgins are: 1) those that become sworn virgins in childhood or at birth, this is usually decided upon by the family; 2) after puberty, this is usually a decision made by a woman who wants to avoid entering an arranged marriage; 3) for semi-religious reasons, these are women who want to live and move about freely, as well as women who become nuns. Similar to the women who participate in woman-woman marriages, Young’s analysis of motives driving sworn virgins encompasses both functional and emotional/personal motives.49

The women who participate in these gender anomalous roles that manipulate traditional gender relationships and institutions all do so for various reasons. However, regardless of what their motives were, these women face both liberating and restrictive consequences. Many see male daughters and woman-woman marriages in Western and Eastern Africa as a strategy used by women to seek status and power and sworn virginity among the Gheg as a “progressive” institution in a time before feminism.50 Through these institutions women were able to gain access to property rights, economic opportunities, and social prestige. They were able to inherit land, maintain their businesses and wealth independently from a male husband, and gain
the social renown of having children, a stable marriage, property rights, and social and/or political representation of their families.

MODERN DAY IGBO PERSPECTIVES

Interestingly, modern day attitudes toward these institutions vary. It is understood and accepted within the community that male daughters exist to carry on the family name and lineage, while female husbands “gain power and status in society” by having a wife to bear them children. Although these institutions are seen as being used to provide social harmony by perpetuating patrilineal lineage when there are no male children, Igbo women have a unique analysis on the institutions of male daughters and female husbands. Two interviewed Igbo women emphasized the fact that “women who marry female husbands lose respect and dignity.” Female husbands tend to marry two types of women: pregnant girls that are not married and poor girls.

Women lose respect from their community when they are pregnant and unmarried. Both Igbo women expressed the notion that these women become “social outcasts” in the community. Women who marry female husbands do not participate in annual community marital celebrations, nor are they buried within the town after death, as heterosexually married women would.

Men and women within each community analyze and approach these institutions differently. Perhaps future research should analyze gender attitudes and understandings of these roles, because to truly understand these institutions and their impact on society we must understand how each gender within the society interacts and reacts with these institutions.

CONCLUSION

The extent of the opportunities and liberations experienced by women who participated in any one of the gender manipulating institutions vary in reflection of the flexibility or rigidity of the gender ideologies held within their respective society. Societies such as the Igbo and Kikuyu granted women more opportunities politically, socially, and economically due to the flexibility of their gender ideologies. In contrast, the Nandi and Gheg are traditionally more rigid. The women who participate in gender manipulating institutions in these societies reap fewer benefits than their counterparts in other societies, in addition to being forced to assume a stronger male identity.

Gender roles are manipulated to address social issues and ensure societal and cultural continuity. As stated by Greene “adaptability ensured perpetuity.” By adapting gender roles to social needs, rules of succession
and descent were not challenged. There was no social confusion or instability. Male daughters and female husbands guaranteed the continuation of paternal lineage. Female husbands that were wealthy and politically important managed to maintain their wealth and status by assuming a dominant male role in marriage and being provided children as heirs. Women, especially among the Igbo who do not have a direct correlation between gender roles and biological gender, have been able to succeed from woman-woman marriages.\textsuperscript{57} The women that occupied the roles of male daughter and female husband were able to “occupy roles and positions usually monopolized by men, and thereby exercise considerable power and authority over both men and women.”\textsuperscript{58}

Considering the institution of woman-woman marriage, the female husband technically fulfills the same position of authority over her wife as a male husband would.\textsuperscript{59} The degree of achievement women made through this institution is therefore questionable. Amadiume describes the institutions of woman-woman marriage and male daughters as “pro-female” because it provides women with rights that are otherwise denied to them.\textsuperscript{60} This may be so, yet the role the women are fulfilling, the manner in which they are achieving those rights and privileges that are typically denied them, is by assuming a male social role. Only through a woman assuming a male social role are customs of descent, inheritance, and residence maintained. Even when a female husband bequeaths property to the next generation, she is assuming the role of paternal father and inheritance is followed patrilineally. It is thus clear that the construction of institutions such as female husbands, male daughters, and sworn virgins do not challenge patriarchal norms of their respective societies. How then can it be seen as empowering women? Do women as a whole group benefit from these institutions? The answer is no, they do not.

Although these women gained much, their successes were equally limited and restricted because they were done so in a manner that did not challenge patriarchal structures. The women who assumed the role of female husband, male daughter, or sworn virgin attained rights and privileges that would otherwise be denied to them or any other woman only through assuming a male social role; the extent of which they had to embody the male role is relative of the society’s gender ideologies. However it is still embodying a male role regardless of its degree. The Igbo and Kikuyu are more flexible socially, so female husbands and male daughters do not have to embody male characteristics to the extreme extents of women in similar institutions among the Nandi and Gheg. Among the Igbo we see that a female husband may still be married to her male husband and does not face any sexual restrictions. The Gheg on the other hand, require a sworn virgin to completely adopt a male role in almost all aspects.

The institution of woman-woman marriage can even be seen as having a negative influence on women as a whole. This is because within the demographic population of women a female hierarchy is created. Female
husbands have the same degree of authority and control over their wives as men do. Thus there are only a selected few that are gaining privileges, while keeping the majority of women in lower social standing. There are some scholars that argue the wives of female husbands benefit from having a more sympathetic husband in their female husband and have easier lives. It would seem true that a woman who has had experiences as a woman would be more sympathetic; however this does not challenge patriarchal attitudes and social norms. In fact in West African situations where a woman was politically important, her childlessness only enhanced her position. “Marrying a man and having biological children undermined a woman’s position as a chief or religious leader.”61 Thus any circumstance that takes her away from her femininity, or female role, brings a woman further opportunities and social standing.

It is similar with sworn virgins among the Gheg. These women only gain rights and respect through denouncing their femininity in every aspect. These women must assume masculinity physically and socially, in their behavior and demeanor. By doing so, sworn virgins completely dissociate themselves with the general female population. This only reinforces patriarchal notions.

Nothing is being changed through these institutions. They are simply adaptive institutions that perpetuate a patriarchal society. They work within the system in which they were created, not against it. It would then be fair to state that individual women who assumed the role of female husband, male daughter, or sworn virgin benefited from these institutions by having an option where they can “pursue any number of interests: political, social, economic, and personal,”62 however not women as a whole. The patriarchal societies of the Igbo, Nandi, Kikuyu, and Gheg were adaptive in addressing issues where confusion and instability may arise. They created the opportunity for some women to choose an alternate path, albeit a path that was intended to benefit the men of society. Through each of these institutions men were able to legitimize male heirs patrilineally.

The existence of social anomalies, such as female husbands, male daughters, and sworn virgins, is evidence of the manipulation of gender roles and social institutions in society. It does not change the fact that power within these societies is distinctly identified as male, and thus they had to assume male roles in order to achieve the privileges they did. Some women did benefit from these institutions. Women had access to political, economic, and social opportunities that are typically reserved only for men. Some wives of female husbands lead more pleasant lives than their fellow women who married men. However men seem to have benefited the most from these institutions. They were able to have access to heirs when they otherwise would not have had, and did so in a manner that reinforced patriarchal concepts and rule. Recent studies indicate that all of these institutions have been notably declining. Through the standards set by the Western world, women have been gaining social, political, and economic rights around the
world. However it should be recognized that within traditional patriarchal societies, some women did what they could to succeed, regardless of the reason, even if it meant denying their femininity and womanhood.

NOTES

3. Scholars such as Ifi Amadiume and Jean Cadigan have suggested that through these institutions women assume greater autonomy in society. Amadiume, *Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society* (London: Zed Books, 1987).
4. A ritual or formality in these patriarchal societies is the payment of the bride price or bridewealth. This is the payment of an agreed upon amount of goods or services from the groom’s family to the bride’s family. This is expected to compensate the bride and her family for her leaving, and thus her family having one less laborer. In addition among the Gheg, a set amount would belong to the bride herself. Among all the societies that include bride price as a marital ritual, young men are limited in the sense that they cannot marry unless they can afford to pay a bride price, thus their connection and dependency upon the family patriarch to help support them is intensified. For further discussion on bride price in Africa see: Kirk Arden Hoppe, “Gender in African History,” in *Africa*, vol. 3, *Colonial Africa, 1885–1939*, ed. Toyin Falola (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 224. For further discussion on bride price in Albania see: Shjtëfën Gjeçov, *Kanuni I Lëk Dukagjinit* (New York: Gjonlekaj Publishing Company, 1989), bk. 3, chap.19; or Ian Whitaker, “A Sack For Carrying Things: The Traditional Role of Women in Northern Albanian Society,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (Jul., 1981): 152.
5. Igbo women have had a notable economic impact as market women both prior to and during colonialism. Market women organized their own networks and played large roles in the production and marketing of staple goods such as Taro root, palm oil, and cassava. In response to colonial taxation policies in the 1920s and 1930s, southern Nigerian market women organized a Woman’s War. See Hoppe, “Gender in African History,” 236.
6. The use of the term rigid society refers to the notion that there is little flexibility and limited rights of women. Societies such as the Nandi and Gheg are patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal. Women in these societies have very little economic opportunities or independence as in other societies, specifically the Igbo where women have had a history of economic opportunities and success. These rigid societies tend to be more defined in gender roles and duties. For further discussion on the rigidity of gender positions and roles among the Nandi see: Regina Smith Oboler, “Is the Female Husband a Man? Woman/Woman Marriage Among the Nandi of Kenya,” *Ethnology* 19, no. 1 (Jan., 1980): 70–74; Among the Gheg see: Gjeçov, *Kanun I Lëk Dukagjinit*, bk. 2, chap. 9; Ifi Amadiume also discusses the issue of rigidity in her book *Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society* (London: Zed Books, 1987).
7. Polygamy is directly tied to the accumulation of wives, wealth, authority, and power. For more information on polygamy among the Igbo and Kikuyu see Amadiume, Male Daughters, Female Husbands, 42; and Hoppe “Gender in African History,” 225. Even among the Gheg, although traditionally monogamous, the concept of marriage is based around the husband purchasing a woman’s labor and cohabitation, therefore defining marriage within a functional perspective, for this see Gjeçov, Kanun I Lëk Dukagjinit, bk. 3, chap. 27, 38.


14. Historically, women among the Igbo have had the opportunity to work as traders and market women. See Hoppe, “Gender in African History,” 236.


17. Ibid., 404.

18. Oboler, “Is the Female Husband a Man?”, 75.

19. Ibid., 74.


22. Both the Kikuyu and the Igbo are more flexible with regard to women’s opportunities in society than their Nandi and Gheg counterparts. See note 6.


24. Ibid., 7.

25. Scholars who argue that the attainment of a male heir is the driving motive behind woman-woman marriages include: Oboler, “Is the Female-Husband a Man?”; Greene, “Institution of Woman-Marriage in Africa”; and R. Jean Cadigan, “Woman-to-Woman Marriage.”

26. Extracting sentimental notions from the concept of marriage, it is understood that marriage serves as a functional institution used to maintain stability and preserve a society. Using this analysis of marriage, women can thus
be seen as a form of capital—an asset to a person, family, or community. The
functional role of women in these societies is crucial because they provide
labor and offer the ability to reproduce, which increases the amount of labor-
ers within a community or family.
28. Njambi and O’Brien argue that the personal and emotional motives of wom-
an-woman marriages have not been explored.
31. Ibid., 92
35. Ibid., 404.
36. Amadiuume, Male Daughters, Female Husbands, 185.
37. Gjeçov, Kanuni I Lëkë Dukagjinit, bk. 3, chap 34, 44.
38. For the rights and obligations of the mistress of the house see Gjeçov, Kanuni
I Lëkë Dukagjinit, bk. 3, chap. 22, 16.
39. Arranged marriages are written and described in the Kanun; the time frame
of this practice among Ghegs is reflective of each familial and regional expe-
rience. Typically, the collapse of Enver Hoxha’s Communist regime marks
a period of modernization among Albanian’s within Albania and diaspora.
It is this period of modernization, in the early 1990s, that it can be said
arranged marriages are no longer widely practiced.
40. Whitaker, “‘A Sack For Carrying Things,’” 152.
41. Ibid., 151.
42. Zumbrum, “The Sacrifices of Albania’s ‘Sworn Virgins,’” 2.
43. Ibid.
44. For more information about Albanian oaths and the penalties for false oaths
see: Gjeçov, Kanun I Lëk Dukagjinit, bk. 7, chap. 95, p. 126.
45. Whitaker, “‘A Sack For Carrying Things,’” 149.
46. Gjeçov, Kanuni I Lëkë Dukagjinit, bk. 12, chap. 23, p. 216.
47. Antonia Young, Women Who Become Men: Albanian Sworn Virgins (New
York: Berg, 1987), 42.
48. Whitaker, “‘A Sack For Carrying Things,’” 149; Gjeçov, Kanuni I Lëk Duk-
agjinit, bk. 10, chap. 22, p. 162–186
49. Young, Women Who Become Men.
50. Hoppe “Gender in African History,” 226; Zumbrum, “The Sacrifices of
Albania’s ‘Sworn Virgins,’” 1.
September 7, 2011.
52. Ebisike, Marachi. Interview by Fiosa Begai Mjeshtri. Electronic interview.
September 23, 2011.
53. Agu, Mary. Interview conducted by Fiosa Begai Mjeshtri. Personal interview.
Staten Island, New York, September, 13 2011.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
57. Amadiuume, Male Daughters, Female Husbands, 15.
58. Ibid, 40.
59. Oboler, “Is the Female Husband a Man?” 78.
60. Amadiuume, Male Daughters, Female Husbands, 193.
NEW FOCI, NEW APPROACHES

In recent decades, Brazilian historiographic productions about slavery have been punctuated by a series of new studies, seeking to consider and recover the constitution of families within Brazil’s enslaved population. This theme, although not extensively explored until the second half of the 1970s, has always been controversial, given discussions about the importance and even the existence of families among the captive population.

Debates in the 1980s led to criticism of the “patriarchal family” concept formulated by Gilberto Freyre in The Masters and the Slaves (Casa grande e senzala), which was conceived as the predominant model in Brazilian society and which had, until that point, dominated literature on this subject. These criticisms questioned the generalization of this model as the family structure for all the diverse regions in the country, particularly outside the sugar-cane plantation areas—the principal setting for Freyre’s studies.

An important contribution to this debate came from the formulations of the anthropologist Mariza Corrêa, who acknowledged the existence and importance of the “patriarchal family,” but posited that it did not exist on its own, nor did it dominate the formulation of Brazilian society. Therefore, there is evidence of the need to investigate the forms of family life experienced concretely and on a daily basis by various sectors of the population and not only those of the agrarian elites, who were the leading proponents of the principal family model around which all others revolved.

New approaches to the “slave family” have also emerged as part of this discussion. Studies about the family constitution of the enslaved Black population were essential to the wider context of recovering slaves as the subject of history. Here we also note contributions made as a result of advances in demographic and social history, extending the possibilities for analysis by consulting new and varied sources, which have supported new approaches.

We should also mention the importance of repercussions in Brazil, which resulted from studies conducted about slavery in the south of the United States and the Caribbean during the 1970s. These studies promoted a vigorous debate about the Black family during slavery and post-abolition...
Isabel Cristina Ferreira dos Reis

in the sphere of North American historiography. One of the significant questions contested the idea that unions between slaves were dominated by instability, lack of autonomy, illegitimacy, and promiscuity. Thus, the need for new investigations and a review of studies on this theme emerged.4

In parallel to these North American historiographic production trends, a lot of criticism had been leveled at studies on slavery up to that period in Brazil, particularly at those which made reference to the family or family life of enslaved Black people. These studies and traditional North American historiography, although not embracing the idea of the nonexistence of families amongst the enslaved, emphasized the absence of significant kinship ties amongst the captive population.

The new vision of the subject also recognized the pressure slavery put on Black people's family life during the slave period, but did not deny it outright. Robert Slenes, in an important assessment of Brazilian historiographic production on this theme, cautions that reports of White observers, particularly those of foreign travelers from the last century found in most history books, create an image of debauchery that characterizes slaves' sexual behavior and family life. Slenes also notes that the racism, cultural prejudice, and Western ideological aspects of works from the period predispose European and Brazilian observers to see Black people—who apparently did not follow the same rules in their private lives—as lawless. The author suggests that, from a White point of view, it is possible to recover a Black home life consistent with the new demographic data that forms the principal foundation of recent studies about the “slave family.”5

Following the initiation of the phase contesting the old thesis about the nonexistence of family units among the captive population, a discussion began about the limitations involved in its existence and its forms and strategies for survival. An important fact to note is the huge gap in approaches to the theme that considers the three first centuries of Brazilian slavery, because most of these approaches were applied to the nineteenth century, a period that refers to the last decades of the slave system and ignores almost three entire centuries of Black slavery in the country.

Recent studies about the “slave family” take into account regional and local specificities in respect of the density of the utilization of the slave workforce, the type of economic activities undertaken, the size and demographic profile of the slaves (birth rates, mortality rates, number of males, Africanness, etc.), among other variables. At the same time, a range of sources have been utilized, often in a combination that reflects new trends in historical research, the most common being: iconography, works of fiction, travelers’ reports, legislation from the period, wills, inventories, lists of registered slaves, lists of slaves to be freed by the Emancipation Fund,6 ecclesiastical records (baptisms, marriages, and deaths), newspaper advertisements, criminal proceedings, and freedom lawsuits. These sources, cross-referenced with equally diverse methodological procedures, have contributed to improved in-depth analysis. Emphasis on this combination has
become increasingly important, particularly to form a basis for the study of social history which favors an understanding of the meanings that Black people conferred on their own experiences.

Criminal proceedings and freedom lawsuits are “dense” qualitative documents, generally containing detailed information, which allows one to monitor reports/histories. As well as revealing indices of Black family ties, these may also provide information for the construction of approaches that present historical subjects who, despite the situation of subjugation in which they find themselves, have projects and aspirations and move to break down the barriers that limit their existence. This strategy to construct the object of research may be found, for example, in the work of Sidney Chalhoub on slaves from Rio de Janeiro in the final decades before abolition.7

Dense qualitative sources may be cross-referenced with others of a descriptive nature, for example, in notebooks, wills, and post mortem inventories of the owners or ex-owners of those involved in these cases, as well as census, financial, and ecclesiastical sources, such as registration lists, records of births, marriages, etc. The “method of the nominative connection of sources,” suggested by micro-history, was the procedure successfully utilized by Regina Xavier in her study of those freed from Campinas in the second half of the nineteenth century; it was also used by Robert Slenes, when he weaved together a network of real links between various types of sources—qualitative and quantitative—in order to follow the trajectories of certain characters in a study about relationships of subjugation in western Sao Paulo.8

Research has revealed that, despite obstacles to prevent slaves from forming a family, not only did the family exist, but it often also experienced a certain amount of stability over time and was an important institution for slaves and owners alike. Therefore, it is also possible to detail a great many aspects of the family life of Black slaves, the free and freed.

In terms of the question of the legitimacy of matrimonial unions between the enslaved, free, and freed, one can see that marriages were much more frequent than previously supposed and preferences can be observed in the choice of marriage partners that indicated a trend for endogamy by color, ethnic origin, legal status, the age group of the betrothed, and their occupation, amongst other aspects. In this sense, studies conducted over the last three decades have made important contributions through more sophisticated quantitative analyses that allow us to better understand and tackle different realities.9

Today the consensus is that the slave family was not necessarily based on legal marriage. It is worth noting, however, that in no way do the low indices of legitimate unions among the Black population disqualify their experience of family life. There is plenty of evidence of the importance attributed by Blacks of differing legal statuses to their family relationships and kinship ties, independent of whether the family was constituted through Catholic or consensual marriage, a nuclear or partial family. Furthermore,
Isabel Cristina Ferreira dos Reis

historians going beyond an analysis of the nuclear and legitimate family have, to some extent, observed the extended relationships between slaves by analyzing their wider kinship and godparent-godchild ties, suggesting that it was possible to promulgate diverse patterns of family life and kinship networks within Black communities in the slave context.10

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE RE-CREATION OF AFRICAN NOTIONS OF FAMILY AND KINSHIP TIES

There are other open questions in literature about Black families, some of which may give rise to possibilities for research, which as yet are little explored. Although some authors admit the possibility of the existence of a slave family different from the patterns prevalent in the world of the owners, particularly of the possible influence of diverse African cultures—thus signaling the complexity of this theme—most take the nuclear and monogamous family as their model.11 These authors almost always developed their analyses around data that refers to matrimonial relationships sanctioned by the Catholic Church, the so-called “legitimate unions.” There is a need for a more in-depth exploration of the family, affective and kinship relationships that are at the margin of the patterns established by society at the time.

In this sense, the question of the re-creation of the pattern of family life between Blacks during the slavery period may be evidenced in various forms of symbolic or ritual kinship that go beyond godparent-godchild relationships, such as the “familias-de-santo,”12 the Black religious sisterhoods, ethnic groups (nations), and “kinship ties” forged along the trafficking routes, such as the malungo.13 Black people used these relationships, as well as their extended family,14 in order to coordinate a solidarity network that afforded them greater shelter, particularly given that the immediate blood family was permanently under the threat of separation.15 When thinking about these relationship strategies, an in-depth discussion on the extent to which these were conceived through African cultural matrixes would be beneficial, paying specific attention to African family/kinship meanings and how these were transformed over the century, particularly after the definitive end of the slave trade in 1850, when the captive population began a rapid creolization process.16 The historiography of slavery in the U.S. has already produced works of an anthropological nature regarding the settled Black family in specifically African and duly dated discussions on, for example, consensual marriage practices, extended family structures, symbolic kinship, courtship love rituals, naming practices for children, and others.17

Although in Brazil we do not have exceptional sources like those existing in the United States—such as slave narratives, interviews with ex-slaves from the WPA Project,18 among the other sources that, in giving the slave’s version, serve as direct testimony of African kinship notions—we can find some inspiration from this historiographic production. Thus it becomes
possible, for example, to “hear” the voice of the subjects of this history (Black slaves, the free, and freed) in research documentation, particularly in the police interrogations contained in criminal proceedings and in other documents, such as freedom lawsuits, the wills of freed Africans, and even in the scarce documents written by these individuals. However, we need to be clear that, in seeking African meanings in kinship ties, we are not attempting to make an inventory of African survival, but are rather looking for what Sidney Mintz and Richard Price called the “abstract cultural principles” or “underlying principles” present in a range of African cultures, which often serve as a guide to the structures of slave institutions in the “New World,” including the family. 19

We know, for example, that according to the traditions of most African societies one can measure an individual’s wealth by the number of wives he has and that polygamy therefore was an indication of prestige. Furthermore, wives often constituted an important work force. 20 However, in the African-American context, polygamy could not—at least institutionally—exist, because, in addition to the moral values of the Catholic world in defense of the preeminence of the nuclear and monogamous family, the high number of males would have inhibited polygamy. 21 However, this does not mean to say that “extra-officially,” in their day-to-day existence, Africans and Afro-descendants did not cultivate this practice in their family and affective arrangements.

In Katia Mattoso’s opinion, for example, in Brazil, African polygamy was substituted by a succession of temporary connections. 22 Luis Mott, however, in discussing certain aspects of the sex lives of Africans and their descendants in Brazil at the time of slavery (from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries), provided evidence that, despite the purported lack of women in the slave universe and the rigorous penalties applied by the Catholic Church against those who had a second religious marriage when their first spouse was still alive, a number of Black and mixed race Brazilians were reported to, and some were prosecuted by, the Holy Office for involvement in the crime of bigamy. 23 On the other hand, Maria Inês Côrtes de Oliveira mentions the observations made in a will by Ana Maria da Silva Rosa, an African “heathen from Guinea,” revealing her resentment of and the reasons for her separation from her husband, Mathias de Souza, given the fact that he “brought nothing to the partnership, so that, lavishing his goods on his concubines, he could not have been a husband, because there existed a legal sentence of divorce.” 24

In turn, João José Reis observes that, when uprooted, the Nagô Africans were probably not able to transfer the sophisticated cultural marriage protocol of their lands to Brazil. 25 However, it is worth mentioning that, contrary to what Reis appears to suggest, there are some indications that the slave trade did not destroy fundamental African notions of kinship. 26 One indication to this effect, despite the racial and cultural prejudice it contains, may be noted in a passage from an article entitled “The marriage”
published in the Bahian periodical *O Mosaico* in January 1848. This stated that “Africans and savage Americans, to some extent imitating the Mohammedans, also marry many women: they repudiate those that fall from favor, take others, even kill them without this offending the religion they espouse or the public.”

In order to shed a little more light on an approach that still requires further investigation, I will provide some evidence of how polygamous relationships may have been present, principally in the daily life of free or freed Africans and those who possessed a certain amount of wealth. We will see hints, for example, left in the wills of some Africans who, surprisingly, lived surrounded by women. The first character in question is Gil Antonio de Almeida. On preparing his will on September 11, 1869, Gil Antonio says he is a freed man, aged sixty, and professes to “the law of Christ.” The African declares that he is not married but has four children “through human frailty”: three sons with the freed African, Esperança Borges; and a daughter with another freed African, Justina Baptista dos Reis. Gil Antonio recognizes his four children “as from legitimate matrimony,” in order to succeed to his goods as his legitimate heirs. He also mentions that “he has in his company” the freed African Maria Antonia Guimarães, to whom he leaves a “third” for the good services rendered and names his second executor as Joanna Maria Roza, his children’s tutor. Despite the impossibility of disentangling the connections between Gil Antonio, Esperança Borges, Justina Baptista dos Reis, Maria Antonia Guimarães, and Joanna Maria Roza and thus explaining the relationships between them, it is not unreasonable to suppose that this was a polygamous family experience.

Thomé de França’s will was prepared on October 20, 1868, on Caldeireiros street in the village of Pilar, where he lived. Thomé de França declared himself to be a native of the African Coast and the Nagô nation in this document, having been the slave of André de França, who had died long ago and having obtained his liberty by paying the sum of five hundred thousand Reis. Thomé, like Gil Antonio de Almeida, said he was single, Catholic—he was baptized in the Parish Church—and had four Creole children with four African women. One striking fact is that Thomé de França said he had freed the four women who were the mothers of his children. The testator’s wish was that his four children and the mother living with him inherit the “few goods” that he possessed. Thomé de França lived from “businesses” conducted between the provinces of Bahia and Pernambuco and the African Coast, to which he frequently traveled and where he went to die in August 1874.

Next is evidence of a polygamous family experience explicitly manifest in the will of the freed African Joaquim Maia, native of Iquineu, on the African Coast, son of the African Orualará, who was already dead. Joaquim Maia died in 1877 and, unlike his aforementioned countrymen, declared in his will that he professed “the law of Mohammed, in whose faith I have lived and protest to die, despite having been baptized in the
Roman Apostolic Catholic religion." Joaquim Maia then declared that he had been “married” in Lagos by the same “law of Mohammed” to three women, whose marriages did not produce children. However, Joaquim Maia had a fourth relationship in Bahia and provides information regarding the existence of a grandchild, to whom he makes a point of leaving the sum of two hundred thousand Reis.

We thus have indications that Africans, principally those outside captivity and who managed to acquire some wealth, enjoyed the privilege of establishing affective or matrimonial relationships with more than one woman. As Slenes observed, “it is important to remember that African polygyny tended to be a sign of relative wealth; usually only men who have sufficient possessions to sustain a large domestic economy marry more than one woman.” This does not, however, mean that enslaved Africans and Afro-descendants were not also involved in the same practice. One needs to take into account the fact that the vestiges of polygamous relationships are more accessible to the researcher through wills, which are documents only produced by free or freed Blacks who possessed goods.

Through some studies that approach different aspects of African and Afro-Brazilian history and/or culture in Bahia at the time of slavery, we can gather evidence that the existence of certain individuals in Bahian Black communities was not rare; individuals with the recognized authority to act to promote romance, to achieve amorous conquests, even to legitimate matrimonial unions; and everything indicates that this occurred within an Afro-Brazilian conceptualization. We regret the lack of information about the way in which these marriage celebrations took place; celebrations that were certainly non-Catholic or were permeated by “African principles.” Attempting to uncover these ceremonies in African American culture—ceremonies that probably originated not only from a combination of African and European elements, but perhaps also from Amerindian ones—is currently a great challenge.

EXPERIENCES OF BLACK FAMILY LIFE IN BRAZILIAN SLAVE-BASED SOCIETY

We can also observe a near absence of approaches that consider aspects of slaves’ everyday family and affective lives in studies on the “slave family”—studies, for example, which discuss rules of the court, familial sociability, socialization of their children, the rules and rites of social harmony, standards of authority, and survival and resistance strategies, among other themes.

It should also be observed that the studies on the family life of Blacks in slave-based Brazil have concentrated on the rural world, which is justified by the fact that slavery had principally been an agricultural labor regime and, therefore, the great majority of the slave population resided on sugar
Isabel Cristina Ferreira dos Reis

plantations, farms, and small holdings in the countryside. However, Brazil saw large slave-based cities being formed in its territory, with the examples of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Vila Rica, Recife, and Salvador. When analyzing the nineteenth century, slavery in the towns and cities was deeply marked by the “income-producing workers” (i.e., those who were employed to commercialize products and provide services). Therefore, Africans and Afro-descendants of both sexes and different legal statutes filled everyday life in the main towns and cities of the empirical provinces. They were seen in the streets, squares, and alley ways with their straw baskets and trays and made a huge amount of noise in order to trade a wide range of products; women were in the majority for this type of labor. Africans and Afro-Brazilians were typical figures in this sphere of activity and were frequently accompanied by their small children, who were tied to their backs, wrapped in a great variety of colored cloths. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how urban slavery affected the family and affective lives of the enslaved and to what extent it differed from what took place in the rural world. At the same time, it is fitting to investigate the kinship ties involving rural slaves who lived at different properties; and the ties between rural and urban slaves.

Apart from concentrating on the rural world, the more systematic and innovative studies on the “slave family” have considered the situation, especially in the southeast of the country. Very little has been written about the northeast and Bahia in particular and, certainly, nothing that has utilized a comparative strategy between the rural and urban experience.

EMANCIPATIONIST LEGISLATION AND BLACK PROTAGONISM

Historians of the “slave family” in nineteenth century Brazil have established some significant markers to develop their approaches. The way in which political interventions that took place in the Atlantic slave trade and regulation of slavery were evaluated in particular, especially with Law No. 2040 of September 28, 1871 (Law of the Free Womb), which had repercussions in the daily lives of the enslaved and their relationships with society in general. In order to acquire further knowledge of the experience of Black people within the context of the last decades of the Brazilian slave-based system, it is relevant to discuss how social, economic, and political changes during the period influenced the daily lives, expectations, and despair of those submitted, or not, to the regime of slavery. A clear emancipationist situation needs to be considered—both from the point of view of a policy that was orchestrated and controlled by the state and the pressure commanded by the enslaved, free, and freed Blacks, and also by the expansion of abolitionist movements. Interaction between individuals with different legal statutes is expanded in this situation, connected by family ties, kinship, affective,
and community relationships, which ended up leaving us with complex and unusual situations. It should be strongly emphasized that it was not just a few individuals who formed a part of families that experienced the contentious slave-freedom duality during this period: there were slaves united in a consensual or legitimate form to free or freed people; and the enslaved with children who had already been freed or had been born after Law No. 2040 of September 28, 1871. Many of those who still remained in an enslaved condition had to share the bitterness imposed by the regime of slavery with their non-slave relatives. Seeking to explore this aspect further, led to extending our conceptual field of the “slave family” to “Black family.” An observation of this detail leads us to break with the circuit of slavery, or, in other words, to observe the kinship ties between the enslaved and freed and free people, as well as the interaction between the enslaved and society in general—not only their masters. This is still an important hiatus in literature on the Black experience during the nineteenth century.

In order to corroborate with the above arguments, a brief mention of the infringement of transatlantic anti-trafficking legislation, starting from 1831 becomes necessary and the appearance of the “free African” figure, of the Africans who were apprehended by the Brazilian government in the illegal slave trade. The experience of this segment of the Black population, which has still seen little exploration by Brazilian historiographic production, are individuals who, as Beatriz Galloti Mamigonian highlights, were frequently treated as a faceless group, only represented by numbers; there has been extensive written work on the diplomatic negotiations conducted by Great Britain to enforce treaties to abolish transatlantic slave trafficking, however, literature is rarely dedicated to the people who were the object of such measures.

Until the appropriate steps were taken on the destiny of the Africans who had arrived illegally, the government of the Empire decided to provisionally use them in public works or entrust them to individuals by auctioning their services at a public marketplace to those that offered the highest annual sum for their labor. It would unburden the public treasury of any expenses related to them in the time in which they secured their freedom and until the General Assembly made a decision on their fate. However, they remained under the judges for orphans’ responsibility and were obliged to provide services for a period of fourteen years in exchange for food, clothing, and a “modest salary.” It was only on completing the fourteen year period that the Africans were considered duly prepared to live on their own accord, as the free people that they were. Despite what Brazilian legislation determined on the rights and duties acquired by Africans that had been illegally imported to Brazil, the studies developed on them have shown, particularly through the processes produced by petitions for emancipation, the various disputes that took place between them and their concessionaires, questions related to their quality of life, the treatment that they were subjected to, and the control and cost of their labor.
When we look further into these Africans’ experiences, we are able to find out about their day-to-day work, their family existence, and their interaction with other sectors of society. It is not difficult to prove that they also ardently aspired to truly live in freedom in the country, or even be able to return to their homeland, and that they endured dreadful living conditions every day. Despite proof that shows that the “free Africans” daily lives were almost as precarious or even worse (as some state) than that experienced by those who were legally submitted to slavery, they, however, could cultivate family and community ties to some extent, which was deeply marked by the specifics of their legal condition.

In the study which I carried out on “free African” family life experiences in Bahia, it is noted that they married between themselves and were encouraged to form nuclear families and to legitimize them through the Catholic Church, from a decision by the presidency of the province, as has been explicitly proven. Despite the strong presence of children in the “free African” community, formed in the River Jequitinhonha region (in the extreme south of the province of Bahia), it was possible to gather very little information on them, with information regarding their births or deaths only being available; there were little indications on their socialization, their daily lives, or of any initiative to educate or provide them with any kind of training. The emancipation of all the “free Africans” who were residents of the Brazilian Empire was determined by Decree No. 3.310 of September 24, 1864, fourteen years after the first genuinely Brazilian anti-trafficking law (Euzébio de Queirós in 1850) and thirty-three years after the 1831 anti-trafficking law. Following emancipation, the illegally imported Africans were absorbed by the whole of the Black community and, therefore, are not duly identified in the majority of historical studies and appear amid the enslaved and freed Africans, so that the specific nature of their trajectory and life experience almost always escapes us.

It should be emphasized that the most important ramification of the suspension of the international slave trade in Brazil was the increase in trafficking of the enslaved from the northern, northeastern, and southern regions of the country to work in the coffee plantations that arose in the center-south, especially in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Minas Gerais. It is estimated that approximately two hundred thousand slaves were traded between 1851 and the beginning of the 1880s. Despite investigations into the domestic slave trade and its consequences on the experience of Black family life, we still need a greater emphasis within Brazilian historiographic production, particularly in its demographic aspects. There is no lack of examples of the initiatives undertaken by individuals who sought to impede the sale of their family and relatives and of attempts to recover family ties broken by inter-provincial trade. As Sidney Chalhoub admirably observed, “the wounds from the floggings probably healed with time; the affective separations or the constant threat of separation were eternally open sores within captivity.” The decline in the domestic slave market took
place between 1881 and 1883,41 and therefore until the Sexagenarian Law of September 28, 1885, which prohibited the inter-provincial slave trade, many experienced the sadness, despair, and frustration of the expectation of being able to be free one day and close to their families, on being sold to the southeast.42

Giving continuity to the emancipation policy of the “servile element” in the slowest and most gradual way possible, the sanctioning of Law No. 2040 of September, 28, 1871, as Conrad observed, as a new and strong argument to maintain the slave-based system; however, it would condemn slavery to extinction and thanks to this law, no other measure would be necessary to ensure its disappearance within the lifetimes of existing generations.43 The Law of the Free Womb, apart from repeating the prohibition of separating the slave family by the separate trade of its members and declaring the children of an enslaved woman who were born after that date as free, it determined measures on the upbringing and treatment to be conferred to children born to enslaved women; gave freedom to slaves belonging to the nation, to those given for the enjoyment of the crown, to those from unclaimed inheritances, and to slaves that had been abandoned by their masters. It also decreed the annual registration of all the enslaved that existed in the Empire, with the penalty being that the slaves whose owners declined to register them within a one year period were freed.44 It was not uncommon for the enslaved to report an omission in registration, seeking to benefit from the law, pleading for their own manumission or for family members. This law also conceded the legal right of accumulating wealth to the enslaved, through donations, bequests, inheritances, and to that obtained with the consent of their masters through work and savings. Finally, it also determined the annual emancipation of the enslaved through an “Emancipation Fund.”

To mention another perspective of approach, the documentation generated within the context of the annual emancipation of the enslaved through the Emancipation Fund remains little explored by Brazilian historians. This source deserves further examination, especially by scholars of the “slave family,” considering that the criteria for manumission by the Fund determined that the first to benefit should be those who formed part of nuclear families, followed by men and women that had children who had been born free as a result of Law No. 2040 of September 28, 1871.

The qualitative documentation produced by members of the “Classification Board,” the “emancipation candidates,”45 and their owners—petitions, requests, decisions by municipal and provincial authorities, and central government on specific cases—are useful in order to obtain knowledge of the strategies undertaken by the “emancipation candidates” and the slave-based ruling classes. However, an analysis of the data made available through the “classification lists” and “emancipation list” of slaves could supply data that allows us to find out more about the profile of the “emancipation candidates”: if they were married, single, or widows/widowers;
if they were the father or mother of enslaved, free, or freed children; the activities that they performed; the cost of the evaluations and whether the manumission candidates contributed financially; and other information.

From the moment in which this resolution was put into practice, many conflicts and debates were generated during the classification and emancipation of slaves through this Fund in the Empire of Brazil. The most frequent controversies and complaints were related to the emancipation of the enslaved who were said to be “married” and their families—such as considering, or not, the consensual unions at the time the emancipation candidates were classified; on the priority of classifying those slaves married to free/freed people and those that belonged to different masters; the increased number of marriages of slaves, bearing in mind the priority in classifying for manumission by the Fund; and about how to proceed in cases in which a part of a family had been freed and the other members remained enslaved, awaiting classification the following year; and other questions.

It can be noted that the “policy” of manumission through the Emancipation Fund started to be a target of interest by the Bahian slave-based ruling class from the start of the 1880s, who were seeking forms to ease their probable losses. In this situation, declaring single slaves as married and allowing and encouraging the enslaved to legitimize their matrimonial unions were some of the strategies implemented by owners, in order to reinforce the chances of paid manumission for their slaves. Therefore, the Emancipation Fund resources functioned as a type of compensation paid by the state to slave owners for the emancipation of their slaves.

When plenty of details exist, the lists of “emancipation candidates” classified for manumission by the Emancipation Fund provide evidence that many enslaved mothers and fathers had young children who had been born following the Law of September 28, 1871, or were already freed and that they almost always remained at the slave-owners’ property. This is empirical data that indicates the continued exploitation of the labor of the ingenuous, as if they were still enslaved.

In conclusion, despite existing gaps, Brazilian historiographic production has been expanding in the sense of allowing us to discover more about the intense mobilization and Black protagonism in search of benefits made available by Brazilian legislation in the last decades of the slave-based system. This could involve not just affective but also family aspirations, which does not signify that a significant number of individuals had the conditions to enjoy their benefits, protest for acquired rights, or protest against abuse of the law, especially when faced with the slave owners’ reactions, and who were “increasingly obliged to go to the Judiciary in order to maintain control of their slaves.”

Brazilian legislation on the “servile element” during the nineteenth century foresaw various mechanisms to favor the slave-based ruling class, delaying the end to Black subjection, at a time when the enslaved, free, and freed Blacks sought all possible means to forge their own path. Apart from
the escapes, the formation of quilombos, slave revolts, crimes, suicides, infanticides, and common-placed rebellious behavior, knowledge of legislation on the “servile element,” and attempts to turn to institutional routes in search of their rights, were artifices that were also used by many. This is an approach is increasingly recurrent in recent studies on Blacks in Brazilian slave-based society.

NOTES

1. This text brings together some of the main arguments discussed in my research on this topic. See Isabel Cristina Ferreira dos Reis, Histórias de vida familiar e afetiva de escravos na Bahia do século XIX (Salvador: Centro de Estudos Baianos, 2001) and Isabel Cristina Ferreira dos Reis, “A família negra no tempo da escravidão: Bahia, 1850–1888” (PhD diss., Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2007).

2. The patriarchal family in Brazil was formed on the arrival of the Portuguese. It was an extended family, really a clan, which included a wife and possible concubines, children, grandchildren, godchildren, friends, general dependents, and former slaves, all of whom were subject to the authority of the patriarch (who could be the father, father-in-law, or grandfather). Gilberto Freyre, Casa grande & senzala (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. José Olympio, 1987 [1933]).


6. The Emancipation Fund was created with resources originating from tax collection and fines in 1871. Distribution of this resource (in annual quotas) took the proportion of enslaved people in each location into consideration. The difficulties in promoting the manumission of the enslaved by the Emancipation Fund were extremely diverse, and it remained far from satisfactorily achieving its objectives. This resource gave priority to the emancipation of married slaves and mothers and fathers with young children.

7. The study of “case examples” from criminal proceedings and freedom lawsuits by Chalhoub was extremely productive. See Sidney Chalhoub, Visões


11. See Slenes, Na senzala, uma flor; and also Florentino and Góes, A paz das senzalas, 152–159 and 176, who suggest that the control of the conjugal market by older slaves is a possible African inheritance.

12. Família de Santo (literally, Family of the Saint) is a term used to refer to Terreiro de Candomblé communities; where Candomblé is an Afro-Brazilian religion. Vivaldo da Costa Lima shows that Candomblé groups represent family structures characterized by the relationships the Pais e Mães de Santo (literally Fathers and Mothers of the Saints—the Priests and Priestesses) have with their “children,” forming what could be called a partial religious family. According to Lima, the ties developed in Candomblé through initiation into the cult of the Orihas (spirits or deities) are effectively family ties of obedience and discipline, protection and assistance, grace and sanction, tension and conflict. All these elements are present in a family, just as they are in Candomblé. Vivaldo da Costa Lima, “Família de santo nos candomblés jejenagós da Bahia: um estudo de relações intra-grupais,” (PhD diss., Universidade Federal da Bahia, 1977), 146–147.

14. A set of two or more family units (father, mother, and children) tied by vertical (great-grandparents, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc.) and/or horizontal bloodlines (brothers, cousins). The extended family is highly prestigious among Africans and Blacks of the diaspora, which is reflected, for example, in the symbolic kinship ties within the *Terreiro de Candomblé* communities. See Nei Lopes, *Enciclopédia Brasileira da Diáspora Africana* (São Paulo: Selo Negro, 2004), 270.

15. “The utilization of ritual kinship ties was one of the solutions found by Africans throughout their re-socialization process in order to substitute the family ties broken down by captivity.” Maria Inês Côrtes de Oliveira, “Viver e morrer no meio dos seus: nações e comunidades africanas no século XIX,” *Revista da USP* 28 (dezembro de 1995–fevereiro de 1996, Dossiê Povo Negro—300 Anos), 184.

16. Brazil adopted the Law of November 7, 1831, declaring all Africans arriving through illegal trading as free and it established fines, punishments, and even prison sentences for traffickers, who also had to pay any costs incurred for the Africans to return to their continent. However, the smuggling of Africans lasted for a further two decades. See the Law of November 7, 1831, *Collecção de Leis do Império do Brasil* (*Collection of Laws from the Brazilian Empire*) (Rio de Janeiro: National Typography, 1831), 182–184 and “Decree of April 12, 1832—regulates the law of November 7, 1831,” *Collecção de Leis do Império do Brasil*.


18. The Works Progress Administration (WPA) was a robust initiative set up by the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1930s, as a way of promoting economic improvements and enabling the country to recover from the Great Depression of 1929. One of the consequences of the WPA was the creation of the Federal Writers’ Project, which sponsored unemployed writers to conduct research and write papers that included oral history interviews with former slaves from the South and the bordering states. The WPA began to edit these interviews in October 1939; they were compiled into seventeen volumes and sent to the rare books section of the Library of Congress in 1941. They are now widely known as the WPA Slave Narratives, 1936–1938. This archive constitutes an important instrument for African-North-American historical slavery and post-abolition studies. In Brazil, an important initiative to reclaim slave memoirs from the genealogies of families descendant from the last slaves of the old coffee areas in the southeast, was the creation of the Oral History and Image Laboratory at the Fluminense Federal University (*Laboratório de História Oral e Imagem: LABHOI, Universidade Federal Fluminense: UFF*) in 1982, which brings together an archive of oral, visual, and digital sources.


21. Nevertheless, according to Slenes’ statements, “the practice of polygamy must have been relatively uncommon (independent of slave rules) under the conditions of captivity in Brazil, since men not only faced a serious lack of women, but almost all also had very few resources.” See Slenes, “Lares negros, olhares brancos,” 194.


23. See Luís Mott’s, admittedly fragmented and incomplete, survey of the sexual practices and customs of the different African ethnicities transported to Portuguese America: “the predominance in most African slave societies of polygynous polygamy, the practically inexistent possibility of a woman remaining celibate; the almost universal existence in most of these ethnicities of initiation rites, such as sexual mutilation: circumcision, clitoridectomy and, to a lesser extent, infibulation and deflowering with a ceremonial phallus; adultery, homosexuality, masturbation, divorce and prostitution are some of the sexual conduct variables of these different tribes, whose reaction to such behavior varies from indifference to repression, including the death penalty; the great variety and complexity of the moral codes of these dozens of peoples is reflected in the way that they do or do not cover their nudity, in their taboos and sexual prohibitions, in the varying importance they grant to corporal esthetics, etc.” See Luís Mott, “As alternativas eróticas dos africanos e seus descendentes no Brasil escravista,” *LPH: Revista de História* 1 (1992): 185.


29. APEB—Judicial Section (Book for Will Registrations), Capital, Classification: 07/01/1876 to 08/01/1877, n. 51, 185–189.

30. Ibid., 19/01/1877 to 18/12/1878, n. 52, 39–41.


32. Stuart Schwartz suggests that it is precisely in everyday questions of life in captivity, in common aspects which refer to the home, family, work, and leisure time that the documents generally ignore. See Stuart Schwartz, *Segredos internos: engenhos e escravos na sociedade colonial* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1988), 312–313.

34. See Florentino e Góes, “Parentesco e família,” 141–164; Florentino e Góes, 
and Goldschmidt, “As exigências eclesiásticas para o matrimonio,” 89–91, 
among others.

35. See recent work by Cristiane Pinheiro Santos Jacinto, _Laços e enlaces: relações de 
intimidade de sujeitos escravizados_ – São Luís – Século XIX (São Luís: EDUFMA, 
2008); and Solange P. Rocha, _Gente negra na Paraíba oitocentista: população, 

and Citizenship in the Nineteenth Century,” (PhD diss., Universidade de 

37. See Judiciary Notice No. 367 of October 29, 1834, with “Instructions regard-
ing the auctioning of Africans illicitly introduced into the Empire.” _Collecção 
das Leis do Império do Brasil_ (Rio de Janeiro: National Typography, 1834).

38. See “Decree 3110—Emancipation of Free Africans” of September 24, 1864. 
_Collecção das Leis do Império do Brasil_ (Rio de Janeiro: National Typogra-
phy, 1864), 160–161.

39. See the in-depth discussion on inter-provincial trafficking in Slenes, “Demog-
raphy and Economics,” parts II and III; Robert W. Slenes, “The Brazilian 
Internal Slave Trade, 1850–1888: regional economies, slave experience and 
the politics of a peculiar market,” in _The Chattel Principles: Internal Slave 
Trades in the Americas, 1808–1888_, ed. Walter Johnson (New Haven: Yale 

40. Chalhoub, _Visões da liberdade_, 244.

41. Slenes, “The Brazilian internal slave trade,” 357.

42. The “Sexagenarian Law” or “Saraiva-Cotegipe Law,” considered the most 
conservative and anti-abolitionist from the emancipation laws, is very well-
known for having emancipated all adults aged over sixty. See the text from 
the Law in _Collecção das Leis do Império do Brasil_ (1885) (Rio de Janeiro: 
National Typography, 1885), t. XXXI (part I), 146–151. See also Joseli 
Maria Nunes Mendonça, _Entre a mão, e os anéis: a lei dos sexagenários e os 
caminhos da abolição no Brasil_ (São Paulo: Editora da Unicamp; Centro de 
Pesquisa em História Social da Cultura, 1999).


44. A document in which the name, sex, age, marital status, aptitude for work, 
and descendents, when known, should be stated.

45. Official name for slaves classified for manumission by the Emancipation 
Fund, in Portuguese “libertandos.”

46. Sidney Chalhoub, _Machado de Assis: historiador_ (São Paulo: Companhia 
das Letras, 2003), 221.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Chalhoub, Sidney. _Visões da liberdade: uma história das últimas décadas da 


Cody, Cheryll Ann. “Naming kinship and estate dispersao: notes on slave family 
life on South Carolina plantation, 1786 to 1833.” _William and Mary Quarterly_ 


14 A Global Education
Cold War Networks, Imperial Angst, and the Development of Tanzanian Schools, 1960–1970

Timothy Nicholson

In 1959, as Tanzania prepared for self-rule, British colonial attaché Douglas Williams noticed the huge numbers of East African students applying to a new American program known as the African-American Students Foundation (AASF), which chartered a plane to fly East African students to America. Writing to his superiors in London about this program, Williams realized this project “dramatizes the surge of American interest in Africa.”\(^1\) This new program also demonstrated the interest East African students had in studying in America; intent on using this new opportunity for their own advantages and highlighting the transnational nature of education during the last years of colonial rule and the early post-colonial period. Upon achieving independence in 1961, the Tanzanian state under Julius Nyerere positioned itself at the forefront of international relations by engaging with, providing shelter for, and supporting anti-colonial movements throughout southern Africa.\(^2\) While some Tanzanians claimed these associations, especially with FRELIMO of Mozambique, ultimately cost more than they helped, this foreign policy also furthered their country’s position to the extent that, although poor and African, it could not be ignored by others and necessitated greater interest by the superpower countries of the world. With a strong statesman in Nyerere, who enjoyed a reputation as a philosopher-king, and an activist foreign policy, Tanzania proved to be at the forefront of international relations in the African Cold War and began campaigning for transnational resources, such as foreign aid and volunteers, through which to build its education system and other domestic programs.

Possessing a population with a limited education, the post-colonial Tanzanian state needed to develop a highly trained workforce for its expanding bureaucracy and education system. Recognizing the country’s limitations in the immediate post-colonial period, state planners, educational bureaucrats, and students wanted to maximize opportunities for education, with students also looking to advance their careers and fulfill a genuine desire to see the world. Using sources from the National Archive in Tanzania, the Kennedy Library, and newly collected records of Tanzanian students abroad, this chapter will highlight the transnational aspects of Tanzania’s
institutional development and demonstrate the linkages between individual students and teachers with the Cold War world. To accomplish this goal, it first will examine the creation of a the AASF, an American program that threatened British dominance in the region and provided an opportunity for Tanzanian students to study in America, before then analyzing the role of American Peace Corps teachers in staffing Tanzania’s rapidly expanding secondary school system. Through this examination this chapter will show that the Cold War in Africa was more than proxy wars, assassinations, direct interventions, and ideological confusion. This global rivalry created a paradigm that Tanzanian state officials and students were able to exploit for their own gains; outside powers did not just act upon Africa. Thus, by leveraging colonial connections and Cold War resources, the Tanzanian political elite could better target its people, unite the population, and reinforce its legitimacy as an emerging nation-state.

COLD WAR NETWORKS AND IMPERIAL ANGST

While opportunities to study in the United Kingdom remained rare and opportunities to attended Makerere (the university in Uganda that took students from all of British East Africa) were limited to all but the elite students, new opportunities to study abroad emerging during the last years of the colonial period enjoyed a profound impact on students in the region. Factors such as the entry of Americans into East Africa and rising Cold War tension served as the impetus behind these opportunities. Motivated by events in the Congo, where the lack of educated officials and the quick withdrawal of the Belgians created an unstable political and social atmosphere, Americans quickly recognized the importance of education in the decolonizing world. Cara West, along with support from Jackie Robinson and a number of other activists, established the AASF to provide scholarships to African students for furthering their education in the United States and to centralize efforts aimed at arranging educational opportunities elsewhere. This organization also worked to recruit students throughout East and Central Africa to American universities and provided assistance in meeting associated costs including the purchase of stamps for mailing applications, travel to departure cities, application fees, and the three hundred dollars necessary to secure a visa—all expenses many students could not afford. Recognizing the need for increased educational opportunities in East and Central Africa, the AASF directly involved leading politicians such as Tom Mboya, Gikonya Kiano, and Karfuki Njiiri (all Kenyans), Nyerere, and Kenneth Kaunda (of Northern Rhodesia). The foundation directly questioned the success of small, elite, British-modeled institutions and argued in favor of the wide range of opportunities small liberal arts and large land-grant institutions provided. This movement of students to educational institutions abroad and growth in American funding occurred
at the moment Tanzania was readying itself for independence and became a major recourse for those desperately seeking an education.  

In his book *Airlift to America*, Tom Shachtman argues for the importance of the AASF in providing the necessary aid to East African students. Those involved with the AASF worked to further the supply of educated leaders needed “to meet the urgent needs of self government, and the demands for education coming from within the territories.” As a step toward accomplishing this goal, the foundation chartered planes in 1959 and again in 1960 to transport students from East Africa, mostly Kenyan and including Barack Obama Sr., to the United States where the students were already accepted into various universities. Involving itself in rising Cold War debates, the AASF encouraged American universities, such as Boston University, to establish additional scholarships for African students, especially after the Soviet Union announced the “University of Friendship of the People,” which promised to provide four thousand scholarships for African, Latin American, and Asian students.  

As 1960 existed both as “The Year of Africa” internationally and as an election year in the United States, both American candidates worked to use issues emerging from Africa to win over African-American voters. Shachtman, along with James Meriwether, rightly highlight that the 1960 presidential race between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon proved critical for the second wave of East African students needing assistance before coming to America. As a relatively untested Senator, Kennedy needed to enhance his foreign policy credentials and increase his support among African-American voters. As a means of doing so, the candidate pledged funds from the Kennedy Foundation to ensure a successful 1960 AASF airlift effort and promote the arrival of East African students to America. However, both Shachtman and Meriwether ignore the imperial and Cold War influences on the foundation, which proved critical in ensuring additional East African students attended American universities.  

The British colonial attaché in Washington, Douglas Williams, accidentally informed the State Department of Kennedy’s plan. Previously unaware of the Kennedy Foundation’s offer, Vice President Nixon responded by pressuring the State Department to reverse their previous decision not to assist Mboya. This also caused a dispute between Senator Scott and Kennedy on the Senate floor, with Scott alleging Kennedy was using his “‘charitable tax exempt money pot’ to deprive the U.S. government of the credit” and garnering the publicity for his presidential campaign. In relaying events to London, Williams wrote: “Unfortunately the airlift exercise has become a prominent issue in the American Presidential Election scene with the State Department and Mr. Kennedy outbidding each other in offers to help,” and Nixon was now pressuring the State Department for $8 to 10 million for funding African education. In addition to Britain’s discomfort over being outshone and close examination of this debate, Kennedy’s involvement also put those with knowledge of the airlift, including the Director
of the Information Services of the White Fathers in Tanzania and British officials in East Africa, in an awkward position as they did not want to support the airlift scheme, but also did not want to offend the potential American president. Additionally, officials did not want to the American money allocated for Mboya distributed without their involvement.\(^{11}\) Aware of this hesitation, Williams argued: “In a United States election year Anglo-American cooperation in the African field plays second fiddle to the over-riding importance of capturing the Negro vote.”\(^{12}\) Thanks to changing domestic issues, the American government increased their involvement in the East African region, a presence that would continue to grow with rising Cold War involvement.

Recognizing the impossibility of stopping the airlift program and limiting the desire of East African students to study in America, former colonial educationists began debating the need for supporting a university in Tanzania—immediately expressing concern over the potentially dangerous domestic repercussions associated with the new American educational programs and introducing new British educational methods to counter American influence. If they were not studying in Tanzania, Crawford worked to ensure students remained in East Africa, stating: “If the output of ‘A’ level school certificate holders could be increased in East Africa, this would be a valuable political move.”\(^{13}\) Crawford and Cox also began planning ways to combine their aid with American assistance in order to increase the scope of secondary education in Tanzania. Proposals surfaced that suggested both countries supply the teachers and aid necessary for any expansion. Such actions highlight the quick response needed from the British Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) and educationalists and show how Britain was forced to alter its long term planning.

Britain’s objective was to have American resources devoted to projects where they could be of greatest benefit and with least expense, especially as East African colonies received independence.\(^ {14}\) Through Anglo-American cooperation, the fear of all East African students leaving to study in America could be abated and East African institutions, as well as British generosity, could be highlighted. Crawford, Cox, and Gorell-Barnes also purposed using American aid and scholarships to American universities for post-graduate study in courses that were unavailable in East Africa.\(^ {13}\) Officials such as Crawford also worked to increase the number of scholarships available to study in Britain and to redirect students to study in the United Kingdom. Spurred to action by the Americans, British ODM and education officials sought to redirect American efforts, sell their accumulated knowledge on East African education, and build new institutions that would limit the need for students to travel outside East Africa.

With a narrow victory in the 1960 election, Kennedy promised a new way of engaging the Soviet Union and worked to further American interests in East Africa, an engagement that would prove American commitment to Africa and one that needed to be kept separate from combined
Anglo-American endeavors. As James Meriwether argues, Kennedy saw Africa as the newest frontier, where he could win support for the United States from newly independent states. Although the number of students from sub-Saharan Africa increased from 995 to 1,579 between 1959 and 1961, Kennedy pointed out during his presidential campaign that only 200 of these students received aid from the U.S. government, while “the Soviet Union, its satellites, and Communist China are making Africa a major target for educational and propaganda activities. Soviet bloc educational exchange programs for Africa are doubling every year.” Additionally, the Soviet’s Friendship University frightened American experts, although the Soviet Union experienced difficulty in recruiting African leaders. Kennedy’s attacks furthered his foreign policy agenda and provided him with an important critique of Eisenhower and Nixon necessary in securing support during the election.

TANZANIAN STUDENTS AND COLD WAR OPPORTUNITIES

Tanzanian students quickly realized the opportunities that scholarships to foreign universities offered and responded in a quick manner to new programs devoted to providing scholarships. As word spread of the educational aid provided by organizations such as the AASF, students throughout East Africa, especially in Tanzania, began writing letters to obtain scholarships, funding, or other opportunities to study abroad. Developing their own transnational networks, often with little assistance other than advice on how to frame the request as they sent letters to American universities, organizations, and private individuals. As the letters followed the same general template, several prominent themes emerged in the requests sent abroad. Many writers to the AASF recognized the true purpose of the organization—asking for financial help after obtaining admission to an American university and highlighting the limited scope of their needs. For example, one student, F.B. Mugobi, wrote to the president of the AASF: “The problem now confronting me is to get money to cover all necessary expenses which is required by the school. As I do not have finance nor have I had reliable support while I am out for studies, I have found it unavoidable to appeal to you.” In another example, a student wrote: “My college will be opened on September 10, 1961 and I am asked to leave for the US immediately. I need fare only.” By limiting their requests, the writers hoped to improve their chances in receiving the support they needed to continue their studies.

Tanzanian students worked to prove their poverty as another method of obtaining scholarships from outside countries. For example, one potential student, Gaudency Pipi, wrote: “I was born in a poor illiterate family, and it has many children to support and it cannot afford the expenses of sending me to a University college.” In addition to personal poverty, the poverty of the applicant’s ethnic group was also highlighted in an effort to remove
the student’s individual situation from blame: “I am very much interested to pursue a course in medicine that is not only for my own benefit but also for my tribe which I was sorry to say, greatly lacks.”20 The lack of opportunities and resources within the country served as the final way of proving poverty. In this instance, student Charles Nganda wrote: “My educational qualifications is an ex-Standard XII. Indeed I feel it is not the highest standard I can be satisfied in, but only fail due to financial problem which exists not only in my family but also in the whole of the Tanganyikan people.”21 Gaudency Pipi also wrote about how the Tanzanian government lacked the financial wherewithal to send students to Makerere or overseas universities.22 By proving their poverty, students highlighted the systemic issues that limited their educational advances while also demonstrating their poverty in a manner consistent with the stereotypes held by the outside world.

Another strategy involved letter writers complaining they were stuck in colonial-era jobs that limited their intellectual and career progression. D. Werandumi acknowledged: “I am one of the unfortunate young men who have fought hard but have not gained anything as a result of their struggle . . . due to the poor facilities in my country, I was naturally forced to join a Medical Assistants’ Course in 1955 after I had left school.”23 Writers hoped to impress those that awarded scholarships by demonstrating how the colonial system, rather than their individual actions, had limited their education. The anger possessed by these letter writers is evident in their posts to outside institutions. Although educated by the colonial state, they felt constrained by their government, which placed them in second-tier jobs with little hope of advancement. These low-level bureaucrats generally felt ignored by the post-colonial leaders who began concentrating on educating the next generation of students and needed these workers to continue in their posts. Thus, this older cohort of students felt their only chance for furthering their education existed in the world beyond East Africa. Ultimately, all letter writers were focused on increasing their chances of receiving assistance by writing what they hoped the foreign institutions and providers of scholarships wanted to hear, including the use of anti-imperial rhetoric to bolster their argument in hopes of obtaining a scholarship and chance to study abroad.

THE NEW EMPIRE: PEACE CORPS AND U.S.-TANZANIAN INTERESTS DURING THE COLD WAR

Only slightly more than a year into his presidency, Kennedy worked to increase American presence throughout Africa and especially in Tanzania. To do so, America needed to counter the influence of several countries still involved in helping to build Tanzania’s education system via overseas aid for schools and universities. In 1964, the Soviets pledged to build a technical school for one thousand students and provide fifteen Soviet teachers to
man the school until local personnel took over. This package was part of a £15 million loan pledged by the Soviet, Polish, and Czech governments. Multilateral and private institutions also donated or lent money to finance the education system in Tanzania. For example, the International Development Association, an institute of the World Bank, granted a £2 million loan to complete a secondary boarding school designed for six hundred students and to improve twenty-four existing secondary schools. UNESCO provided an additional £250,000 for building a new girls’ secondary school at Korogowe, which would eventually house five hundred female students. With other countries already involved, the United States quickly needed to involve itself in the affairs of the country.

To American diplomats and foreign policy experts, Nyerere’s aggressive foreign policies furthered America’s interest in the country and necessitated American involvement, both through increased aid and the Peace Corps program. The United States was interested in Tanzania for a variety of reasons including its geographic location, as well as the knowledge that nearly every liberation group in southern Africa possessed headquarters in Dar es Salaam. The Zanzibari revolution of 1964 in which the island supported communist governments before merging with Tanzania catapulted this ignored colony to the headlines of newspapers throughout the world. Using its location and foreign policy, Tanzania forged a unique place in the Cold War to which other countries, especially the United States and Soviet Union, needed to respond. Finally, Julius Nyerere, who was alternately praised for his intellect and reason and condemned for his radicalism by the same side, forced countries to recognize the importance of his country, as he became perhaps the most vocal African leader following the fall of Kwame Nkrumah. The result was a government positioned to claim additional transnational resources.

With these Cold War pressures and responding to a campaign pledge made before ten thousand students in Michigan, Kennedy established the Peace Corps in 1961 through which the American government encouraged its citizens to volunteer and promote American goodwill in developing countries. Gerald Rice, author of *The Bold Experiment: JFK’s Peace Corps*, argues that teaching was the perfect job for quickly trained volunteers as “it provided a relatively structured environment, was well suited to young college graduates, had a direct people-to-people impact, and it allowed the agency to get off to a dramatically fast start.” Fritz Fisher shows that although Kennedy viewed the Peace Corps as a cornerstone of his Cold War policy, Peace Corps volunteers realized the problems of dividing up the world into two camps, promoting a linear sense of development and, as was the case in Tanzania, becoming critical of American foreign policy itself. Finally, Larry Grubbs includes Peace Corps volunteers as one of many secular American missionaries groups of the 1960s, reminding readers of the modernization paradigm preached by Peace Corps officials. Despite this focus, local reactions and interactions to these Cold War programs, as well
as their use by host nations, have not been adequately considered. Tanzania’s need for assistance, with its teacher shortage and poverty, made it the ideal host for the nascent and quickly expanding Peace Corps.

Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs) largely consisted of college graduates with middle-class backgrounds from throughout the United States who were ready to see the world and hoping to have a life-altering experience (as well as eventually to escape the Vietnam War). After quick training courses in Kiswahili and teaching methods at Syracuse University, the volunteers left the country (most for the first time) and excitedly arrived in Tanzania to replace earlier private American volunteers and further liberate the country from remaining British colonial teachers. While teachers were aware of official goals of promoting American culture, remained idealistic and promoted Western notions of education, their quick training, youth, and experiences in Tanzania limited their effectiveness in furthering the foreign policy goals of the United States government.

In Tanzania the rapid expansion of education during the early 1960s created a massive shortage of teachers throughout the country and caused leaders to begin to recruit teachers from abroad. Compared with fewer than 10,000, mostly male African students during the late colonial period, government figures show that 486,470 students were enrolled in schools in 1961, rising to 537,725 students the following year. By 1966 schools taught 774,604 students and 829,182 students in 1967, including 319,064 females. With massive local efforts at establishing local schools, the number of schools also increased, with approximately five hundred new schools, mostly at the primary level, being established between 1962 and 1966. However, the supply of teachers never matched the overwhelming demand brought by this rapid expansion. The need to Africanize the civil service further exacerbated this staffing problem, especially as the national bureaucracy claimed all the Tanzanians who graduated from the University of East Africa. As the educated elite, other teachers became politicians and moved into leadership positions at local, regional, and national levels. This process of expansion and Africanization allowed less qualified and more problematic teachers to enter the education system.

National education officials in Tanzania, aware of the massive shortage of teachers within the country, recognized the importance of making use of these teachers and other arriving American experts. Nyerere personally welcomed the first group of Peace Corps volunteers to East Africa and received a telegraph from Kennedy stating that these volunteers reflected the true spirit of friendship from the American people. “You will be viewed as representatives of the United States . . . I am confident that you will meet the challenge of this profound responsibility,” the telegraph added. Nyerere embraced these volunteers by highlighting the precedent-setting project and the desperate need for teachers to fill existing vacancies throughout the region. Minister of Education Simon Eliufoo also welcomed teachers, stating: “The present struggle required more know-how in many
different ways and this was why the overseas teachers’ contribution was so important.”

In another interaction with the Peace Corps, he mentioned: “Some of these overseas staff come as volunteers and they cost us almost nothing. Our gratitude for the services of these people is proof of success in their contribution.” Top officials welcomed these volunteers and quickly put them to work furthering Tanzania’s domestic education policy.

The PCVs arriving in the country helped staff newly built schools and interacted with newly appointed Tanzanian teachers. These volunteers, mostly placed in upper primary schools, freed existing local teachers to return to teacher training colleges to further their own education, receive an upgraded classification, and, for the Tanzanian state, create more reliable workers. The level of interaction with ordinary Tanzanians also increased. PCV John Bush recalls how the Peace Corps began filling its own goals as it brought Americans into the lives of everyday Tanzanians for the first time: “[Children] were running alongside of us. And they were all saying ‘cowboy, cowboy, cowboy’ from all the television and movies they had seen all Americans were cowboys. So while we were walking down the street they were calling us cowboy.”

In another example, PCV Walter Bengstone helped a Tanzanian purchase the glasses he needed to see the blackboard and continue as a top student. Due to their posting in rural areas with no more than two volunteers at a school, the level of interaction between Americans and Tanzanians was maximized.

In Tanzania, American teachers were to be treated as normal, everyday teachers with all the typical duties. In preparation for their 1963 arrival in the Mwanza region, the Chief Education Officer instructed head teachers that PCVs “will take their turn as Duty Teacher; supervision of sports and games, supervise cleaning, grass-cutting, garden work; take charge of school societies, and assist in store keeping. In every way they expect to be treated, and they should be treated, as ordinary members of staff.” Such treatment allowed American volunteers to interact with local teachers and students in a highly intimate manner, both inside and outside the classroom, thereby fulfilling Kennedy’s goal for the Peace Corps. Thus, vacant teaching positions in the rapidly expanding education system were often filled by the American volunteers who—after a shaky and nervous start—provided the necessary instruction to promote language, science, and math skills.

Most of the records within the Tanzanian archives dealing with the Peace Corps document mundane matters—where to house them, how to find furniture for the rooms, and who to displace so the volunteers could have the housing guaranteed to them. For local head teachers, receiving a PCV necessitated a great deal of preparation to ensure they met the housing and furniture requirements, the latter of which the Peace Corps would pay for. Judging by the number of repeated requests for information, local head teachers voiced a number of concerns—including questions about payment—to the Ministry, who in turn constantly sent additional information
to the local schools to inform the teachers exactly what the responsibilities and expectations of the volunteers were and how to treat them.

Despite any local conflicts, programs associated with the Peace Corps also helped further the expansion of Tanzanian education through the building of classrooms. PCVs were required to complete a second project in addition to their everyday teaching. Volunteers contacted their friends in America to raise money for this construction and promoted private assistance to Tanzania. In 1966, PCV fundraising efforts allowed Tanzanians to build four new classrooms (valued at 7,000 Tanzanian shillings each) and four libraries (worth between 875 and 3,500 Tanzanian shillings each), and resulted in a promise to increase the number of students in Std. I and VI. Taking advantage of this funding, the Mwanza Regional Government ordered local councils to “carry on with the work of making bricks, etc. for the new classrooms as per new development offered” and “borrow building materials and start building.” Consistent with previous Tanzanian programs, this aid was not allocated to cover labor, “which must be provided by the local community,” and once again necessitated community involvement. The results achieved through PCV second projects were similar to the school building efforts earlier in the decade and helped with the continued expansion of the education system.

Peace Corps volunteers who staffed upper primary and secondary schools also became involved in enforcing the sexual morals of the post-colonial state. Often witnessing the wrath of overzealous minor state officials and teachers, these volunteers experienced a difficult decision as they needed to weigh their own views on proper behavior and the need to uphold the rules of the school. For example, PCV Leonard Levitt recalled his experience with this sexual regulation as he reported a male and female student walking together and holding hands. With this information, the head teacher brought the two students into his office and interrogated them, hoping that one would admit to improper relations. The teachers then beat the boy until he confessed and began naming others who were also having intercourse. After identifying all the girls of in school, the head teacher brought in the girls, who then named their partners causing nearly every student to receive a beating. Desperate for information and to counter immoral behavior among students, teachers used every source available to them, including relying on Peace Corps volunteers.

THE REACTION TO PEACE CORPS TEACHERS

Despite its usefulness, the Peace Corps existed as a contentious program at the local and national level. While Ministry of Education officials openly welcomed the volunteers and realized their importance in providing critical manpower, Tanzanian critics pointed out the imperial nature of the program. In doing so, they demonstrated an advanced knowledge of Cold
War events and differentiated American teachers from their British counterparts. Most importantly, the mere presence of the Peace Corps in Tanzania provided a highly visible reminder of the state’s failure to fully Africanize the bureaucracy, provide the necessary teachers, and end its dependence on outside assistance. By 1965, the government boasted that Tanzanians held 93 percent of all government posts. The reliance on Peace Corps volunteers reminded others that the government’s success was still incomplete and that Americans merely replaced the British in enjoying undue influence within the country.

These debates over the imperial nature of the Peace Corps took place within the Tanzanian Parliament. Seeking notoriety and support of the masses through a populist move, Regional Commissioner for the Southern Highlands John Mwakangale stated: “Wherever they [PCVs] are we always hear of trouble, you hear of people trying to overthrow the Government. These people are not here for peace, they are here for trouble. We do not want any more Peace Corps.” Mwakangale then acknowledged that he had never met with the volunteers nor had he any concrete evidence to support the allegations. However, his speech was immediately condemned by Prime Minister Kawawa as “the most irresponsible speech ever heard in the House.” Gerard Rice points out that periodic criticism of this nature was a deliberate ploy by the Tanzanian government to appease the Soviets and ensure that aid from Communist countries continued. Thus, by attacking the program and using international rivalries, the domestic programs could be expanded.

At a local level, teachers and officials also criticized the role of the Peace Corps. For example, one teacher highlighted the lack of training volunteers possessed, especially when compared to the Teachers for East Africa workers, stating: “The children in the schools complain they cannot understand the American-English these teachers use,” before adding: “If the government wants to get teachers under a scheme like the Peace Corps they should make sure they get fully trained people” and should not be “picking anyone off the street in order to fulfill the need.” This comment led the Peace Corps’ Director for the African Regions to respond that the volunteers never displaced Tanzanian teachers. However, this criticism resonated as the volunteers did possess limited teaching and Kiswahili backgrounds.

The use of PCVs also caused contentious debates at town meetings. During a town meeting in Mwanza, skeptics went so far as to claim that volunteers “were actually dangerous because of their lack of knowledge of methods and their lack of appreciation of the problems of which the school had.” The debate continued with the chairman refuting this concern by arguing: “The supply of these teachers would cost Tanganyika nothing, that the Peace Corps was accustomed to hardship and they would receive intensive instruction in methods and the Swahili language both in the United States and in Tanganyika before they were posted to schools.” The chairman then emphasized the limited role of the
volunteers, pointing out that the PCVs’ teaching responsibilities would be confined to math and English, and reminded everyone that the volunteers would help solve the teacher shortages that plagued the country. The rising demand for teachers and the growing need to address local problems provided sufficient reason for officials to concede that PCVs could teach at their schools. Still, transnational resources made available by the Cold War bolstered the expanding system of education and became instrumental in solving domestic shortcomings.

Due to their country’s active engagement with other Cold War powers, Tanzanian students became highly engaged in the politics of the era. Reed Kramer writes that his colleague Tamela Hultman encountered a young student in 1966 who “queried her group incessantly about civilian casualties in the war in Vietnam, U.S. support for apartheid, and whether the CIA had been involved in the assassination of Kennedy and the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana.”54 PCVs reported constant questions about American involvement in the world. “Soon some of the local TANU officials began stopping at the school, speaking to the boys about the Congo... Then they would start about the Congo and Tshombe, American imperialists murdering their African brothers,” reported PCV Leonard Levitt.55 This interaction, being forced to defend America and seeing the effects of American foreign policies abroad helped alter the perceptions of the PCVs. Most PCVs recall returning to America more critical of American interventions abroad, including debating their own role in this new imperialism. Those coming later in the decade experienced support for their anti-war feelings and felt further alienated from their homeland. The experience of being abroad and serving in villages “much like those being bombed in Vietnam” changed the mindset of the PCVs and limited their effectiveness in winning the hearts of the Tanzanian people.56 Additionally, PCV John Bush recalled that Tanzanians in Bukoba were aware of the activities in Vietnam and that they asked him about American involvement in that country, especially the Tet offensive.57 In a manner Kennedy envisioned, PCVs countered the negative overall perceptions of Americans, but in most cases, the volunteers found themselves on the defensive when dealing with criticism over America’s foreign policies.

University students, generally the most socialist, radical, and anti-American component of Tanzanian society, felt that Cold War events, especially the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, represented the dangers of American influence within Africa.58 Having just achieved independence, charges of neo-colonialism resonated with Tanzanians, a common charge against the Peace Corps and its volunteers throughout the continent. Realizing this debate did not directly condemn the Tanzanian government, national newspapers printed these periodic critiques of the program. For example, B.S. Kajunjumele of Dar es Salaam wrote: “Being young University graduates, they are bound to be tolerant to our shortcomings, cautious in their approach, rational and keen to help us in every aspect. They
will work under the administration of our Ministers and they will have nothing to do with politics.” Furthermore, he added: “I cannot imagine that any politically mature nationalist would associate such an invaluable humanitarian venture with neo-colonialism.” Kwanza Kilewela, a university student, developed the following acrostic in a letter to *The Nationalist* newspaper condemning the presence of the Peace Corps:

- P—Plunder
- E—Exploitation
- A—Aggression
- C—Colonialism
- E—Espionage
- C—Corruption
- O—Opportunism
- R—Racialism
- P—Piracy
- S—Sabotage

In response to both letters, a fellow resident of Dar es Salaam urged a cautious acceptance of these volunteers. “We are now living in a world full of power politics and it is therefore very important for a true nationalist to be inquisitive,” wrote J. Husein. In increasingly creative ways, Tanzanians argued both for and against the presence of the Peace Corps and nearly every Tanzanian, especially the students, possessed an opinion on the program.

Americans also provided an easy target for criticism in the areas of Mwanza, Tabora, and Mbeya where they were concentrated. It was a safe debate that would not divide the country as other issues might. The broader Tanzanian population also was aware of the details behind the volunteer issues they argued. Tanzanians were highly informed about the background, purpose, and players within the Peace Corps. “Shriver, a millionaire, made his pile in land speculation in Chicago was also known as the friend, confidant and co-worker of the former head of the Central Intelligence Allen Dulles,” wrote university student John Kabwela. He then condemned the Peace Corps: “The Peace Corps are completely engaged in subversive activities in collaboration with local agencies which they have already subverted to further their mission.” Thus, students remained focused on attacking Peace Corps programs; an assault the government felt safe printing in newspapers as it did not directly criticize the politicians.

However, many Tanzanians differentiated between the individual Peace Corps volunteers, whom they generally liked and genuinely appreciated, and the broad American foreign policies that implied the ulterior motives of the Peace Corps program. In one illustrative instance, PCV Levitt writes of his experience: “No matter, they would say, laughing and shaking their heads. These are *mambo ya siasa*—political matters—and we ordinary
people cannot be expected to understand them, the way our leaders do. You both are very good, but your government is very bad.” While watching a demonstration against the Peace Corps and American government, Levett recalls at first feeling betrayed. He noted the protestors carried signs stating: “AMERICA GO HOME. AMERICAN SPIES. AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS. TSHOMBE AMERICAN STOOGE. These demonstrators, our friends, they were demonstrating against us.” However, a Tanzanian teacher came up to his friend and worked to make them understand that “what they were saying had nothing to do with us, [PCV] Mike or me. We were their friend, they all knew that. It was the government they were against. They were the spies. Not us. They all greatly appreciated what we were doing at Ndumulu, they knew how hard we were working, and how much we were trying to help them. While those with direct contact with the volunteers or in the Ministry of Education mostly were thankful for their work, those with more distance from the teachers were highly critical of their presence. Still, nearly everyone remained wary of any American program in Tanzania and debates over the imperial nature of the program manifested themselves in periodic outbursts of anti-American sentiment.

These marches against perceived American involvement in the country were not necessarily specifically aimed at the PCVs or necessarily even the role of America in Tanzania. Instead of using the rallies as a means to actually remove the Peace Corps, officials used them for domestic ends including motivating and re-energizing the people. According to Bush, local officials “created a demonstration . . . The African politicians to their credit in the stadium took the opportunity to present to the people that now that they had the freedom they had the need to behave responsibly. That we have to work harder than ever to maintain the freedom and make it work for us. . . . But he still was asking other people why the Americans were here.” By the late 1960s, the national government would mount anti-American campaigns with Nyerere going on the radio and accusing missionaries and PCVs of plotting to overthrow the government. “Those were very tense times. Tanzanian friends would say to us ‘We’ve been told not to have anything to do with you socially. If we don’t acknowledge you on the street, it’s not because we don’t like you.’” The presence of PCVs and knowledge of American policies became a tool by which local politicians could rally and unite the local population. These rallies reached entire segments of the population, not just those in schools, and PCVs became the outsiders through which the government helped define a Tanzanian identity.

PEACE CORPS AND THE ARUSHA DECLARATION

As the role of the Peace Corps expanded and Tanzania moved further to the left during the late 1960s, Peace Corps volunteers provided critical feedback and suggestions for implementing Nyerere’s famous 1967 “Arusha
Declaration” and “Education for Self Reliance” (ESR) programs. According to Nyerere, ESR was to encourage “the social goals of living together, and working together, for the common good . . . Our education must therefore inculcate a sense of commitment to the total community, and help the pupils to accept the values appropriate to our kind of future, not those appropriate to our colonial past.” In order to accomplish this goal and realistically prepare students for their future, schools “must produce good farmers; it has also to prepare people for their responsibilities as free workers and citizens in a free and democratic society, albeit a largely rural society. They have to be able to think for themselves.” These agriculturally focused projects were quickly implemented in schools and PCVs, as well as their Tanzanian colleagues, worked to ensure their viability within the school system and proposed “ideas on practical projects that could be initiated at the secondary schools.”

Existing PCV programs, such as poultry keeping, egg selling, and milk production, dovetailed with the goals of ESR and, as the Ministry required schools to increasingly stress agriculture, Americans became key participants. The expanding focus on agricultural subjects kept foreign PCVs from teaching sensitive subjects such as history and provided them with an opportunity to use their agricultural training. This emphasis continued until the volunteers were “not be expected to teach other academic subjects.”

By the time the ESR programs filtered down to the local level, PCVs possessed two years of experience within Tanzanian schools, so they already knew what worked and what failed. While reaching out to these schools, government officials enjoyed the rare opportunity that teachers, albeit foreign teachers, willingly came to them and openly talked about the ESR projects. Because they were leaving the country and, unlike nearly everyone else, did not have careers or a vested interest in the system, their feedback could be more direct and blunt than if it originated from other sources. For example, volunteer Carl Halpern suggested that “crops grown at the school should be sold through a cooperative,” which would allow students to attend meetings, learn about the operations of cooperatives, and learn real-world skills while aiding the school and participating in Arusha Declaration and ESR activities.

PCVs provided important feedback, specifically to the Ministry of Education, regarding the implementation of Arusha Declarations programs during the critical first years of their implementation. Anonymous comments given by the volunteers highlighted concerns that “elitist attitudes are set in primary school” and “students say that Agriculture is good for the country, but is for other people to do, not them.” Other complaints noted: “Our head teacher came back with great enthusiasm and is starting shamba [garden] work and emphasizing self reliance,” but “no students wanted to help” or “our school is having a difficult time getting organized” and getting students to participate in ESR projects. These comments noted
the problematic role of teachers in these programs, noting that teachers used ESR projects as a disciplinary tool, failed to follow up on new projects, and needed to work with students to “organize projects at school and in the community.” With the success of ESR programs exaggerated elsewhere, PCVs provided an alternative conduit for the Ministry to gain feedback on the success of ESR reforms and better target its population. In 1969, Nyerere expelled the Peace Corps from Tanzania. He cited the war in Vietnam but was also caving to pressure from the more radical elements in Tanzania, those that had been writing letters and condemning the Peace Corps for the past nine years. However, by this point Tanzania enjoyed increased aid from socialist countries, including China, the Soviet Union, and Sweden. In 1975, the Ministry of National Education announced the successful recruitment of 160 teachers from Sweden and Denmark, 120 from India, and a few from Britain. At the same time, increased aid from Scandinavian countries allowed for the continued expansion of education and the building of new schools. Norwegian students also directly contributed to funding this expansion, donating over two million shillings in 1975, which the Tanzanian government used to fund the construction of thirty classrooms and twenty teachers’ quarters. With increased aid, Nyerere could terminate the Peace Corps program, while also increasing his own domestic prestige and socialist credentials. Thus, even in its withdrawal, the Peace Corps program further legitimized Nyerere and the Tanzanian government.

CONCLUSION

The use of transnational resources, especially educators from abroad, provided both practical and symbolic domestic benefits to the Tanzanian government. These foreign teachers helped the Tanzanian state provide additional secondary education opportunities, staff vacant teaching posts, and fulfill promises made during the late colonial and early post-colonial eras. These educators also freed other teachers to move into the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Education, become head teachers, and teach additional Tanzanian history and civics classes. The civil service could be further Africanized and more students could be inculcated with new notions of belonging to Tanzania. Symbolically, these foreign teachers provided a major “other” around which to rally and unite the population, including those outside the formal education system. The African Tanzanian identity being promoted by the new state could be more easily emphasized. With their mere presence, debates of neocolonialism and the Cold War enjoyed more resonance and provided an important rallying cry for Tanzanian politicians to mobilize Tanzanians. Thus, the presence of transnational educators and resources from the Cold War furthered the domestic strength of the Tanzanian state, increased its legitimacy, and helped unify the population.
NOTES

2. To avoid the confusion between using Tanganyika and Tanzania, this chapter only uses the name Tanzania, but acknowledges the fact that this switch occurred in 1964.
3. This included Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland.
7. Shachtman, Airlift to America, 75–94.
12. “Note for Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.”
14. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. “M. Gaudency Pipi to Board of Directors.”
25. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
38. “Teachers from Abroad Vital.”
44. Ibid.
52. “Peace Corps Volunteers Dangerous,” TNAM Acc10/14/124.
53. Ibid.
58. With scholars such as Walter Rodney, the University of Dar es Salaam was widely known as a home for leftist intellectuals and students.
60. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 137–138.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
Social spaces, unlike professional and necessary community spaces, are primarily actively chosen by the individual, demonstrating the most about that individual’s persuasions. The debate on decolonization assumes the desegregation of all spaces in Kenya ignoring more subtle forms of spatial separation. This chapter argues that the phenomenon of separation and internal migration patterns along race lines has simply morphed into more abstract forms, specifically the social and recreational involvement and engagement of White people in Kenya’s urban spaces. In a post-colonial reality it is much easier to recognize the isolation of “types” along economic lines. Because most White people in Kenya belong to the middle class and above, and because segregation in classed societies often corresponds with individuals’ economic conditions, financial wherewithal has become the salient marker of separation between Whites and other races in Kenya, consequently removing all other significant forms of social separation within urban spaces. An immersion into the social life of Kenya’s Nairobi however, reveals strong clustering indices along race lines confirming that urban Kenya’s social scene is in fact the melting pot whose ingredients never truly blended. This chapter examines the separation of social and recreational spaces along race lines in Nairobi, Kenya, contesting the image of a race-unified Kenya, while exploring the forces behind urban social space separations.

Jean has lived in Kenya for almost twenty years. She is British Kenyan and is married to a fellow British Kenyan. During a social gathering at their home, their then four-year-old daughter, asked, in the middle of general conversation among the adults, as only a child could, “Mummy, is Besi black?” Everyone was filled with discomfort, and several people must have wondered what conversation someone had been having with the little girl to occasion such a question.

Perhaps what conversation had been had is not as significant as the little girl’s own experiences, the limits of which were provided by adults in her life. In her world, all her friends are White. These are the people who show up at her birthday parties and these are the people that she goes to school with, at an exclusive Montessori school. The majority of the African
Kenyans she sees with her parents are either service providers in public spaces, servants in their home, or employees in their office. So, for her, the idea of a “Black” person that would be in their family’s space, for no other reason other than friendship, must have been confusing. One must consider the possibility that in the three years of her life that “Besi” had been around her family, this little girl had not yet started to grasp the concept of Black/White or race. She was now growing older and more attuned to differences among people and this “different” presence was cause for some confusion. The rest of this chapter uses the terms “African Kenyans” or “Africans” and “White Kenyans” or “Whites” deliberately for ease of distinguishing between these two races that are residents of Kenya. This should in no way erase in the reader’s mind the fact that many of Kenya’s White residents are African, and self-identify so.

Martin Parr’s blog entry from April 2010, “The Whites of Kenya,” is representative of experiences of Kenyans and non-Kenyans of the racialized space in Kenya. It captures his encounters with some members of White communities during a visit to Kenya.

It is important to historicize the presence of Europeans in present day Nairobi, the city that is the focus of this chapter. While it is a wide history spanning centuries, this chapter will focus on the establishment of their presence in Nairobi city and their connection to and influences on the occupation of different spaces by Whites and Africans during colonialism and after.

First, let us define the “White Kenyan” as conceptualized in this work. The end of British colonial rule in Kenya in 1963 occasioned the mass departure of White settlers. Most sold their holdings in Kenya and moved away by the mid-1970s. A minority, however, chose to stay and most of them assumed Kenyan citizenship. During colonialism Whites mainly occupied “The White Highlands,” which were the rich and highly productive lands that were appropriated to Whites. Today, some White Kenyans still work with the land, doubling in different forms of farming and related businesses. Many more however, make their living in other industries and sectors, located mainly in the cities, which places most of the White population in the urban centers. Over 45 percent of Kenya’s urban population is located in Nairobi.

The influx of Whites not connected to colonialism, which began into Kenya in the 1970s continues. This is because, as Doro rightly observes, “Among third world capitals Nairobi is an ideal location for a job tour abroad; the extraordinarily beautiful environment, the healthy climate, and the high degree of modernization are especially attractive for professionals who wish to have their dependents with them.” Today, the growth of Nairobi city continues, to a point, to be beholden to global forces and influences. With this, the number of foreigners moving into the country remains on the rise. This is also impacted by the fact that Nairobi plays host to headquarters for such organizations as United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Program (UNHABITAT), as well as diplomatic missions and secretariats for global organizations, among others. The expatriate population, some of whom decide to stay and take on citizenship or simply make Kenya their permanent residence, continues to rise as international bodies and multi-national and small enterprise companies invest in the country. Further, the growth in influence of Nairobi as a technology development center has greatly reinforced the city’s increasing White population.4

Intentionally or not, in his description of his interactions, Parr aids our historicization project about Whites physically, culturally, and emotionally in Kenya and this calls attention to the question of whether, speaking in general terms, participation of Whites in modern Kenya is too specifically and restrictively defined by this demographic group. Are members of this section of the Kenyan population too selective about what sections of modern Kenya they will be a part of? Is that selection racially motivated?

Different factors inform and contribute to situations of segregation in urban spaces including social, economic, racial or ethnic divides, legal, political and cultural factors. Grant and Nijman, in their article “Globalization and the Corporate Geography of Cities in the Less Developed World,” capture the historicized perspective of the economic and political aspects and influences of urban development and spatial endowments.5 In different contexts, one can engage differences in income, proximity to employers, markets and businesses, crime, job opportunities, influences of realtors, or even influences of mortgage and other loan providing companies as contributing to conditions of separation. In a post-colonial, supposedly “post-racial” world, rarely do we broach the subject of race in certain parts of the world, Kenya included, as a factor in such separation.

Urban spatial segregation is an age-old phenomenon. Indeed scholarship on the separation of physical spaces along race, class, and other lines illustrates this.6 While it will be necessary to make reference to this in this chapter, particularly to provide a historical context, this is not the focus of this exploration. By referencing physical separation, it becomes possible to recognize that within the physical segregation an implicit social separation subsists. As Olima states, “urban spatial segregation is a reflection of the existing social structure.”7 It is easy to make a case for the economic and legal aspects that influence urban segregation particularly from a physical space perspective. Olima identifies some causes and posits possible solutions, concluding that “land management is crucial for the achievement and promotion of effective functioning of urban settlements.”8 It is much harder to make the same kind of easy definition of resolutions for social segregation. This contribution seeks to push the conversation on to the social aspects for which separation in physical space is a manifestation by deliberately focusing on social spaces. Thus, it engages issues related to the particularities and dynamics that continue to contribute to the creation and sustainability of urban segregation in social spaces in Nairobi. Because
social space is space related to recreation and non-professional interactions, social space segregation or social segregation is separation within or related to interactions in the social space.

One thing that stands true for all forms of segregation related to race in Nairobi, is something that can be traced back to its roots: “Its origin in the Kenyan towns can be traced way back to the emergence of colonization.”9 Christopher states, “The geographical division of territory on ethnically defined lines, whether in urban or rural areas, or through state partition, is the heritage of many ex-British colonies.”10 He explains further: “The degree of separation varied from urban segregation to the demarcation of extensive rural land reserves and ultimately to the political fragmentation of colonies into separate states.”11 Between the end of the nineteenth century and 1960 urban segregation, as a staple of colonialism informing the distribution of resources and services, was alive and well in Nairobi city and the situation was reproduced, albeit to a lesser degree, in the other primary Kenyan cities, including Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, Nyeri, and Eldoret. With the White population living mainly in the up-market spaces, there was and still is a perceived reality of an existing privilege to this constituency and the spaces they occupy in terms of “the allocation of goods, services, income and other resources.”12 It is for this reason, among others, that even in what many prefer to view as a safe and equal, multi-cultural, post-colonial space, it is necessary to exhaustively interrogate this issue, rather than shy away from complexities that may accompany the confrontation.

To understand the origins of Nairobi city and its attendant segregation of spaces, one must trace the history back to the end of the nineteenth century, to the building of the Kenya Uganda Railway (KUR), which reached Nairobi in May 1899. When the headquarters of the railroad was transferred to Nairobi from Mombasa, Nairobi grew into a major economic and industrial urban space. The city consequently developed into the main center for the businesses and undertakings of the colonial British government, not just for Kenya, but also for those affecting the larger East Africa region. The influence of Nairobi was enhanced when, in 1900, it was designated the capital of Kenya. European settlers began moving to the city for business or missionary, professional, or government work, self-appropriated the best sections of the city, which were deliberately separated from settlements for indigenous Kenyans and other races like the Asians.

Racial segregation was at the core of the layout of Nairobi city from its very beginnings. Among other reasons, this segregation was for “hygiene” issues,13 a pseudo-reason defined by the colonial Whites, as well as the need to preempt and avoid potential conflicts with indigenous populations. Some residential areas that were open exclusively to Europeans included Loresho, Kileleshwa, Lavington, Upper Parklands, Muthaiga, Westlands, Karen, and Kilimani.14 With this separation and the unequal distribution of resources and services, the attitudes of resentment were present from the get go, fuelling separation on an emotional level in addition to the physical
one. This separation was rife with racial undertones because the spatial segregation that inspired it was constructed along racial lines. During the same colonial period, Asians also had certain areas carved out for them. Unlike the high-end European neighborhoods, these areas including Parklands, Eastleigh, Pangani, and Nairobi South, were characterized by medium income and medium population density, a situation that was still much better than the conditions in African neighborhoods. The Eastlands section of the city—Mathare, Kariokor, Pumwani, and their surroundings—was populated by Africans and was low-income and very densely populated. Indeed, “the colonial government discouraged the provision of the large-scale public housing in order to curtail the excessive influx of the Africans into the city.”

Beyond creating colonial cities from plans adapted from the European framework, residential and commercial areas of the cities were also racialized. New cities that were created to facilitate foreign penetration of the inland took on this format, but cities already in existence did not escape this fate, either. They were also redesigned to embrace European culture and to accommodate the racial spatial divide.

The European areas did not just receive an unfair advantage in the distribution of resources, they were also the most productive, most appealing, least populated, and were best served in terms of infrastructure. This superior infrastructure was designed to provide comfort for the Europeans, access to the resources that were available in these highly productive areas, and access to commercial interests of the colonial government and other private business owners. Most Europeans still live in some of these areas in Nairobi today. Indeed one could argue that the definition of these spaces at their creation as “White spaces” still influences how they are viewed today and the expectations attached to what areas Whites automatically inhabit within the city. Up-market residential areas in Nairobi are often referred to in street slang as “Uzunguni,” meaning “where White people reside.”

In post-colonial Kenya, spaces, as well as “the capitalist structure created under the colonial administration was passed on intact to the independence government; the Europeans, whether they stayed or left, were (thus) assured that the loss of political power did not mean economic ruin.” Before independence, by the time Nairobi became a city in 1950, indigenous Kenyans began to settle in spaces that were not primarily designated for Africans, although on a very small scale and the migration was limited to the “elite” African Kenyans. The movement would happen much faster in the period following independence, but would still be limited to this same class of Africans. There was no similar movement of Whites into areas that were designated for Africans and Asians, except for business purposes. The psychological and social definition of spaces fit for White person’s occupation therefore endured beyond colonialism.

Some would argue, and rightly so, that following independence, segregation became more an issue of socio-economic status and less about race.
Otiso and Owusu state, “Although racial residential segregation was abolished [ . . . ] at independence, it was quickly replaced by segregation along income, ethnic, and religious lines.”19 This chapter argues that this perspective, which is fed by the absence of Whites in most areas, while accurate, does not tell the full story. Indeed, the very absence of Whites in most areas, while it may be mostly a function of their small numbers, could also have other implications and layers of interpretation. Today, Nairobi’s population has risen exponentially. In 2009, it stood at 3,138,295,20 a massive increase from the population of almost 350,000 that lived there in 1963.21 Most of the current city’s population is African. However, even with this incredible rise in population, one cannot deny the fact that certain spaces and interactions remain primarily White. What Olima calls “social polarization,” still persists nearly half a century after independence.22 While Olima’s focus is on physical spatial segregation, this argument can also be appropriated to, the social space.

Economically, most White people in Kenya belong to the upper-middle and upper classes. This has further amplified the social inequality via economic inequality in the city. With the White population always being part of the group on the favored end of the economic spectrum, this social polarization, which is sometimes manifest through the visuality of geographic space occupied, often takes on a racial face. While unspoken resentments still bubble under the surface at this unfair positioning of Whites in the class system hierarchy, the image of a happy multi-cultural society continues to be sold and bought into by many. Some resentments, unspoken or spoken only in moments of venting, are exemplified in the following responses received to the question posed to a few middle-class Kenyans: “Are you happy with where the relations and positions of Africans and Whites have developed to in the country?”

“What relations? I don’t exactly ‘relate’ with my boss.”

“I think they still have it better.”

“I will believe we are all the same when I see a few mzungus [Kiswahili word commonly used to refer to a ‘White person’] as my neighbors in Embakasi.”23

Even within the space of cordial and, to a large extent, positive relations that Parr speaks of, is there enough large scale social interaction between the members of the two races to call the social scape racially integrated? Is social integration possible in a space where one race still bears the mark of privilege, either by design (their own or someone else’s) or by default? Globalization and Westernization means that a city like Nairobi, which continues to experience an increased preference for media (i.e., television, radio and film programming or production styles) that reproduce those in
the West, in fact, privileges things Western. This influence is not limited to the media industry. The very face of urban development is, as Otiso and Owusu state, equally informed by Westernization and modernization. They state:

> It is also noteworthy that while urban development in [Ghana and] Kenya in the colonial and national periods was largely informed by the modernization paradigm, their contemporary urban growth is heavily influenced by the neo-liberal global cities and postmodern urbanism paradigms even though the empirical work that underlies both of the latter approaches is largely drawn from cities in the developed world.24

With the West being associated with Whiteness, particularly against a background of colonialism that demonized all things indigenous, while celebrating all things European, the profile and value of Whiteness flourishes, increasing the polarization of the races socially within this urban space. Separation is a socio-spatial phenomenon. Human beings are social entities that exist within physical spaces as they perform their humanity within their professional spaces or in recreation. Like all other separations, social and recreational categories and activities are also spatial phenomena. Understanding segregation requires an exploration of social differences and how these interact with spatial differences. So, we raise the question again: Is the separation along racial lines of people and social activities a thing of the past in post-colonial Kenya? In seeking to understand how systematic and systemic these separations are in terms of race and the urban social space in Kenya, the big question is, Is the separation of the colonial period that operated along race lines resolved in Kenya and does separation remain purely a “class” issue today?

This chapter does not support the tag sometimes conferred on White Kenyans as “ex-colonists” living in “Happy Valley” oblivious to all else and others around them, particularly because most White people in Kenya today settled there after independence. Doro states of Europeans in post-colonial Kenya that, “Perhaps the most significant clue to the future of the Europeans in Kenya after Kenyatta is that they have attracted little, if any, attention.”25 If we paid more attention, might we unearth new patterns of separation along race lines?

Doro divides the European residents in Kenya into two types: “one is the settler class of colonial vintage, the other consists of the expatriate professionals on contract to provide expertise for multi-national corporations, government agencies, and private organizations.”26 She notes, however, that “most Africans tend to regard them as all the same,” for different reasons.27 The former group she sees as having greater commitment to Kenya as home where more than one of their family generations has lived, while the latter are just passing through and see Kenya merely as a career destination. This chapter further divides her second group into two: those passing through
and those who stay either permanently or for very extended periods. Generally however, “now that the settler class is no longer politically dominant the Africans accept them—citizen and non-citizen—as part of the fabric of their society.” Indeed, Kenya is recognized, particularly in reference to urban spaces, as a multi-racial community. Even the census report does not train any focus on the question of race. For this reason, this chapter deliberately treats all White Kenyan residents as a combined demographic group and does the same for the African residents, allowing for differences only in class and economic status, as explained in earlier sections.

So, what is the relationship between Whites and Africans in post-colonial Kenya? Doro defined it thus:

The current relationship between the Europeans and the Africans can be characterized as amicable ambivalence. The amicability rests on the longevity of the peaceful accommodation between the moderates who remained and the Africans who not only accepted their presence but also utilized the post-independence accommodation to maintain the economic system and to gain access to its rewards. The ambivalence arises out of charges from Africans on the left that Kenya need not, and ought not, rely on non Africans for their economic development.

Most Whites in Kenya do actually appear to have moved on and are comfortably living in a multi-cultural society. However, a closer examination of the social and recreational spaces many White Kenyans occupy, tells a different story.

This chapter focuses on the social space because this is a space of “choice.” In the work and business environment, human beings are around people and interact with them out of necessity. The social space in a free society provides members with options and choices relating to “where,” “who,” and “what” to allow within that space. By examining spatial units within Nairobi, whose social composition appears to exclude or include to a very small extent, participation by people of races other than White, this chapter focuses on the White population and the seeming lack of large-scale integration into the city’s social fabric. This relationship is explored in part via the experiential narratives of people living in Nairobi. The illustrated existence of segregated spaces clear in the little girl’s question that was the genesis of this chapter as well as predominantly white social spaces, an example of which is the Kenya Regiment club referenced by Parr in his blog, is more ubiquitous than one would suspect.

In some of these seemingly exclusive party spaces you will find the occasional African or mixed race young person. For example, some of the new members of the White population move to Kenya after they are married to Kenyans who were abroad either for studies, business, or pleasure. It is interesting to note that, even though the African spouse definitely has more family in Kenya, a significant number of these couples create their
primary social circle with the White community. This is in part due to the fact that Kenyan society is very classed, with some members of the population still bearing what some would call a “colonization of the mind” mentality as a remnant of colonialism. These people would then espouse the belief that there is a certain prestige that comes with being associated with White people. Additionally, for the couple, there might be the conviction that opportunities for advancement and better treatment within society exist more with the White end of their social circle. As established earlier, many of the White residents of Kenya occupy influential positions in industry and business, so proximity to them would provide access to those networks of consequence.

Dialogue with a biracial, Nairobi-based couple, a White American woman and a Black Kenyan male, can provide further insight into this matter. The husband provided a different reason for their choice to create a social circle among the White community, even though almost all his relations are in the country and she has none. He argued that it had been easier for him to assimilate into the “White circle” than it was for her to do the reverse. According to him, he was raised urban middle class and has lived in the West, where he went to college, and so it was not a stretch for him to fit into the circle they chose. It would, in his opinion, have required a lot more effort for his wife to learn the culture and nuances of interaction of his Kenyan family and friends. Thus, theirs is a choice of convenience.

While his argument may make sense to some degree, it exposes two new issues. One issue is that, having never lived in Kenya, she was easily and quickly able to find an almost exclusively White community to operate within, when there are so many more Africans, including those in her new family to attach to. The second, is his willingness to assimilate into a new culture, which stands in stark dissimilarity to her disinterest in doing the same. There is also a failure to recognize his own history from his statement: when he first moved to the United States, he quickly found a way to work with the new culture, embraced it, and even found a life partner within it. In contrast, even though they have settled in Kenya, there is an excuse for her not to assimilate into the Kenyan culture, instead she chose the one that mirrored her American life and existed among the White Kenyan community. One has to ask whether this is a statement not just about the fact that one culture is viewed as worthy of assimilating into and the other not, but also a representation of how people from the developed world approach spaces and cultures they move into (e.g., countries like Kenya). The colonialists did the same thing.

Our gentleman further indicated that he and his wife were up against a cultural view of Nairobi as a work city, distinct from most Kenyan ancestral homes. Christopher best captures this idea when he stated about South Africa that, “indeed the idea that the indigenous peoples were inherently non-urban and therefore only temporary urban residents was a common settler belief in colonies and dominions with no indigenous urban traditions.”
Our subject obviously shared this colonial mentality, which fails to recognize the existence of urban centers in many parts of pre-colonial Africa. As he explains it, the idea of an ancestral home independent of the city home was foreign to his wife, so they chose to set down their roots and get involved in more activities within the city. In doing so he, unintentionally, defined the urban as White and the rural as African. Now, his argument is definitely flawed because first, Europeans and Americans understand the concept that one can live away from their family home and still maintain a connection to that home as a place where they have their roots and second, many African Kenyans, choose for no other reason than the fact that it suits them, to create a primary and often, only, home in the city. However, even in recognizing the flaws in his argument, it is of interest to scrutinize his position and determine whether or not what he says may provide a new way of looking at the clustering of White people in Nairobi as fulfilling a need to create new “families” in a foreign land. However, even if we choose to establish some legitimacy to this, it would still not apply to those who have lived in Kenya for decades, some even having been born there.

Typically, more accessible social spaces are more racially integrated. In Nairobi, the integration of public and accessible spaces like malls and hotels is still minimal. While both African and White people operate freely within these spaces, closer observation reveals that pockets of people of different races are interacting with people of their own race within the public and shared space, rather than with people of different races. A visit to the Java Coffee House, and the malls—Sarit Centre, Westgate Mall, The Junction or Yaya Centre—provides appropriate illustration. Little cross-racial interaction can be observed. Legally, social segregation is not sanctioned in Kenya. But does this indicate its absence? In her exploration of the development of Kenya as a multi-racial community, Doro describes it using Furnivall’s definition as a plural society where the races “meet in the marketplace but do not mingle.” This situation is more ingrained in urban Kenyan societies than most recognize. Christopher’s statement about post-colonial societies helps to visualize this: “Boundary lines drawn on the ground in colonial times have been remarkably difficult to erase in the post-colonial era.”

While the sharing of public spaces may play tricks on the mind, convincing most that the society is integrated, away from public spaces, how people share their personal and social space is especially instructive. This refers to the interaction and socialization in their homes and private groups and clubs. Often we have little choice with whom we share public spaces, but within the private space our voice, choices, and preferences clearly emerge. The invitation into the personal space remains very selectively racial among many of the White people in Kenya. Does this creation of exclusively White spaces silently reproduce in the post-colonial reality paradigms that restricted Africans from certain spaces during colonialism? A similar situation, albeit from a class perspective, is engaged in the following statement, which could inform how we dissect this social space issue:
The exponential expansion of such fortified enclaves as gated residential communities, enclosed shopping malls, cocooned office complexes and luxury entertainment sites offers a globally tested mechanism for the propertied middle [and upper] classes to insulate themselves from the threats—real or imagined—to their physical security and sense of well-being. This kind of city building not only follows the prescription of the neo-liberal vision of the entrepreneurial city, but is also part-and-parcel of *revanchist* [original emphasis] urbanism where the defense of life style and privilege is governed by the spatial logic of exclusion, intolerance and insularity.35

If we apply Murray’s observation to social spaces, then the creation of specific enclosed spaces in the physical and the abstract that are for and protective of the White population can be critiqued in a similar manner as from a class perspective. It is this that has led to the creation within Nairobi of what Christopher called, in reference to South Africa, “culturally self-contained” White communities.36 Such guarding of the personal space, which results, consciously or not, in spaces that are race specific is worthy of studying when trying to understand issues of race and spatial definition.

A case can be made for members of contained White publics finding common ground in creating activity-specific groups. One could argue that it is an issue of shared interests and cultures, but this fails to hold up and is easily challenged when you consider that there are Kenyan’s who are not white running an array of activity clusters similar to those run by these groups whose patrons are all white.

If one discounts the factors of common interests and personal histories, because in fact some of these Whites are Kenyan by birth and for other reasons outlined earlier, one must explore alternative motivations for this selective inclusion in activities and spaces. It would seem that a lot of this separation begins very early with the socialization of children. The *Guardian* published an article in October 2006 on the Whites of Kenya, which was inspired by the story of Tom Cholmondeley who was accused of shooting two Black people. The article refers to, “the middle-class suburbanites who ‘love Africa’ but dispatch their children to school in England.”37 This chapter does not judge the parents’ choice to educate their children in certain schools or countries. However, the practice is of interest because it could explain at least one of the causes of this social separation of races in Nairobi. When these England-educated children return to Kenya after school to settle down, they are already used to certain social set-ups that mainly include White people and they have shared experiences within those set-ups that create a basis for those relationships. They have also created within those set-ups and experiences relationships that will last a lifetime. The result, therefore, is that when they settle in Kenya as adults, they reproduce interaction compositions that are race specific. The role of shared experiences and interests in creating social groups is undeniable and “social
networks can interact with the physical space in ways that significantly affect the outcomes, in particular the spatial distribution that results."

Another cause of this separation that should be considered trains our eye on the African Kenyans. Part of the responsibility also lies on the shoulders of the urban Kenyan African middle and upper class. Historicized arguments raised earlier in this chapter explain why some members of this demography may aspire to live like the Whites and even consciously or subconsciously frame their lifestyles as “White-like.” The privileged lives of the middle- and upper-class African Kenyans, who some view as being in close proximity to Whites, becomes a point of envy and desire for society’s underprivileged. This envy remains connected to the White ideal standard of living that some of the middle- and upper-class African Kenyans aspire to and are closer to than the rest of the masses. En masse therefore, people from different classes of African Kenyans aspire to this ideal, which results in some of the groups continuing to privilege the White person in their psyche. This privilege or value of abstract and physical things connected to White spaces, viewed as distinct from African spaces, provides a psychological space that in itself separates the White and African, providing a background for the social separation. This connection is more apparent in the private, social, and recreational spaces because these spaces are in the domain where exclusivity abounds. Public spaces provide the illusion that they are accessible to all and, therefore, they espouse egalitarianism.

Having established that the responsibility for this segregation of social and recreational spaces is, to a point, shared between White and African Kenyan’s, this chapter however, asserts that this separation of activities and spaces can be mainly looked at as resulting from and manifesting Whites’ preferences. As indicated earlier, some African Kenyans aspire to get to “uzunguni” (where White people live). In this case, an obvious assumption would therefore be that they are always open to interaction with the White Kenyans. Indeed statements common in the language, particularly in urban slang, as well as mother tongue, indicate that good living is equated with living like a White person, for example “Tembea kizungu,” “Siku hizi umekuwa mzungu” and “Mwana wa mberi ni musungu.”

If in fact one can look at this separation as potentially resulting from the choices of White people in Kenya, then in the same way as we have questioned the motivation behind the African people’s contribution to this state of affairs, one must interrogate what inspires this preference by White Kenyans to create pockets of interaction that are not racially inclusive. Is it intolerance or fear? Fear is a powerful motivator. As fear is shared and transmitted to friends and similar types, the new partners identified within the fear bind together and pass on the feeling to new members of their “type” that join the society. When this pattern is reinforced over time, then a new pattern manifesting intolerance emerges.

A White Kenyan acquaintance, when asked about this social separation between the races, shared that when she first moved to Kenya, she
knew little about the people of Kenya, except what she had gleaned from travel books and her church back home. This lack of understanding, therefore, meant that her move to Kenya was accompanied by a pre-established expectation of poor and squalid Africans struggling with survival. She, even while resisting this, had a perception of most Kenyans as dangerous in their quest to survive their hardships at all odds, or that they would always need something from her. This view, some have related to the “White savior complex.” As a result, upon moving to Kenya, she made very few African Kenyan friends. She in effect found security among the White community before she even attempted to befriend any Kenyans. Interestingly, she made a point to get connected, via acquaintances in England, to some White people in Nairobi before she even moved to Kenya. She explains that following her move, she need a paradigm shift in her conceptualization of African Kenyans before she could engage in social relations with some of them. By the time this happened, she already had a concrete social circle that was primarily White.

The entry point and lack of knowledge on Kenya that most White visitors or migrants exhibit is undeniable. Therefore, either for self-protection or because they do not believe they have the social skills to interact with people they know in their pre-conceived understanding to be “the Kenyan,” they arrive in Kenya prepared to shield themselves from them. The unfortunate result is that before they establish relationships that would allow them to deal with these issues, they already, either out of fear or for social anchoring, establish relationships within White communities, which become their staple relationships. Having no friends of a different race means that social clusters that include people of just one race emerge.

Understanding the place of fear fed by pre-conceived notions about African Kenyans does not, however, address the question of why this segregation has been sustained over the years even with those whose families have been in Kenya since before independence or for over twenty years. It also does not explain why, after having been in Nairobi for a while and realizing that their preconceived ideas are wrong, Whites do not then seek to establish new interactions across races or why White Kenyans are comfortable interacting with Africans in the office and other spaces that necessarily force interaction, but do not extend this interaction into their personal or recreational spaces. More research is required in this area to conclusively answer questions related to what else, besides the reasons raised here, informs the segregation of social spaces along race lines in Nairobi, Kenya.

While other race-based issues from colonial Kenya appear to have been de-compounded post-colonially, the self-imposed segregation of social spaces persists. Legal, cultural, and economic forces have greatly contributed to the sustaining of racially defined spatial divisions. In this new Nairobi, some upper- and middle-class African Kenyans easily cross the boundaries into the “White spaces” and engage in activities and with the
characteristics of the “White space.” Little attempt is made, however, to integrate these spaces and have them represent things and values African.

According to Franzén, “Urban segregation is a never ending, on-going, dynamic process, where barriers are being raised, bridged and evaporated along different social lines.” Occasionally in this dynamism, a crossing of the boundaries occurs. Sadly, the crossover, in the reality of Nairobi, is mainly from the African Kenyan to the White Kenyan space. Little reverse assimilation is happening and so, once again, the effect will undoubtedly be the erasure of social practices uniquely African, particularly in Nairobi’s middle- and upper-class spaces. Worse still, the result will be a marrying of race and class as a segregating factor. While some could argue that it is more a matter of class rather than race, life in Nairobi city is being lived in different social worlds and some of those worlds are racially defined.

NOTES

1. Name changed to protect the privacy of the subject.
8. Ibid., ii.
9. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 234.
15. Olima, “Dynamics and Implications”; Godwin R. Murunga, “‘Inherently Unhygienic Races’: Plague and the Origins of Settler Dominance in Nairobi,


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 44.

29. Doro, “Human Souvenirs,” 53


31. Conversations with the male subject were held in Nairobi on July 2, 2010.


34. Christopher, “Divide and Rule,” 239.


39. This statement means “walk like a White person.” It is often used to indicate the act of carrying oneself with pride and a sense of accomplishment.

40. This statement translates into “you have become a White person,” indicating a change in lifestyle or behavior that indicates upward mobility in the class system.

41. This lyric is drawn from a celebration song among the Luhya community. It means, “the first child is a White person.” The first child in this case does not necessarily reference the firstborn child. It is used to celebrate someone who has achieved something significant or is celebrating something significant. It is that situation that makes them the “lead child.” While the celebrated individual is likened to many things in singing their praises, in this case, the metaphor “she/he is a White person” has obvious implications.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Race and Social Islands in Kenya’s Urban Social Spaces 323


World War II profoundly influenced dress culture during the 1940s. Although the politicization of dress did not necessarily begin during this period, conditions in the first half of the twentieth century, particularly during World War II, ignited segments of the populations of the United States and Congo-Brazzaville. Despite their various differences, zoot suiters and early sapeurs responded to forms of state violence and repression by donning flashy outfits through which they could exert their presence in the oppressive states where they lived. In the United States, this phenomenon primarily included young Mexican Americans and African Americans in urban centers across the country. The sapeur movement grew significantly in the post-war period as African soldiers that fought in Europe during the war returned to Congo-Brazzaville with new ideas of politics, colonialism, communism, and democracy.

This chapter seeks to address how World War II influenced dress in these two movements and why the act of dressing out became a powerful tool in forcing people to re-evaluate the concepts of citizenship and democracy. In the case of zoot suiters, outbreaks of violence that centered around flashy participants and the marginalized communities that surrounded them forced lawmakers and activists to examine the complex issues of discrimination, juvenile delinquency, and the harsh conditions that oppressed minorities faced in American society. For the sapeurs, dressing elegantly in the wake of World War II was an affront to the doctrine of colonialism because it challenged the concept of the African savage that allegedly needed to be civilized. While the politics of sapeurs were more nuanced, they represented changing times and political circumstances in Africa, and in Congo-Brazzaville specifically.

WORLD WAR II AND THE POLITICIZATION AND CRIMINALIZATION OF THE ZOOT SUIT

World War II heavily influenced dress culture in the United States. The war shaped zoot suiters’ ideas about politics, society, and dress, and they used
their flashy outfits to exert their presence in an America that was hostile to minorities, especially those that the White status quo perceived as subversive. At the same time, the war years influenced how others perceived zoot style and the non-White communities of urban centers across the United States. This section seeks to address the complexity of zoot style in the war years and the politicization of dress inside and outside the communities of zoot suiters in the United States.

During the Sleepy Lagoon Case in 1942, Lieutenant Edward Duran Ayres of the Public Relations Bureau of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office released a document that discussed the issue of crime and the Mexican American community. He argued that discrimination and economic conditions were contributing factors to crime in the Mexican American community of Los Angeles, but the main cause of Mexican American crime stemmed from a biological difference that separated Mexicans from White Americans. Ayres stated,

But to get a true perspective of this condition we must look for a basic cause that is even more fundamental than the factors already mentioned, no matter how basically they may appear. Let us view it from the biological basis— in fact, as the main basis to work from. Although a wild cat and a domestic cat are of the same family they have certain biological characteristics so different that while one may be domesticated the other would have to be caged to be kept in captivity; and there is practically as much difference between the races of man as so aptly recognized by Rudyard Kipling.

While Ayres’ overt racism is appalling, his mention of captivity is oddly illuminating because it reflects the imposed enclosure and semi-imprisonment of non-White youths in Los Angeles before and during the war years.

Whether or not Ayres felt the relative captivity of the Mexican American community via socioeconomic discrimination was justifiable due to this alleged biological difference, it is evident that non-White youths faced increased levels of discrimination in Los Angeles and elsewhere due to residential segregation, limited leisure opportunities, and racist hiring practices.

Discriminatory practices against minority communities across the United States were not new during this period, but the war managed to exacerbate already tense conditions due to migration and a continuation of racist policies. In his discussion of Black cultural politics during World War II in Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class, Robin D.G. Kelley argues that migration and economic transformations caused by the war led to heightened class, racial, and cultural tensions. Kelley’s assertion is important because it emphasizes the often forgotten impact World War II had on the home front. The implications of America’s involvement in World War II reached far beyond rationing goods and the draft. Communities throughout the United States felt the impact of the war in their daily lives,
especially those that were living in increasingly cramped housing in urban centers, which resulted from the influx of war labor.

The Grand Jury of Los Angeles County discussed the increased migration of African Americans and Mexican Americans resulting from the war effort in their report on juvenile crime and delinquency in 1943. Similar to their discussion of new Mexican American residents of the county, the Grand Jury stated,

Responsible authorities estimate that the Negro population of the City of Los Angeles has doubled within the past two years. These new citizens . . . are mostly living in areas which were overcrowded before they came. The housing situation in these congested colored districts has therefore reached an intolerable condition.

This bad situation is aggravated by the fact that the recreational and playground facilities in these areas are inadequate in area, physical equipment, and personnel. Such conditions breed crime, especially among juveniles.5

While the document was released on July 23, 1943, after the Zoot Suit Riots of that summer, it still offers considerable insight to the poor conditions that non-White youths faced during the war years in Los Angeles and is representative of a larger trend across the United States.

In addition to residential segregation and the increase in abysmal living conditions, Mexican Americans and African Americans also faced discrimination in the war effort through racist hiring practices. According to an article in the August 1943 issue of Survey Graphic, Mexican Americans isolated themselves before the war due to external ostracism. However, once the war began, many young Mexican American youths attempted to get involved in the war effort. Despite their efforts, the author argued, “Any United States Employment Service office in California could testify that the placement of even well qualified Mexican youth necessitated a struggle with prejudiced employers. A survey made by the CIO in November 1942 showed only 5,000 of Los Angeles’ more than 200,000 Mexicans working in basic industries.”6

Thus, the combination of residential discrimination, ostracism, and decreased opportunities for non-White communities became impossible to ignore and non-White youths began finding additional ways to express their dignity and presence within American society.

Many zoot suiters fell into the category of the disfranchised and dressed in a manner that reflected their marginalization. According to a letter from Walter White to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary Henry L. Stimson of the War Department, Secretary Frank Knox of the Department of the Navy, and Attorney General Francis Biddle, “There are many of us who have aesthetic or other objections to ‘zoot suits’ or any other bazaar form of dress or action. But it is superficial and childish to attribute acts of
Zoot Suiters and Sapeurs  327

this character solely to modes of dress. Many zoot suiters wear such clothing to compensate a sense of being rejected by society. The wearers are almost invariably the victims of poverty, proscription, and segregation.7 Thus, the clothes did not make Mexican American and African American youths revolt; rather, their politicization and actions stemmed from frustration with the system that suppressed their lives and liberties in the United States. Both Kelley and Alvarez align with Walter White’s assertion in their respective works on zoot suiters in the 1940s. As Kelley eloquently states, “While the suit itself was not meant as a direct political statement, the social context in which it was created and worn rendered it so.”8

Luis Alvarez devotes considerable attention to the circumstances that led to politicization of dress among zoot suiters in his book, The Power of the Zoot: Youth Culture and Resistance during World War II.9 According to Alvarez, many outsiders perceived the zoot suit as un-American and a disruption of the home front; yet, zoot suiters used their bodies as resources to create a dialogue with American society and challenge their marginalization.10 Alvarez’s assertion is important because he correctly identifies the importance of the marginalization and forced subordination of non-White youths in the politicization of the zoot suit in the 1940s.

Alvarez’s emphasis on the forging of a dialogue between non-White youths and American society through the zoot suit represents a larger struggle that goes beyond the superficial. Zoot suiters were not simply dressing in zoot style to solely express their frustration; they also sought to insert themselves in a conversation that frequently ignored or misconstrued their presence in American society. Alvarez states, “When they walked down the street, frequented local hangouts or used public transportation, zoot suiters claimed dignity by asserting their public presence while much of wartime society denigrated them as a negative influence. Whether one admired or loathed zoot suiters, their public persona made them a part of the home front that could not be ignored.”11 This complements Walter White’s discussion of the zoot suit in his letter to the leaders of the United States following the outbreak of the Zoot Suit Riots in 1943 and sheds light onto the complexity of the politics behind zoot suit style in the 1940s. While often misunderstood, zoot style was a significant way for youths to participate in discourses of modernity and inclusion in America.

The discussions held by non-White youths in the zoot suit movement also delved into the complex politics of America’s entry into the war following the attack on Pearl Harbor. America’s participation in World War II illuminated the hypocrisies of the state’s racial politics for many individuals throughout the nation. While America was attempting to preserve freedom and liberty abroad, many Americans found themselves in a brutal and repressive state where their presence was often silenced. Zoot suiters and civilians responded in a variety of ways. Some zoot suiters, like Shorty in The Autobiography of Malcolm X, dodged the draft. As Shorty states, “Whitey owns everything. He wants us to go and bleed for him? Let him fight.”12
At the same time, the ideological terrain of zoot suit politics was incredibly heterogeneous regarding World War II, as evidenced by the aforementioned Mexican American youths that sought to participate in the war effort. While outsiders often saw zoot suiters as a monolithic anti-American entity, many participated in the war effort as members of the armed services. According to Alvarez, “Although zoot suiters were usually construed as antiwar, unpatriotic, and even pro-Axis, they were regularly being drafted or were voluntarily joining the navy and army and were serving their country with great rigor.” Additionally, some African American zoot suiters did not abandon zoot style when they joined the war effort through armed service. In *Stylin*: *African American Expressive Culture from Its Beginnings to the Zoot Suit*, Shane White and Graham White note that some African American soldiers altered their uniforms to incorporate zoot style.

Even the young men accused of murder in the Sleepy Lagoon case found ways to participate in the war effort. In the *Sleepy Lagoon News*, the newsletter of the Sleepy Lagoon Defense committee, the author stated, “The behavior of the defendants at San Quentin [Prison] has been exemplary . . . Their offer to give blood to the Red Cross as a group was read by Ward Duffy over the institutional radio hook-up and the prison paper carried an editorial about it.” Thus, the participation of young zoot suiters in the war effort refutes blanket allegations of anti-Americanism and pro-Axis leanings among those that adopted the flashy style of dress.

Although some zoot suiters joined the armed forces and war effort, they did not necessarily become depoliticized in the process and many participated in the Double V campaign, which centered on efforts within the African American community to end racism abroad and domestically. According to Kelley, “the Double V campaign . . . partly articulated the sense of hope and pessimism, support and detachment that dominated a good deal of daily conversation.” Following in Kelley’s assertion, the participation of Mexican American and African American zoot suiters in the armed services and the Double V campaign underscores their frustrations with the evident hypocrisy of the American government.

The summer of 1943 brought the issue of zoot suiters to the forefront of American politics and society. Young White servicemen and civilians wandered the streets of Los Angeles and attacked countless young zoot suiters and others during the first week of June 1943 in what was labeled the “Zoot Suit Riots.” Tuck’s article in the August 1943 issue of *Survey Graphic* revealed the brutality of the riots and their aftermath:

A thousand uniformed men and civilians milled through the Main Street district of Los Angeles, attacking and beating any youth who appeared to be of Mexican extraction. The wearing of a zoot suit seems to have been entirely incidental; pictures of police line-ups show less than half of the Mexican boys so attired.
The racism that shaped the riots in Los Angeles reflected the convergence of politics, social conditions, and the deep implications of the war. Alvarez does an outstanding job of discussing the history of tensions between zoot suiters and servicemen in *The Power of the Zoot* and argues that wartime xenophobia and conflicting ideas of U.S. identity, Whiteness, and manhood fueled the riots in Los Angeles.

While recent scholars and some figures in the 1940s agree with the fact that the zoot suit, itself, did not politicize oppressed youths that did not necessarily change public perceptions of the garment at the time. Servicemen and civilians participating in the riots often stripped zoot suiters of their outfits and left the beaten bodies of their victims in the streets. The visual and physical silencing of zoot suiters by stripping them of their clothing represented a direct attack on the range of politics expressed through the zoot during the war. After the riots, the criminalization of the zoot suit in public discourses reflected the same mentality of the suit itself being a transformative and violent entity.

Media coverage and the series of events during and immediately following the Zoot Suit Riots represented the overwhelmingly negative perceptions of zoot suiters and their patterns of dress. According to an article published on June 10, 1943 by Peter Furst, the press was particularly inflammatory in their assertions that any physical scuffle was essentially a “zoot suit war” and that dressing in drapes meant the individual was a gangster. Further, Furst contends, “this label, of course, is by implication extended to all Mexican and Negro youths, who affect suits, and even some white youths. As the Hearst *Herald and Express* said yesterday- a statement which is typical- the zoot suiters are ‘bent on hurting innocent bystanders.’”

The portrait of violent and criminal zoot suiters was not limited to Hearst newspapers in Los Angeles; rather, the criminalization of zoot suiters in media outlets was part of a broader trend that spanned the country. In a letter from July 15, 1943, a young African American soldier that wished to remain anonymous wrote to Walter White about how the media was using the word “zoot suiter” in a discriminatory manner and included a clipping from the *Stoneman Salvo* about zoot suiters and soldiers. He stated, “The word Zoot Suiter isn’t only used in discriminatory civilian newspapers but also in the USO papers as well and if you will read closely you will get a lot from this article. I cannot sign my name because we are watched closely in our mail. I am a colored soldier member of the NAACP and I know you know my father well in Montgomery, Alabama. I am still keeping my eyes open.”

Similarly, before the riots of the summer of 1943 even began, an editorial from the *Long Island Review-Star* expressed concern about zoot suiters and the protection of White women. The author stated,

Six flashily-dressed Negroes have been arrested in Hempstead and are reported by the police to have confessed guilt in a series of “mugging”
attacks and petty robberies in that village. While these boys apparently are not charged with rape, if permitted to pursue their career of crime it is only a question of time until this outrage would be added to their other offenses. The citizens of Nassau County are not safe with these men at large.25

The author goes on to discuss a previous editorial that promoted the protection of White women against Black crime in New York and even claims that lynching laws in the South made the region the safest place in the world for White women.26 The overt racism in this article follows the predominant trend of the era, which associated crime with the zoot suit without giving any thought to the background of the actual wearer beyond the color of their skin.

Buying into the criminalization of the zoot suit, the Los Angeles City Council banned zoot suits inside city limits shortly after the riots began in June 1943.27 Furst mentioned the ban on “zoot garb” in his article from June 10, 1943, and stated, “Infl ammatory stories in the Los Angeles newspapers were blamed today for aggravating the race clashes between Mexican youths and American sailors which culminated in the City Council’s action last night prohibiting anyone from wearing a zoot suit.”28 While their actions trailed eight months behind the U.S. Department of Justice’s ban of the manufacture and sale of zoot suits, the Los Angeles City Council’s decision to attempt to prohibit zoot suits inside city limits reflected a drastically different set of reasoning. The U.S. Department of Justice banned the manufacture and sale of zoot suits as a way of enforcing the War Production Board’s call to conserve fabric.29 On the other hand, the Los Angeles City Council clearly felt that by eliminating the presence of zoot suits in city limits, the riots and racial tensions would dissolve. The mere timing of the decision to ban zoot suits in city limits was evidence of the reactionary politics of the Los Angeles City Council.

The attempts of the Los Angeles City Council to depoliticize zoot suiters through methods that sought to strip them of the “badge of a gangster,” emphasize the fact that the zoot suit and zoot suiters became a sort of icon of subversion for White America. Rather than perceiving the complex circumstances that stood behind the suit, those in power sought to point the finger at the disfranchised and oppressed in American society and blamed the violence on their fashion sense.

Despite the immediate reactionary politics of local bureaucracies and media outlets, the nation moved forward after the race riots that swept the country in the summer of 1943 as activists and politicians began to look toward possible solutions to ameliorate racial tensions in urban centers like Los Angeles and New York City. More than a month and a half after the outbreak of the Zoot Suit Riots, the Grand Jury of Los Angeles County released a document that centered on juvenile delinquency. While the Grand Jury offered many recommendations to decrease juvenile
crime, perhaps what was most interesting was the emphasis placed on housing conditions:

The housing situation in the Negro and Mexican districts is a disgrace to the great and wealthy community. This problem demands the attention of its best thought.

It cannot be solved overnight or within the lifetime of this Grand Jury. A start however can and should be made now. For immediate relief during the present emergency, it is the opinion of the Grand Jury that the district on the east side, largely occupied by Negro citizens, including the Little Tokyo district, should be included within the War Housing Conversion Program, to permit the modernization of many substandard dwellings and buildings into habitations fit for human beings, and to increase the housing capacity of the districts.

The moral and economic necessities of a long-range housing program for Negroes are in our estimation imperative. We recommend therefore, that the Los Angeles City Planning Commission and the Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission give this problem their immediate and continued attention.

The Jury is furthermore of the opinion that the Negro housing problem has reached such a degree of aggravation that it seriously affects the business and social life of the entire community. It is therefore recommended that the Chamber of Commerce of the City of Los Angeles, the most powerful civic group in this area, devote its facilities to a solution of this problem, commanding and coordinating therefore the facilities of all existing agencies.30

The Grand Jury’s emphasis on alleviating horrible residential conditions in the non-White community of Los Angeles directly challenged some of the circumstances that fueled the politicization of the zoot suit and the young men that consciously aligned with the political, cultural, and social significations of the garment.

In the wake of the riots in New York, two thousand people met at Hunter College in New York City on September 25, 1943, for the Citizens Emergency Conference for Interracial Unity.31 The conference, at which both Fiorello LaGuardia and Walter White spoke, attempted to create a program of action that would help forge interracial unity. The official report of the conference stated,

The time for the abolition of discrimination and segregation is NOW. We cannot afford to postpone action . . . The facts are known to those whose responsibility is to act. The conference does not propose any further studies or investigations of conditions of Negroes or other minority groups. It proposes that specific action be immediately taken to deal with the known conditions.
The sum and sense of the panel discussions held this afternoon was simply this: that Negroes, together with other minorities, must be brought into full and equal economic, political, and social relationship with all other citizens in the community and the nation.\textsuperscript{32}

Whether or not this could be immediately achieved, the actions of the conference reflected progress. Furthermore, the examples of the Los Angeles Grand Jury and the Conference for Interracial Unity are representative of the progressive nature of racial politics that emerged among some groups after the riots of 1943.\textsuperscript{13} This is not to say that the zoot suit riots and other race riots across the United States immediately solved all of America’s problems regarding racial discrimination. Rather, the unrest of the summer of 1943 brought the zoot suit and racial politics to the attention of American society and forced many to reconsider the patterns of marginalization and discrimination aimed at oppressed minority groups in the nation.

The zoot suit did not emerge as a result of World War II; rather, the continuation and exacerbation of oppressive conditions in the United States during the war politicized a body of Mexican American and African American youths that chose to wear the zoot suit to express their unique identities and dignity in a society that sought to reject their presence. Despite their nuanced politics of dress, they were often misunderstood and characterized as subversive and a threat to American democracy. Whether or not this was the case, they wore their zoot suits proudly. While some zoot suiters dodged the draft, others joined the war effort in a variety of ways (although they were unwelcome at times). Ultimately, the zoot suit riots and race riots of 1943 thrust zoot suiters into the spotlight. While they were initially subjected to judgmental attention that criminalized them for the mere act of wearing a style of suit, their presence and style managed to help insert their voices into a larger discussion of citizenship in the United States that could not be ignored. While the \textit{sapeurs} of Congo-Brazzaville were not brutally attacked like zoot suiters in the United States, similar struggles in colonial Brazzaville and World War II helped politicize the act of dressing elegantly for Congolese soldiers. The following section will discuss the rise of the \textit{sapeurs} and the politicization of flamboyant fashion in the Congo in the World War II era.

\textbf{HOT COUTURE: THE POLITICIZATION OF THE SAPEUR IN THE WORLD WAR II ERA}

The origins of the \textit{sapeur} movement originally centered on the intersection of Western fashion and African tradition in colonial Brazzaville. While this is not something that necessarily disappeared from the \textit{sapeur} movement in the decades to follow, another major factor entered the discourse on dress culture during the mid-twentieth century. World War II had a profound
impact on the manner in which Congolese men dressed and contributed to the politicized nature of the *sapeur* movement in the mid-twentieth century. This section will delve into the explicit psychological, physical, and emotional implications of World War II and how these factors shaped the development of *sapeur* movement.

Before the fall of France in 1940, the French sent eighty thousand African troops to fight in World War II. While the French did not take the entirety of its Africans soldiers from Congo-Brazzaville, the implications of the large number of African troops fighting on the European front of World War II is important because it represents the immense number of lives directly influenced by the war and experiences abroad. According to Myron Echenberg, Africans accounted for 9 percent of the French Army in France in 1940. While this number seems relatively small, African soldiers from Francophone Africa became a major force within the Allied cause in World War II. Toward the beginning of the war, the French and Belgians depended on voluntary enlistment in their African colonies, but conscription eventually became more prominent as the war progressed.

African soldiers fought valiantly for the French cause in the campaign that led to the fall of France in the summer of 1940. An example of this can be seen in the eloquent words of Corporal Jean-Baptiste N’Tchoréré, an officer from Gabon who was stationed on the lower Somme. He wrote a letter to his father in which he stated, “Whatever happens papa, I will always be ready to defend our dear country France.” This fervor and a deep fear of harsh treatment from the Germans led Francophone Africans to resist German soldiers with all of their might.

The combination of Nazi propaganda and rumors of Africans mutilating Germans informed the German outlook on Africans fighting in World War II. As a result, German soldiers killed Africans in some of the most inhumane ways, including the use of flame throwers. Those that survived became prisoners of war in German internment camps where they faced increased levels of violence and discrimination from the Germans. It is estimated that half of the Africans in these camps did not survive. Furthermore, according to Raffaël Scheck, “German officers ordering the killings of black POWs clearly considered the West Africans illegitimate combatants and therefore not protected by the Geneva Convention.”

Following the fall of Belgium in May 1940 and France in the same summer, the two countries had little to cling to except their central African colonies. According to Crowder, “For France and Belgium, continued existence as independent entities briefly resided in their own dependencies: French Equatorial Africa in the case of France, and the Congo in the case of Belgium.” More specifically, when France fell to the Germans, their empire fragmented as the colonial administrations of French North and West Africa, the Somali coast, and Madagascar chose to align with the Vichy government, while French Equatorial Africa (AEF), led by Félix Eboué, aligned with the Free French cause.
As a result of the relatively large colonial defection, Charles de Gaulle began broadcasting messages from Brazzaville to recruit soldiers and rally the population behind the Allied cause. On November 3, 1940, W.T. Arms devoted attention to this phenomenon in his *New York Times* article, “Short-Wave Pick-Ups”:

General Charles de Gaulle has turned to short-wave broadcasting as a means of rallying French Africans to his standard. Lands which have seldom before spoken by radio to the world today are loud with cries of “Vive La France Libre” and the trumpeting of new French fighting songs . . . 46

Due to a combination of the flood of propaganda and mandatory conscription in the AEF, more African soldiers joined the cause and fought tirelessly in Europe’s war against fascism.47

Francophone African soldiers faced considerable racism from Nazis in POW camps, but the discrimination against African soldiers did not end there. Despite the great contributions of Africans in the World War II cause, the French also treated African soldiers poorly. Upon liberation, many African soldiers continued to fight against the Germans and others worked in military labor units.49 Eventually, most of the Africans stationed in the country were transferred to the south of France to wait to be sent back to Africa.49 This was primarily because of the *blanchiment*, or Whitening, policy that strived for “young Frenchmen [to] be given a taste of victory, a share in the Allied success in ridding France of its shame and humiliation”50

Africans did not look at this situation with complacency. According to Echenberg, there was considerable resistance among francophone African soldiers during this period as evidenced by the fifteen recorded incidents among enlisted African men serving in Europe.51 He states,

Underlying issues of the uprisings ranged from aspects of daily life to ideological issues. Most common were complaints about poor food, clothing and housing, failure to deliver back pay, bans on the sale of alcohol, and disputes over access to women. But the spark that set off the trouble was most often either a physical attack on African soldiers by French military personnel or else a racial slight.52

The level of dissent demonstrated by this disturbance later fueled politicization against the oppressive colonial regime. This spirit of dissent was central to the creation of the *sapeur* mentality and lifestyle upon the return of Congolese veterans to Brazzaville after their participation in the war was completed.

Despite the harsh sidelining of African soldiers during the *blanchiment* campaign, the decision for French leaders to meet at the Brazzaville Conference in 1944 to discuss colonial conditions and social, economic, political,
and legal reforms in the French empire represented a level of respect for the French colonies and a recognition that colonial policies had to change. Major newspapers around the world covered this groundbreaking moment in colonial history. On January 30, 1944, The Washington Post released an article entitled “Brazzaville Conference: On the United Nations’ Inside Front” that discussed the upcoming conference and some of the issues that would later emerge. After setting the stage by discussing the participants in the Brazzaville Conference, the author reported on the deep significance of the occasion due to the urgency of addressing French postwar policy in Africa. He stated,

This is a problem of vital concern to France, for whom the war brought the realization of the importance of her colonial empire and all of the complexities connected with colonial problems. It was only after the collapse of Metropolitan France that the French were able to appreciate the political and economic value of their empire.53

Further, Visson argued that the course of the war forced France into a new position that centered around “empire-consciousness.”54 The desire to invoke a greater level of participation of those within the Francophone African colonies and increased integration with France was central to this new ideological leaning.55 Despite this, is interesting to consider the implications of this shift in politics because it contrasts the level of inequality demonstrated by the policy of blanchiment, France’s inability to provide back pay to many African soldiers, and the utter lack of essential supplies given to Africans soldiers in general.

Nevertheless, according to The Washington Post, the Brazzaville Conference sought to revolutionize colonial policies:

The main object of the reforms is to develop the French colonies as rapidly as possible into a French federation. Exploitation of native populations has been a common feature of colonial administrations in the past, and even in the most benevolently administered colonies, the position of labor was far behind that of the parent nations. It was a great step forward, therefore, when the Brazzaville conference declared in favor of establishing the freedom of labor, with all the normal rights of workers in democratic countries implied in that phrase, and set a period of five years as the time to be allowed the local colonial authorities to complete the attainment of this objective . . .

. . . The process of granting greater liberties to the colonies will be considerably accelerated by the elevation to responsibility for government of the men of the resistance movements. They have not only gained a greater sympathy for the situation of colonial peoples, but they have come to realize that France’s chance for the future of being regarded as one of the world’s primary powers will improve to the extent that all
the 100 million people of her empire reach full political maturity such as is at present exemplified by the 40 million of that number who live in France proper.\textsuperscript{56}

Despite the boastful language used by the author, the Brazzaville Conference did little to help Africans truly find emancipation. Rather, the end of the war brought a renewal of colonial missions and a second colonization of Africa.\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, Crowder argues that the Brazzaville Conference served as a means to strengthen bonds between Francophone colonies and the metropole.\textsuperscript{58} He states, “Through a strengthened empire the grandeur of France would be re-established.”\textsuperscript{59}

The half-hearted attempts of the French at restoring unity and creating social, political, economic, and legal reforms were problematic because they attempted to profit from these insufficient reforms under the guise of creating improved colonial conditions and rewarding Africans for their contributions to the French empire. The contradictory nature of French claims and the unfair treatment of African soldiers during World War II could not be negated with the shallow acts of the Brazzaville Conference in 1944, due to the education and invaluable experiences of soldiers in Europe during the war.

Africans that experienced Europe during World War II returned to Africa with a new outlook on colonialism and European colonizers. According to Crowder, “[The war] exposed [nationalist] pioneers to a range of influences much broader than those that had been able to penetrate the enclosed colonial world of the 1930s.”\textsuperscript{60} Soldiers were able to learn to read and write, acquire skills they could bring back to Africa, and learn about theories of democracy, communism, and liberty.\textsuperscript{61} Similarly, according to Ndabaningi Sithole,

\begin{quote}
World War II . . . has had a great deal to do with the awakening of the peoples of Africa. During the war the African came in contact with practically all the peoples of the earth . . . He saw no difference between the primitive and civilized man. In short, he saw through European pretensions that only Africans were savages. This had a revolutionizing psychological impact on the African.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

Crowder’s and Sithole’s works complement each other because they illustrate an ongoing process that allowed African soldiers to form new ideas about democracy, colonial oppression, and their wartime experiences and express these ideas using the education they acquired during the war.

World War II exposed Africans to new ideas regarding politics and philosophies, allowed African soldiers to rethink the patterns of discrimination thrust upon them by the hypocritical doctrine of the colonizer, and helped Africans acquire new technical skills that they brought back to their homes following the war. The shared experiences of African soldiers
empowered them to think beyond daily oppression within the colony. One example of the reconceptualization of daily life and society as a result of war-time experiences was the increased politicization of the sapeur movement. Similar to their peers from across the African continent, Brazzaville veterans returned from World War II with new ideas regarding identity, politics, and colonialism. However, what differentiated Brazzaville veterans from their counterparts in other areas of Africa was the fact that their experiences abroad deeply contributed to the emergence of the dress culture phenomenon known as the SAPE.

Many scholars, including Justin-Daniel Gandoulou, argue that the origins of the sapeur movement centered on the post–World War II period in Africa and European overconsumption. Yet, when one considers the entirety of the experiences of Africans in the French army in World War II, it is impossible to ignore the complexity of their experiences as soldiers in the metropole and the influence this had on dress and identity politics. By solely focusing on World War II consumerism and high fashion, one loses sight of what made the sapeur movement unique from over-arching fashion movements in Europe: a deeply imbedded sense of identity and colonial and post-colonial politics expressed through the medium of elegant clothing.

While it is easy to make the assumption that Congolese soldiers simply fell in love with French fashion while serving in the war and sought to mimic it when they returned to the Congo, making this shallow assumption does not account for the complexity of the French fashion industry during this period. Valerie Steele’s, Paris Fashion: A Cultural History, traces the history of French fashion, its importance in a global context, and gives considerable attention to the World War II era. According to Steele, the fashion industry was largely left under French control despite the Nazi’s initial attempt to move the entire industry from Paris to Berlin. As a result, the couture houses that remained open during the war dealt with German oppression and fabric shortages. Nevertheless, they put their efforts toward constructing elaborate creations that were often copied on the streets of Paris. Furthermore, indulging in French fashion was seen as a type of resistance against the Germans. As Steele states, “English and Americans hoped that saving material would help the war effort, in occupied France the people assumed that the more material a garment used the less the Germans would get.”

Despite the ability of Parisian couture houses to maintain at least a semblance of autonomy, this did not mean that everyday French people had easy access to high fashion. In May 1944, the New York Times shed considerable light onto the realities of the French fashion industry:

There are two types of fashions in Paris. One is followed by the great majority of women who, like Solange, try to keep smart and use whatever they possess, be it a curtain, a bedspread or just scraps. The other concerns an infinitesimal group of Parisians who can still afford the couturiers . . .
. . . The Galeries Lafayette have closed all of their floors but one. There is nothing to sell. Yet the Kommandatur has issued another order forbidding the counters to look bare. Thus shopping becomes somewhat of an adventure. Parisians never know what will appear on the shelves next. One day nothing but paper napkins will cover all the counters. The next day there will be a crop of socks.

The conditions in the Parisian fashion world illuminate the economic difficulties felt by average French consumers during the war. While Paris was, and continued to be, envisioned as the strong metropolis that could not fall, it is evident that Paris did fall to the Germans and was severely distraught by this fact. Furthermore, generalizations regarding the fashion education of African soldiers in France during the war must take the extreme levels of desperation exhibited by average French citizens into account.

Following their return from the war, Congolese soldiers began to rebuild their lives in a way that reflected their experiences abroad. While Gandoulou’s assertion that the sapeur movement originated in the post-war period fails to take into account the longer cultural and political history of those in the region, his argument that the men that returned from the war brought new ideas of fashion to Brazzaville is correct. As Martin states, “After the Second World War, the return of veterans, increased travel abroad and the growth of an international popular culture through music and the cinema helped to spread new fashion ideas.”

In previous decades, the sapeur movement centered on night clubs and dance halls, and this did not disappear. However, following the war, organizations based around the common theme of fashion emerged. According to Martin, “The proto-sapeurs clubs of the 1950s expressed the burgeoning interests of the urban youth. Through their ‘cult of elegance’ young men sought to define their social distinctiveness, while at the same time deriving a great deal of personal pleasure from wearing stylish clothes, admiring each others’ dress and, hopefully, attracting girls.”

As superficial as these organizations may seem, they also served as mutual-aid associations, addressed the interests of the participants, and some were inspired by European concepts and thinkers. An example of this was the group entitled “Existos,” which was founded by students inspired by Sartre, a French thinker whose work they undoubtedly came into contact with in France. According to Martin, there were several groups like Existos in existence in colonial Brazzaville, including Cabaret and Simple et bien. Through these groups, they engaged in discussions regarding fashion and modernity that were initiated by veterans following their return from the war.

The emergence of groups like Existos mirrors Johannes Fabian’s conjecture that, “Popular culture, however, did not come about merely as a response to questions and conditions; it asks questions and creates conditions.” Groups like Existos exemplified Fabian’s argument because they served as a meeting place where sapeurs could evaluate colonial society and politics,
and furthermore, creatively ponder ways to exert their individuality and agency through dress culture and representation. The meetings of post-war sapeurs represented an ongoing discourse that heavily influenced the growth of the sapeur movement and symbolized the expansion of increasingly politicized ideas.

In addition, the ongoing discourses of dress and representation during the 1940s and 1950s in Brazzaville represent a renegotiation of history. This meshes with Fabian's notion that "popular culture comprises a complex of distinctive expression of life experience. It was pioneered by the urban masses and eventually accepted by the total population." Thus, the ongoing discussion of fashion and modernity in associations like Existos embodied the memories of lived experiences and wearing these memories to express their stories to others. For them, fashion was not simply about random articles of clothing; instead, it was the expression of their identities, frustrations, and experiences through carefully created outfits.

The clear divergence from European mimicry can also be seen in the process in which men acquired clothing immediately following World War II. According to Martin, early sapeurs were usually employed members of the colony and often had their clothing custom made by talented tailors using the best fabrics. Furthermore, she states, "In 1950, a report on the clothing market in AEF noted that the sale of ready-made clothes was still restricted, since most consumers bought cloth and had it made up by specialized tailors." The methods utilized by early sapeurs are significant because they were a distinct break from the colonizer's monopoly on new fashions.

The series of decisions regarding dress culture and fashion following World War II in colonial Brazzaville reflects the larger body of experiences that shaped the sapeur's understanding of himself, society, and the colonizer. His decision to wear custom clothing represents this history. The sapeur returned from the war with money and new ideas about fashion. However, he did not simply don colonial cast-offs, second-hand clothing, or newly imported fashions; instead, he took matters into his own hands, created something new that reshaped understandings of fashion among the Africans of Brazzaville, and exhibited a sense of fashion independence from the colonizer.

One cannot look at the SAPE as an isolated movement among men that had reached Europe because those participating in the movement extended beyond the number of veterans and students that had traveled to the metropole. Thus, the implications of the early sapeur’s decision to turn contemporary fashion on its head in the colony reached beyond the individual fashion clubs and created a trend that involved the larger African population of Brazzaville. This was not a small, grassroots movement; rather, it involved a majority of African consumers in Brazzaville who preferred fabric to ready-made clothing and the people that observed the early sapeurs in the nightclubs of Leopoldville.
The manner in which the participants in this dress culture movement acquired goods also represents a form of resistance against the racist discourses that surrounded colonialism. Their clothing may have reflected European trends, but they were made by Africans with fabric selected by Africans to fit their needs. A clear example of this is evident in Leisure and Society in Colonial Brazzaville when Martin discusses the demand for wool among African men who appreciated the elegance of wool suits despite the tropical climate. These men sharply contrasted European men in Brazzaville who preferred other fabrics due to the harsh environment.77

Furthermore, their conscious decision to purchase fabric and have tailors construct the pieces cannot simply be deduced to creating cheap outfits with readily available labor and materials, due to the fact that the material they purchased was expensive high-quality fabric.78 As a result, tailors whose sole business centered on creating new fashions weekly for the sapeurs began to emerge in Brazzaville.79 Thus, the early Congolese sapeurs were giving back to their communities and stimulating local economies, rather than mindlessly purchasing finished goods that originated in Europe.

The men that took control of fashion in the colony strongly countered the racist discourses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that attested that Africans could not take care of themselves and needed to be civilized.80 Through the construction of new fashions it is clear that they were not just subservient beings and could take control of their own lives and economies. Moreover, this step away from the colonizer and his sphere of control undermined a sense of economic dependency seen between the French and the Congolese during this period. The movement showed that it was not based around a worship of European high society and its labels; rather, it involved the unique African embodiment of aesthetics, culture, and fashion.

The internal dialogues of resistance and cultural melding fits within the framework of Hendrickson’s Clothing and Difference: Embodied Identities in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa, where she states, “clothing and other treatments of the body are primary symbols in the performances through which modernity—and therefore history—have been conceived, constructed, and challenged in Africa.”81 The men of Bacongo who wore custom clothing from African tailors were participating in the performances that Hendrickson discusses. Moreover, they negotiated concepts of fashion, politics, and identity and expressed these things overtly through the clothes in which they lived their daily lives.

Similar to the broader world of fashion, trends within Brazzaville changed quickly and the early sapeurs began to appreciate prêt-a-porter fashions. The immense amount of imported clothing entering the AEF during this period contributed to this shift.82 According to Crowder, “During the war a substantial number of factories was established in the major African cities to process locally produced materials that hitherto had been imported in their finished state from Europe.”83 Nevertheless, the end of
the war and the rebuilding of the French empire and economy eventually brought an influx of European finished goods, including clothing, that could have driven down the cost of dressing fashionably. It is important to remember that the men of Bacongo were part of a larger French empire and at times, their consumption was heavily influenced by the French colonial presence. This shift in consumption reflects the sort of relationship that typified colonialism.

Furthermore, the availability of synthetic fabrics like polyester also influenced the *sapeur*’s decision to wear imported clothing, because these materials were easier to care for and lasted longer. These qualities were important because those that dressed elegantly did not necessarily have consistent access to clean water or the funds to cover specialized clothing care. Despite the move toward European articles of clothing, the political aspects of the *sapeur* movement remained intact, as the longer history of culture, politics, and identity production could not be forgotten with the importation of fashionable articles of clothing in Brazzaville and the relatively short period of colonial rule.

Despite their revolutionary attitude toward dress and politics, the early *sapeurs* were heavily critiqued for their spending habits by the educated elite in the AEF during the 1950s. Examples of this can be seen in *Liaison*, a literary magazine published during the 1950s and 1960s. According to Elisabeth Dorier-Apprill, Abel Kouvouama, and Christophe Appril, *Liaison* was a popular publication among the *évolués* of the AEF and published cultural works and social commentaries for the intellectuals of the region.

Martin discusses some of the poignant arguments against the early *sapeurs* submitted to *Liaison* in her work. She states,

> An article on the theme, “clothes do not make a man”, castigated a young man who earned 7000–8000 francs per month yet ordered a suit for 7000 francs and two pairs of leather shoes for 6000 francs . . . He went on to claim that such excesses drove young men into debt and fraudulent activities. Another claimed . . . their attitudes and ways of dressing are contaminated by the “Rock and Roll” virus.

What is interesting about the outrage among the educated elite members of Congolese society that submitted articles to *Liaison* is the fact that they failed to recognize the political implications of the manner in which the early *sapeurs* dressed. Instead of recognizing the overt politicization of dress and fashion, they oversimplified the existence of the early *sapeurs* and associated the movement with excess, crime, and a greater worldwide phenomenon that minimized the movement to acts of mimicry.

The lapse of understanding could be attributed to the vast differences between the lives of *évolués* and *sapeurs* in colonial Brazzaville. The *évolués* that contributed to *Liaison* clearly had greater opportunities for education, were coddled by the colonial government for their achievements,
and advanced further than the early *sapeurs* of colonial Brazzaville. Discourses on propriety relating to dress can also be seen in conversations on respectability in the African American community of the United States. In the context of the African American community, some felt as though dressing in a manner that contrasted the status quo was a threat to advancement in American society. This notion is definitely evident among the old settlers discussed in Davarian Baldwin’s *Chicago’s New Negroes*.\(^8^8\)

It is evident that there were competing notions of politics at the time in Congo-Brazzaville and the United States. In the context of Congo-Brazzaville, the *Liaison* contributors that preferred more conservative fashions were clearly participating in discourses on modernity, politics, and nationalism through the publication; however, they failed to recognize the politicization of dress in *sapeur* circles because they could not truly understand the lives of the early *sapeurs* and those less fortunate than themselves. As a result, they oversimplified a very complex political, cultural, and social phenomenon. Rather than simply living beyond their means, the *sapeurs* of the post-war period attempted to exert a sense of control in their lives, something that they had been systematically stripped of during colonialism and was not repaired during the Brazzaville Conference. Their fashion choices were so much more than simply pairing a seemingly ostentatious shirt with a pair of trousers. Instead, it was an expression of identity, agency, and independence from colonial control.

Those with higher levels of education in Brazzaville could clearly express their political thoughts in a formal manner, as evidenced by the *évolués* that contributed to *Liaison*; however, this does not negate the merit of the expression of the *sapeurs*. When one considers the similar discourses occurring in the public and literary spheres of other African colonies, one can recognize that the *sapeur* was incredibly progressive and groundbreaking in their more nuanced approach to colonial politics.\(^8^9\)

This section centered on the impact of World War II on the history of the *sapeur*. It is evident that an understanding of the origins of the *sapeur* would be incomplete without examining the immense role of World War II. Francophone African soldiers served in World War II in great numbers and had a wide variety of experiences, ranging from fighting on the European front to becoming prisoners of war in German internment camps. Despite the immense diversity of experiences, World War II educated Africans, united them with their peers from across the continent, exposed the mortality of France, and made Africans subject to increased racism and terrible treatment from the French.

As a result of this, it is impossible to say that Africans simply went to France as soldiers during the war and became obsessed with the fashion of the colonizer. By solely focusing on World War II consumerism and high fashion one loses sight of what made the *sapeur* movement unique from over-arching fashion movements in Europe: the expression of political ideas and a deeply imbedded sense of identity. Furthermore, it negates the
immense cultural and political history of these men and erases their memori-
ies regarding the unfair treatment they received from the French both dur-
ing the war and in the colonial state.

While people in other colonies may have expressed themselves through
the written word (Césaire and Senghor), the newly politicized Congolese
veterans returning from the war chose to express themselves through cloth-
ing. However, this does not discount the political voices of the *sapeurs*. Sim-
ply considering this movement to be a fashionable fad removes the political
agency of the men that returned from the war with new ideas and a new
outlook on life in the Congo. Their conceptualizations of power dynam-
ics and self-proclaimed fashion existentialism through groups like *Existos*
represented a divergence from complacency within the colony.

**CONCLUSION**

It is clear that the zoot suiters and *sapeurs* had considerable differences.
While they adopted similar styles of dress, their struggles differed in a vari-
ety of ways due to political, social, and cultural conditions. Yet, despite
these factors, societal oppression united these individuals around the com-
mon theme of fashion. Zoot suiters and *sapeurs* faced discrimination and
oppression daily on the home front and abroad. World War II helped fuel
the politicization of dress culture among these youths. Whether or not they
realized it, they were participating in a global crusade against discrimina-
tion. By simply casting a superficial glance at dress, one may lose sight of
the nuanced politics of those that decided to dress elegantly and flamboy-
antly in Congo-Brazzaville and the United States.

Whether they were criminalized or ostracized, zoot suiters and *sapeurs* found unique ways to exert their individuality and dignity amidst climates
categorized by state violence and oppression. Understanding their his-
tories is important because their dress culture practices represent a larger
discussion of politics and fashion at the subaltern level. This discourse does
not simply conclude with the end of World War II in the United States or
independence in the Congo; rather, it continues through fashion and the
trends of the oppressed within the histories of these two countries. The
histories of zoot suiters and *sapeurs* is not just about clothing; instead, it
is a conversation that extends from the beginning of African cultures to
the present and was built on experiences like World War II, which forced
normal citizens to rethink fashion, identity, society, politics, and culture.
Thus, the World War II era cannot be forgotten because it helped set the
framework for the political struggles that followed.

This chapter does not attempt to be a definitive study of zoot suiters and
*sapeurs* during the World War II era. Others have written on zoot suiters in
World War II, including Alvarez and Kelley, and they have done a fantastic
job of illuminating the complexity of the zoot suit experience in America.
Rather than attempt to compete with their works, this chapter attempts to show how oppression influenced these two dress culture movements in the context of World War II. No one has placed the zoot suiter and sapeur next to each other in an in-depth study that focuses on the strikingly similar characteristics that fueled the politicization of dress culture in both countries. Thus, this chapter attempts to highlight these similarities as a way of making the critical linkage between fashion and politics. As evidenced by the zoot suiters and sapeurs, wearing clothing is much more than simply selecting an outfit to wear on any given day. Rather, the process of wearing clothes is informed by a complex body of beliefs surrounding internal and external politics. Zoot suiters and sapeurs exemplify this notion.

NOTES

5. “Findings and Recommendations of the Grand Jury of Los Angeles County for 1943, Based Upon its Inquiry into Juvenile Crime and Delinquency in that County,” Papers of the NAACP, Part 7, Series A.
7. “Letter from Walter White to President Roosevelt, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Attorney General Biddle Regarding the Zoot Suit Riots in California, June 11, 1943,” Papers of the NAACP, Part 7, Series A.
10. Alvarez goes into detail about the use of the body in the struggle for dignity in the third chapter of the book.
15. *Sleepy Lagoon News*, Papers of the NAACP, Part 7, Series A. There was no date on the document, however, the newsletter does state, “This is the news of the Sleepy Lagoon Defense committee—reporting to you the progress of the campaign to free the boys who were convicted in the Sleepy Lagoon case.
18 months ago.” Since the conviction occurred in January 1943, it is reasonable to assume that this newsletter was distributed in the summer of 1944.

20. Ibid., 171.
21. Peter Furst, “Press Blamed for Spread of Zoot Suit Riots,” June 10, 1943, Papers of the NAACP, Part 7, Series A. The title of the newspaper was not included in the microfilm series.
22. Peter Furst, “Press Blamed for Spread of Zoot Suit Riots,” June 10, 1943, Papers of the NAACP, Part 7, Series A. The title of the newspaper was not included in the microfilm series.
24. Ibid.
25. “Harsher Methods Needed,” *Hempstead Long Island Review-Star*, Papers of the NAACP, Part 7, Series A. The exact date of publication was not included in the microfilm series.
26. Ibid.
27. Peter Furst, “Press Blamed for Spread of Zoot Suit Riots.”
28. Ibid.
31. It is important to note that the riots in New York did not center around zoot suiters. As Kelley states, in both Detroit and Harlem, “riots were sparked by incidents of racial injustice. The zoot suiters, many of whom participated in the looting and acts of random violence, we also victims of, or witnesses to, acts of outright police brutality.” Kelley, *Race Rebels*, 167. Thus, the participation of zoot suiters in the riots reflects a larger frustration with oppression and the brutality of the status quo that extended beyond the specific group of elegantly dressed men and women.
33. In a letter from September 13, 1943, the Archdiocese of Los Angeles offered suggestions to the Attorney General’s office regarding police action during race riots. Similarly, the Peace Officers Committee submitted a report to the governor of California on civil disturbances. The report urged officers to gain an understanding of the social conditions of the communities surrounding them in an attempt to prevent race riots. Both of these documents expressed a desire to move forward and address the inequality and discrimination rampant in Los Angeles. Again, these two documents represent the larger body of racially progressive work in this period. Both of these documents can be found in the papers of the NAACP microfilm series, Part 7, Series A.
35. Very little has been written specifically about the experiences of African soldiers from Congo-Brazzaville and the Belgian Congo in World War II. Nevertheless, based on the experiences of those from the larger scope of Francophone Africa, we can forge an understanding of general conditions
Danielle Porter Sanchez

that influenced the lives of those from Brazzaville. Similarly, due to the close linkages between the colonizers of AEF and the Belgian Congo during the war, it is evident that there was a sense of continuity between the neighboring colonies.

38. Echenberg, “‘Morts Pour La France,’” 369–370.
40. Echenberg, “‘Morts Pour La France,’” 371. Raffael Scheck discusses prejudice and violence against African soldiers in Hitler’s African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). He also argues that the part of the prejudice felt against African soldiers originated during Germany’s experience as a colonizing power in Africa due to the alleged atrocities committed against German soldiers. The second chapter of his book traces the emergence of popularized prejudice against African soldiers and the continuation and repercussions of racist ideologies during World War II.
41. Ibid.
42. Scheck, Hitler’s African Victims, 67.
43. The role of Africans from the Belgian Congo participating in World War II in Africa and abroad has not been discussed in detail and requires serious attention in the future.
45. Ibid., 16. The Vichy regime, led by Marshal Pétain, lasted from July 1940 to August 1944. Vichy France was essentially the government of France during this period and collaborated with the Germans. Free French, led by Charles de Gaulle, began its campaign against Vichy France in summer 1940 and continuously fought against the Axis powers until the end of the war.
47. Crowder, “Second World War,” 31. According to Crowder, mandatory conscription in the AEF and other parts of Africa was not consistent from the beginning of the war. He states, “As demands for recruits rose, voluntary enlistment was increasingly replaced by some measure of conscription, in French, Belgian, and British territories.”
48. Echenberg, “‘Morts Pour La France,’” 373.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 374
51. Ibid., 375.
52. Ibid., 375.
54. Ibid.
58. Ibid., 42.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 31.
64. Ibid., 267.
65. Ibid.
68. Phyllis Martin devotes considerable attention to night life and fashion during colonialism in Brazzaville in Chapter 6 of *Leisure and Society in Colonial Brazzaville*.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 315.
75. Martin, “Contesting Clothes,” 424.
77. Ibid. The wool selected by Africans in Brazzaville should not be confused with tropical wool, which became increasingly popular throughout colonies in Africa during the twentieth century.
79. Ibid.
82. “In 1950, 129 tons of clothing such as jackets, trousers and shirts, and 40 tons of accessories such as scarves, collars and ties had been imported: 80 percent was kept in the AEF and the rest re-exported to British and Belgian territories.” Martin, *Leisure and Society*, 166.
86. Ibid.
89. There are several outstanding books that discuss nationalism and politics leading to the struggle for independence in Africa, including Cooper’s *Africa Since 1940* and *Decolonization and African Society*, and Falola’s *Africa*, vol. 4, *The End of Colonial Rule: Nationalism and Decolonization* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002).

BIBLIOGRAPHY


South Africa and Nigeria share a lot of things in common. First, both have a shared colonial experience under British rule. Secondly, both nations were, for a long period of time after their independence, under obnoxious and repressive regimes—apartheid in South Africa and the military government in Nigeria. In South Africa, Apartheid was dominantly by a White minority maintaining power over the majority. The military regimes in Nigeria were similar to apartheid because, even if those exercising power under the military regime in Nigeria were Africans, the institutions through which they were governing were neo-colonial institutions. The military oligarchy was thus Black in color, but White in mentality. Whereas the apartheid system had a long, unbroken period of rule in South Africa that terminated with the collapse of the system in 1990, the military regime in Nigeria, on the other hand, sometimes alternated with a civilian government. The first military government came to power in 1966 and did not abdicate until 1979. It rebounded to power in 1983, only to abdicate again in 1993, for three months, before it resumed power again that same year until 1999.

Thirdly, the two systems had a penchant for collaborating with the traditional rulers to carry out their anti-people policies. To annul the June 12, 1993, presidential election and to give credibility to the video coup of 1997, the military regime in Nigeria enlisted the support of the traditional rulers, which they willingly gave in return for ensuring that the future constitution affirms the roles of the traditional rulers in its content.

In South Africa, on the other hand, prominent chiefs were part beneficiaries of apartheid’s “tribal homeland” policy and its ethnic-focused politics in the Black townships. It is widely known that at the basis of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi’s politics of ethnicity lay the legitimizing notion of “traditional authority.”

Currently, the two countries are under civilian democratic governments. In both nations and, indeed most African countries, according to Sklar, “traditional authorities are unmistakably formal and part of public domain. Furthermore, their existence is often recognized by national constitutions, and they are frequently incorporated into a constitutional order
for the performance of specific functions.”3 But the issue of traditional rulers in modern governance has dominated political discussion in these countries in recent times. The pertinent question is, should traditional rulers be involved in modern governance? If so, how do we ensure its co-existence with the modern and democratic system of government? Again, at what level of government should they be involved in governance if they were ever considered for participation in governance at all: federal, state, local, or at all levels? The concern of this chapter is to compare and examine the trends of the debates, regarding the integration of traditional rulership in modern governance, the gradual modernization of this process, and the question of women in traditional rulership.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND MODERN INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

A brief distinction between the apparatus of governance in traditional and modern systems of governance at the local level is necessary here to elucidate their contradictions. This distinction has South African and the Nigerian variants, although it is essentially the same in content. The agencies and custodians of traditional practices, the customary regulatory bodies that moderate the ordinary business of life in an ethnic community include, among others (a) traditional rulers and chiefs, (b) the lineage, (c) the extended family system, (d) the nuclear family (marriage relations), (e) the age grades, (f) professional guilds, (g) administration of justice, and (h) official court historians, griots, and praise singers.4 For reckoning, women in Nigeria, particularly among the Yorubas, fought hard against these obstacles.

On the other hand, inherent in modern governance are certain basic elements that are created, even if forcefully, enabling an environment for citizens in general, and women in particular, to exercise their fundamental human rights. The first of such elements is “an energetic system of the citizenry in which there exists a reciprocal relationship of participation and distribution between the structures of administration and the citizens.” In this is the advantage of collective welfare.5 Secondly, “modern governance is operational open and visible, thus accommodating the principles of accessibility, accountability, public criticisms and responsive meaningful change in the direction of the populist welfare path. Thirdly, and as a corollary, the formal separation of Government powers and the concomitant institutionalization of checks and balances assume lack of arbitrariness of governance which the traditional institutions seem to undermine in a rapidly transitory society.”6

The South African dimension sees modern governance as an entity that bolsters inalienable human rights and the imperative of democracy. Sithole elaborated on this when he said, “traditional leadership is thought of as
contradictory to democracy; sustained by lack of efficiency of local government; is expected to evolve out of governance options and politics through an infiltration of democracy and sound economic principles; and needs to be assisted to extinction by a state committed to ‘real’ democracy.”

TRADITIONAL RULERS COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN POWER

To start, traditional rulership in Nigeria and South Africa has managed to survive various administrations that attempted to obliterate it from governance. All human societies have had chiefs or traditional rulers at one time or the other and Africa is no exception. But when Africa was subdued by colonial powers, the colonizers faced the problem of how to govern African societies. To solve this problem, the British colonial authorities decided to make use of the only viable structure on ground, which was the institution of monarchy that was in place already. In South Africa the British colonial power not only made use of the chiefs or traditional rulers as agents of social control in reserve areas, but more importantly they were used as local government functionaries accountable to the colonial power, rather than the broad mass of the population. A similar, but much more elaborate, situation prevailed in Nigeria. Under the colonial administration in Nigeria, the local government was known as the Native Administration system, indirect rule or Anglo-African government as Ayoade prefers to call it, and this according to Alex Gboyega, comprised four main interdependent parts. First, the resident who provided direction and control; second, the Native Authority, usually headed by a chief who enjoyed legitimacy under the indigenous political system, and was often supported by a councils of elders; third, the Native Treasury; and fourth, the Native courts, composed of representatives of the Native Administration.

These arrangements, both in South Africa and Nigeria, curtailed the powers of the traditional rulers or chiefs, as the case may be, especially by the appointment of British Residents to supervise the traditional rulers. But the most devastating blow to the position and authority of the traditional rulers was the challenge of the educated classes (the politicians) for their non-inclusion in the running of the affairs of their countries. If the traditional rulers or chiefs, as the case may be, had come to accept the supremacy of the Whitman and the leeway, as Ajayi puts it, he gave them in the indirect rule system, “they could not understand the politicians or educated classes, mostly descendants of commoners, who were challenging the settled assumption of the day.” Political events however forced them (traditional rulers) to see the need for educated classes (mostly descendants of commoners) and participation in governance, especially at the higher levels of government. When in 1946, particularly in Nigeria, Governor Richard began to construct a national legislative council, Native Authorities,
Democratizing Traditional Rulership

according to Akpan, formed themselves into electoral colleges for the election of the representatives to the central legislature. It is important to note the connection between the Native Authorities as local institution and the National Legislature. The national legislative council was a place for lettered people with good command of English language, thus the dilemma of the majority of the chiefs that constituted the Native Authorities. As a way out, the traditional rulers devised the means of honorary chiefs for the educated ranks in their societies. Some members of the educated classes were awarded honorary chieftaincy titles, which allowed them to be admitted into the Native Administration councils. From there, they were elected to represent their respective Native Authorities at the central legislature. Traditional rulers that were sufficiently educated were also able to be elected.

As traditional rulers began to realize that all modern forms of governance in these two countries—colonial, civilian, military, or apartheid—no longer need their system of governance, because the people have developed to a stage where their social development contradicts the traditional institution, the traditional rulers began to settle for collaboration with any government of day, as long as their interests would be protected. But the modern types of governance mentioned above could not ignore them completely, given the politicians who wanted power. These politicians had to seek recognition and legitimacy from the traditional rulers, particularly at the rural level, because of the grassroots strength of pre-colonial infrastructures. The military and apartheid regimes in particular, being run by a minority and undemocratic government, sought the co-operation of the traditional rulers that were also battling with survival problems, and for legitimacy, particularly at the local level.

As the system of government changed in these two countries, traditional rulers also reordered their articles of exchange between the government and themselves. But the permanent interests of the traditional rulers were and are political, social, and economic survival. It was this that exposed the nature of the relationship between traditional rulers and the colonial, civilian, military, or apartheid systems. The description of this relationship between the traditional rulers and any of these systems of governance varies according to the perceptions of the scholars concerned. Some see it as collaboration; others see it as partnership or modernization because they believe it was “the progressive adaptation of native institution to modern condition.” Yet, other scholars describe the relationship between traditional rulers and their superior systems as cooptation because, according to them, colonial, military, and apartheid systems had always exercised power through the traditional rulers. This thus, led to the cultivation of a special relationship between them (traditional rulers) and the military or apartheid systems, in particular. This relationship is underpinned by the inevitable tie of reciprocal dependence that prevented the military or apartheid system from confronting the issue of the role of traditional rulers in democratic process. Because the colonial, military, and apartheid
systems of governance were aberrations in nature and content, however, the dilemma in the present day democratic governments is how to order the relationship between the traditional rulers and the politicians in modern governance, given the antithetical nature of both democratic and monarchical governments.

TRADITIONAL RULERS IN POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE

The determined efforts of traditional rulers to survive in modern governance led them to participate in politics and ultimately in governance, but with disastrous consequences. In South Africa for instance, traditional leadership dominates political development and party politics in at least two of its nine provinces—Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal—and are experiencing resurgence in two more, Northern and Mpumalanga. Nigeria had a similar experience in its colonial and early independent periods up until the military emerged in politics and the governance of the country in 1966. For instance, the indirect rule system, according to the British, was meant to bring development in political and social spheres, but these gradually immersed traditional rulers in dirty Nigerian politics. Not only did they have to relate with the British residents as presidents of the Native Authorities, they also had to maintain a delicate balance between the interests of the Residents and their subjects in transmitting and executing British policies. Further evidence of their involvement in politics during this period was their involvement in the Electoral College for the purpose of electing representatives to the central legislature. With the beginning of party politics in 1950, nearly all the parties made traditional rulers the patrons of their parties before the election and also members of their executive councils—some as governors—after winning elections in their respective regions. Above all, lower Consultative Assemblies (Houses of Chiefs) were created for them in each of the then four regions. But their executive and legislative roles were merely ceremonial as the Premiers and the Houses of Assemblies were actually in charge of governance and legislations.

However, it should be noted that while the political clouts of the traditional rulers in these two countries, and indeed most African countries, are determined by at least two factors—politics and governance—they are central to any party gaining votes, mainly among the rural voters. This, perhaps, partly explains why, since the 1976 local government reforms in Nigeria, the activities of the traditional rulers have been limited to the local government level. Frequent clashes between the politicians and the traditional rulers, in the course of politicking and governance may be another factor for restricting the political activities of the traditional rulers to the local level. The frequent clashes with the politicians have often led to the dethronement and banishment of recalcitrant traditional rulers. Though more predominant in democratic dispensation, military and
Democratizing Traditional Rulership

colonial regimes also had course to remove traditional rulers that refused to subordinate to their authorities. However, the most disturbing aspects of traditional rulers’ burden on national governments, in modern governance, is how they constitute the most important source of challenge to the authority and legitimacy of local governments. They have always engaged the local governments in competition for the loyalty and resources of the localities. This situation is no less different in South Africa where the traditional rulers “maintain their unofficial powers in resource allocation in many communities by acting as the de facto local authorities.” These manifestations of the uncomfortable coexistence of the traditional rulers with democratic institutions, particularly local governments, are the subject of intense debate in both South Africa and Nigeria. Beginning from 1976, Nigeria has had rounds of debates leading to series of local government reforms—1976, 1978, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1999, and 2003. The 1978 and 1987 debates were the most spectacular in the way the traditional rulers were separated from the local government by creating a special council known as traditional rulers’ council at the local level, which was later confirmed by the 1979 constitution. The roles and functions assigned to the traditional councils were purely advisory and deliberative to the extent that local governments became the undisputed authorities at the local level. However, important traditional rulers, especially in the northern parts of the country, continued to wield considerable influence on local administration. The 1987 political bureau debate, on the other hand, was spectacular in the way Nigerian people were asked to participate on the future role of traditional rulers in modern governance. At the outcome of the debate, the Nigerian people presented five positions on what should be the future role of traditional rulers in governance: (a) the abolition of the institution, (b) the cooptation of the institution to participate in government, (c) the democratization of the institution to conform with modern government, (d) the maintenance of the status-quo, and (e) the determination of their relevance and future by the people. The military regime of that period, in action, appeared to have picked cooptation of traditional rulers in modern government, while the 1989 constitution, affirmed most of the recommendations of this reform, listed the functions of the traditional rulers council in its content, and stipulated that their functions were to be purely advisory, deliberative, and consultative. Exactly twenty years after these series of reforms attempted to divest the local governments of the burden of the traditional rulers, South Africa’s final constitution (passed by Parliament in 1996) compelled the state to recognize traditional leadership positions and obligated Parliament to provide local government roles for the chiefs, as well as to establish provincial houses and a National Council of Traditional Leaders for them. In addition, South African courts must also apply customary law wherever relevant. At the regional, state, or provincial level, chiefs in Nigeria had always had institutions that represent them. The regional, state, or provincial legislature was a bicameral of Houses of
Chiefs and Assembly. While the House of Assembly had lawmaking power, the House of Chiefs was merely deliberative and advisory. The chiefs played no role in the regional and national judicial system, except at the local level where a customary court existed. When the country entered the Second Republic, the Houses of Chiefs were phased out and replaced by the State Council of Chiefs, which was also advisory and deliberative in function in each state of the federation. For a long time, prominent chiefs across the country had always had presence in the meetings of the Council of State, which was a deliberative and advisory body to the Federal Military Government. However, under General Abacha’s military administration, an attempt was made in the 1995 draft constitution to enshrine the existence of the newly established National Traditional Rulers Forum. A military ruler, Lieutenant General Jeremiah Useni, initially headed the forum because of the acrimony among the traditional rulers over who headed this new national body.

However, as National Council of Traditional rulers in South Africa is just a mere “talk shop,” its equivalent in Nigeria is also a toothless “bulldog” with no real power—they only advise provincial and national governments, as the case may be, and have no law making power. Unlike South Africa, where the roles, functions, and powers for traditional authorities are not elaborate—leading to a great deal of confusion as to where the true authority lies, which negatively impacts service delivery—the roles, functions, and powers of traditional rulers in Nigeria are clearly stipulated in the previous constitutions, except the current one, which is still undergoing review.

Apart from the politics and governance that sometimes brings the traditional rulers and the national and provincial authorities on collision course, politics and religion also lead to occasional confrontations between the traditional rulers and the local elites in the traditional societies. Traditional rulers transitioning into pastors, Imams, or Evangelists, and, preaching about it in their respective domains, is a current fad among the traditional rulers in Nigeria today, particularly in the Southern part of the country. How this is expected to conform to the traditions and customs of the various communities that they represent has yet to unfold. In Osun State, Oba Matthew Oyebode Oyekale, the Adegbokun 111 of Masifa in Ejigbo Council area, was ordained Pastor of the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Masifa. Also in the same state, there are Association of Born Again Christian Obas (AOBACO). His Royal Highness, Dr. Wilfred Uyiekpen, the Enogie of Evboligun Community, was the first ruler in Benin City to become an Evangelist. Every Sunday, he preaches at St. Joseph Chosen Church of God.

Conversely, in the eastern part of the country, a traditional ruler, Alhaji (Eze) Shittu K. Ejiongu, the Ogbuji 1 of Ogbujioma Autonomous community in Mbaitolu Local Government Area of Imo state, abandoned his faith in the Christian religion to embrace Islam. One newspaper stated
that he was “facing dethronement by his subjects, who have asked him to either renounce Islam or vacate the throne of his ancestors.” When palaces become churches how do the Royal Highnesses cater for other faiths, especially the adherents of Islam? For several years when the Muslims dominated the governance at the federal level, they ensured that only a Mosque was built at the State House in Abuja. But when a Christian, General Obasanjo took over, his first priority was to establish State Church at Aso Rock to balance the equation. Perhaps the message the Christian traditional rulers are sending is that when Muslim traditional rulers emerge in these places, they could do as they wish. However, this is a dangerous trend and the consequence is bound to cause severe cleavages into the communities, the gradual build up of theocratic communities similar to that of the Hausa/Fulani communities, and the substitution of African customs and tradition with that of the Western and Arabian countries that Christianity and Islam, respectively, represent.

The Awise Agbaye (institutional spokesman of the Yoruba on traditional and culture), the world president, international congress of Orisa, and former Vice-Chancellor of Obafemi Awolowo University, Professor Wande Abimbola, added his voice to this raging controversy. He questioned the secularity of Nigeria in a situation where adherents of African religion are scorned and laughed at and their shrines are violated and burnt. According to him, “I teach indigenous Religion of West Africa and traditional African Religion in the Diaspora at University of Boston, Massachusetts United States. I also teach Africa Today for the African Studies centre also in the United States. For me, it gives me a sense of fulfilment that I am propagating our religion to our brothers and sisters in the Diaspora.”

This religious bickering among the traditional rulers at the local level is mimicry of what happens at the state and national levels. For instance, when the Advisory Council on Religion was set up, it took some time to arrive at a formula for sharing the leadership of the organization with equal membership of twelve from each side—Islam and Christianity—to the exclusion of African Traditional Religion. Similarly, when the National Traditional Rulers Forum was set up under the administration of the late General Abacha, the problem of who would head it, between Ooni of Ife and the Sultan of Sokoto, was debated in the forum headed by Lieutenant General Jeremiah Useni. Under the civilian administration of retired General Olusegun Obasanjo, the National Traditional Rulers Council met at Enugu on August 2000 over Sharia controversy. The meeting had to be co-chaired by the Sultan of Sokoto and the Ooni of Ife, who are Muslim and Christian, respectively. The point is that the local government has become a fertile ground for waging religious politics by local elite and politicians, at the prodding of the state and national elites and politicians.

Business interests of traditional rulers are another issue that draws traditional rulers into politics. There are many business organizations that enjoy government patronage and also serve as strategy for the monarchs
to get closer to the government, but suffice to cite two Traditional Rulers as examples. The then Sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim Dasuki, and Ooni of Ife are some of these powerful traditional businessmen. For years, Hold Trade airline was said to have won the contract for the airlift of pilgrims. As for the African Investment Bank (AIB), it was formerly a Nigerian arm of the now defunct Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), but when BCCI came under global scrutiny for a chain of malpractice, including money laundering, Sultan Dasuki's influence was deployed to shield BCCI (Nigeria) from Central Bank's investigation. The bank merely changed its name to African International Bank (AIB) and business continued as usual, until the then Sultan fell out with General Sani Abacha, who deposed and detained him. Ooni of Ife, on the other hand, has the following business outﬁts: oil-lifting licenses, Reynolds Construction Company (RCC), and NITTI Nigeria Limited. His licenses to prospect oil were obtained under the administration of General Babangida but utilized mostly under General Abacha's administration. Although Ooni of Ife is not the owner of RCC, he nonetheless retains commanding interests in the business outfit. Through the influence of Ooni, RCC won the contract for the dualization of the Ibadan–Ife road; it is also one of the three contractors of the busy Benin–Onitsha road, and the dualization of the abandoned Benin–Warri road. The NITTI, however, is a new telecommunication company jointly owned by Ooni of Ife, Oba Okunade Sijuwade, and the Emir of Kano, Ado Bayero. This business organization had been awarded N80 billion deals with the authority to provide one million telephone lines to Nigerians. NITTI also awarded the British telecommunication industry a staggering 1 billion contracts to provide the telephone lines to Nigerians between 1997 and the year 2002. As can be seen above, the business interest of these traditional rulers has not only drawn them into politics, but into corruption as well.

These political, economic, and business relationships between the traditional rulers and the operators of modern systems of governance are by-products of the inevitable tie of the governing accord between the operators of modern system of governance and traditional rulers. It is a relationship that, like the political one, sometimes results in conflict between these antagonistic ruling classes and dates back to pre-colonial days when the traditional rulers, who wanted economic and technological advantage from the Europeans, had to clash with them (the Europeans) for exercising undue freedom of action. In the colonial days, traditional rulers and their Native Authorities had specific functions to collect tax, of which a fixed percentage went to the colonial authorities, while the remaining percentage had a budget established to control it. Under the military regimes of Buhari and Abacha, two traditional rulers were sanctioned for conducting international business without the permission of the military government. Similarly, Sultan Dasuki was removed from office for both economic and political matters. Hitherto, the traditional ruler had overall
control on Native Treasury and could take as much as he needed without question. The civilian administration of retired General Obasanjo had its own major business conflict between the Ooni of Ife and the Osun State Government over Ede water scheme. These intricate and increasing webs of relationships, sometimes resulting in face-off between these antagonistic classes, strengthened the need for settling the issue of traditional rulers in modern governance.

WOMEN IN TRADITIONAL RULERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

In Africa, traditional rulership is overwhelmingly patrilineal, particularly at the top; there are some places where it is matrilineal, though, as Sithole puts it, “simultaneously patriarchal, that is largely benefiting men in practice.” Beside these, is the tradition of cognatic (double descent—male and female) traditional rulership. This is common in some parts of Nigeria such as Ondo, Ekiti, Delta, and the Onitsha area of Anambra states. The issue of women in traditional rulership is given prominence by the African traditions and customs, but the advent of colonialism altered this in favor of male rulers whom they turned into autocrats by empowering them more than their female counterparts. However, modernization and globalization have intensified the efforts of women’s groups to challenge the inequitable and undemocratic allocation of resources at the hands of patriarchal and dictatorial chiefs in some communities of Nigeria, and Africa as a whole. Generally, female traditional rulers have always existed, in Nigeria, although there are very few and are found mostly in rural areas. Today three categories of women traditional rulers exist in Nigeria: substantive women traditional rulers, dual-sex rulership, and regency. In-depth research into the origin of women traditional rulers in Nigeria shows that most of Nigeria’s great kingdoms had female rulers in the past, before they gradually lost out to their male counterparts in power struggles. In some places, the arrangement is to allow for co-rulership by both male and female rulers. Thus, in some parts of Yoruba, Igbo, and Edo lands, dual-sex political systems exist.

Furthermore, princesses are allowed to act as regents, pending the appointment and installation of a new traditional ruler. This is particularly common to the Yoruba areas of Ondo and Ekiti. This regency institution later carried the stamp of state authority; for, in 1981 the Morgan Commission report, which reviewed the chiefs Laws Cap 19, Laws of Western Nigeria, as applicable to Ekiti, and Ondo states recommended that whenever a chieftaincy stool became vacant, “a Regency Council should be appointed to perform all the duties of such an Oba during the interregnum.” The recommendation was wholly accepted, with a caveat that the regent must be celibate and also the daughter of a deceased Oba or the next high-ranking chief to the deceased Oba. The potential for a
male child delivered by a woman while on the throne, and the possibility of the consequent threat of a parallel ruling lineage, is one reason why the protagonists of the institution decided to insert this provision. This is an area that needs to be modernized to allow for competition, competence, and ultimately, the emergence of the best candidate as the traditional ruler. In this regard, however, some regents have picked up the gauntlet. Although no timetable is traditionally ordained within which regents must quit the stool, the tenure is expected to be brief, at most, three months. However, some regents, in modern times, are reluctant to vacate the throne. Instead of the maximum period of three months regency, there are those regents that have rebelled and spent between five and seventeen years on the throne. The current regents of Owo/Akure Axis include (a) Princess Adeyinka Adesida, the Deji of Akureland; (b) Princess Victoria Fasan, the Agede of Ogbese; (c) Princess Arinade Olayisade, Ido Ekiti; (d) Princess Adegolarin Adeye, Ire Ekiti; (e) Princess Abigail Adegoke, Ikoro-Ekiti; (f) Princess Fehintola Omoleewo, Ayegbaju Ekiti; (g) Princess Adetola Opeyemi, Iyun Ekiti; and (h) princess Adenike Adebomi, Ise Ekiti. More important is the recent discovery of women traditional rulers in the Niger, Adamaw, Eboyin, Ondo, and Ekiti states. This is an indication that with more intensive research more discoveries could be made.

Ess, traditional rulership is part of the modern system of governance in Nigeria. They are part of a daily reality at the local level, where traditional councils coexist with local government councils. However, while the question of women in local government administration has been resolved by allowing their election into local councils, female traditional rulers have not been integrated into the formal structure of government. Only a few are members of the Traditional Councils and no female has headed any of the 774 Traditional Councils in Nigeria. The data presented in this chapter emphasizes the different ways in which female traditional rulers exercise authority. There are substantive traditional rulers such as the Kumbada in Niger State, and Arnado Debo and Nokowo, respectively, in Adamawa State. There are women who exercise full rulership as a result of the existence of dual kingship systems, such as in the Yoruba kingdoms of Ondo, Ile-Oluji, Idanre, Ijero, Okpanam, Ogwashi-Uku, and Ibusa. The regency institution is the third main avenue for rulership, although it is typically a temporary design to protect the community during the usually long-drawn process of identifying a new ruler. Thus, in some parts of Nigeria, as in Belgium, the institution of traditional rulership is no longer an exclusive men’s club; modernization has changed it. Only as recently as 1991 was Belgian law changed to allow women succession in the male dominated Belgian throne. Earlier, in 1987, under the administration of General Babangida of Nigeria, women made their debut as female chairpersons at the local level, then deputy governors in 1999 and governor in 2004.
Although for a long time women in modern politics have been suppressed by many factors—of which one, and the most important, is the burden of culture and tradition—they have always shown good strength in the politics of their various communities. Instances include Aba Women’s Riot of 1929, the Egba market women demonstrations that rocked Abeokuta and ultimately led to temporary abdication of throne by the then traditional ruler of the community and, of course, the one woman (Hajia Gambo Sawaba) defiance against stinging policies of authorities in the north where colonial and Islamic policies interlocked to keep individuals, particularly women, down. Despite slow beginnings, female representation continues to expand in the country. Out of the 774 Local Government Councils in the country, only once—in 1987—were two women elected as Local Government Chairmen, in Ogun and Katsina States, respectively. This improved in the current fourth republic, where eight females were elected. Since then, however, there has been an explosion of women in politics, especially in Kano State, where rich Islamic and cultural traditions combine to repress women participation in politics. In Local Government elections in June 2003, more than a hundred women were seeking elective posts either as Councilors or Local Government Chairwomen throughout the State. Women upsurges in local politics of the other States of the Federation of Nigeria were also impressive.

The little information about females in political activity in South Africa that is available shows that South African women also face the familiar problem of inequality and undemocratic exclusion from politics and resource allocation in the hands of not only the patriarchal, dictatorial chiefs, but also some modern governing institutions as well.

DEMOCRATISING TRADITIONAL RULERSHIP

The Nigerian government appears to be less interested in modernizing the procedure through which the traditional rulers are selected because democratizing the procedure would negate the inherent tradition of the institution, although most Nigerian communities still stick to primordial means of appointing their traditional rulers, selection fraud, modernization, and other circumstances are forcing most of the communities to adapt and adopt democratic tenets in the selection of their paramount rulers. Beginning with the Alaafin of Oyo, when Oba Bello Ladigbolu died in January 1968, Obileye Commission of Inquiry forwarded the name of Oladepe Adeyemi to the government of General Adeyinka Adebayo as the only one the next ruling family had presented. On the basis of this, the government of Western Region issued an edict describing Oladepe Adeyemi as the only nominee of the Alowolodu Ruling House for the vacant stool of Alaafin of Oyo. However, this Ruling House was comprised of four sections, out of which only one, headed by Bello Oranlola (father of the
nominated Oladeapo Adeyemi), was responsible for the nomination of the only candidate. Other sections of the Ruling House were the Ajuwon section headed by Bello Adebiyi, the Tella Kankansi headed by Isiaka Tella Kankansi, and the Tella Aremoye section headed by Agbonyin Tella Aremoye. To resolve the selection fraud, the first democratic principle agreed to by the kingmakers was a public meeting of the members of all sections of the Alowolodu Ruling House at Atiba Hall, Oyo, to determine the popularity or otherwise of Oladeapo Adeyemi. Second, on July 8, 1968, the Oyo kingmakers decided to vote democratically to determine whether Oladeapo Adeyemi would continue to enjoy their support as the sole candidate for the declared vacant stool of Alaafin of Oyo, as stipulated by the edict. When the votes were eventually cast in the Afi n of Basorun at Oyo, the kingmakers, by a majority of five to two, overturned the candidature of Oladeapo Adeyemi, while his rival, Lamidi Adeyemi, was upheld as the new Alaafin of Oyo.  

The second example was the succession conflict between Maccido and Dasuki over the Sultanate throne, which also led to the call for democratic process of appointing traditional rulers. Maccido was the choice of the kingmakers, even though his father had just left the throne, but Dasuki was imposed by the military administration of General Babangida, who sustained the new Sultan in office by providing him with military protection against recurrent bloody civil strife. Not until another military government came to power, was Dasuki removed and the people’s choice—Maccido—was their respite in the Sultanate.

The third example, was that of a particular community in the Kolokuma/Opokuma Local Government area of Bayelsa state, which adopted a democratic procedure of appointing their traditional rulers. At first, it was the people that massively voted for Professor Ogionwo as Ibenanaowo or clan head, but this was disputed, prompting another round of elections. The second election, which took place in a referendum, included the following officials: the chairman of Kolokuma/Opokuma Local Government council, Chief Alex Igbanibo, the chairman of state electoral commission, Chief Christopher Alasigha, and the representatives of security agencies, including the police and the SSS. In this electoral process of appointing the new traditional ruler, ten delegates represented each of the nine towns. In all, ninety delegates participated in the referendum, out of which eighty-four voted for Professor Ogionwo, four voted against, and two votes were disqualified for irregularities. However, apart from the efforts of some of the communities themselves and, in some cases, their traditional rulers, to modernize the procedure of selecting their chiefs in both countries, neither the South African nor Nigerian governments have dabbled in this aspect of tradition with the sole aim of effecting modernization. Indeed, much of the African continent is shying away from modernizing the procedure of appointing traditional rulers to conform to modern trends.
THE SURGE AND RESURGENCE OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES

There has been increasing concern in academic circles about the surge and resurgence of traditional authorities in modern governance by various scholars in both South Africa and Nigeria. For de Jong, “this reinsertion” is “based on traditionalist constituencies reasserting themselves.” Oomen also sees it as the “surprising resurgence of traditional authority and customary law in post-apartheid South Africa.” From Nigeria comes the strongest view about the resurgence of traditional authorities in modern governance. According to author and historian Jacob Ade-Ajayi, “The institution, despite various assaults on it, continues to thrive for variety of socio-political reasons. Traditional rulers have proved to be master survivalists. They have not only survived, they have thrived.” Ade-Ajayi went on to demonstrate the mechanism of their survival instincts. According to him, “[Traditional rulers] had come to accept the supremacy of the White-man and the leeway he gave them under the indirect rule system. But they could not understand the politicians, mostly descendants of commoners, who were challenging the settled assumptions of the day. It was a credit to the royal class that they quickly adapted to the new situation. They soon joined hands with the politicians, originally as unwilling captives, but soon as voluntary friend.”

It is important to note the international dimension of this resurgence, particularly of women monarchs in Western Europe, as benchmarks for Nigeria and South Africa. The monarchical institution in Western Europe, as in Nigeria and South Africa, was discriminatory until recently when it began to modernize the system. This went through three different phases; democratic governance, constitutional reviews, and implemented reforms conducted bureaucratically. Constitutional reforms allow women access to leadership whether ceremonial or real. In Belgium, for instance, the monarchical institution is no longer an exclusive men’s club, for in 1991, Belgian law changed to allow women succession. Although another constitutional reform in Belgium in 1993 curbed the Belgian monarch’s power, it still remains hardly ceremonial. Every bill or “project de loi” submitted to parliament by the government is signed by the king, who approves and promulgates all laws. The king also represents the highest executive authority, which he shares with his ministers, whom he appoints and removes from office. Because the constitutional reform now allows women succession to the Belgian throne, it is hoped that one day a Belgian Queen with executive power would emerge in the country.

In the Netherlands, the constitutional reform classifies the Queen as a member of the government as well as head of state. She chairs the Council of State, which supervises and sometimes arbitrates legislative procedures, and takes a counseling role in the formation of a new government after an election. Monaco, Europe’s smallest monarchy, provides the most interesting constitutional reform of integrating women into monarchical leadership. An
April 2, 2001, constitutional reform clarified that the throne can pass from a reigning prince who dies without children to his siblings. This ensured that if seventy-eight-year-old Prince Rainier III’s bachelor son, Albert, forty-four, remains childless, the Grimaldi clan will retain the throne through Albert’s sisters. The adoption of a constitutional means should pose no problem if the National Governments of Nigeria and South Africa summon the courage and extend their commitment to gender equity to the lowest level of governance (local government). This can be anchored on the concept of proportional representation that is now an acceptable strategy. The two governments can extend this constitutional recognition to women traditional rulers. In order to incorporate it into the democratic system, it can be subjected to debates, a referendum, or opinion polls to measure their performance. When Frederick VIII was offered the Norwegian throne in 1905, the matter was put to a plebiscite. This is why it is claimed that today Norwegian monarchy is built on a democratic vote. Voting is also expected to make it possible for the people to remove the monarch if they wish. Opinion polls across Europe are also used to rate the monarchy. Approval ratings for the monarchs are 70 percent in Britain, 80 percent in the Netherlands, 90 percent in Denmark, 85 percent in Sweden, and 80 percent in Spain. These ratings, positively or negatively, are assisted by the tabloid newspapers that cover the royal family activities, but more importantly in the scrutiny of their private lives. Similarly, in 2013, the British monarchy decided to let the first born be eligible for the crown, even if it is a female.

Finally, self-reform by the institution is another possible way of paving the way for women traditional rulers. A leading monarch in this regard in Europe is Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein who proposed a reform that would make it possible for the people to remove the monarchy if they do not want it anymore, and even threatened that if voters did not approve his proposal he would quit the throne.

CONCLUSION

From the above analysis in both South Africa and Nigeria, there are two main problems bedeviling traditional rulership in modern governance; first is the incompatibility of traditional rulership and modern governance, and second is the issue of how to harmonize them in a way that neither loses its operating principles. While cohabitation of traditional rulership with modern governance is yet to be achieved, the issue of women in both is another albatross yet to be unburdened by the national governments in both countries.

Both South Africa and Nigeria, more than a decade ago, started afresh the issue of traditional rulers in modern governance, especially at the local level. The advent of the November 2000 Local Government Election in South Africa and Nigeria’s 1999 constitution’s lack of recognition for
traditional rulers in modern governance at all the levels of government, triggered off these renewed debates. Across the continent, Africans are divided between those who want to remain under an intricate, unequal, feudal culture, and a swelling army of urbanites who prefer a Western right-based democracy; and those who also cite examples of monarchical systems in Western Europe. Finding a compromise will take years, perhaps decades to resolve this dilemma.67

NOTES

5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
18. Akpan, *Epitaph to Indirect Rule*, 31
19. Ibid.
20. Sanya Onabamiro, *Glimpses into Nigerian History* (Lagos: Macmillan Nige-
21. Alex Gboyega, “Local Government and Democratisation in Nigeria, in the
Last Two Decades,” (Paper presented at the National Conference on Two
Decades of Local Government in Nigeria, Administrative Staff College of
Nigeria (ASCON), Topo-Badagry, June 4–6, 1996), 3. Gboyega is a Senior
Fellow for the Foundation for Development and Environmental Initiatives in
Nigeria.
23. Ibid.
144.
27. Habib Sani, “Traditional Rulers,” *The Great Debate* (Lagos: Daily Times,
28. Jerimiaya Useni, “Toward Democratic Governance,” (an address by the
chairman, *Traditional Rulers Forum*, and Honourable Minister, Federal
Capital Territory, Lt. General J.T Usani, at the 2nd meeting of the forum,
2002, 18.
31. Tunde Thomas, “Traditional Ruler Turns Preacher in Benin: Destroys 54
32. Ibid.
33. Chuks Onuoha, “Monarch laments over community’s poise to dethrone him
34. Muyiwa Adeyemi, “Why We Formed Association of Born Again Christian
35. Fatai Ayisa Olasupo, “Dilemma of Traditional Rulers in Modern Gover-
nance: A Comparison of South Africa and Nigeria,” in *Perspectives on Afri-
can Studies in Honour of Toyin Falola*, ed. Akin Alao and Rotimi Taiwo,
46.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. J.A. Atanda, “Collision and Coalition in the Politics and Society of West-
ern Nigeria in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Evolution of Political Culture in
Nigeria*, ed. J.F. Ade-Ajayi and Bashir Ikara (Ibadan: University Press Lim-
ited, 1985), 95.
40. Alex Gboyega, *Political Value and Local Government in Nigeria* (Lagos:
41. Dare Babarinsa, “Royalty Clouds of Uncertainty,” *Newswatch*, April 18,
1988, 16.
43. Mojirayo M. Afolabi and Fatai Ayisa Olasupo, “The Female Gender in Tra-
ditional Leadership in Nigeria: A Socio-Cultural Perspective,” in *Engender-
ing Leadership: Through Research and Practice, Conference Proceedings,
Perth, July 21–24, 2008*, ed. J Hutchinson (Perth: University of Western Aus-
tralia, 2008), 8–17.
45. Ibid., 178.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Afolabi and Olasupo, “Female Gender,” 12.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Jacobs, “Too many chiefs?,” 15
58. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Komolafe, K. “Supreme Court as Constitutional Engineer.” *ThisDay*, April 8, 2000.


“Why Should the Queen Escape the Taxman?” *Nigerian Tribune*, October 20, 2002.

Editors and Contributors

EDITORS

Dr. Toyin Falola is the Jacob and Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair Professor in the Humanities and a Distinguished Teaching Professor at the University of Texas at Austin. He is a Fellow of the Historical Society of Nigeria and a Fellow of the Nigerian Academy of Letters. He has received various awards and honors, including the Jean Holloway Award for Teaching Excellence, the Texas Exes Teaching Award, and the Ibn Khaldun Distinguished Award for Research Excellence, and the Distinguished Fellow, Ibadan Cultural Group.


For his singular and distinguished contribution to the study of Africa, his students and colleagues have presented him with three Festschriften—two edited by Adebayo Oyebade, The Transformation of Nigeria: Essays in Honor of Toyin Falola and The Foundations of Nigeria: Essays in Honor of Toyin Falola, and one edited by Akin Ogundiran, Pre-Colonial Nigeria: Essays in Honor of Toyin Falola. His award-winning memoir, A Mouth Sweeter than Salt: An African Memoir, was published by the University of Michigan Press.

Danielle Porter Sanchez is a doctoral candidate in the Department of History at the University of Texas at Austin. She received her BA in History with honors in 2008 from the University of Texas at Austin. Following that, she received a Masters from the Africana Studies and Research Center at Cornell University in 2010, where she worked with Dr. Judith Byfield on a thesis about Congolese dress culture. She is currently working on her doctorate with Professor Toyin Falola. Her dissertation focuses
Editors and Contributors

on race, consumerism, cosmopolitanism, and urban space in Brazzaville, the capital of Afrique France Libre, during the Second World War.

Danielle Porter Sanchez is a proud Texan, mother, wife, sister, daughter, and friend. She currently lives in Austin with her adorable (and mischievous) son and wonderfully nerdy husband.

CONTRIBUTORS

Ann Albuyeh is Professor of English Linguistics at the University of Puerto Rico. She received her PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. She has taught in Tehran, Iran, and Jalingo, Nigeria, as well as at Harvard University and the University of Wisconsin-Madison and been a faculty associate at the International School of Theory at the University of Santiago de Compostela in Spain. Her research includes theoretical issues in language acquisition, but her linguistics publications have most often focused on the evolution of English from Old English to the current varieties of English pidgins, creoles, and standard dialects worldwide, with a particular emphasis on Africa and the Caribbean.

Oladele Abiodun Balogun is Professor of African philosophy at Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria. He received his PhD from the University of Ibadan in 2004. He is the author of Causality in Western Science and Traditional African Thought: A Study in Comparative Philosophy. His papers have appeared in international publications such as African Identities, Nordic Journal of African Studies, The Journal of Pan-African Studies, Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya, and Lumina, among numerous other scholarly journals. His research interests are African philosophy, philosophy of education, and philosophy of law.

Emma Deputy graduated from the University of Texas with her MA in Government in 2011. She was a NSEP Boren Fellow in Egypt from 2011 to 2012.

Samantha Manchester Earley is an Associate Professor of English and Dean of the School of Arts and Letters at Indiana University Southeast. Her teaching areas include African American literature and early American literature. Her research specialties are slave narratives and spiritual narratives in the African American culture in the mid-1800s.

Myra Ann Houser is a doctoral candidate in African History at Howard University. Her research and interests focus on the transnational elements of southern African liberation and social movements during the
late twentieth century, and she is currently at work on a dissertation on anti-fascist activism in World War II era South Africa.

Alexander Kure is an Associate Professor of Comparative Literature, Department of English and Drama and Director, General Studies Program at Kaduna State University, Kaduna-Nigeria. His major research interest is in Comparative Literature as it interrogates gender, peace/conflict resolution and environmental issues. He is a member of the Linguistics Association of Nigeria (LAN), Nigerian English Studies Association (NESA), and English Language Teachers Association of Nigeria (ELTAN).

Fiosa Begai Mjeshtri is a high school Social Studies teacher and Coordinator of the Exploration Academy Learning Center at Susan E. Wagner High School in Staten Island, New York. She earned a bachelor's degree in History and Adolescence Education from the College of Staten Island (CUNY), graduating Magna Cum Laude and earning the Professor Herbert Foster-James Sturm-Don Hausdorff Memorial Award. She is a Certified General Education and Special Education teacher, dealing predominately with students with learning disabilities and emotional disturbances. Currently, she is pursuing a master's degree in History and hopes to pursue a PhD in the near future.

Dr. Besi Brillian Muhonja is an Assistant Professor of Africana Studies, Gender and Women’s Studies, and Foreign Languages, Literatures and Cultures at James Madison University. Her research, publication, and teaching areas include Gender Studies/Feminist Theory, African and African American Feminisms, and Indigenous and Contemporary Kenyan Cultures.

Timothy Nicholson earned his PhD from Stony Brook University. He is currently an Assistant Professor of History at the State University of New York at Delhi.

F.A. Olasupo is a senior lecturer in the Department of Local Government Studies at Obafemi Awolowo University. His research areas include comparative local government, gender in local governance, and traditional rulers under military rule.

Kelvin Onongha is a lecturer in the Religious Studies Department of Babcock University, the author of the book *Pentecostalism in Nigeria: Phenomenon, Prospects and Problems to Mainline Churches*, and several articles on missiology and culture. He is presently a post-doctoral student of world missions at Andrews University in Berrien Springs, Michigan.
Kunirum Osia has a MPhil and a PhD in Political Science from George Washington University and a MA in Social Anthropology/African Studies from Howard University. Presently he teaches multiculturalism, organization, and administration at Coppin State University. He was Executive Editor of World Review of Science, Technology and Sustainable Development (WRSTSD), a paper and electronic journal based in the United Kingdom. He was also the Editor-in-Chief of International Journal of Nigerian Studies and Development for sixteen years, formerly based in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He also taught at Central Michigan University in the College of Extended Learning.

Dino Palaj received his BA in history with honors from the City University of New York, College of Staten Island. He is currently a graduate student in history at the same institution. His research interests include European, Middle East, and African history. He also has interest in researching the involvement Western governments have had in Muslim lands in the Middle East and Africa. He is happily married with two young boys.

Isabel Cristina Ferreira dos Reis received bachelor’s and master’s degrees in History from the Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA) in Brazil. In 2007 she was awarded a doctorate in Social History from the Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) in Campinas City, São Paulo, where she defended a dissertation on the subject of “The Black Family in Slavery: Bahia, 1850–1888.” Dr. Reis has been teaching at the university level since 1996 and is currently a member of the Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia (UFRB) in Cachoeira City, Bahia, where she directs courses in History of Brazil, History of Bahia, and Black People History in Brazil. She is also a member of the Núcleo de Estudos Afro-Brasileiros do Recôncavo da Bahia (NEAB—UFRB) and professor of the Programa de Pós-graduação em História Regional e Local in Universidade do Estado da Bahia (PPGHIS—UNEB). Her current research interests include the Black Family in the Slavery Society and Black Diaspora; Nineteenth Century Bahian History; and Afro-Brazilian History and Culture. She is author of the book Histórias de vida familiar e afetiva de escravos na Bahia do século XIX (Histories of Slave Family and Emotional Life in 19th Century Bahia) published in 2001.

Michael Sharp is a Professor of English and Caribbean Studies at the University of Puerto Rico. Educated in Great Britain and the United States, professor Sharp received his PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has been a Faculty Associate in the International School of Theory in the Humanities at the University of Santiago de Compostela in Spain, and has taught in Scotland, Greece, Portugal, Nigeria, and at the universities of Harvard, Binghamton, and Wisconsin. Professor Sharp’s poetry has been published on both sides of the Atlantic, and
his academic research focuses primarily on poetry written in English in Africa and the Caribbean.

Kathleen R. Smythe is a Professor of History at Xavier University. She is the author of *Fipa Families: Social Reproduction and Catholic Missionaries in Nkansi, Tanzania, 1880–1960* and a number of related articles. Her current teaching and research is at the intersection of globalization, development, and sustainability. This work led to her recently completed manuscript, *Why We Need African History*, in which she argues that African societies of the past and present have long-standing institutions and ideas that need to be considered for our successful global future. Her chapter in this volume is drawn from this manuscript.
This page intentionally left blank
Index

A
Achebe, Chinua, 197–201, 205–206, 211, 212, 213
Afghanistan, 118, 122, 123
African diaspora, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9–14, 71, 82, 84, 135, 159, 161, 163, 231, 251, 268, 283, 286, 357, 371, 374
African identities, 13, 125, 347, 348, 372
African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, 231, 232, 241, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249
African National Congress, 152, 174, 188, 215, 218, 221
African Pentecostalism, 73, 75–82, 83, 84
African philosophy, 12, 56–60, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 206, 224
African Union, 57, 62
Afrikaans, 172, 173, 215, 217–220, 222, 227
AIDS, 72, 76
Aladura, 75, 76, 83, 84
Alcohol, 46, 49, 53, 236, 334
Algerian Muslims, 38–44, 46–49, 53, 54
Algiers, 22, 26, 27, 29, 32, 36, 39, 88, 89, 189, 193, 195
American Committee on Africa, 143, 155
American democracy, 24, 332
American Revolutionary War, 18
Ancestors, 67, 201, 240, 357
Anglican church, 74–75, 217, 233
Anglican Communion, 74–75
Anglicization, 174
Animism, 77, 82, 83, 84
Annan, Kofi, 61
Anthills of the Savannah, 197, 198, 206, 211, 212
Anti-Apartheid activism, 143, 148, 149, 151, 153, 156
Arab Spring, 1, 36, 50, 118, 177, 189
Arab world, 17, 18, 33, 34, 93
Arabic, 42, 43, 44, 49, 171, 175–178, 184
Arabization, 177, 184, 189, 193
Armed Conflict, 61, 63, 65, 68
Arusha Declaration, 178, 179, 195, 301–302
Asia, 21, 24, 33, 71, 82, 86, 119, 122, 172, 282, 286, 290, 310, 311
Assimilation, 8, 13, 37–45, 49, 51, 175, 183, 320
Association for French Cultural Development in Africa, 43, 47
Atlantic world, 6, 14
Azikiwe, Benjamin, 168

B
Banking, 20, 24, 132, 150
Bantu Education Act, 173
Bantu, 165, 166, 167, 173, 189, 217
Batswana, 180, 183, 184
Bechuanaland, 180
Belgium, 40, 289, 333, 345–347, 360, 363
Benin, 88, 91, 118, 356, 358, 366, 368, 369
Berbers, 39, 52, 132, 176–177, 195
Biko, Steve, 139, 147–148, 156, 157, 158, 161
Book of Genesis, 21, 22, 208
Botswana, 118, 147, 165–166, 168, 175, 180, 181–186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194
Brazil, 5, 13, 269–287
Brazzaville, 324, 332–347, 349
Britain, 23, 37, 39, 50, 79, 83, 84, 127–128, 147, 168, 179, 277, 290, 291, 313, 364, 374
Brown v. Board of Education, 140–141
C
Cairo, 89, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 110, 111, 117
Cameroon, 92, 97, 99, 101, 103, 106, 118
Canal, 17, 20, 21, 25, 90, 100, 193
Cantonnement, 39
Cape Town, 142, 217
Capitalism, 72, 77
Cardinal Richelieu, 38
Catholicism, 28, 30, 31, 32, 38, 75, 205, 233, 271–275, 278
Charles X, 38, 51
Chevalier, Michel, 19–28, 32, 34, 35, 36
Citizenship, 43, 140, 285, 308–309, 324, 332
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 142
Civilization, 21–25, 37–38, 41, 44, 45, 49, 51, 74, 121, 134, 185, 197
Clergy, 19, 205, 225
Cold War, 1, 13, 54, 85, 86, 126, 194, 288–294, 199, 303, 306
Colonization, 2, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27–29, 31–41, 259, 307, 310, 315, 336
Communalism, 65, 67, 68
Conflict resolution, 13, 56–57, 63–68, 199–206, 211, 212, 213
Congo Crisis, 85, 115
Constitutional Law, 38, 141, 142, 152, 202, 224, 363
Corporations, 40, 139, 147, 313
Corruption, 2, 7, 10, 122, 132, 208, 300, 358
D
Dakar, 85, 97, 99–104, 106, 109–110, 117
De Tocqueville, Alexis, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 34, 35, 36, 129
Death, 37, 60, 61, 67, 82, 146, 262, 263, 270
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 7, 40, 61, 63, 66, 73, 85, 113, 118, 187, 289, 299
Dey of Algiers, 39, 51
Dictators, 49, 122, 126, 217, 359, 561
E
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 62
Economic development, 3, 9, 56, 63, 131, 132, 137, 181, 203
Egypt, 17, 21, 22, 23, 34, 36, 85, 87, 89–119, 177
Enfantin, Barthélemy Prosper, 18–23
Eritrea, 63, 66, 73
G
Gabon, 91, 118, 333
Gender, 13, 67, 197, 199, 217, 224, 232, 236, 241, 244, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259–268, 364, 366, 367
Ghana, 73, 74, 75, 86, 87, 92, 106, 115, 118, 138, 299, 313, 320, 322, 323
Gheg, 253–268
Globalization, 2, 8, 9, 10, 14, 17, 19, 27, 33, 34, 73, 123, 134, 189, 192, 196, 312, 320, 322, 359, 375
Great Britain, 23, 37, 39, 50, 79, 127, 147, 168, 212, 213, 277, 291, 374
Guinea, 93, 273
H
Hausa, 169, 170, 184, 188, 357
Healing, 75, 76, 78, 81, 217
Health, 121, 203, 246, 308
Hijab, 45, 46, 53
Holy Land, 22, 32, 33, 75, 273
Homeland, 5, 12, 157, 158, 278, 299, 350
Hopkins, Rob, 121, 134,
Human rights, 7, 63, 66, 122, 139, 144, 154, 197, 203, 204, 215, 218, 220, 224–228, 231, 235, 351
I
Identity, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 41, 47, 78, 80, 81, 125, 166, 171, 177, 179, 189, 193, 197, 214, 215, 253, 255, 257, 261, 263, 301, 313, 329, 337, 340–343
Igbo, 169, 170, 184, 205, 253–267, 359, 361
Immigrants, 42, 73, 77
Imperialism, 1, 2, 36, 37, 50, 51, 52, 54, 114, 299
Indigenous churches, 73, 79
Industry, 20, 32, 40, 42, 46, 137, 313, 315, 337, 358
### Index

Intellectuals, 2, 11, 19, 37, 38, 39, 41, 44, 45, 57, 59, 209, 293, 305, 341, 348

International politics, 1–13, 36, 60, 80, 87, 89, 93, 101, 107, 113, 119, 121, 123, 129, 130, 137, 139, 152–3, 160, 165, 186, 190, 194, 211, 212, 338, 348, 357, 358

Internet, 1, 7, 169, 170, 171, 173, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 186–191, 193

Iraq, 123, 135, 177


Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire), 61, 63, 66, 88, 92, 97, 99, 101, 106, 108, 118, 187, 189, 192, 214

J

Jamaica, 74

Jarring Mission, 92–114, 116, 118, 119


Jim Crow, 141–142, 158

Jordan, 90, 92

K

Kaunda, Kenneth, 89, 94, 115, 289


Khoi, 166, 175, 182, 186, 189

Khoisan, 166, 175, 182, 186, 189

Kikuyu, 253–267


Kiswahtili, 178–180, 184, 189, 190, 193, 194, 295, 298, 312

Krog, Antjie, 172, 188, 193, 214–223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230

KwaZulu Natal, 152, 169, 226, 227, 354

L


Lawyers’ Committee, 139–153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161

Leisure, 325, 340, 347

Lesotho, 88, 91, 118

Liberia, 62, 63, 92, 97, 99, 101, 106, 118, 123

Lingua franca, 170, 171, 175, 178, 180, 184, 185

Literacy, 169, 173, 176, 177, 179, 181

Literature, 2, 8, 13, 80, 130, 163, 197, 198, 212, 213, 221, 269, 272, 277

London, 27, 28, 144, 145, 149, 151, 205, 209, 217, 227, 288, 290

Louisiana, 23, 286

Lusaka, 89

M

Magic, 77, 78, 81

Malawi, 91, 115, 188, 190, 193, 322

Malcolm X, 140, 186, 193, 327, 344, 348

Male daughters, 253–268


Manifest Destiny, 17, 19, 20, 23, 27, 29

Marriage, 26, 42–43, 49, 125, 253–264, 266, 267, 268, 270–273, 275, 280, 282, 284, 351

Mauritania, 95, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 106, 118

Mbeki, Thabo, 149, 215, 224

Medicine, 72, 75, 76, 78, 141, 195, 293

Mediterranean Sea, 39

Mediterranean, 29, 39

Memory, 13, 80

Middle East, 22, 27, 85–97, 99, 100, 102, 104, 105, 107–109,
Index

112–113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 374

Migrants, 79, 319
Migration, 71–73, 132, 135, 186, 307, 311, 325
Miscegenation, 25
Mission Civilisatrice, 22, 37
Missionaries, 71–72, 74, 80, 82–84, 294, 301, 305
Mobutu Sese Seko, 99, 100, 117
Modernity, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 34, 36, 51, 55, 191, 192, 327, 338–342, 347, 348
Modernization, 185, 268, 294, 308, 313, 331, 351, 353, 359, 360
Morocco, 36, 106, 118, 189
Mozambique, 188, 189, 190, 226, 288
Multilingualism, 165, 166, 188
Music, 2, 4, 8, 11, 12, 77, 171, 229, 338, 347, 349

N
NAACP, 140–142, 147, 156, 329, 344, 345
Nairobi, 307–323
Namibia, 142–144, 146–147, 149, 152–153, 158, 160, 183, 191
Nandi, 253–267
National Liberation Front (FLN), 47–50
Nationalism, 6, 37, 39, 51, 195, 347, 348, 349
New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 61
New World, 6, 7, 25, 80, 236, 273
Niger, 91, 118, 360
Nigeria-Biafra War, 61, 85
Nkrumah, Kwame, 86–87, 294, 299
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 56, 133, 200, 202–205
North Africa, 17, 31–36, 93, 177
Northern Rhodesia, 289, 304
O
Old Testament, 222, 231, 237, 241, 245
Organization of African Unity, 86–112, 115–119

P
Palestine, 94, 101, 113
Peace Corps, 289, 293–306
Peacekeeping, 62–63, 66, 123, 202–203
Polygamy, 255, 261, 267, 273, 284
Poverty, 40, 61, 64, 78, 133, 292–293, 295, 327
Pretoria, 144, 158, 193, 194, 217, 220–222, 226
Prisons, 18, 21, 29, 31, 49, 144–146, 149, 151, 174, 217, 226, 283, 325, 328, 333, 342
Propaganda, 47–49, 292, 333–334

R
Rhodesia, 139, 289, 304
Rivonia Trial, 142, 144
Rwanda, 61–62, 91, 115, 118, 189, 190, 201, 214, 349
Saint-Simonian movement, 17–34
Sanctions, 63, 139, 143, 147, 149, 150–151, 158, 217, 225, 256, 272, 279, 282, 316, 358
Sapeurs, 324, 332–349
Secularism, 71, 72, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84
Setswana, 175, 180–184
Settler colony, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25–32, 40, 42, 46, 48, 215, 308, 310, 313, 323
Sexuality, 256, 284
Sierra Leone, 63, 91, 92, 118, 214
Slave trade, 272–273, 276–279, 285, 287
Socialism, 13, 36, 77, 195, 215, 306
Somaliland, 121–138
Southwest Africa, 139, 159, 169
Sovereignty, 10, 88
Soviet Unión, 74, 205, 290–292, 294, 303
Soweto, 173, 188, 227
Soyinka, Wole, 2, 207, 212, 213
State violence, 47, 139, 324, 343
Sudan, 7, 61–63, 113, 115, 118, 123, 134, 201
Swahili, 175, 178–180, 184, 189, 190, 193–194, 196, 295, 298, 312
Swahilization, 179, 184
SWAPO, 142, 144, 147
Swaziland, 88, 91, 106
Sworn virgins, 253–268
Tanganyika, 179, 194, 293, 298, 304, 305
Taxation, 42, 46, 132, 266
Taxes, 28, 46, 72, 132
Technology, 4, 12, 17, 21, 24, 32–34, 36–37, 41, 60, 121, 171, 175, 177, 180, 183, 186, 189, 191, 192, 194, 309
Telecommunication, 171, 175, 184, 358
Terrorism, 47, 123, 127, 129, 144, 155
Things Fall Apart, 197, 198, 201, 206, 208, 211, 212, 219, 225
Tobacco, 23, 32
Togo, 73, 118
Transportation, 19, 20, 21, 27, 46, 156, 327
Tunisia, 36, 40, 118, 187, 189, 192
Ubuntu, 217, 224
Uganda, 7, 8, 61, 89, 92, 115, 118, 289, 304, 310
Ujamaa, 179
Ulama Association, 43–44, 53
Unemployment, 26, 61, 73, 283
United Kingdom, 73, 75, 289, 291, 305, 374
V
Westernization, 52, 312, 313
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wine, 32, 40, 42, 46, 216</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank, 131, 133, 294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright, John, 27–36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xhosa, 172–173, 189, 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth, 7, 19, 41, 44, 61, 72, 150, 159, 201, 228, 295, 325–332, 338, 343–344, 348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire, 62, 92, 95, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 115, 116, 118, 349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia, 89, 94, 105, 112, 113, 115, 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar, 178–179, 294, 304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe, 74, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoot Suit Riots, 326–332, 344, 345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoot suit, 324–332, 341, 343–345, 349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>